DONALD THOMAS LOCKRIDGE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 2, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-002442-MR
DONALD THOMAS LOCKRIDGE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES M. SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-002685
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
KNOPF, MILLER, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Donald Thomas Lockridge brings this appeal from
September 26, 2001 and October 5, 2001 opinions and orders of the
Jefferson Circuit Court.
We reverse and remand.
In July of 1999, appellant entered a guilty plea to
assault in the first degree, Kentucky Revised Statutes 508.010,
and was sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment.
In May of 2000,
appellant filed the instant Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42 motion to
vacate sentence.
As a basis for the motion, appellant contended
that his trial counsel gave him “gross misadvice” about parole
eligibility.
Specifically, appellant contended that trial
counsel advised him that he would be eligible for parole after
serving only two years and five months of his sentence.
In fact,
appellant discovered that he was required to serve fifty percent
of his sentence, or six years, before becoming eligible for
parole.
The circuit court appointed counsel but held no
evidentiary hearing.
On September 26, 2001, and October 5, 2001
the circuit court entered opinions and orders denying appellant's
RCr 11.42 motion.
This appeal follows.
Appellant argues the circuit court committed reversible
error by denying his RCr 11.42 motion without holding an
evidentiary hearing.
Appellant specifically argues that his
guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered into
because of trial counsel's ineffective assistance.
In order to
obtain relief, appellant must demonstrate that trial counsel's
performance was deficient, and that such deficiency so seriously
affected the outcome of the plea process that but for counsel's
errors, there is a reasonable probability that appellant, rather
than having pled guilty, would have insisted upon going to trial.
See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d
203 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); Sparks v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
721 S.W.2d 726 (1986).
In the case at hand, appellant alleges that trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by erroneously
informing him that he would be eligible for parole after only
some two and a half years' imprisonment.
It appears the record
was supplemented with statements from appellant's wife and
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pastor.
They stated that trial counsel had told them that
appellant would be eligible for parole after some two and a half
years' imprisonment.
As the record failed to refute the
allegation that trial counsel supplied erroneous advice
concerning parole eligibility, appellant claims entitlement to an
evidentiary hearing.
See Fraser v. Commonwealth, Ky., 59 S.W.3d
448, 452-453 (2001)(holding that an evidentiary hearing is
required if a material fact cannot be resolved by examination of
the record).
We are compelled to agree.
Without an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court
concluded that trial counsel is not required to “advise a
defendant as to all possible consequences of his plea” and, thus,
rejected appellant's claim that misadvice concerning parole
eligibility could amount to ineffective assistance by trial
counsel.
We believe the circuit erred by so concluding.
We are persuaded that erroneous advice concerning parole
eligibility can, indeed, satisfy the first prong of Strickland -that trial counsel's assistance fell below the range of
competency required of an attorney in a criminal case.
See
Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1988)(reviewing a
Kentucky case and holding “gross misadvice” concerning parole
eligibility can result in ineffective assistance of trial
counsel).
We also think appellant's allegation that he would
have insisted upon going to trial if supplied with correct parole
eligibility information can satisfy the prejudicial prong of
Strickland.
As such, we think appellant's allegation of
misadvice concerning parole eligibility sufficient to require an
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evidentiary hearing upon his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.
For the foregoing reasons, the opinions and orders of
the Jefferson Circuit Court are reversed and remanded for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
TACKETT, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN RESULT BY SEPARATE OPINION:
I agree with the majority that gross mis-advice concerning parole
eligibility can, in some instances, satisfy both prongs of an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
I agree, therefore,
that Lockridge is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the
matter and so concur in the majority’s result.
I write
separately to emphasize that, in my judgment, whether the alleged
mis-advice in this case satisfies either prong are questions of
fact to be resolved by the trial court after the hearing.
It is
the function of the trial court, which will hear the evidence,
not this court, to make those findings.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Edward L. Gafford
LaGrange, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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