SEABOARD SURETY COMPANY v. NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET; GREEN COAL COMPANY, INC.
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RENDERED:
October 11, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-002571-MR
SEABOARD SURETY COMPANY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00319
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION CABINET;
GREEN COAL COMPANY, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, KNOPF, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE: Seaboard Surety Company (Seaboard) brings this
appeal from an order of the Franklin Circuit Court entered
November 16, 2001.
We reverse and remand.
This matter emanates from an administrative proceeding
by the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet
(Cabinet), commenced January 7, 1999, in an effort to forfeit a
reclamation bond covering Increment Number 2 of the Green Coal
Company’s Surface Mining Permit No. 830-8003 in Daviess County,
Kentucky.1
Seaboard was surety on the bond.
On December 29, 1999, the hearing officer issued a
report in favor of the Cabinet’s motion.
The report, served by
mail, contained the following:
VI.
EXCEPTIONS AND RESPONSE RIGHTS
Pursuant to KRS 350.0301 any party may file
exceptions to this Report and Recommended
Order within fourteen (14) days of service of
this Report. A party may file a Response to
any Exceptions within (21) days of service of
this Report. The Secretary will then
consider this report, exceptions, response
and recommended order and decide the case.
(emphasis added).
On January 18, 2000, Seaboard filed exceptions to the
report.
untimely.
The Cabinet objected, arguing that the exceptions were
On February 2, 2000, the Secretary of the Cabinet
issued his final order adopting the hearing officer’s report.
Seaboard was adjudicated liable on the bond.
The Secretary noted
that the exceptions filed by Seaboard were untimely and therefore
not considered.
On March 3, 2000, Seaboard filed the instant action in
Franklin Circuit Court entitled “PETITION ON APPEAL AND COMPLAINT
FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF.”
On November 16, 2001, the Franklin
Circuit Court entered an order dismissing the petition, which
precipitated this appeal.
The circuit court considered Seaboard’s petition an
attempt to appeal the order of the Cabinet, without first having
exhausted its administrative remedy.
1
The court was of the
Green Coal Company failed to appear.
-2-
opinion that it was without jurisdiction inasmuch as the
exceptions to the hearing officer’s report were made outside the
fourteen day provision in Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
350.0301(2).
Cf. Swatzell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 962 S.W.2d 866
(1998)(holding that failure to file exceptions to a hearing
officer’s report constitutes failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, thus precluding appeal).
KRS 350.0301(2) reads in pertinent part as follows:
. . . The hearing officer shall serve a copy
of his report and recommended order upon all
parties or record and their attorney of
record to the proceeding, and they shall be
granted the right to file exceptions thereto
within fourteen (14) days of service.
(emphases added).
Thereunder, Seaboard was required to file exceptions within
fourteen days of the report’s date of service (December 29,
1999).
The circuit court concluded that Seaboard’s exceptions
were due January 12, 2000.
Seaboard argued that the
weekend/holiday extension and that the mail extension of 400 Ky.
Admin. Regs. (KAR) 1:030 §3(1) and (3) applied, thus extending
the filing deadline to January 18, 2000.
400 KAR 1:030 provides
in relevant part as follows:
Section 3. Time. (1) Computation. In
computing any period of time prescribed or
allowed by order of the hearing officer or by
any applicable administrative regulation, the
day of the act, event or default after which
the designated period of time begins to run
is not to be included. The last day of the
period so computed is to be included, unless
it is a Saturday, a Sunday or a legal
holiday, in which event the period runs until
the end of the next day which is not a
Saturday, a Sunday or a legal holiday.
Unless otherwise directed by the hearing
officer, when the period of time prescribed
-3-
or allowed is less than seven (7) days,
intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal
holidays shall be excluded from the
computation. (emphasis added).
. . . .
(3) Additional time after service by
mail. Whenever a party has the right or is
required to do some act or take some
proceeding within a period prescribed by
order of the hearing officer or by
administrative regulation after the service
of a notice or other paper upon the party and
the notice or paper is served by mail, three
(3) days shall be added to the prescribed
period. This provision shall not apply to
the service of administrative summons and
initiating documents by mail.
The circuit court viewed 400 KAR 1:030 §3 as
inapplicable and reasoned thusly:
400 KAR 1:030[Section](3)(3) also requires
that the original filing deadline must have
been prescribed either by regulation or a
hearing officer’s order. Seaboard asserts
the original deadline was prescribed by order
because it was laid out in the hearing
officer’s report. However, the time for
filing exceptions in this case was prescribed
by statute, KRS 350.0301, not by order. This
fact does not change simply because the
hearing officer cited this statute in his
report. It is by statute that the fourteen
days to file existed. The hearing officer
merely referenced that statute, he did not
prescribe it. Because a statute prescribed
the fourteen days and not a hearing officer’s
order, the three day extension in 400 KAR
1:030[Section](3)(3) does not apply in this
case. Because the three day extension does
not apply, neither does the weekend extension
in 400 KAR 1:030[Section](3)(1). (emphasis
added).
We must disagree with the circuit court’s interpretation of 400
KAR 1:030 §3.
We think the circuit court too narrowly
interpreted the phrase “prescribed or allowed by order of the
hearing officer.”
The circuit court focused on the word
-4-
“prescribed” and failed to consider the word “allowed.”
It is a
well established rule of interpretation that a word will be given
its ordinary and common meaning.
See Kentucky Unemployment
Insurance Commission v. Jones, Ky. App., 809 S.W.2d 715 (1991).
A common definition of “allow” is “to acknowledge or admit.”
American Heritage Dictionary 96 (2d ed. 1985).
The
Here, we believe
the hearing officer’s report could be said to have “acknowledged
or admitted” the fourteen day time period prescribed for filing
under KRS 350.0301(2).
Hence, we are of the opinion that the
time for filing exceptions to the hearing officer’s report is
properly computed under 400 KAR 1:030 §3.
In sum, we think Seaboard should have been accorded a
three day extension for notice by mail and a three day exclusion
comprising the weekend and Monday, which was a legal holiday.
We
thus conclude that Seaboard’s exceptions to the hearing officer’s
report were timely filed on January 18, 2000.
Finally, although we are aware that the civil rules are
not applicable to the filing of exceptions as the latter is a
proceeding within the confines of the administrative agency (see
Board of Adjustments of City of Richmond v. Flood, Ky., 581
S.W.2d 1 (1978)), we must note that the wording of 400 KAR 1:030
substantially parrots Ky. R. Civ. P. 6.01 and 6.05.
It seems
reasonable that in adopting the regulation, the Cabinet sought
to, in some measure, adhere to those rules.
We view Seaboard’s remaining contentions as moot.
-5-
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Franklin
Circuit Court is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, NATURAL
RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION CABINET:
Mark R. Overstreet
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jennifer Cable Smock
Frankfort, Kentucky
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