TROY HAMILTON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 27, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-002050-MR
TROY HAMILTON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES E. LOWE JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-00106
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, HUDDLESTON, KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Following the denial of his motion to suppress
evidence, Troy Hamilton conditionally pled guilty to trafficking
in marijuana1 and marijuana cultivation,2 both class-D felonies,
and to possession of a defaced firearm3 and possession of
marijuana,4 class-A misdemeanors.
By judgment entered September
11, 2001, the Pike Circuit Court sentenced him to a term of five
1
KRS 218A.1421.
2
KRS 218A.1423(2).
3
KRS 527.050.
4
KRS 218A.1422.
years in prison.
Hamilton claims that police officers violated
his rights under Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution and the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when they
engaged in an extensive warrantless search of his residence.
The
trial court erred, Hamilton contends, when it denied his motion
to suppress evidence discovered during that search.
Although we
agree with the trial court that the most damning evidence against
Hamilton was admissible and therefore affirm the judgment to the
extent that it convicts and sentences Hamilton for the marijuana
offenses, we are obliged to reverse the misdemeanor conviction
for firearm defacement and remand for additional proceedings.
At about 3:00 a.m. January 31, 2000, two Kentucky State
Police officers responded to an emergency call in Jonancy, Pike
County, Kentucky.
Two callers reported that a shooting had
occurred outside the residence of Troy Hamilton near the bottom
of Doc Bill Branch Road and that the victim, Ricky Newsome, had
sought assistance at Roger Caudill’s residence near the top of
the road.
The officers found Newsome at the Caudill residence.
He was intoxicated, uncooperative, and had sustained a serious
injury to his left arm.
Mr. Caudill told the officers that
Newsome had knocked on his door, declared that he had been shot
and needed help, and then had collapsed onto the floor where the
officers found him.
The officers summoned an ambulance, and,
after medics had departed with Newsome, followed a trail of blood
back down the snowy road to the residence at the bottom of the
hollow, arriving there at about 3:30 a.m.
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In the driveway of the residence they found a white,
late-model car with its parking lights on and a shattered rear
window.
Near the car they noticed two large areas where the snow
was apparently covered with blood.
While the officers were still
in the driveway, Troy Hamilton came out of the residence onto a
porch and identified himself.
The officers frisked him and
informed him of his Miranda rights.5
After indicating that he
understood those rights, he explained that he had shot Newsome
after Newsome had threatened to get a gun and to burn down
Hamilton’s house.
One of the officers then went inside the
residence and briefly interviewed Hamilton’s live-in girlfriend,
Kathy Lawson, who had placed one of the emergency calls.
She
apparently confirmed that there had been a drunken altercation
between Hamilton and Newsome inside the residence, that Newsome
had exited threatening violence, that Hamilton had armed himself
with a gun and followed Newsome outside, and that shortly
thereafter she had heard gun shots.
That officer then returned
to the porch and informed Hamilton that he was to be detained.
Because the early morning was cold, both officers
accompanied Hamilton inside the residence so that he could get a
coat.
Hamilton directed them to the coat and to the gun he had
used, a twelve-gauge Winchester shotgun.
As one of the officers
retrieved the gun, he noticed on the floor of an adjoining room a
small plastic bag containing a black substance he believed might
be hashish.
One of the officers also searched the coat before
giving it to Hamilton, and in a pocket found a plastic bag
5
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
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containing what appeared to be a small amount of marijuana.
The
officers then took Hamilton from the residence and secured him in
one of their cruisers.
This was at about 4:00 a.m.
Both officers testified at the suppression hearing that
they had noticed what appeared to be fresh footprints in the snow
leading around to the rear of the residence and that Hamilton had
told them that the footprints were not his.
Once Hamilton was
secured, therefore, one of the officers, fearing that another
person might be on the premises, followed the prints around the
house.
At the rear of the residence, this officer came upon
several small bags of processed marijuana lying on the ground in
plain view near a heat pump, stalks of raw marijuana hung to dry
in an unlocked storage shed just behind the heat pump, and guns
and more processed marijuana lying on the ground near a car
parked on the hillside not far above the shed.
The officers also
walked through the entire residence, again, according to their
testimony, to ensure that no one else was present.
They noted
what appeared to be marijuana seeds and roaches, firearms,
illegal alcohol,6 and drug paraphernalia.
The officers seized
none of this apparent contraband, but awaited a detective.
At
approximately 4:30 a.m., the detective arrived who was to
investigate the alleged assault.
After his arrival, one of the
officers approached Lawson with a consent-to-search form.
executed the form at 5:00 a.m.
Lawson
There ensued a thorough search of
the residence and its immediate surroundings, the search yielding
additional alcohol, drug paraphernalia, and weapons.
6
Hamilton’s residence is in a dry territory.
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A second
detective, from the narcotics division, arrived about 6:30 A.M.
He apparently seized and processed all of the drug-related
evidence.
According to this detective’s written report, when he
first arrived at the scene, one of the officers told him that
Lawson had verbally consented to a search as soon as the officer
had found the little bag of suspected hashish, about the time of
Hamilton’s arrest at 4:00 a.m.
however, Lawson denied this.
At the suppression hearing,
She testified that as soon as the
officers found the marijuana in Hamilton’s coat and the little
bag of supposed hashish on the floor, they had immediately begun
looking around for more drug evidence and badgering her for
consent to search.
Three times during the next hour, she said,
she had refused their demands for consent, and only when the
officers threatened her with arrest and the loss of her child had
she executed the consent form.
By then, for all intents and
purposes, she testified, the search had already taken place.
The trial court found that the officers had not validly
obtained Lawson’s consent and therefore agreed to suppress any
evidence discovered in drawers and cupboards during the officers’
full evidentiary search after her execution of the consent form.
The court believed, however, that the officers had had a right to
make a protective sweep of the residence, both inside and
outside, and that the evidence discovered in plain view during
that sweep would be admissible.
Hamilton contends that the trial
court applied the notion of a permissible, warrantless protective
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sweep too broadly.
We agree, but not to the extent that Hamilton
would like.
At the core of the constitutional guarantees against
unreasonable searches and seizures is protection against the
state’s unjustified intrusion into private homes.7
With a
handful of narrow exceptions, agents of the state must obtain a
search warrant before they may enter a residence or its immediate
surroundings to look for evidence.8
As Hamilton points out,
there is no “crime scene” exception to this general warrant
requirement.9
Police officers may enter the scene of a fresh
crime, including a residence, to look for perpetrators, victims,
or conditions they reasonably suspect of posing a substantial and
immediate risk of harm.10
warrant is sought.11
They may secure the scene while a
And they may seize evidence in plain view
during such an entry.12
They may not, however, extend their
entry beyond what is necessary for these limited purposes, and,
of course, they may not search for evidence, absent a bona fide
7
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290, 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978).
8
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 94 L. Ed. 2d 326, 107 S. Ct. 1134 (1987).
9
Mincey v. Arizona, supra; Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 145 L. Ed. 2d 16, 120
S. Ct. 7 (1999); Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 83 L. Ed. 2d 246, 105 S. Ct. 409 (1984).
10
Mincey v. Arizona, supra.
11
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 82 L. Ed. 2d 599, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984); United
States v. Taylor, 248 F. 3d 506 (6th Cir. 2001).
12
Mincey v. Arizona, supra.
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exigency, until they have a warrant or valid consent.13
The
state bears the burden of justifying a warrantless search.14
The trial court believed that the officers’ protective
sweep of Hamilton’s entire home was a legitimate part of their
securing the scene of the shooting and arrest.
Their warrantless
seizure of evidence in plain view during that sweep, therefore,
did not, according to the trial court, offend our constitutions.
In Maryland v. Buie,15 however, a case that considered protective
sweeps in conjunction with in-home arrests, such as the one
before us, the United States Supreme Court limited the right of
police officers to make such sweeps.
to be automatic, the Court said.
Protective sweeps are not
Rather, the searching officer
must possess “a reasonable belief based on specific and
articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual
posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.”16
We agree with the trial court that the footprints
leading to the back of Hamilton’s residence justified the
officers’ protective sweep of that area.
The evidence discovered
in plain view behind the house and in the unlocked storage shed,
therefore, was admissible, as the trial court ruled.
We do not
agree, however, that the officers justified their sweep of the
13
Bilida v. McCleod, 211 F. 3d 166 (1st Cir. 2000); Middleton v. State, 714 N. E. 2d 1099
(Ind. 1999).
14
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 26 L. Ed. 2d 409, 90 S. Ct. 1969 (1970); Colbert v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 43 S.W.3d 777 (2001).
15
494 U.S. 325, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276, 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990).
16
494 U.S. at 337, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 288, 110 S. Ct. at 1099-1100. See also United States
v. Colbert, 76 F. 3d 773 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Morgan, 743 F. 2d 1158 (6th Cir. 1984).
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inside of Hamilton’s home.
They articulated no facts from which
they might reasonably have suspected that a third person was
there.
On the contrary, Lawson’s testimony strongly suggests
that rather than suspecting any danger, the officers merely
balked at having to obtain an inconvenient warrant.
Their
“sweep” of the inside of the residence, therefore, was unlawful,
and even evidence found in plain view during that “sweep” should
have been suppressed.
That evidence included the allegedly defaced firearm, a
gun with a modified barrel.
At oral argument, the parties
stipulated that the gun had been found in a bedroom.
In light of
our ruling that the search of the residence was illegal,
therefore, Hamilton will be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea
to the defaced-firearm charge.
remain unaffected.
The other charges, however,
Accordingly, we reverse the September 11,
2001, judgment of the Pike Circuit Court to the extent that it
convicted Hamilton of possessing a defaced firearm and remand to
permit Hamilton to withdraw that portion of his guilty plea.
In
all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Richard Hoffman
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Anitria M. Franklin
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Anitria M. Franklin
Frankfort, Kentucky
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