ADAM JASHIENSKI v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 23, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-002188-MR
ADAM JASHIENSKI
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN L. ATKINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00106
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, GUIDUGLI, and SCHRODER, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE: Adam Jashienski appeals the judgment of the
Christian Circuit Court convicting him of possession of cocaine,
possession of marijuana, and disorderly conduct.
Jashienski
entered a conditional guilty plea to these offenses pursuant to
RCr1 8.09 after the trial court denied his motion to suppress
evidence seized at the time of his arrest.
The appellant
contends that the evidence underlying his conviction should have
been suppressed as it was obtained during an unlawful stop and
arrest.
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We disagree and affirm.
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
At approximately 2:25 p.m. on January 13, 2001, Officer
Robert Schneider of the Hopkinsville Police Department was on a
routine patrol in the vicinity of a liquor store located in a
high-crime area of Hopkinsville.
He observed Jashienski, a young
white male, talking to a group of older black men.
Officer
Schneider testified that this was the first time in the five
years he had been patrolling this area that he had seen a white
person in that particular vicinity.
He suspected that Jashienski
either was attempting to obtain alcohol from the older men or was
involved in a drug transaction.
Upon becoming aware of the
presence of the police, Jashienski turned his back to the officer
and faced the group of men.
By the time Officer Schneider turned
his vehicle around and returned to where the men were
congregating, Jashienski had left.
He asked the men for the
direction Jashienski had taken.
When Officer Schneider caught up with Jashienski, he
was walking down the street talking on a cell phone.
He asked
Jashienski to stop and to take his right hand out of his pocket.
Jashienski terminated his phone conversation, but he refused to
take his hand out of his coat pocket.
Officer Schneider
attempted to frisk Jashienski “for his own safety,” but
Jashienski pushed his hands away.
As he stepped toward
Jashienski, Jashienski correspondingly moved backward, thereby
keeping a distance between them.
Motorists driving by noticed
the incident, and the officer then arrested Jashienski for
disorderly conduct.
A search incident to that arrest revealed a
plastic bag containing both marijuana and cocaine.
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The Christian Circuit Court held a suppression
hearing at which Officer Schneider testified.
The Commonwealth
argued that the officer’s encounter with Jashienski was a lawful
investigative stop pursuant to reasonable suspicion that
Jashienski was engaged in criminal activity.
Jashienski pointed
out that he was merely walking down the street talking on a cell
phone in the middle of the day.
He argued that Officer Schneider
could not reasonably have suspected him of any criminal activity
and contended that he was the subject of racial profiling.
Based on Officer Schneider’s description of
Jashienski’s behavior, the trial court denied the motion to
suppress the evidence and found that he was loitering.
In its
overview of the totality of the circumstances, the court
concluded that Officer Schneider’s suspicion of Jashienski was
sufficiently particularized and objective to justify the initial
investigative stop and the officer’s subsequent attempts to
question him.
Jashienski then entered a conditional guilty plea
and reserved for our review the issue of the legality of the
warrantless search and seizure.
He was sentenced to serve four
years in prison; the sentence was ordered to run consecutively to
a felony conviction in Tennessee.
The merits of this case involve the application of the
principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868,
20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the seminal case on the implications of
the Fourth Amendment with respect to warrantless stops.
In
Terry, the Supreme Court recognized that police officers may make
investigatory stops when their experience indicates that
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specific, articulable facts (and any reasonable inferences to be
drawn from those facts) have created a reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot.
1877.
Id. 392 U.S. at 16, 88 S.Ct. at
(2001).
See also, Commonwealth v. Banks, Ky., 68 S.W.3d 347
As this is a question of law, our review is de novo.
Thus, our task is to analyze whether the seizure was justified
under Terry and its progeny while giving due deference to the
court’s findings of fact.
With regard to the factual findings of the
trial court “clearly erroneous” is the
standard of review for an appeal of an order
denying suppression. However, the ultimate
legal question of whether there was
reasonable suspicion to stop or probable
cause to search is reviewed de novo. Ornelas
v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691, 116
S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996).
Banks, 68 S.W.3d at 349.
Jashienski first contends that the court’s finding that
he was loitering is not supported by the evidence.
that he was not were arrested for loitering.
He points out
Further, he argues
that the officer’s testimony establishes that the officer did not
observe him for a sufficient period of time to prove that he was
loitering.
While we agree that Jashienski could not have been
convicted of loitering under the facts presented at the
suppression hearing, our real inquiry is whether Officer
Schneider could reasonably infer from the circumstances that
Jashienski was engaging in an illegal activity:
[T]he test for a Terry stop and frisk is not
whether an officer can conclude that an
individual is engaging in criminal activity,
but rather whether the officer can articulate
reasonable facts to suspect that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the suspect
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may be armed and dangerous. The totality of
the circumstances must be evaluated to
determine the probability of criminal
conduct, rather than the certainty. As the
Supreme Court held in United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585,
104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), the level of
articulable suspicion necessary to justify a
stop is considerably less than proof of
wrongdoing by preponderance of the evidence.
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 350-351.
(Citations omitted).
Jashienski directs our attention to Brown v. Texas, 443
U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), a case he
describes as “similar” and “factually on point.”
In that case,
the Supreme Court held that:
the fact that the defendant “was in a
neighborhood frequented by drug dealers,
standing alone, is not a basis for concluding
that [the defendant] himself was engaged in
criminal conduct.
Id. 443 U.S. at 52.
While Brown holds that one’s location in a
high crime neighborhood is not enough to create a reasonable
suspicion to conduct a Terry search, it is nonetheless a
legitimate and relevant factor that can be taken into
consideration “in deciding whether an officer can conduct a Terry
stop.”
See, Banks, at 350, citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S.
199, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 676, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2001).
We believe that the case before us is distinguishable
from Brown in that Officer Schneider articulated specific reasons
for being suspicious of Jashienski besides the mere fact of the
neighborhood in which he had been observed.
The officer
testified that there was a group of men — including Jashienski —
who appeared to be loitering near a liquor store in an area of
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town commonly known for loitering.
It was an area where the
officer had made several drug-related arrests.
In addition, the
officer noticed that Jashienski was considerably younger than the
remaining members of the group; that he was in a neighborhood
rarely frequented by other members of his race; that Jashienski
turned his back when he realized he was being watched by a police
officer; that he left the scene immediately after realizing that
police were the area; and that when approached by the officer,
Jashienski refused to remove his hand from his pocket and
otherwise attempted to evade the officer.
We agree that when
taken all together, these facts and circumstances relied on by
Officer Schneider were sufficient to give rise to a reasonable
suspicion that Jashienski might have been engaging in criminal
activity.
See also, Simpson v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 834 S.W.2d
686 (1992).
Jashienski also argues that the officer’s surveillance
of him constituted improper racial profiling.
In support of this
argument, Jashienski cites an unpublished employment law case and
KRS2 15A.195, which was enacted after his arrest.
The statute
prohibits the detention or search “of any person when such an
action is solely motivated by consideration of race.”
added.)
(Emphasis
While it is obvious from the testimony at the hearing
that the officer’s suspicions were at least partly aroused
because of Jashienski’s race, the appellant fails to indicate how
his Fourth Amendment rights were implicated.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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See, Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89
(1996), where the Supreme Court analyzed this issue as follows:
We of course agree with petitioners that the
Constitution prohibits selective enforcement
of the law based on considerations such as
race. But the constitutional basis for
objecting to intentionally discriminatory
application of laws is the Equal Protection
Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective
intentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.
See also, Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 37 S.W.3d 745 (2001).
Finally, Jashienski argues that there was no evidence
at the suppression hearing that Officer Schneider had reason to
believe that he was armed or dangerous.
He points to Officer
Schneider’s testimony that it was his practice to frisk all
persons whom he stops for investigative purposes -- a practice
Jashienski characterizes as a “flagrant offense to the standards
outlined by Terry.”
Officer Schneider testified that he sought
to frisk Jashienski for his own safety and for Jashienski’s
safety.
The officer admitted that it was his practice to pat
down all persons in such situations as he did not know who was
armed and who was not.
We are not convinced that Jashienski’s
rights have been violated.
Once a stop is made, in order to frisk for
weapons, what is required is that the
officer’s observations lead him reasonably to
conclude that the person with whom he is
dealing may be armed and dangerous. See
Terry v. Ohio, 88 S.Ct. At 1883. In some
cases the right to frisk for weapons will
follow automatically from the circumstances,
such as where the stop is for suspicion of a
violent crime.
Although Officer Schneider did not suspect him of having
committed a violent crime, Jashienski surely aroused a higher
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level of suspicion or fear by refusing to remove his hand from
his pocket.
We agree with the Commonwealth that this refusal
constituted sufficiently threatening behavior to justify the
officer’s decision to frisk for weapons.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Christian Circuit Court is affirmed.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Misty J. Dugger
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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