BERNARR TARTER v. WILLIAM F. HANSFORD, D/B/A TARTER'S FEED MILL
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 6, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-002586-MR
BERNARR TARTER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CASEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES G. WEDDLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 77-CI-00115
v.
WILLIAM F. HANSFORD,
D/B/A TARTER’S FEED MILL
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, HUDDLESTON, KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
In July 1977, William Hansford, doing business as
Tarter’s Feed Mill, sued Bernarr Tarter to recover an alleged
debt to the feed mill of $4,899.34.
Hansford also sought six-
percent annual interest on the debt beginning February 20, 1976.
On September 17, 1985, the Casey Circuit Court entered a default
judgment against Tarter awarding Hansford his claimed principal
plus costs and “interest at the legal rate from February 20,
1976, until paid.”
Hansford did not seek to execute upon the
judgment until September 12, 2000.
In November 2000, he obtained
an order of garnishment on a trust account in which Tarter had an
expectancy.
And in October 2001, after Tarter’s expectancy had
ripened into possession, he obtained a renewed order of
garnishment for more than $58,000.00 in principal and accrued
interest.
In response, Tarter moved to have the 1985 default
judgment set aside.
The trial court denied his motion by order
entered November 21, 2001.
to satisfy Hansford’s claim.
The same order directed the garnishee
has appealed.
It is from that order that Tarter
He maintains that the default judgment is void and
that Hansford’s long delay both in moving for a judgment and in
seeking to enforce the judgment he obtained should preclude
enforcement now.
We are persuaded by none of these contentions
and so affirm the trial court’s order.
As noted, Hansford’s original complaint sought interest
at six percent compounded annually.
In August 1985, Hansford
filed an amended complaint in which he incorporated his prior
allegations but sought interest at the legal rate.
In 1980, the
General Assembly had increased the legal rate from six to eight
percent.
Tarter did not receive notice of the amended complaint.
He correctly observes that if the amended complaint asserted new
or additional claims for relief, then he was entitled to notice.1
If, on the other hand, the amendment merely clarified the
original pleading and brought it up to date, then notice was not
required.2
The trial court found that the amendment was of this
latter kind, and we agree.
1
The original claim for relief was for
CR 5.01.
2
Id. Roadrunner Mining, Engineering & Development Company v. Bank Josephine, Ky.,
558 S.W.2d 597 (1977); Combs v. Coal & Mineral Management Services, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 472
(D. D.C. 1984).
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a liquidated principal debt plus interest at the rate--the
maximum legal rate--ordinarily allowed on such debts.3
The claim
in the amended complaint was precisely the same, albeit the new
complaint demanded legal-rate interest explicitly rather than
implicitly.
The trial court did not err, therefore, by ruling
that Tarter’s lack of notice of the amendment did not render the
default judgment invalid.
The law disfavors default judgments, and under CR 55.02
and CR 60.02 the trial court has broad discretion to set such a
judgment aside.4
Ordinarily, the party moving for relief from a
default judgment will attempt to show that there was good cause
for the default and that he was possessed of a meritorious
defense.5
Tarter has eschewed this usual form of argument,
however, and contends instead that Hansford’s delay in moving for
a default judgment and then his delay in seeking to enforce the
judgment amount to circumstances extraordinary and inequitable
enough to warrant relief under CR 60.02(f).6
He correctly notes
that prejudicial delay--laches--will sometimes estop a party from
asserting what otherwise would be his right.7
He fails to
explain, however, how Hansford’s delay has prejudiced him.
3
To be
Nucor Corporation v. General Electric Company, Ky., 812 S.W.2d 136 (1991).
4
Green Seed Company v. Harrison Tobacco Storage Warehouse, Inc., Ky. App., 663
S.W.2d 755 (1984).
5
Id.
6
That subsection of the rule permits the trial court to reopen a final judgment for “any
other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief.”
7
Denison v. McCann, 303 Ky. 195, 197 S.W.2d 248 (1946).
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sure, a significant amount of interest has been added to
Hansford’s damages, and if Hansford had pressed his claim earlier
perhaps Tarter would have paid it before so much interest had
accumulated.
Hansford’s delay, however, can not be said to have
caused or induced Tarter’s failure to satisfy the judgment in a
more timely manner, and usually some such cause or inducement
must be shown before laches or estoppel will apply.8
Tarter
concedes that he received notice in 1977 of Hansford’s original
complaint and that he never filed an answer.
He believed, he
asserts, that his father had settled the matter.
He does not,
however, accuse Hansford of somehow creating that impression, and
he further admits that he never enquired about the case’s status,
although obviously he might have done so at any time.
Rather, noting that parties have sometimes been
estopped from belatedly complaining about wrongful building
construction when, because of the complainant’s unreasonable
silence, the construction has become costly to undo,9 Tarter
contends that Hansford had a duty to assert the alleged default
more promptly than he did and before the interest damages had
mushroomed.
The construction analogy seems to us weak.
Tarter’s
failure to pay his debt or to enquire about Hansford’s law suit
is hardly comparable, despite the accumulation of interest, to
continued investment in a building.
Aside from this dubious
analogy, Tarter cites no authority for the proposition that
8
Plaza Condo Association v. Wellington Corporation, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 51 (1996);
Farnworth v. Jensen, 217 P.2d 571 (Utah 1950).
9
Chapman v. Bradshaw, Ky., 536 S.W.2d 447 (1976); Silliman v. Falls City Stone
Company, Ky., 305 S.W.2d 322 (1957).
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Hansford had a duty to speak up more promptly than he did about
Tarter’s alleged default.
CR 41.02 and CR 77.02 permit the trial
court to dismiss claims that have grown stale for lack of
prosecution, but those rules are not self-effecting, and of
course a lax plaintiff is under no legal duty to bring them down
upon himself.
Once the default judgment was entered, moreover, KRS
413.09010 and KRS 426.03511 obliged Hansford, if he would keep his
judgment alive, to do no more than attempt execution within
fifteen years.12
requirement.
Tarter concedes that Hansford met this
Where the General Assembly has said that Hansford
has fifteen years in which to assert his right, it is generally
not for the courts to tell him he must have asserted it sooner or
to scrutinize his motives for waiting as long as he did.13
Tarter has suggested no reason to depart from that rule here.
In sum, it is clear that Tarter’s own careless
disregard of the original complaint is the root from which his
current misfortune has grown.
“Carelessness by a party . . . is
not reason enough to set [a default judgment] aside.”14
We
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by denying
10
This statute creates a fifteen-year limitations period for actions on a judgment.
11
KRS 426.035 provides that “[a]n execution may be issued upon a judgment at any time
until the collection of it is barred by the statute of limitations.”
12
Slaughter v. Mattingly, 155 Ky. 407, 159 S.W. 980 (1913); Gotee v. Graves, 153 Ky.
26, 154 S.W. 386 (1913).
13
Plaza Condo Association v. Wellington Corporation, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 51 (1996).
14
Perry v. Central Bank & Trust Company, Ky. App., 812 S.W.2d 166, 170 (1991)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Tarter’s motion for relief from his default.
Accordingly, we
affirm the November 21, 2001, order of the Casey Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David F. McAnelly
Liberty, Kentucky
Richard Clay
Clay & Clay
Danville, Kentucky
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