GEORGINA GOODMAN AND BEN GOODMAN v. CAROLYN GOODMAN AND MARK GOODMAN
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RENDERED:
December 13, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-002289-MR
GEORGINA GOODMAN AND BEN
GOODMAN
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JANET COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00047
v.
CAROLYN GOODMAN AND MARK
GOODMAN
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, KNOPF, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Ben and Georgina Goodman, husband and wife, appeal
from an order of the Hardin Circuit Court, entered September 21,
2001, awarding custody of their daughter, Briahnna Nickole
Goodman, to Ben’s parents, Mark and Carolyn Goodman.
The trial
court found that Mark and Carolyn were Briahnna’s de facto
custodians and that permanent custody by the grandparents was in
the child’s best interest.
those findings.
Ben and Georgina contest both of
They also object to what they contend was an
insufficient invocation of the circuit court’s jurisdiction.
Persuaded that the circuit court duly acquired jurisdiction and
that it neither erred nor abused its discretion, we affirm.
Ben and Georgina married in June 1998.
Georgina had
just turned eighteen, and Ben was a month shy of twenty-one.
Briahnna Nickole was born September 8, 1999.
The couple
separated December 29, 1999, and two weeks later Georgina
petitioned for divorce.
A decree was entered dissolving the
marriage on August 14, 2000.
In the interim Georgina had
reluctantly agreed that Ben should have custody of Briahnna, and
that agreement was incorporated in the decree.
Ben had begun a
job with the post office and thus had some means of caring for
the child, whereas Georgina apparently emerged from the divorce
scarcely able to care for herself.
Notwithstanding the award of custody to Ben, Briahnna’s
real caretakers were Mark and Carolyn.
Even before Ben and
Georgina separated, before Briahnna was a month old, Ben’s
parents began keeping her five or six nights per week.
At the
time of the separation in December 1999, they took over her care
completely.
They provided her home, her food, and her clothing.
Ben gave them a medical power of attorney, and they established a
relationship with a pediatrician.
They brought Briahnna’s
vaccinations up to date and attended her through a minor ear
surgery.
Under their care, Briahnna’s weight increased from low
to average for her age, and she began to make normal
developmental progress.
Because the grandparents both worked
during the day, in February 2000, they placed Briahnna in day
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care.
They assumed the full expense of that care until June
2000, when Ben was able to begin paying for it.
The grandparents continued as Briahnna’s primary
caretakers through January 2001.
For much of that period Ben
visited Briahnna regularly after work, but he devoted himself
primarily to “getting back on his feet.”
In August 2000 he
attempted to establish a household with a woman he had known for
two days.
During their liaison, Ben and this girlfriend once
kept Briahnna overnight.
A similar relationship with another
woman in October was even shorter lived, but again included Ben’s
trusting Briahnna to the care of someone he little knew.
Although Mark and Carolyn hoped that they were caring for
Briahnna only until Ben became capable of that trust, these
seemingly ill-considered relationships disturbed them.
They were
further disturbed in December 2000 or January 2001 when they
learned that Ben and Georgina had resumed living together and
that Georgina was again pregnant.
Georgina had been largely absent from Briahnna’s life.
She had been obliged to resume working only three weeks after
Briahnna was born, and the grandparents alleged that during those
early days Briahnna was often found unwashed and unattended,
propped on a couch with a bottle in her mouth.
They also alleged
that Georgina had seemed to them uncomfortable with the child and
with motherhood.
Carolyn testified that in December 1999, when
Georgina had moved out, she, Carolyn, had helped Ben clean his
home and had found Briahnna’s bedding apparently unchanged since
she had first come home from the hospital, and had found pet
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feces throughout the house.
She also testified that, although
the divorce decree provided that Georgina could visit with
Briahnna, she rarely did so.
The few times she had, according to
Carolyn, she had displayed little closeness for the baby.
Georgina had provided nothing for Briahnna’s support.
And more
recently, after she and Ben had reasserted responsibility for
Briahnna’s care, she had permitted a diaper rash to become
infected and blistered without seeking medical attention.
Concerned that neither Ben nor Georgina was prepared to
care for one child, let alone two, near the end of January 2001,
Mark and Carolyn told Ben that they intended to seek legal
custody of Briahnna.
They had hoped that he would understand
this as an attempt to protect Briahnna while his and Georgina’s
prospects remained uncertain, but Ben instead took deep offense
at what he perceived to be his parents’ lack of confidence in him
and their desire to take away his child.
Ben immediately removed
Briahnna from his parents’ home, and his relationship with them
became increasingly adversarial.
On January 31, 2001, Mark and
Carolyn filed notice of their intention to intervene in Ben’s
divorce action.
They alleged that they should be deemed
Briahnna’s de facto custodians and sought modification of the
award of custody to Ben.
Ben and Georgina then remarried on Feburary 16, 2001,
and proceeded to resist all attempts by Ben’s parents to maintain
contact with the little girl they had cared for for nearly all of
her seventeen months.
The parents denied the grandparents
visitation until a court order gave the grandparents limited
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access to the child, they revoked the medical power of attorney,
they removed Briahanna from her settled daycare when they learned
that Ben’s parents visited her there during the day, and at the
conclusion of the hearing on his parents’ custody motion in July
2001, Ben announced during testimony that he had quit his job at
the post office without having secured another job and intended
the next morning to move his family to Indiana.
When asked where
they would live, he responded that they were to move in with
Georgina’s father, a man Ben believed, erroneously it seems, had
sexually molested one of Georgina’s sisters.
“Mark and Carolyn
were visibly stunned by this revelation,” wrote the commissioner
who heard the matter.
“Even this Commissioner was moved by Ben’s
lack of consideration and heartless attitude toward his own
parents.”
With the circuit court’s concurrence, the commissioner
found that Mark and Carolyn met the statutory definition of de
facto custodians and thus had standing to seek custody of
Briahnna.
Again with the court’s concurrence, the commissioner
further found that Briahnna’s best interest would be served by
giving Mark and Carolyn custody.
The commissioner noted the
strong bond of affection and dependence that had grown between
grandparents and granddaughter, the good care the grandparents
had provided, their eager desire to assure her continued care,
and Ben and Georgina’s undeniable record of immature judgments,
however well intentioned, exposing the child to the risk of
serious harms.
It is from these findings, adopted by the court,
that Ben and Georgina appeal.
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They contend first that Mark and Carolyn failed to
invoke the circuit court’s jurisdiction.
We disagree.
As Ben and Georgina correctly point out, KRS 403.420
provides how, where, and under what circumstances a custody
proceeding may be commenced by a parent, by a non-parent, and by
a de facto custodian.
Under the statute, such a proceeding may
be commenced by a non-parent only if the child is not in the
physical custody of either parent.
Ben and Georgina contend that
because Mark and Carolyn are not Briahnna’s parents, because
Briahnna was in her parents’ physical custody when Mark and
Carolyn filed their motion, and because Mark and Carolyn had not
yet been deemed de facto custodians, they lacked standing under
either prong of the statute to commence a custody proceeding.
In
French v. Barnett,1 however, this Court ruled that jurisdiction
does not hinge on de facto custodianship being predetermined.
The circuit court’s custody jurisdiction may be invoked, rather,
by an allegation in the petition of some statutory basis for
standing, such as de facto custodianship, and thereafter
jurisdiction survives provided a basis for standing is
established in the course of the proceeding.
Mark and Carolyn
alleged in their motion that they should be deemed Briahnna’s de
facto custodians.
This was a proper assertion of standing and
permitted the court to consider the motion.
Ben and Georgina next point out that under KRS 403.340
circuit court jurisdiction to modify a custody order may not be
invoked earlier than two years after the order was made unless
1
Ky. App., 43 S.W.3d 289 (2001).
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the motion to modify is accompanied by at least two affidavits
giving reason to believe “that . . . [t]he custodian appointed
under the prior decree has placed the child with a de facto
custodian.”2
Here, Mark and Carolyn both averred, in an
affidavit they both signed and attached to their motion to
intervene, facts that gave reason to believe that they had become
Briahnna’s de facto custodians.
We agree with the appellees that
although it was printed only once, this affidavit was in effect
two affidavits and thus satisfied the statutory requirement.
Acknowledging the fact that in our modern society
children are often raised by persons other than their biological
parents, in 1998 the General Assembly created the status of de
facto custodian to protect children from being unreasonably
deprived of the love and concern of their non-parental
caretakers.
As defined in KRS 403.270, a de facto custodian is
a person who has been shown by clear and
convincing evidence to have been the primary
caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a
child who has resided with the person for a
period of six (6) months or more if the child
is under three (3) years of age. . . .
Ben and Georgina raise two objections to the trial
court’s determination that Mark and Carolyn were Briahnna’s de
facto custodians.
They first contend that Mark and Carolyn did
not really provide primary care or support.
Rather, according to
the appellants, Mark and Carolyn merely transported the child to
and from day care and gave her a place to sleep.
Ben provided
the day care, he claims, at least after June 2000; he provided
2
KRS 403.340(1)(b). See Petrey v. Cain, Ky., 987 S.W.2d 786 (1999).
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her medical insurance; and he was present most evenings until his
daughter went to bed.
He, not his parents, should thus be deemed
Briahnna’s primary caretaker and supporter.
Mark and Carolyn testified, without contradiction, that
for more than a year they were the persons on call for Briahnna
twenty-four hours each day.
She lived with them and they
provided for her daily needs.
They fed her, housed her, clothed
her, bathed her, visited her at the day care, took her to the
doctor, played with her, and loved her.
The trial court did not
err by deeming Mark and Carolyn Briahnna’s primary caretakers and
supporters.
Ben and Georgina also contend that because Mark and
Carolyn did not have physical custody of Briahnna when they filed
their motion to intervene, they cannot be deemed de facto
custodians.
They assume that the statute requires a continuous
six-month period of care and support, and they contend that any
gap in physical custody restarts the statutory six-month
requirement.
We disagree.
There is no question that Mark and Carolyn cared for
Briahnna continuously for more than six months.
the continuity issue is thus not before us.
That aspect of
KRS 403.270 fails to
specify, however, how soon after six months of care and support
de-facto-custodian status must be asserted.
significant gap in the statute.
cautiously, case by case.
This is a
Courts generally fill such gaps
They try to discern, from the
legislature’s expressed intentions, how the legislature would
have resolved the matter presently before the court had it been
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asked to do so.3
The General Assembly cannot have been unmindful
that custody disputes between de facto custodians and parents are
apt to arise precisely when long-absent parents reappear and
assert their parental rights.
If a parent could defeat the de
facto custodian’s claim merely by removing the child from the
custodian’s home, the protection afforded children by the statute
would be seriously compromised.
We are persuaded that such an
undermining of the statute was not the General Assembly’s intent.
Rather, a de facto custodian must assert a custody claim while
the child is in his or her care or within a reasonable time
thereafter.
We need not define “reasonable time” for present
purposes beyond saying that Mark and Carolyn’s claim, initiated
within twenty-four hours of Briahnna’s removal from their home,
was timely.
There was no delay here to be accounted for, nor any
possibility of undue harm to the child, nor prejudice to Ben and
Georgina.
Briahnna was not in Mark and Carolyn’s care at the
time they first filed notice of their motion to intervene only
because they sought to spare Ben’s feelings by warning him of
their intentions.
The statute should not be construed so as to
punish such basic decency.
A parent’s right to the custody of his or her child is
one of the most cherished rights of our society.
In Kentucky,
this right is embodied statutorily in KRS 405.020(1) and (2),
which provide in part that
3
Beckham v. Board of Education of Jefferson County, Ky., 873 S.W.2d 575 (1994);
Board of Barbers & Beautician Examiners v. Mayo State Vocational School, Ky., 259 S.W.2d
452 (1953).
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[t]he father and mother shall have the joint
custody, nurture, and education or their
children who are under the age of eighteen
(18).
As amended in 1998, however, this statute clearly intends that
the parent’s right be limited:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections
(1) and (2) of this section, a person
claiming to be a de facto custodian, as
defined in KRS 403.270, may petition a court
for legal custody of a child. The court
shall grant legal custody to the person if
the court determines that the person meets
the definition of de facto custodian and that
the best interests of the child will be
served by awarding custody to the de facto
custodian.4
Ben and Georgina contend that the trial court abused
its discretion when it ruled that giving custody to Mark and
Carolyn served Briahnna’s best interests.
They correctly note
that KRS 403.270 (2) lists several factors potentially relevant
to a best-interest determination and argue that the trial court
gave insufficient consideration to some of them.
In particular,
Ben and Georgina point out that the parents’ wishes and their
reasons for having left the child with a de facto custodian
figure prominently among the statutory factors.
They strongly
desire Briahnna’s custody, and they maintain that Ben gratefully
accepted Mark and Carolyn’s temporary assistance, but only with
the understanding that it was given freely to him.
He would not
have accepted it, they suggest, had he thought it might be used
to challenge his right to Briahnna’s custody.
4
KRS 405.020(3).
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We agree with Ben and Georgina that fit parents who
were forced by economic necessity to relinquish the care of their
child have a compelling claim to be reunited with the child once
their circumstances permit them to meet the child’s needs for
stability, nurture, and training.
Our law has long presumed that
it is in the best interest of a child to be raised by its parents
whenever the parents are reasonably capable of the trust.5
As
recently amended, KRS 405.020 and KRS 403.270 qualify that
presumption in disputes involving a de facto custodian, but they
do not do away with it.6
Were Ben and Georgina plainly capable
of meeting Briahnna’s needs, this would be a very difficult case
indeed.
In fact, however, at the time of the evidentiary
hearings Ben and Georgina were not plainly capable of meeting
Briahnna’s needs.
Doubts on that score arose not so much from
the evidence indicating the inexperienced couple’s lack of
parenting and housekeeping skills (those skills can be acquired)
but from their immature judgment (painfully demonstrated by their
hostile response to Mark and Carolyn’s concern for their
daughter), and from the simple facts that they were without a
permanent abode and that neither of them was employed.
Perhaps
their move to Indiana was successful and they quickly became
established there.
The obvious risk, however, which the trial
court was obliged to assay, was that Briahnna was to be wrenched
5
Shifflet v. Shifflet, Ky., 891 S.W.2d 392 (1995); Kantorowicz v. Reams, Ky., 332
S.W.2d 269 (1959); Setser v. Caldwell, 300 Ky. 356, 188 S.W.2d 451 (1945); Stapleton v.
Poynter, 111 Ky. 264, 62 S.W. 730 (1901).
6
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
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from stable caretakers, who had, for most of her life, provided
very well for her, and given over to a situation of domestic
instability and financial want merely to satisfy her parents’
spitefulness.
The trial court did not clearly err or abuse its
discretion7 by deeming this risk substantial and contrary to
Briahnna’s best interest.8
Few situations are as painful as those in which people
love at cross purposes.
case.
There was much of such pain in this
We hope that the love for this little girl, apparent in
all the parties, will by now have provided them with sufficient
common ground to give them a wise perspective on their
differences.
We commend both the domestic relations
commissioner, D. Michael Coyle, and the trial judge, Janet
Coleman, for their sensitive handling of this case, and we affirm
the September 21, 2001, order of the Hardin Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Carol B. Meinhart
Musselwhite & Meinhart, PSC
Radcliff, Kentucky
Phyllis K. Lonneman
Lonneman & Associates, PLLC
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
7
Dudgeon v. Dudgeon, Ky., 458 S.W.2d 159 (1970); Bickel v. Bickel, Ky., 442 S.W.2d
575 (1969).
8
Cf. Shaw v. Graham, Ky., 310 S.W.2d 522 (1958) (mother denied custody where child
had long resided with grandparents and mother’s new situation was not yet established).
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