COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. LARRY YELDER
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 11, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-002297-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENISE CLAYTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-000390
v.
LARRY YELDER
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE, BUCKINGHAM AND GUDGEL, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE: The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals from an
order of the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing a criminal
indictment against Larry Yelder.
Because we conclude that the
circuit court erroneously dismissed the indictment, we reverse
and remand.
Larry Yelder was arrested on a charge of second-degree
rape on December 7, 2000.
On the following day, he was arraigned
in the Jefferson District Court.
His attorney subsequently filed
a motion requesting that Yelder’s competency be evaluated.
motion was granted in late January 2001, and all further
The
proceedings in the Jefferson District Court were suspended
pending the evaluation.
On February 13, 2001, a Jefferson County grand jury
returned an indictment against Yelder charging him with the
crime.
Following the issuance of the circuit court indictment,
the district court entered an order dismissing the action pending
before it.
Yelder was arraigned in the Jefferson Circuit Court
on February 19, 2001.
On March 20, 2001, Yelder’s attorney filed a second
competency motion, this time in circuit court.
The circuit court
granted the motion, and Yelder was evaluated by a staff
psychiatrist at the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center.
The psychiatrist determined that Yelder was competent to stand
trial, and Yelder thereafter stipulated his competency.
Yelder subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the
indictment.
He argued in his motion that all further proceedings
in his case, including the indictment, should have been suspended
once the district court granted his motion to have his competency
evaluated.
On October 9, 2001, the circuit court entered an
order granting Yelder’s motion to dismiss.
Yelder was thereafter
released from custody, and the Commonwealth filed this appeal.
KRS1 504.100(1) states as follows:
If upon arraignment, or during any stage of
the proceedings, the court has reasonable
grounds to believe the defendant is
incompetent to stand trial, the court shall
appoint at least one (1) psychologist or
psychiatrist to examine, treat and report on
the defendant’s mental condition.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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RCr2 8.06 states as follows:
If upon arraignment or during the
proceedings there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the defendant lacks the capacity
to appreciate the nature and consequences of
the proceedings against him or her, or to
participate rationally in his or her defense,
all proceedings shall be postponed until the
issue of incapacity is determined as provided
by KRS 504.100. (Emphasis added.)
Yelder maintains that the language in RCr 8.06 that
“all proceedings shall be postponed until the issue of incapacity
is determined as provided by KRS 504.100" means that grand jury
action in Yelder’s case should not have proceeded until the issue
of competency had been determined.
On the other hand, the
Commonwealth asserts that a grand jury proceeding is not a
“proceeding” subject to stay under RCr 8.06.
We agree with the
Commonwealth.
The interpretation of criminal procedural rules is a
question of law rather than a question of fact.
Therefore, we
give no deference to the interpretation of the rule by the
circuit court.
See Commonwealth v. Hillhaven Corp., Ky. App.,
687 S.W.2d 545 (1984).
Yelder interprets the term “all proceedings” in RCr
8.06 as meaning all proceedings in the Court of Justice.
This
interpretation overlooks the fact that any proceeding before a
grand jury is separate and distinct from any action occurring in
the district court.
In Bowling v. Sinnette, Ky., 666 S.W.2d 743
(1984), the Kentucky Supreme Court recognized that a grand jury
“is a proceeding in a circuit court.”
2
Id. at 745. See also
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
-3-
Greenwell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 317 S.W.2d 859, 861 (1958).
However, this does not necessarily mean that a grand jury
proceeding is a part of one continuous proceeding that began in
the district court.
The district court has limited jurisdiction to act in
criminal cases.
KRS 24A.110 limits such jurisdiction.
First,
the statute gives the district court exclusive jurisdiction to
make final disposition of all criminal matters except felonies or
capital offenses and offenses punishable by death or imprisonment
in the penitentiary.
KRS 24A.110(1).
Second, the district court
has concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court to hold
preliminary hearings on felony or capital offenses or offenses
which may be punishable by death or imprisonment in the
penitentiary.
KRS 24A.110(3).
The district court may also
commit a defendant charged with a felony or capital offense to
jail or hold him to bail or other forms of pretrial release.
Id.
Finally, the district court may reduce a felony charge to a
misdemeanor charge in accordance with the criminal rules.
24A.110(4).
KRS
In addition, the district court has further
authority over felonies and capital offenses pursuant to RCr
3.02-3.22.
Nevertheless, the grand jury operates independently of
the district court proceedings as illustrated in King v. Venters,
Ky., 595 S.W.2d 714 (1980).
In that case, the appellant sought
an order of mandamus requiring the circuit judge to either
dismiss two indictments or to grant him a “post-indictment
preliminary hearing.”
This court denied the appellant relief,
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and the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed.
In doing so, the court
first noted that the purpose of a preliminary hearing is to
determine “whether there is sufficient evidence to justify
detaining the defendant in jail or under bond until the grand
jury has an opportunity to act on the charges.”
Id.; see also
Commonwealth v. Arnette, Ky., 701 S.W.2d 407, 408 (1985).
However, the court further noted that a grand jury is not bound
to give any consideration to the showing made at the preliminary
hearing.
Id.
Thus, a grand jury is free to issue an indictment
even if the district court determined a lack of probable cause to
support the charges or even if a preliminary hearing was not
held.
See Waugh v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 605 S.W.2d 43 (1980),
where this court held that “[a] finding of probable cause or a
finding of no probable cause cannot be binding on a circuit court
which may later try the case.”
Id. at 45.
is referred to as a “direct submission.”
The latter instance
In other words, a
preliminary hearing “is not prerequisite to the consideration of
a charge by the grand jury or to the validity of an indictment
returned pursuant to a ‘direct submission.’” King, 595 S.W.2d at
715.
Furthermore, until an indictment is issued in the
circuit court, the district court may exercise jurisdiction in
connection with felony charges.
657 S.W.2d 583 (1983).
See Commonwealth v. Karnes, Ky.,
However, once an indictment is issued,
the district court no longer has jurisdiction to dispose of the
felony charge.
345, 346 (1981).
Commonwealth v. Hamblem, Ky. App., 628 S.W.2d
As the Hamblem court stated, “to allow the
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district court to retain jurisdiction of felony offenses after an
indictment on the same offense . . . could lead to an abuse of
our two-tiered court system.”
Id.
RCr 1.04 states that “[t]he Rules of Criminal Procedure
are intended to provide for a just determination of every
criminal proceeding.
They shall be construed to secure
simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.”
Within the
spirit of that rule, and because proceedings before the district
court are distinct and separate from proceedings before the
circuit court, including grand jury proceedings, we conclude that
the language of RCr 8.06 which states “all proceedings” refers to
those proceedings pending before that specific court.
The order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is reversed,
and this case is remanded for the reinstatement of the
indictment.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
J. David Niehaus
Louisville, Kentucky
Jeanne Anderson
Special Assistant Attorney
General
Louisville, Kentucky
Bryan Fantoni
Special Assistant Attorney
General
Louisville, Kentucky
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