ST. STEPHEN BAPTIST CHURCH v. ERNEST S. ALLEN and ELIZABETH ALLEN
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 18, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-002129-MR
ST. STEPHEN BAPTIST CHURCH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN RYAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-002869
ERNEST S. ALLEN and
ELIZABETH ALLEN
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM AND GUDGEL, JUDGES.
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE: St. Stephen Baptist Church filed this
action seeking specific performance of a real estate sales and
purchase contract between it and the owners of the property,
Ernest S. Allen and Elizabeth Allen.
After the trial court
denied St. Stephen’s motion for summary judgment, the case was
submitted to a jury which found, pursuant to the court’s
instructions, that the Allens did not understand the contract and
St. Stephen’s claim was denied.
We reverse.
St. Stephen is located on South Fifteenth Street in
Louisville, Kentucky.
In early 1999, the church approached the
Allens about selling their property.
At the time the Allens
owned and operated a nightclub located on South Fifteenth Street.
Of interest specifically were parcels at 902, 904, 908 and 910
South Fifteenth Street and 1510 and 1512 Breckenridge Avenue.
On
February 19, 1999, the Allens and the church entered into a
written Sales and Purchase Contract for all of such parcels.
Pursuant to the contract, the Allens were to sell the property to
St. Stephen for $85,000 and April 15, 1999, was set as the
closing date.
In consideration for the Allens’ promise to sell
the property, St. Stephen agreed to pay the purchase price and
$600 of the real estate taxes owed on the property to the
Jefferson County Revenue Commission.
The contract further stated
that “[t]his contract is contingent upon clear title from all the
aforementioned properties.”
St. Stephen arranged financing, obtained insurance, and
delivered a check to the Allens payable to the Jefferson County
Revenue Commission.
On April 15, 1999, Norman Cleaver, the St.
Stephen’s representative, appeared for the closing; the Allens,
however, failed to appear.
The Allens also failed to appear at
two other rescheduled closing dates, and on May 4, 1999, returned
the $600 check to St. Stephen.
On May 17, 1999, St. Stephen sought specific
performance of the property contract and consequential damages.
St. Stephen moved for, and was granted, an injunction preventing
the Allens from selling the property to a third party.
Subsequently, however, St. Stephen learned the property would be
sold at a commissioner’s sale on August 10, 1999, at which time
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it purchased the nightclub and two parcels of the property at the
sale for $80,000.
The instrument contains all the necessary elements of a
binding and enforceable contract.
It is definite and specific in
its terms and promises to be performed by each party.
The Allens
agreed to convey title to the property to St. Stephen for a
specified sum.1
As a general rule, the construction of a
contract is a question of law for the court.
As stated in
Sherman & Sons v. United Clothing Stores:2
The primary object of construction is to
ascertain the intention of the parties, and
in this character of case, if the evidence as
to this is conflicting, or the facts and
circumstances are such as to raise a
difference of opinion in the minds of
reasonable men as to such intention, the case
should be submitted to the jury under
appropriate instructions, otherwise it is a
question of law for the court. (Citations
omitted).
The contract here is a standard real estate contract
form, clear and straight forward.
The Allens contend, however,
that because they could not convey clear title on the date
specified for the closing, that the contract did not have to be
performed.
In Hopkins v. Performance Tire and Auto Service
Center, Inc.,3 and Green River Steel Corp. v. Globe Erection
Co.,4 the courts held that contracts conditioned on obtaining
third-party approval were found to be executory and
1
See Kovacs v. Freeman, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 251 (1997).
2
214 Ky. 526, 527, 283 S.W. 1022, 1023 (1926).
3
Ky. App., 866 S.W.2d 438 (1993).
4
Ky., 294 S.W.2d 507 (1956).
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unenforceable.
These cases, relied on by the Allens, offer no
support for their attempt to escape enforcement of the present
contract.
In both cases, the contract specified that it would
not be binding until approved by a third party.
The issue in
this case is whether the seller can prevent enforcement of the
contract because of a defect in the title where the buyer is
willing and able to perform the contract.
This question was
resolved in Preece v. Wolford:5
[I]t is a well-settled principle that an
undertaking to sell a larger interest in land
than the vendor owns does not relieve him
from carrying out the contract as to the
interest that he does own. This is also true
as to coparceners. (Citations omitted).
St. Stephen is willing and able to perform the contract
and accept whatever title the Allens have even if it is not clear
title.
Since only St. Stephen, not the Allens, is in the
position as buyer to object to the lack of clear title, the trial
court erred when it did not grant summary judgment in favor of
St. Stephen.
The judgment is reversed and the case remanded to the
trial court for judgment in favor of St. Stephen and granting
specific performance of the contract.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES:
J. Michael Brown
Gordon A. Rowe, Jr.
Clarence A. Wilborn
WYATT, TARRANT & COMBS, LLP
Louisville, Kentucky
Martin Z. Kasdan, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
5
196 Ky. 710, 713, 246 S.W. 27, 28 (1922).
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ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
Gordon A. Rowe, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
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