THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE UNDER THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF JAMES B. ALLEN, DECEASED; ANNE D. ALLEN and JANE A. DEVAN v. PNC BANK, N.A., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTOR UNDER THE WILL OF JAMES B. ALLEN AND BANK ONE, N.A., EXECUTOR UNDER THE WILL OF EDITH ALLEN; and DONNA MILLER
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December 13, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-002040-MR
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE UNDER THE
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
JAMES B. ALLEN, DECEASED;
ANNE D. ALLEN and JANE A. DEVAN
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM CLARK CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JULIA HYLTON ADAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00196
v.
PNC BANK, N.A., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
EXECUTOR UNDER THE WILL OF JAMES B. ALLEN
AND
BANK ONE, N.A., EXECUTOR UNDER THE WILL OF
EDITH ALLEN; and DONNA MILLER
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, HUDDLESTON, AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE:
The Advisory Committee under the will of
James B. Allen appeals the Clark Circuit Court’s decision denying
the Committee’s request to remove PNC Bank, N.A., as the executor
of Allen’s estate pursuant to KRS1 395.510.
Although its claim
below alleged acts of mismanagement, neglect, and breach of
fiduciary duties requiring the removal of PNC, the Advisory
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
Committee now claims that the case is only about conflicts of
interest.
We discern no error by the trial court and thus
affirm.
James B. Allen died testate on October 18, 1997.
He
was survived by his wife, Edith Allen, and three daughters from a
previous marriage:
Anne Douglas (Penny) Allen, Jane Allen DeVan,
and Donna Allen Miller.
Committee.
These daughters comprised the Advisory
This committee was established by Allen’s will to
“consult with and advise [the] Executor and Trustee regarding all
important matters affecting [the] estate . . . .”
However, Donna
resigned her position shortly after the will was probated and
stated that she did not want to participate with her sisters in a
“vendetta” against Mrs. Allen.
The Clark District Court admitted Mr. Allen’s will to
probate on November 6, 1997, and appointed PNC Bank, N.A., as
executor.
will.
On November 7, 1997, Mrs. Allen renounced Mr. Allen’s
After a summary judgment finding the renunciation valid,
this court confirmed the renunciation’s validity.
See The
Advisory Committee v. PNC Bank and Bank One, No. 1999-CA-000482MR, rendered April 21, 2000, not to be published.
Disputes and litigation surrounding Mr. Allen’s wealth
characterized the period of time immediately before his death and
all the years following.
Before his death, a dispute arose
concerning Mrs. Allen’s expenditures as his guardian.
She had
been appointed guardian after he suffered a debilitating stroke
in 1993.
While his guardian, she made many expenditures of his
funds which were questioned, and she requested a large guardian
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fee in the settlement.
As the dispute over Mrs. Allen’s guardian
expenditures and fee festered, a dispute arose in Wisconsin over
the negligent construction and design of a yacht Mr. Allen had
commissioned.
Mr. and Mrs. Allen were named defendants in a
lawsuit filed in that state.
After much litigation, the Wisconsin and the
guardianship disputes were settled.
Included in the settlements
were standard releases from liability arising from the subject
matter of the disputes.
Mrs. Allen had sought $2 million for her
services as guardian, but she settled with the estate for $35,000
plus the payment of her attorney’s fees relating to the Wisconsin
dispute.
In addition, the estate settled with the Wisconsin
plaintiff for $100,000.
By this point, litigation related to
Mrs. Allen’s renunciation had commenced with vigor.
After Mr. Allen’s death, another dispute arose between
Mrs. Allen and the members of the Advisory Committee; this one
concerned the distribution of personal property contained in a
home included in the estate.
After lengthy negotiations and
PNC’s suggestion that court intervention might be sought to reach
a resolution, the members of the Advisory Committee and Mrs.
Allen settled the issue and executed a standard release from
liability concerning the subject matter of that dispute.
Meanwhile, another dispute began to simmer; this one
concerned differing valuations of the most valuable asset in Mr.
Allen’s estate - his 57% ownership interest in The Allen Company.
An initial appraisal suggested a date-of-death valuation of $13.3
million.
However, the Advisory Committee, Mrs. Allen, and PNC
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believed that estimate to be low.
Moreover, a concern arose over
the effect a low appraisal might have on efforts to sell the
stock.
PNC then commissioned another appraisal.
This second
appraisal determined that the value of the ownership interest was
$16.3 million as of October 22, 1998.
An IRS audit and a dispute
over estate taxes ensued.
Mr. Allen’s will provided that his daughters would be
responsible for the estate tax liability while they would share
responsibility for capital gains tax liability with Mrs. Allen.
Thus, while the daughters sought a low date-of-death valuation of
the estate, Mrs. Allen sought a high one.
Accordingly, each
party argued for their respective position: the daughters argued
that The Allen Company stock increased in value after Mr. Allen’s
death from $13.3 million to $16.3 million, and Mrs. Allen argued
that The Allen Company stock’s value was always $16.3 million or
more.
Nevertheless, before the second appraisal was received,
the deadline for filing the estate tax return arrived.
PNC filed
the estate tax return and assigned the value to the stock from
the first appraisal, $13.3 million.
Finally, the stock was sold to Leonard Lawson for $18
million plus a $2 million control premium.
In addition, the
terms of the sale provided that Lawson would pay Mr. Allen’s
daughters $400,000.
Hugh Gabbard, the president of The Allen
Company and a former “advisory director” of PNC Bank’s Lexington
and Richmond locations, participated in the purchase of The Allen
Company stock with Lawson.
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After the stock sale, PNC invested the proceeds in the
Black Rock Municipal Money Market Fund.
free investment.
It was a liquid, tax-
PNC held an equity interest in the company that
managed the investment fund, but it did not own it.
Over a year after the stock sale and the investment in
Black Rock, the Advisory Committee filed a motion in the Clark
Circuit Court seeking PNC’s removal.
After amending a previous
complaint and providing a “More Particular Statement,” the
Advisory Committee provided the basis for its complaint: it
alleged acts of mismanagement, neglect, and breach of fiduciary
duties by PNC that necessitated removal pursuant to KRS 395.510.
The trial court considered all of the Advisory
Committee’s allegations concerning PNC’s activity as executor.
It found the Advisory Committee “failed to show by even a
preponderance of the evidence that PNC . . . committed acts of
mismanagement, misrepresentation, neglect, fraud or breach of its
duties . . .”
Thus, it concluded that PNC’s removal pursuant to
KRS 395.510 was not proper and denied the Advisory Committee’s
request.
The trial court’s order was entered on June 21, 2001,
and this appeal followed.
Now, the Advisory Committee claims the only issue in
this case is conflicts of interest - “nothing else.”
It argues
that conflicts of interest existed between PNC and the estate
mandating removal of PNC as executor.
However, the trial court
did not find the conflicts alleged by the Advisory Committee.
“An execut[or] is a fiduciary” holding the testator’s
estate as trustee.
Lucas v. Mannering, Ky. App., 745 S.W.2d 654,
-5-
656 (1987).
distributees.
He represents the testator, heirs, legatees, and
Id.
He fulfils his duty to them by executing the
wishes of the testator impartially, Hurst v. First Kentucky Trust
Co., Ky., 560 S.W.2d 819, 821 (1978), and by preserving and
maximizing the value of the estate.
Moberley's Guardian v. Mt.
Sterling Nat. Bank, 187 Ky. 403, 410, 219 S.W. 423 (1920).
When a testator names an executor, the testator’s
wishes should be followed if possible.
663, 672, 26 S.W.2d 526 (1930).
Nunn v. Hamilton, 233 Ky.
Nonetheless, circumstances may
exist where the named executor is apparently unable to faithfully
execute his duty.
See Ewald v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust
Co., Ky., 305 S.W.2d 533, 534-536 (1957), for an analysis of
cases considering circumstances where an executor appeared unable
to fulfil his duty.
For instance, a court properly refuses to
qualify the named executor when he holds a personal claim against
the estate.
Id.
However, when the testator’s choice for
executor is qualified by the court, a presumption that the
executor will faithfully discharge his duty to the testator,
heirs, legatees, and distributees arises.
See Kuechler v.
Rubbathen, 266 Ky., 390, 395, 200 S.W.2d 74 (1936), where the
court denied appellant’s request to disqualify an executor for
hostility or a lack of sympathy toward the legatees of the will;
the court noted “that the law presumes honesty and fair dealings
among people until the contrary has been shown, and the court
cannot anticipate or presume dishonesty and unfair dealings until
such has been clearly established.”
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Id.
A party seeking the executor’s removal must overcome
the burden posed by the presumption.
This may be done by
establishing one of the grounds for automatic removal listed in
KRS 395.160.
Pursuant to KRS 395.160, a party may be removed for
failure to designate a process agent if he moves out of state;
for bankruptcy or insolvency or “failing circumstances;” for
becoming insane; or if he is “otherwise incapable to discharge
the trust.”
Id.
These grounds must be presented in district
court, KRS 395.160, and the proceeding is nonadversarial.
See
Ewald v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., Ky., 305 S.W.2d 533,
534-535 (1957), where the court recognized that the nature rather
than the merits of an alleged conflict of interest is to be
considered when deciding whether to remove or disqualify an
executor for an inability to “discharge the trust.” Cf. Morris v.
Brien, Ky. App., 712 S.W.2d 347 (1986).
Thus, when removal is
sought for an executor’s conflict of interests, the trial court
need only view the circumstances surrounding the alleged conflict
to determine if the executor can faithfully discharge his duties.
If the court concludes that the executor cannot, it properly
removes him or refuses to qualify him.
See Ewald, supra.
Another method for overcoming the presumption is
through an action for settlement under KRS 395.510(1).
The party
seeking the removal must prove that the executor committed acts
of mismanagement, fraud, deceit, breach of fiduciary duties, or
the like while administering the estate.
See Priestley v.
Priestley, Ky., 949 S.W.2d 594, 597 (1997).
Unlike removal
actions for alleged conflicts of interest, this action is
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conducted in circuit court and is adversarial in nature:
the
trial court considers the nature as well as the merits of the
allegations.
See Priestly, supra, and Lee v. Porter, Ky. App.,
598 S.W.2d 465 (1980).
In the instant case, an action to remove an executor
was prosecuted pursuant to KRS 395.510 in Clark Circuit Court
against PNC Bank, the executor of James B. Allen’s estate.
The
Advisory Committee of the estate - which is comprised of the
estate’s primary beneficiaries, Mr. Allen’s daughters - alleged
acts of mismanagement, neglect, and breach of fiduciary duties by
PNC.
On March 8, 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing at
which each side presented its evidence and arguments for or
against PNC’s removal.
The court entered its order denying the
Advisory Committee’s request to remove PNC and finding that the
Advisory Committee failed to show evidence of mismanagement,
fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duties
sufficient to warrant PNC’s removal.
The Advisory Committee claims that the circuit court
mistook the claim for PNC’s removal.
only about conflicts of interest.
It insists that the case is
However, the Advisory
Committee neither challenges the findings of the circuit court
nor cites to evidence in the record that might demonstrate the
findings were clearly erroneous.
The parties tried the case to the court without a jury.
The appropriate standard of review for such findings was
discussed by this court in Cole v. Gilvin, Ky. App., 59 S.W.3d
468 (2001).
The court stated:
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Since this case was tried before the court
without a jury, its factual findings "shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses." A factual
finding is not clearly erroneous if it is
supported by substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence is evidence of substance
and relevant consequence sufficient to induce
conviction in the minds of reasonable people.
"It is within the province of the fact-finder
to determine the credibility of witnesses and
the weight to be given the evidence."
Id. at 472-73. (citations omitted).
Thus, the reviewing court
need only inquire whether substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s findings.
If so, they should not be overturned.
The district court is a court of limited jurisdiction,
and its original jurisdiction is limited to those matters
provided by the General Assembly. Kentucky Constitution § 113.
Furthermore, when the General Assembly grants jurisdiction over
any matter to the district court, its jurisdiction is exclusive
unless the statute “specifically states that the jurisdiction
shall be concurrent.”
KRS 24A.020.
The General Assembly provided the district court with
original jurisdiction in all matters specified in KRS 24A.110 to
24A.130.
KRS 24A.010 (1).
Thus, as KRS 24A.120 provides, the
district court has jurisdiction in probate matters except those
probate matters “contested in an adversary proceeding.”
24A.120 (1) (b).
KRS
The General Assembly deemed a matter
“nonadversarial . . . and therefore . . . within the jurisdiction
of the district court” if it is a probate matter and a statute
does not provide for it to be commenced in circuit court.
24A.120 (1) (c).
Thus, the district court enjoys exclusive
KRS
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jurisdiction over the removal of an executor for conflicts of
interest - that is, when an executor is “incapable to discharge
the trust,” Morris, supra - since the General Assembly did not
also grant such jurisdiction to the circuit court.
(1); KRS 24A.020.
KRS 395.160
Accordingly, to the extent the Advisory
Committee sought the removal of PNC Bank for grounds specified or
covered by KRS 395.160, the district court and not the circuit
court had jurisdiction.
See Lee, supra, where the court noted
that the district court will have jurisdiction over actions to
remove personal representatives when the grounds for removal are
those provided in KRS 395.160.
However, as the trial court noted
in the instant case, it would be unreasonable to confine the
remedy of removing a personal representative to district courts
when it might be the appropriate remedy for a personal
representative’s mismanagement, fraud, or breach of fiduciary
duties proven in a circuit court action.
See Priestly, supra,
for support of this theory.
KRS 395.160 (1) includes grounds for automatic removal,
such as when the personal representative fails to designate a
process agent if he moves out of state; when the personal
representative is bankrupt or insolvent or is in “failing
circumstances;” when the personal representative becomes insane;
or when the personal representative is “otherwise incapable to
discharge the trust.”
Id.
The concept of “incapable to
discharge the trust” includes conflicts of interest.
supra.
See Morris,
Thus, a personal representative’s removal solely for
conflicts of interest does not fall within the circuit court’s
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jurisdiction.
See Lee, 598 S.W.2d at 467.
However, if a
conflict of interest manifests in the form of mismanagement,
neglect, fraud, deception, misrepresentation, or breach of
fiduciary duties and an action for settlement pursuant to KRS
395.510 is instituted, the circuit court will have jurisdiction
to consider the alleged matters and may remove the personal
representative for the alleged bad acts.
Priestly, supra; see also Lee, supra.
KRS 395.510.
See
Thus, a party may use KRS
395.160 or KRS 395.510 to effect the removal of a personal
representative.
However, the basis for removing and the court in
which the action for removal must be brought is different in each
instance.
When a party seeks the removal pursuant to KRS 395.160
for conflicts of interest, the merits of the alleged conflict
need not be considered by the court.
supra; Morris, supra; and Lee, supra.
KRS 395.160; see Ewald,
Accordingly, the courts
and the General Assembly demonstrated that removal pursuant to
KRS 395.160 is nonadversarial and to be dealt with in district
court.
KRS 395.160 and KRS 24A.120 (1) (b) & (c).
Conversely,
the courts and the General Assembly demonstrated that removal
pursuant to KRS 395.510 is adversarial and to be dealt with in
circuit court.
KRS 395.510;
Priestly, 949 S.W.2d at 597.
see Lee, 598 S.W.2d at 467, and
Accordingly, once the Advisory
Committee brought its claim pursuant to KRS 395.510 alleging
mismanagement, neglect, and breach of fiduciary duties by PNC,
the circuit court properly exercised jurisdiction of the matter
and considered the bad acts alleged by the Advisory Committee.
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This matter was tried to the court on March 8, 2001,
and the court entered its order on June 21, 2001.
The
appropriate standard of review gives deference to the trial
court’s findings since, as fact-finder, the trial court viewed
the evidence first-hand and may more accurately evaluate the
weight and credibility it deserves.
Indeed, only when the
reviewing court can say the trial court’s findings are clearly
erroneous should those findings be overturned.
Thus, if
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings, they
should be affirmed.
In the instant case, the trial court considered five
interwoven yet distinct fact situations that comprised the
Advisory Committee’s claims of mismanagement, neglect, and breach
of fiduciary duties by PNC.
First, the trial court considered
PNC’s actions concerning Mrs. Allen’s renunciation of Mr.
Allen’s will.
Second, the trial court considered PNC’s actions
concerning the disposition of Mr. Allen’s personal property.
Third, the trial court considered PNC’s actions concerning the
sale of The Allen Company stock.
Fourth, it considered PNC’s
actions concerning the valuation of the estate and the IRS
inquiry.
Finally, the trial court considered PNC’s actions
concerning the investment of the proceeds from the sale of The
Allen Company Stock in Black Rock Municipal Money Market Fund.
After considering each one, the trial court found that PNC did
not act in a manner warranting its removal as executor or
warranting an order for a settlement of the estate.
Finally, the
trial court found the Advisory Committee failed to show by even a
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preponderance of the evidence any “acts of mismanagement,
misrepresentation, neglect, fraud or breach of its fiduciary
duties so as to award relief under KRS 395.510 . . . .”
Now, the Advisory Committee claims this case is only
about conflicts of interest.
Yet, it admitted in its brief that
removal for pure conflicts of interest is
nonadversarial.
Nonadversarial probate matters are the domain of district court,
KRS 24A.120 (1) (b), and the General Assembly made removal for
conflicts of interest the exclusive province of district courts.
KRS 395.160.
Thus, if this case were solely about conflicts of
interest, the Advisory Committee sought removal in the wrong
court.
The Advisory Committee’s filings and the manner in which
it prosecuted the case in circuit court contradict its assertion
that the case is about conflicts of interest only .
The Advisory
Committee alleged acts of mismanagement, neglect, and breach of
fiduciary duties by PNC, and it characterized these acts as the
basis for the relief it sought.
First, the Advisory Committee claims PNC acted
improperly when it refused to oppose Mrs. Allen’s renunciation of
the will.
estate.
An executor has a duty to maximize the value of the
Moberley’s Guardian, supra.
Thus, the Advisory
Committee argues PNC had a duty to oppose the renunciation since
the renunciation had the effect of diminishing the estate that
would be available for distribution to the members of the
Advisory Committee.
The trial court reviewed the parties’ actions
surrounding the renunciation.
It found that the Advisory
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Committee actively opposed the renunciation by litigating its
validity vigorously and thoroughly and that PNC effectively
preserved estate resources by avoiding the legal costs that would
accompany joining in the litigation.
In addition, PNC had
concluded that the renunciation was validly made, and its
conclusion was confirmed, first by the circuit court’s summary
judgment finding the renunciation valid, and then by this court’s
decision affirming the trial court’s judgment.
A review of the
record reveals substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s
findings concerning the renunciation litigation.
Thus, those
findings should not be overturned.
Second, a controversy arose during the administration
of the Allen estate concerning the distribution of personal
property contained within a home included in the estate.
The
Advisory Committee claims that PNC concluded property purchased
by Mr. Allen was not solely Mr. Allen’s property but the joint
property of Mr. and Mrs. Allen and suggested that if the parties
could not reach a resolution concerning the distribution of the
personal property it would seek court intervention to do so.
Consequently, the Advisory Committee argues that it was forced to
enter into an inequitable settlement concerning the personal
property by PNC’s insistence upon seeking court intervention if a
resolution was not reached.
The trial court addressed PNC’s actions surrounding the
personal property dispute and the settlement entered by the
Advisory Committee.
It noted that the dispute concerning the
personal property raged for quite some time with many revisions
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being made to the property listing.
Finally, after several
unsuccessful efforts to resolve the dispute, the parties executed
a property settlement.
The court found the Advisory Committee
was represented by able counsel during all aspects of the dispute
including the execution of the settlement.
Furthermore, it found
that PNC properly refused to take dispositive action concerning
the personal property since it was faced with competing claims.
The court concluded that no evidence supported a finding of
“coercion, fraud or misrepresentation as it related to PNC’s
duties regarding the . . . personal property.”
Substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s findings, and the Advisory
Committee fails to cite to evidence reflecting “coercion, fraud
or misrepresentation” by PNC that the trial court may have
overlooked.
Accordingly, the court’s findings should be upheld.
Several appraisals of The Allen Company stock were
made.
The first appraisal valued the stock at Mr. Allen’s death
at $13.3 million.
All parties agreed at that time that the
appraisal undervalued the stock, so the second appraisal was
commissioned.
It valued the stock as of October 1998 - several
months after Mr. Allen’s death - at $16.3 million.
Since the
will provided that taxes attributable to increases in the value
of the estate should be shared by Mrs. Allen and Mr. Allen’s
daughters while the estate taxes should be paid only by the
daughters, the Advisory Committee argued that the value of the
stock increased after Mr. Allen’s death from $13.3 million.
Conversely, Mrs. Allen, then her estate, argued that the value of
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the stock at death was actually $16.3 million or more rather than
$13.3 million.
Meanwhile, the estate tax return deadline arrived, so
PNC filed the return.
However, the second appraisal had not
arrived, so PNC used the value estimated by the first appraisal $13.3 million.
Then, the IRS sent notice that it planned to
audit the estate.
To clarify the date-of-death value of The
Allen Company stock in light of the disparity between the first
two appraisals and the $20 million sales price, PNC requested an
additional appraisal; this third appraisal valued the stock at
$19.7 million as of Mr. Allen’s death.
The Advisory Committee claims that PNC sought a third
appraisal of the estate’s largest asset knowing it would provide
a higher date-of-death value than the other appraisals, in turn
causing the estate’s position in negotiations with the IRS to be
weakened and the estate tax to be increased.
According to the
Advisory Committee, seeking the third appraisal breached PNC’s
duty to maximize the estate by minimizing taxes.
The trial court addressed PNC’s actions surrounding the
appraisal.
After finding the above facts, the court concluded
that “no evidence of fraud, mismanagement or breach of fiduciary
duty related to the tax issue” existed in the record.
Since the
record supports the court’s findings and the Advisory Committee
failed to point to facts showing the existence of some bad act by
PNC that the court may have overlooked, the trial court’s
findings should be upheld.
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After PNC sold The Allen Company stock, it invested a
large portion of the proceeds into a Black Rock Tax Free
Municipal Money Market Fund.
The Advisory Committee claims this
was improper since PNC was the majority interest holder in the
fund’s parent company and derived a benefit from the income of
the parent company.
The trial court addressed PNC’s actions concerning the
investment in Black Rock.
It noted that PNC attempted to follow
the Advisory Committee’s recommendation concerning the investment
of the proceeds from the stock.
liquidity and tax-free status.
The fund provided desired
The trial court concluded that
the evidence failed to demonstrate that PNC was negligent in the
administration of the stock proceeds or that other specific
investments were superior to the return of PNC’s investments when
considering risk, economic instability, liquidity, long-term
issues, expense of acquisition, and tax-free status.
Finally,
the court recognized that KRS 287.272 serves as statutory
authority permitting PNC’s investment in Black Rock Funds.
Moreover, it concluded that evidence did not support a finding of
fraud, mismanagement, or breach of a fiduciary duty by PNC as it
relates to investment of estate assets.
Since substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s findings and the Advisory
Committee failed to show that the trial court’s findings were
clearly erroneous, they should not be overturned.
The largest asset of the estate was the stock in The
Allen Company.
It was valued by various appraisals from $13.3
million to $19.7 million.
The interested parties deemed a sale
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of the stock followed by a distribution of the cash as the best
method for handling this particular estate asset.
began a process aimed at selling the stock.
Thus, PNC
However, the
Advisory Committee charges that during this process PNC
endeavored to benefit PNC insiders to the detriment of the estate
by offering the stock to them at a lower price than an auction
would have provided and by stalling an ongoing auction to sell
the stock.
Thus, it argues that PNC breached its fiduciary duty
to maximize the estate.
The trial court carefully reviewed the Advisory
Committee’s allegation concerning PNC’s efforts to sell the
stock, and contrary to the Advisory Committee’s assertions, it
did not find PNC’s efforts lacking or a breach of its fiduciary
duty.
However, the court did find the Advisory Committee members
through their efforts to manipulate the stock sale process
hampered PNC’s efforts to effect an auction of the stock at its
highest possible price.
To achieve the highest possible price for the stock,
PNC proposed an auction-type marketing effort to potential buyers
in The Allen Company industry.
PNC distributed sales
announcements and information packets to potential buyers and
several responded.
However, unknown to PNC, other efforts had
been made by the Advisory Committee and by certain members of The
Allen Company senior management to negotiate a sale of the stock.
The Advisory Committee negotiated with Leonard Lawson
for the purchase of the stock.
It agreed to approve his purchase
of the stock in exchange for $18 million, plus a $2 million
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control premium in addition to $400,000 and the attempted
transfer of season tickets to University of Kentucky football and
basketball games to Mr. Allen’s daughters for certain real
property and non-compete agreements.
Moreover, the Advisory
Committee, along with Mrs. Allen and Donna Miller, informed PNC
that they desired the sale to Lawson.
While Lawson conducted negotiations with the Advisory
Committee, he executed an agreement with Hugh Gabbard and Rich
Monohan - senior managers, directors, and stockholders of The
Allen Company.
The agreement provided that Lawson, Gabbard, and
Monohan would purchase The Allen Company with Gabbard and Monohan
owning in the aggregate forty-nine percent of the equity.
After
full disclosure to the other directors of the dealings between
Lawson, Gabbard, and Monohan, the directors approved the sale to
Lawson and waived the corporation’s rights under a buy/sell
agreement.
After the Lawson sale was approved, the parties
executed an Acquisition Agreement that detailed the parties’
rights and responsibilities.
It included each shareholder’s
waiver of rights under the buy-sell agreement; an acknowledgment
by all parties indicating they received copies of correspondence
concerning the purchase of The Allen Company; the Advisory
Committee’s and Mrs. Allen’s express approval of the sale to
Lawson; and an “Acknowledgment, Release and Settlement” in which
all parties acknowledged receipt of a copy of the agreement
between Lawson, Gabbard, and Monohan and satisfaction with the
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answers to questions concerning the agreement.
Finally, the
waiver provided:
Each party hereto waives, releases and
relinquishes unto each of the other parties
hereto, in both individual and fiduciary
capacities, if any, each and every claim,
liability, obligation, cause of action, right
and every other matter of any kind or
description, however denominated, whether
vested or contingent, realized or inchoate,
known or unknown, sounding in tort, contract
or otherwise, including (without limitation)
fiduciary obligations, arising out of or
related to the subject matter of this
Agreement or in any manner from the sale of
the Shares by virtue of this Agreement
(“Claim”). . . . The parties hereto further
acknowledge that: (a) the consummation of the
transactions contemplated by this Agreement
are in settlement of any Claim against the
other; (b) this Section 2.10 specifically
waives, releases and settles (without
limitation) any claim against any party
hereto for executing this Agreement and for
any action or inaction of such party related
to the sale of the Shares; and (c) the
matters waived, released and settled herein
are also waived, released and settled with
respect to and for the benefit of all
officers, directors, employees, members,
attorneys, accountants, agents and other
persons advising and/or participating with
any person or entity which is a party hereto,
or any party described in Sections 2.5 and
2.6 hereto.
The trial court addressed PNC’s actions surrounding the
sale of the stock.
It recognized that The Allen Company senior
management and the Advisory Committee attempted to intervene in
the bid process and acted to secure the interests that were
important to them but that were not necessarily effective to
maximize the estate.
In addition, the court found no evidence
that PNC coerced the Advisory Committee during the stock sale
process, that the Committee was represented by competent counsel
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during the process, and that the waiver and release was valid.
Finally, the trial court concluded that there was insufficient
evidence “to support a claim in reliance on KRS 395.510.”
The Advisory Committee raised conflict of interest
concerns regarding Hugh Gabbard, a director, stockholder, and
president of The Allen Company.
Gabbard served on PNC’s
Lexington and Richmond bank advisory boards.
The Advisory
Committee alleged that PNC colluded with Gabbard to his benefit
and to the detriment of the estate during the stock sale process.
However, the trial court found that the Advisory Committee failed
to develop evidence of any collusion or undue influence.
The
court found that Gabbard acted independently as did the Advisory
Committee when negotiating with Lawson, each to the frustration
of PNC and its efforts to achieve the highest price through an
auction process.
The trial court’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence and should be upheld.
James B. Allen’s wealth and the acts of parties
interested in it spawned seemingly limitless controversy.
Mr.
Allen’s daughters and widow squared-off before Mrs. Allen’s
death.
Then, after her death, her estate continued the battle.
The dispute involved in this case concerns the actions
of PNC Bank, the executor of Mr. Allen’s estate.
While the
Advisory Committee to the estate that sought PNC’s removal now
attempts to claim that pure conflicts of interest rather than bad
acts are the focus of the case, the pleadings and arguments
presented to the circuit court reveal otherwise.
This case was
filed in circuit court seeking removal of PNC Bank pursuant to
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KRS 395.510 for its bad acts, including mismanagement, neglect,
and breach of fiduciary duties.
The trial court conducted a hearing, and each of the
Advisory Committee’s allegations concerning PNC’s actions as
executor was addressed.
In turn, the trial court entered an
order addressing them.
It found in each instance that PNC did
not commit the bad acts alleged by the Advisory Committee.
Substantial evidence supports these findings.
Subsequently, the
trial court concluded that “the plaintiffs have failed to show by
even a preponderance of the evidence that PNC . . . has committed
acts of mismanagement, misrepresentation, neglect, fraud or
breach of its fiduciary duties so as to award relief under KRS
395.510 including the equitable remedy of removal of the
executor.” Because relief pursuant to KRS 395.510 necessitates
finding the personal representative committed bad acts of some
sort or another in its role as representative, the trial court’s
refusal to award relief under KRS 395.510 was proper since no
such bad acts by PNC were found.
The order of the Clark Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, PNC BANK,
N.A., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
EXECUTOR UNDER THE WILL OF
JAMES B. ALLEN:
Robert S. Miller
Lexington, Kentucky
David Tachau
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, BANK ONE
KENTUCKY, N.A., EXECUTOR UNDER
THE WILL OF EDITH ALLEN:
David T. Royce
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, DONNA
MILLER:
Kevin G. Henry
Lexington, Kentucky
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