CAMUEL KELLY ADAMS v. ANN-MARYE COFFEY
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 30, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-002530-MR
CAMUEL KELLY ADAMS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. MAINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00068
v.
ANN-MARYE COFFEY
(FORMERLY ADAMS)
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Camuel Kelly Adams brings this appeal from an
October 22, 2001 order of the Montgomery Circuit Court.
We
affirm.
Camuel and Ann-Marye, appellee herein, were married May
18, 1996.
One child, Josh Harrison Adams, was born of the
marriage August 13, 1997.
The parties were divorced by decree of
dissolution entered by the Montgomery Circuit Court July 22,
1999.
The decree incorporated by reference a “Divorce Agreement”
entered into by Camuel and Ann-Marye.
Therein, the parties
agreed to joint custody of Josh, with Ann-Marye being primary
custodian, and Camuel awarded visitation.
In September 2000, each party moved to modify
visitation.
The matter was settled through mediation, resulting
in an Agreed Order entered October 23, 2000.
In August 2001,
Ann-Marye moved to amend joint custody to sole custody, and to
modify Camuel's visitation.
The circuit court awarded sole
custody to Ann-Marye, and modified Camuel's visitation to its
“Standard Visitation Order” plus one overnight visit per week by
order entered October 22, 2001.
This appeal follows.
Camuel asserts that the circuit court erred by granting
Ann-Marye sole custody and by modifying his visitation.
Specifically, Camuel maintains that the circuit court failed to
follow the mandates of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.340(2)
and KRS 403.340(3).
KRS 403.340(2) is applicable only if custody
modification comes within two years of the custody decree.
Camuel urges us to view the October 23, 2000 order modifying his
visitation as a “custody order.”
This we cannot do.
We observe
the October 23, 2000 order dealt strictly with visitation, and in
no way addressed custody.
At the time of Ann-Marye's motion to
modify custody, the only custody decree in effect was the July
22, 1999 decree of dissolution.
Ann-Marye's motion was made
August 30, 2001, outside the two-year statutory period, thus
rendering KRS 403.340(2) inapplicable.
As to KRS 403.340(3), Camuel contends the circuit court
failed to make the required findings thereunder to support its
order modifying custody.
KRS 403.340(3) reads:
[T]he court shall not modify a prior custody
decree unless after hearing it finds, upon
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the basis of facts that have arisen since the
prior decree or that were unknown to the
court at the time of entry of the prior
decree, that a change has occurred in the
circumstances of the child or his custodian,
and that the modification is necessary to
serve the best interests of the child. When
determining if a change has occurred and
whether a modification of custody is in the
best interests of the child, the court shall
consider the following:
(a) Whether the custodian agrees to
the modification;
(b) Whether the child has been
integrated into the family of the
petitioner with consent of the
custodian;
(c) The facts set forth in KRS
403.270(2) to determine the best
interests of the child;
(d) Whether the child's present
environment endangers seriously
his physical, mental, moral, or
emotional health;
(e) Whether the harm likely to be
caused by a change of environment
is outweighed by its advantages to
him; and
(f) Whether the custodian has placed
the child with a de facto
custodian.
The applicable factors in KRS 403.270(2) are as follows:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
The wishes of the child's parent
or parents, and any de facto
custodian, as to his custody;
The wishes of the child as to his
custodian;
The interaction and interrelationship
of the child with his parent or
parents, his siblings, and any other
person who may significantly affect the
child's best interests;
The child's adjustment to his home,
school, and community;
The mental and physical health of all
individuals involved;
Information, records, and evidence of
domestic violence . . . ;
The court found that based upon incidents occurring
since the July 22, 1999 custody decree, joint custody was “not
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working.”
The circuit court further found that modification was
necessary for the best interest of the child.
The order of the
circuit court evidences consideration of factors required by both
KRS 403.340(3) and KRS 403.270(2)(a)-(f).
sufficient under the statute.
We think the findings
We also believe substantial
evidence supports the circuit court's conclusion that joint
custody was not working, and sole custody in Ann-Marye was in the
best interest of the child.
Thus, we are of the opinion the
circuit court did not err in awarding Ann-Marye sole custody of
Josh.
Camuel contends the circuit court erred by not making
the required findings in the modification of his visitation.
Modification of visitation is controlled by KRS 403.320(3), which
reads:
The court may modify an order granting or
denying visitation rights whenever
modification would serve the best interests
of the child; but the court shall not
restrict a parent's visitation rights unless
it finds that the visitation would endanger
seriously the child's physical, mental,
moral, or emotional health. (Emphasis
added).
Camuel argues that the circuit court did not specifically find
Josh's visitation would seriously endanger Josh's physical,
mental, moral, or emotional health.
For the purposes of KRS
403.320(3), “<restrict' means to provide the non-custodial parent
with something less than <reasonable visitation.'”
Kulas, Ky. App., 898 S.W.2d 529, 530 (1995).
Kulas v.
In the October 23,
2000 Agreed Order, Camuel was awarded visitation every Wednesday
evening from 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., every Thursday and Friday
-4-
night, and alternating weekends.
The circuit court awarded
Camuel visitation of one evening each week from 6:00 to 9:00
p.m., every Thursday overnight, and every other weekend.
The
result was that Camuel's visitation was reduced by one overnight
visit per week.
We are of the opinion that such visitation is
reasonable, and cannot be said to “restrict” Camuel's visitation
rights.
As such, we do not believe the court erred in modifying
visitation under KRS 403.320(3).
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Montgomery
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David M. Ward
Winchester, Kentucky
Stephen E. Neal
Mt. Sterling, Kentucky
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