UNITED GRAFIX INCORPORATED, D/B/A TRI-STATE OUTDOOR ADVERTISING COMPANY, INC. v. GLENN HOUSE, OSCAR GAYLE HOUSE, BAXTER BLEDSOE, JR., BAXTER BLEDSOE, LTD., AND UNITED SIGN, INC.
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 8, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-002275-MR
UNITED GRAFIX INCORPORATED,
D/B/A TRI-STATE OUTDOOR
ADVERTISING COMPANY, INC.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODERICK MESSER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00161
v.
GLENN HOUSE, OSCAR GAYLE HOUSE,
BAXTER BLEDSOE, JR., BAXTER BLEDSOE,
LTD., AND UNITED SIGN, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, McANULTY, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
TACKETT, JUDGE:
United Graphix, Incorporated, d/b/a Tri-State
Advertising Compnay, Inc. (Tri-State) appeals from an order of
the Laurel Circuit Court granting summary judgment against it.
We reverse and remand for a trial of all issues.
United Graphix and it’s subsidiary, Tri-State, were
corporate entities formed by their owner, Gene Mullins, to
acquire, build and lease billboard signs in Kentucky.
In 1986,
Mullins bought out the assets of a similar company which included
the sign, located beside I-75 in Laurel County, which is the
subject of the present controversy.
This sign was constructed in
1959 on land owned by Wilma Poynter who entered into a series of
leases, which ran for five years with five-year renewals,
allowing the sign to be located on her property.
After Mullins
acquired the sign, he continued the pattern of leases with
Poynter.
Their last lease was dated August 20, 1986, for a five-
year term beginning May 31, 1986, with a five-year renewal
option.
This lease included the following provision:
Lessor represents that he is the OWNER/LESSEE
UNDER WRITTEN LEASE . . . of the premises
described above and has the right to grant
Tri-State free access to the premises to
perform all acts necessary to carry on TriState’s business and agrees that all
materials, structures, equipment, and other
works placed upon the leased premises shall
remain the property of Tri-State and may be
removed by Tri-State at any time.
During the term of this lease, Poynter died and Tri-
State received a notification that all future payments should be
made to the estate.
However, Tri-State contends that it was
never notified of the subsequent sale of the property by
Poynter’s administrator to Roland Mooney, Glenn House and Cloyd
House on July 22, 1992.1
On June 30, 1993, Tri-State issued a
check payable to Poynter’s estate for the amount of the annual
rent.
Tri-State enclosed a form letter inquiring as to estate’s
continued ownership of the property; however, no response was
received.
The check was endorsed by the estate’s administrator,
but made payable to “House Brothers for deposit.”
1
Cloyd House died prior to the filing of this action and
his executor, Oscar Gayle House, was named as a defendant.
-2-
Due to its uncertainty over the ownership of the
property, Tri-State did not issue payment for rent in 1994 or
1995.
In 1996, Tri-State’s form letter was returned with an
undated note on the bottom which stated that House Brothers had
purchased the property which was the subject of lease CB-22 and
requesting that Tri-State contact Glenn House.
A telephone
number and a mailing address in East Bernstadt were included.
House sent a letter on March 11, 1996, instructing Tri-State to
contact him at the same address and telephone number previously
given if it wanted to continue leasing the billboard site.
Mullins alleges that he made numerous unsuccessful attempts to
telephone House on Tri-State’s behalf.
Although the last lease
executed with Poynter expired on May 31, 1996, Tri-State
continued to repair the sign until that December.
Moreover,
advertising space was still being rented by Curry Oil Company
which had rented the sign since the 1970s.
Curry Oil paid rent to Tri-State until receiving a
letter on November 1, 1996 from an attorney, Baxter Bledsoe,
which instructed them as follows:
By an earlier conversation between you and I
and as a result of working with Glenn House,
it appears that a company by the name of TriState at one time owned this billboard. If
you are renting from them or paying them
anything by the month you should probably
stop since they have no further interest in
the board.
We will be cleaning the board up and will put
it back into active use with lights and such.
If you have any desire to continue to utilize
the board, we would be more than glad to work
with you.
-3-
In fact, Bledsoe had already entered into an agreement, on
October 15, 1996, with the Houses to lease the sign.
He
subsequently, assigned his interest in the lease to United Sign,
Ltd., in which he was a principal.
Tri-State’s general counsel
sent a subsequent letter to Glenn House offering to renew the
lease and pay increased rent.
Bledsoe responded on the Houses’
behalf that he considered the sign abandoned and, having incurred
repair costs, was assuming control over it.
On April 29, 1997,
United Sign entered into an agreement with Curry Oil to lease
half of the billboard space for advertising, the other half
having already been leased to Jamco Restaurants, Inc., d/b/a
Arby’s.
By this time, Tri-State had already brought an action
seeking a declaration of rights as to the ownership of the
billboard.
The Houses and Bledsoe responded that the sign had
been abandoned due to Tr-State’s failure to remove it in a timely
manner.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, and this court reversed and remanded the case in an
unpublished opinion, 1998-CA-003120-MR.
Upon remand, Tri-State
was given leave to amend the complaint to seek recovery of
damages for trespass, conversion, intentional interference with a
contract, and loss of prospective business advantage.
After
discovery depositions were taken, the matter was set for trial;
however, the defendants once again filed a motion for summary
judgment.
The trial court again granted summary judgment on the
grounds that Tri-State had abandoned the sign, and this appeal
followed.
-4-
Tri-State argues that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of the Houses and Bledsoe on their
claims for trespass, conversion, and specific performance of the
lease enabling Tri-State to remove its sign from the property.
In order to obtain summary judgment, a moving party must show
that there are no genuine issues of material fact.
Steelvest,
Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476
(1991).
Moreover, the record must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the respondent, and summary judgment should only be
granted where it appears impossible for the respondent to produce
evidence at trial warranting a judgment in his favor.
Paintsville Hospital Company v. Ross, Ky., 683 S.W.2d 255 (1985).
As the sole ground for their motion for summary judgment, the
defendants offered a statement, in response to a hypothetical
question, taken from Mullins’ deposition that the billboard could
be removed within sixty days.
The trial court based its ruling
upon this statement which it incorrectly characterized as an
admission by Mullins that Tri-State did not remove the billboard
within a reasonable amount of time.
“In order to establish an abandonment of property,
there must be a showing of acts of abandonment, accompanied with
the intention to abandon.”
Elk Horn Coal Corp. V. Allen, Ky.,
324 S.W.2d 829, 830 (1959); Stinnett v. Kinslow, 238 Ky. 812, 38
S.W.2d 920 (1931); Sandy River Coal v. Champion Bridge Co., 243
Ky. 424, 48 S.W.2d 1062 (1932).
During his deposition, Tri-
State’s accountant, Dale Lewis, produced work orders showing
regular repairs done to the billboard through December 1996.
-5-
He
also introduced invoices and checks for rent payments made by
Curry Oil Company for advertising space until the end of October
1996.
These payments to Tri-State only stopped after Bledsoe
advised Curry Oil to discontinue them.
The trial court seized on
the following portion of Mullins’ deposition to bolster its
ruling against Tri-State:
Q.
If for whatever reason the occasion
should arise, by discussion,
settlement, negotiation, court
order or otherwise, that you would
have the right to remove your
structure--the structure you claim
from this property, how long would
it take you to do that? Could you
do it in a month or less?
A.
I would ask for 30 to 60 days, yes.
But I would need to schedule the
state to come and videotape me
taking it down.
Q.
Why?
A.
. . .
That’s a grandfathered structure.
Q.
A.
In an urban area.
. . .
It’s not commercial.
(Deposition, Gene Mullins, pg. 70.)
To characterize this answer
to a hypothetical question as an admission that Tri-State
intended to abandon the billboard is clearly erroneous.
Moreover, the trial court’s decision to grant summary
judgment in favor of the defendants on the grounds of abandonment
flies in the face of this court’s previous decision.
already stated with regard to this issue
Inasmuch as [Tri-State] had an
active lease on the billboard and was
generating rental income on the billboard,
the trial court erred in concluding as a
matter of law that the billboard had been
-6-
We have
abandoned. To the contrary, [Tri-State’s]
active lease disproves that it had an
intention to abandon the billboard.
. . .
This is a fact issue, and the trial court
erred in making this determination as a
matter of law.
United Graphix, Inc. v. House, 1998-CA-003120-MR (2000).
Consequently, the trial court’s decision to grant summary
judgment on an issue which this court has previously stated must
be decided by a jury requires us to reverse this case and remand
it for a jury trial.
In addition, Tri-State made claims for monetary damages
based on intentional interference with a contract and loss of a
prospective business advantage.
In a tersely worded paragraph,
the trial court stated that Tri-State’s claims “relate to actions
taken after May 30, 1996, the date the Court of Appeals ruled the
lease terminated.
Since the contractual relationship favoring
[Tri-State] had terminated on May 30, 1996, the acts of Bledsoe
and his companies after that date do not create a cause of
action.”
This ruling ignores several factors, the first being
that Tri-State continued to collect rent in exchange for posting
advertisements for Curry Oil through October 1996.
In addition,
because Tri-State’s sign is a grandfathered structure, Bledsoe’s
company, United Sign, would be prohibited by current zoning
ordinances from erecting a replacement sign if the jury found
that Tri-State had retained possession and was entitled to remove
the sign.
Consequently, it is not unlikely that the Houses would
choose to renew their lease with Tri-State rather than lose their
rental income from the sign altogether.
-7-
In conclusion, we cannot
say that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding
Tri-State’s additional claims; therefore, the trial court
improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Laurel
Circuit is reversed and this case is remanded with instructions
to grant a jury trial on all claims.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
John F. Kelley, Jr.
Farmer, Kelley, Brown &
Williams
London, Kentucky
Baxter Bledsoe, Jr.
Bledsoe & Bryson, PSC
London, Kentucky
Marcia M. Ridings
R. Aaron Hostettler
Hamm, Milby & Ridings
London, Kentucky
-8-
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