CALVIN LEE GODDARD v. DIANE LEE GODDARD (NOW SHIRLEY)
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RENDERED: JULY 19, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2002-CA-000196-MR
CALVIN LEE GODDARD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CI-02588
v.
DIANE LEE GODDARD (NOW SHIRLEY)
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, McANULTY, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE: The appellant, Calvin Lee Goddard, appeals from
an order of the Fayette Circuit Court denying visitation with his
minor child.
Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in
denying his motion for visitation.
We agree with the order of
the circuit court and thus affirm.
On November 20, 1990, Appellant and Appellee were
married in Las Vegas, Nevada.
Several months later, Appellee
gave birth to Appellant’s son on June 17, 1991.
At the time of
his child’s birth, Appellant was incarcerated in the Orange
County Jail in Orlando, Florida.
On July 22, 1992, Appellee
filed for dissolution from her incarcerated husband.
A Warning
Order Attorney was promptly appointed to notify Appellant of the
nature and pendency of the dissolution proceeding and a Guardian
Ad Litem was appointed to represent his interests.
On behalf of
Appellant, the Guardian Ad Litem requested that he be granted
unsupervised visitation with his minor child on two unspecified
weekends each month and for one half of the child’s summer
vacation.
After a brief trial, a decree dissolving the marriage
was entered by the circuit court on November 13, 1992.
At the
time of dissolution, however, the issue of Appellant’s visitation
with his minor child was reserved as Appellant was still
incarcerated in Florida.
In 1997, Appellant was transferred from the Florida
Penal System into the custody of the Kentucky Corrections
Cabinet.
Subsequent to his transfer, Appellant filed a motion
with the Fayette Circuit Court requesting an opportunity to visit
with his minor child.
hearing.
However, this motion was denied without a
The matter was appealed to this court and we remanded
to the circuit court with directions that Appellant be afforded
an evidentiary hearing regarding visitation.
On October 29,
1998, Appellant filed a motion requesting the circuit court to
appoint a Guardian Ad Litem to represent him on his pending
motion.
However, this motion was denied by the circuit court on
July 26, 1999.
On February 10, 1999, the circuit court conducted an
evidentiary hearing concerning Appellant’s request for
visitation.
Considering the evidence presented at said hearing,
the circuit court found that allowing visitation would seriously
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endanger the emotional and physical well-being of Appellant’s
child and thus denied Appellant’s motion for visitation.
the decision of the circuit court was appealed.
Again,
In an
unpublished opinion issued July 21, 2000, this court vacated the
circuit court’s order and remanded the matter directing that
Appellant be appointed a Guardian Ad Litem and that an additional
hearing be held following said appointment.
On December 21, 2001, an additional hearing was
conducted on the matter of visitation by the circuit court.
Both
Appellant and Appellee were present and testified at the hearing.
Additionally, the circuit court interviewed the minor child in
camera so as to determine his wishes to develop a father-son
relationship with Appellant.
On January 4, 2002, the circuit
court once again denied Appellant’s motion for visitation,
finding that allowing him visitation would seriously endanger the
mental and physical well-being of the minor child.
The circuit
court also denied Appellant’s motion for a psychological
evaluation of the minor child.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Appellant presents this court with three
arguments.
First, Appellant contends that KRS 403.320 is
unconstitutional as it permits the circuit court to make a
determination as to whether visitation will endanger the mental
and emotional health of a child.
Appellant also contends that
circuit court erred by not ordering a psychological evaluation of
the Appellant’s minor child.
Finally, Appellant contends that
the circuit court erred by failing to include a record of the
testimony of the minor child in the record on appeal.
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Appellant first contends that KRS 403.320 is
unconstitutional because it allows the circuit court to determine
whether visitation will seriously endanger a child’s “physical,
mental, moral, or emotional health.”
KRS 403.320(1).
More
specifically, Appellant claims that KRS 403.320 is
unconstitutional because it allows a circuit court to “pose as a
mental health professional and deny a parent his constitutional
right of association with his child.”
Although Appellant is
correct in his assertion that the rights accompanying parenthood
have been deemed fundamental, we find no merit to the argument
that KRS 403.320 is unconstitutional.
On the contrary, when
drafting KRS 403.320 the General Assembly appears to have gone
out of its way so as to ensure that any noncustodial parent
seeking visitation would be protected by the penumbras of the
United States Constitution.
The express language of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that no State shall, “deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.”
amend. XIV.
U.S. Const.
Indeed, the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is
to provide “heightened protection against government interference
with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.”
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 117 S. Ct. 2258,
2267, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772, 787 (1997).
Of the many rights deemed
“fundamental” by the United States Supreme Court, the oldest and
most fundamental of these is the right a parent has in caring for
and nurturing their children.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49, (2000).
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Thus, it is clear
that the liberty interest at issue here, the interest Appellant
has in establishing a relationship with his only child, is well
within the protection of the Due Process Clause.
Unlike other legal rules, the rubric of due process is
not an esoteric concept unrelated to time, place, or
circumstance.
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 47 L. Ed.
2d 18, 34, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903 (1976) citing Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S. Ct. 1743, 1749, 6 L. Ed. 2d
1230, 1236 (1961).
On the contrary, “[d]ue process is flexible
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.” Matthews at 334 citing Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 494
(1972).
Resolution of a due process challenge, then, requires a
careful analysis of the state and private interest affected.
Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 263, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 1018, 25
L. Ed. 2d 287, 296 (1970).
Indeed, “the fundamental requirement
of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner.’”
Matthews at 333 citing
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S. Ct. 1187, 14 L. Ed.
2d 62 (1965).
The plain language of KRS 403.320 provides that a
noncustodial parent “is entitled to visitation rights unless the
court finds, after a hearing, that visitation would endanger
seriously the child’s physical, mental, moral, or emotional
health.”
KRS 403.320(1).
Moreover, it is well established
through judicial interpretation of KRS 403.320 that even a
noncustodial parent who is incarcerated cannot be denied
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reasonable visitation with his or her children unless there has
first been a hearing regarding visitation.
App., 869 S.W.2d 55 (1994).
Smith v. Smith, Ky.
Appellant has been afforded two
separate hearings regarding visitation with his only child.
Subsequent to each of these hearings, the circuit court
determined that visitation would endanger the mental health of
appellant’s child.
Appellant, then, is concerned not so much
with the constitutionality of the KRS 403.320 as he is with the
methodology articulated by the statute for determining
visitation.
As the express language of KRS 403.320 provides
adequate due process protection and due process was complied with
in the present case, we find appellant’s claim to be without
merit.
Appellant next contends that the circuit court erred in
finding that visitation with the appellant while incarcerated
would seriously endanger the emotional health of Appellant’s
minor child.
More specifically, Appellant claims that it was
error not to base such a finding on a proper psychological
examination of Appellant’s child.
We disagree.
KRS 403.290
provides that the court “may seek the advice of professional
personnel” in order to determine whether allowing visitation
would endanger the child.
KRS 403.290(2) (emphasis added).
language of KRS 403.290 is clearly permissive.
The
Thus, the circuit
court need not have based its findings on the opinion of a mental
health professional.
Finally, Appellant contends that the circuit court
erred by not including a copy of the child’s in camera testimony
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in the record.
KRS 403.290(1) allows the court to interview a
child in camera in order to ascertain the child’s wishes as to
visitation.
However, if the court chooses to conduct such an
interview it “shall cause a record of the interview to be made
and to be part of the record in the case.”
KRS 403.290(1).
On
appeal, the record is silent as to the content of any
conversation between the circuit court and the appellant’s child.
Thus, the circuit court has clearly erred by not complying with
the mandate of KRS 403.290(1).
However, we cannot say that the
circuit court’s error here warrants a reversal of the circuit
court’s decision.
It is well established that errors are harmless or
nonprejudicial where they are not responsible for the appealing
party having lost what he contends on appeal he should have
attained.
Vittitow v. Carpenter, 291 S.W.2d 34, 36 (1956).
is the case sub judice.
Such
The circuit court has noted the
“expressed bitterness” currently existing between Appellant and
Appellee.
Moreover, the on-going litigation over the matter of
visitation has served only to foster this mutual dislike.
Although the circuit court was in error, we cannot see how
including a copy of the child’s testimony in the record would
have changed the outcome of this visitation proceeding.
Thus,
the error is harmless.
In conclusion, we find that KRS 403.320 is
constitutional because it expressly provides noncustodial parents
seeking visitation both notice and opportunity to be heard.
also find that the circuit court properly denied Appellant’s
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We
motion to have his child psychologically evaluated because the
language of KRS 403.290(2) is clearly permissive.
Finally,
although the circuit court erred by not including a record of its
conversation with Appellant’s son, we cannot say that such error
was harmful to Appellant’s motion for visitation.
Accordingly,
we affirm the decision of the circuit court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Calvin Goddard, Pro Se
West Liberty, Kentucky
Michael R. Moloney
Lexington, Kentucky
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