EDWARD J. GILMORE v. KENTUCKY LOTTERY CORPORATION
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RENDERED:
November 22, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-002542-MR
EDWARD J. GILMORE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES M. SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-006458
v.
KENTUCKY LOTTERY CORPORATION
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, DYCHE, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Edward J. Gilmore brings this appeal from a July
12, 2001 order and an October 31, 2001 order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court.
We affirm.
Gilmore was employed by the Kentucky Lottery
Corporation (the Lottery) in 1989.
In February of 1990, he was
moved to the position of “Tell Sell Representative” (TSR), which
he held until his termination on November 11, 1998.
As a TSR
representative, it was Gilmore’s duty to contact lottery ticket
vendors by phone and determine their respective needs for lottery
tickets.
He would then see that the orders were processed and
the merchandise shipped to the vendors.
The process was computer
programmed so that the names of the retailers involved would
periodically appear on the computer screen, indicating that on
that particular day those retailers should be called to ascertain
their needs.
Failure to call a retailer might result in
exhaustion of his supply of tickets.
This necessitated a visit
by an “outside sales representative” in order to rectify the
situation and assure that sales would not be lost.
Gilmore claims that in 1996 he was determined to be
“legally blind” as defined in Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
344.010(4).
He, perforce, argues that he was entitled to be
treated as a qualified disabled individual within the purview of
KRS 344.030(1).
In any event, in 1996 Gilmore began receiving
disciplinary actions for failure to properly perform his job.
In
1997, he received three weeks’ suspension without pay and was
placed on a 60-day Work Improvement Program (WIP).
In 1998, he
was again placed on a WIP as a result of failures in contacting
the retail stores.
The failures, of course, resulted in
complaints from the retailers.
A special problem occurred in 1998 around the November
election.
Because liquor retailers are closed on election day,
the procedure for contacting them was altered to provide for
contacting either the day before or the day after the election.
It appears Gilmore failed to make the adjustment.
On November
11, 1998, Gilmore’s supervisor met with him to discuss his
failure to contact the liquor stores as directed.
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For this
failure and in view of Gilmore’s past performance, he was
terminated for insubordination/poor job performance.
On October 28, 1999, Gilmore filed the instant
complaint claiming, inter alia, the Lottery had: denied him
reasonable accommodation; failed to take affirmative steps to
accommodate his disability as required in KRS Chapter 344;
willfully attempted to force him to resign from his employment
because of his disability; treated him with hostility and
oppression; and wrongfully terminated him on the basis of his
disability.
On January 31, 2001, the Lottery filed a motion for
summary judgment.
On March 22, 2001, two months after the
Lottery had filed its motion for summary judgment, Gilmore served
a second set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of
Documents on the Lottery.
The Lottery objected to the second set
of Interrogatories and Request because they constituted an
unreasonable number of questions.
On May 10, 2001, the trial
court entered an order denying Gilmore’s motion to compel answers
to the Interrogatories because Gilmore had not sought leave of
the court to propound additional interrogatories, which contained
such a large number of questions.
On May 17, 2001, Gilmore filed
a motion requesting permission to submit additional
interrogatories.
The interrogatories were reduced to six.
On
July 12, 2001, before action was taken upon the request, the
circuit court entered summary judgment.
We observe that Gilmore filed a claim of discrimination
with the Louisville & Jefferson County Human Relations Commission
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(Commission) in June 1997.
Therein, he alleged that the Lottery
failed to reasonably accommodate him in his disability.
In May
1998, the Commission dismissed the claim finding that there was
no probable cause to substantiate same.
As Gilmore had
previously filed a claim with the Commission for alleged workplace discrimination, we are of the opinion that the claim before
the Commission bars the instant action under the authority of
Vaezkoroni v. Domino’s Pizza, Ky., 914 S.W.2d 341 (1995)(holding
that the election of an administrative remedy bars a subsequent
court proceeding).
In any event, we have examined the record
herein and are of the opinion that summary judgment was properly
entered.
On this appeal, Gilmore contends: (1) he was subjected
to direct discrimination; (2) he was subjected to a hostile work
environment; and (3) the circuit court erred in entering summary
judgment before discovery was completed.
Our rule in reviewing summary judgment is governed by
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807
S.W.2d 476 (1991)(holding that movant must demonstrate the nonexistence of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a
matter of law).
It is not just any issue of fact, but a material
fact that controls.
See James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc. v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, Ky., 814 S.W.2d 273
(1991); Bennett v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company,
Ky., 407 S.W.2d 403 (1966).
We have examined the record and find
no material issue of fact.
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We therefore think disposition of this appeal revolves
around a question of law.
Gilmore buttresses his claim upon KRS
Chapter 344 (Civil Rights Act) and KRS 207.150, which statutorily
prohibit work-place discrimination against those with disability.
Generally, claims under our Civil Rights Act track
those under Federal law and thus are disposed of by rules
enunciated in Burdine and McDonnell1.
In the case of disability
discrimination, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by
establishing: (1) his disability, (2) his ability to perform the
job, and (3) that he has suffered adverse treatment.
Cf. Monette
v. Electronic Data Systems Corporation, 90 F.3d 1173 (6th Cir.
1996).
The overall burden of proving a case is, of course,
always upon the claimant.
However, when a prima facie case is
established, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a
legitimate business reason for his action.
See Kentucky Center
for the Arts v. Handley, Ky. App., 827 S.W.2d 697 (1991).
This
reason can only be rebutted by the claimant showing that it was a
pretext for his dismissal.
See Turner v. Pendennis Club, Ky.
App., 19 S.W.3d 117 (2000).
The record herein clearly reflects that Gilmore was
afforded every opportunity to perform his job.
He was provided
with a voice-activated system, speech-enhanced, to read his
computer screen.
The Lottery also purchased an over-sized, high
1
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, (1981); McDonnell Douglas
Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d
668 (1973).
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contrast computer screen for his utilization.
Gilmore further
complains that he needed additional software, which the Lottery
refused to provide.
We are advised, however, that the Kentucky
Department for the Blind purchased and installed the software for
Gilmore.
The Kentucky Department of Blind was of the opinion
that the Lottery had fully complied with the Department’s efforts
to accommodate Gilmore.
In fact, it appears that Gilmore made no
further request for accommodation.
We therefore must conclude
that his claim of failure to accommodate is without merit.
Gilmore further complains that he was subjected to a
hostile work environment.
We also think this is without merit.
He refers generally to comments by unnamed fellow employees.
A
single employee did opine that Gilmore was not as restricted in
vision as might be indicated.
We think this evidence
insufficient to attach liability on the Lottery.
In order to
establish a hostile work environment, an employee must show that
conduct was so severe or persuasive that it had the effect of
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.
Cf. Hall v. Transit Authority of Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Government, Ky. App., 883 S.W.2d 884 (1994).
Finally, Gilmore contends that he was not given an
opportunity to complete discovery before the entry of summary
judgment.
The record itself refutes this contention.
action was filed some two years previous.
This
The record had already
accumulated multiple volumes reflecting efforts by Gilmore to
prove his case.
The final delay was brought about by Gilmore’s
request for admissions, which were inordinate in length.
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We
perceive no abuse in entry of summary judgment before answers to
the third set of interrogatories.
To establish a right to
summary judgment, it is not necessary to demonstrate that
discovery is, in fact, completed, but only that there was an
opportunity to do so.
See Hartford Insurance Group v. Citizens
Fidelity Bank & Trust Company, Ky. App., 579 S.W.2d 628 (1979).
We think the record herein clearly demonstrates that Gilmore had
an abundant opportunity to complete discovery.
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion the circuit court
properly entered summary judgment.
For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the Jefferson
Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kenneth L. Sales
Keith B. Hunter
Louisville, Kentucky
Jonathan D. Goldberg
Jan M. West
Louisville, Kentucky
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