QUANTEZ GIBSON v. PHILLIP PARKER
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
OCTOBER 25, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 2001-CA-002034-MR
QUANTEZ GIBSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LYON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BILL CUNNINGHAM, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-CI-00033
v.
PHILLIP PARKER
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, Chief Judge; DYCHE and HUDDLESTON, Judges.
HUDDLESTON, Judge:
Quantez Gibson appeals from a Lyon Circuit
Court order dismissing his petition for declaratory judgment.
Gibson, an inmate at the Kentucky State Penitentiary, filed the
petition in Lyon Circuit Court against Philip Parker, Warden at
Kentucky State Penitentiary, and three members of the Kentucky
State Penitentiary Adjustment Committee,1 alleging that his due
1
Gibson did not name the
Committee in his notice of appeal.
members
of
the
Adjustment
process rights were violated in a disciplinary action taken against
him.
On October 24, 2000, Gibson was involved in a fight with
another inmate, Laron Spaulding. Correctional Officer R. Dixon was
on the scene and ordered the two inmates to stop fighting.
The
inmates did not comply with the order, so Dixon attempted to pull
Spaulding from the fight.
While Dixon was holding Spaulding,
Gibson jumped on Spaulding, knocking both Spaulding and Dixon to
the
ground.
Another
correctional
officer
on
the
scene,
T.
Henderson, attempted to pull Gibson off of Spaulding and Dixon, but
Gibson resisted.
Eventually, Henderson wrapped his arm around
Gibson’s neck and pulled him away.
Gibson
was
subsequently
charged
with
violating
Corrections Policies and Procedures (CPP) 15.2 Category VII, Item
1, the offense of “physical action against an employee or noninmate.”2
On October 31, 2000, the penitentiary’s Adjustment
Committee heard Gibson’s case and found him guilty of the charge.
Gibson was punished with 180 days of disciplinary segregation and
the loss of two years non-restorable good time credits.
Gibson’s
appeal to the Warden was unsuccessful.
On
February
8,
2001,
pursuant
to
Kentucky
Revised
Statutes (KRS) 418.040, Gibson filed a petition for declaration of
rights in Lyon Circuit Court alleging that there was insufficient
evidence to support his conviction of physical action against an
2
For resisting Officer Henderson’s efforts to pull him off
of Spaulding and Dixon, Gibson was also charged with and convicted
of the offense of resisting.
However, the disposition of that
charge is not at issue in this appeal.
-2-
employee; that he was denied the opportunity to call witnesses and
to present a security camera recording of the incident; and that
the adjustment committee failed to make adequate findings.
The
Department of Corrections responded on behalf of the defendants and
filed a motion to dismiss.
On August 7, 2001, the circuit court
dismissed Gibson’s petition for declaratory judgment.
This appeal
followed.
It is well-established that "a prison inmate facing
administrative disciplinary proceedings does not have the same
procedural safeguards as does a person facing criminal prosecution
or even parole revocation . . . ."3
Nevertheless, "fundamental
fairness dictates that the evidence relied upon to punish him at
least
be
reliable."4
In
cases,
as
here,
involving
the
administrative revocation of good time, the minimum requirements of
procedural due process are:
(1) advanced written notice of the
disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with
institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and
present
documentary
evidence
in
defense;
and
(3)
a
written
statement by the fact-finder of the evidence relied upon and the
reasons for the disciplinary action.5
Furthermore a disciplinary
decision may not be disturbed on appeal if "some evidence supports
the decision by the prison disciplinary board to revoke good time
3
Byerly v. Ashley, Ky. App., 825 S.W.2d 286, 288 (1991).
See also Gilhaus v. Wilson, Ky. App., 734 S.W.2d 808, 809 (1987).
4
Byerly, 825 S.W.2d at 288.
5
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-567, 94 S. Ct.
2963, 2978-2982, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974).
-3-
credits.”6
This
court
has
recognized
and
followed
these
requirements.7
First,
Gibson
contends
that
there
was
insufficient
evidence to support a finding that he was guilty of physical action
against an employee and that the circuit court erred in deciding
that the disciplinary committee need not determine his criminal
intent in its determination of his guilt.
As a result of the October 24, 2000, incident, Gibson was
charged with engaging in a physical action against an employee of
the prison.
According to Officer Dixon’s incident report, Sgt.
Lois Lyle’s investigation report, and Officer Dixon’s hearing
testimony, Gibson jumped on Spaulding while Dixon was restraining
Spaulding and, as a result, both Spaulding and Dixon were knocked
to the ground.
Gibson does not dispute Dixon’s version of the
events but, rather, the interpretation of the facts, and cites
Dixon’s testimony in support of his claim that his conduct on
October 24, 2000, does not meet the elements for a finding of guilt
for “physical action against an employee or non-inmate.”
It
appears to be Gibson’s contention that his physical action was
directed against Spaulding only, and not against Dixon, and,
therefore, the charge of physical action against an employee was
unjustified.
6
Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution,
Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454, 105 S. Ct. 2768, 2773, 86 L.
Ed. 2d 356 (1985).
7
Smith v. O'Dea, Ky. App., 939 S.W.2d 353, 357 (1997);
Stanford v. Parker, Ky. App., 949 S.W.2d 616, 617 (1996).
-4-
The CPP in effect at the time of Gibson’s violation did
not define “physical action.”8
However, Gibson’s act of jumping on
the restrained Spaulding was clearly a physical action.
Further,
inasmuch as Dixon was holding Spaulding at the time Gibson took
physical
action
against
Spaulding,
and
since
as
a
natural
consequence of Gibson’s physical action against Spaulding Officer
Dixon was knocked to the floor, we conclude that there was some
evidence that Gibson engaged in physical action against Dixon.
Gibson also alleges that there was insufficient evidence
regarding his intent to engage in a physical action against Dixon.
While the CPP does not specify an intent requirement as an element
for conviction for physical action against an employee, we are
persuaded
evidence.
that
any
KRS
intent
requirement
501.020(1)
provides
is
established
that
a
by
person
the
acts
“intentionally” when the person’s conscious objective is to engage
in the conduct.
Further, KRS 501.060(2)(a) provides that the
intent element is satisfied when the actual result is different
from that intended only in the respect that a different person is
affected.
Here, Gibson essentially concedes that he intentionally
jumped on inmate Spaulding.
As a result of this intentional act,
and as a natural consequence of the act, Dixon was knocked to the
ground.
Under
these
circumstances,
8
Gibson’s
intent
to
take
The version of the CPP effective December 19, 2001,
defines “physical action” as “any act of fighting, hitting,
kicking, shoving, pushing, biting, using force or other similar
types of physical contact, throwing, squirting or spitting any
item, substance or fluid.” See CPP 15.2 § IV., issued December 17,
2001.
-5-
physical action against Spaulding transfers into an intent to take
physical action against Dixon.
Gibson also argues that a conviction for taking physical
action against an employee requires that the elements of KRS
508.025,
which
criminalizes
third-degree
assault,
503.010(4), which defines “physical force,” must be met.
and
KRS
However,
we find no basis to conclude that the CPP intended the offense of
physical
action
against
an
reference to these statutes.
employee
to
be
interpreted
with
Gibson’s argument in this regard is
without merit.
Next, Gibson contends that he was denied the opportunity
to present evidence at the hearing. Gibson alleges that the prison
authorities failed to comply with his request that a security
camera video recording of the fight be turned over and, further,
refused to allow him to call witnesses to rebut the physical action
against an employee charge.
The Investigation section of the Disciplinary Report
Form, which was completed by Sgt. Lois Lyle, explicitly states
“Their [sic] is no tape of the fight.”
As the only evidence in the
record is that no tape of the fight exists, it follows that Gibson
was not denied any right regarding the nonexistent tape.
Gibson also contends that he was denied due process on
the basis that the Adjustment Committee refused to permit him to
call as witnesses inmates F. Malone, M. Gudgen, Lee Willis and
Tyrone White.
This issue is not preserved with respect to Malone,
Gudgen and Willis because the issue with respect to these witnesses
was not raised before the trial court.
-6-
Gibson raised witness
issues in Section II of his petition for declaratory judgment.
Therein, Gibson objected only to the exclusion of White’s testimony
at the hearing; Malone, Gudgen and Willis are not mentioned in the
petition at all.
Issues not presented to the trial court are not
preserved for appellate review.9
With regard to White, Gibson was not deprived of any
right
by
hearing.
the
exclusion
of
his
testimony
at
the
disciplinary
The Disciplinary Report Form for the physical action
against an employee charge, which was signed by Gibson, lists under
“witnesses requested” F. Malone and M. Gudgen only.
listed as a requested witness.10
White is not
As Gibson did not request White
as a witness at the disciplinary hearing in the physical action
case, it follows that the Adjustment Committee properly excluded
White’s oral testimony.11
Finally, Gibson contends that he was deprived of due
process on the basis that the Adjustment Committee failed to make
adequate written findings of fact in support of its decision.
A prison disciplinary committee is required to give a
written statement of the evidentiary basis for its decision to
administer discipline so that a reviewing court can determine
9
Hoy v. Kentucky Industrial Revitalization Authority, Ky.,
907 S.W.2d 766, 769 (1995). See also CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv) (providing
that the appellant shall include "at the beginning of the argument
a statement with reference to the record showing whether the issue
was properly preserved for review and, if so, in what manner").
10
It appears that White may have been listed as a witness
in the resisting offense proceeding.
11
While excluding White’s oral testimony, it appears that
the committee stated that it would accept Gibson’s legal aide’s
account of what White would testify to.
-7-
whether the evidence before the committee was adequate to support
its findings concerning the nature and gravity of the prisoner's
misconduct.12
The function of written findings is to protect
inmates against collateral consequences based on a misunderstanding
of the nature of the original proceeding and to ensure that
administrators act fairly.13 A statement of reasons is instrumental
in making sure that prisoners are not subjected to an undue risk of
being disciplined for things they have not actually done.14
The
written statement of findings may be brief and this Court generally
will not interfere with the prison officials' wide discretion in
their enforcement of prison discipline.15
Despite
the
brevity
of
the
Adjustment
Committee’s
findings, there is no misunderstanding regarding the committee’s
reasoning.
Under the findings section of the disciplinary report,
the Adjustment Committee indicated that it relied upon the report
of the investigating officer and Dixon’s testimony. Based upon the
evidence from these sources, the Adjustment Committee made a
finding that Gibson had jumped on Spalding while Dixon was holding
Spaulding and, as a result, Dixon was knocked to the ground.
Gibson does not appear to deny the facts as described by Dixon,
only the interpretation of those facts.
The written report of the
12
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-565, 94 S. Ct. at 2978-2979;
Hudson v. Edmonson, 848 F.2d 682, 685-686 (6th Cir. 1988).
13
Gilhaus v. Wilson, Ky. App., 734 S.W.2d 808, 810 (1987);
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 565, 94 S. Ct. at 2979.
14
Saenz v. Young, 811 F.2d 1172, 1174 (7th Cir. 1987).
15
See Gilhaus v. Wilson, Ky. App., 734 S.W.2d 808, 810
(1987)(citing Ivey v. Wilson, 577 F. Supp. 169, 172-73 (W.D. Ky.
1983)); Smith v. O'Dea, supra, n.7, at 357.
-8-
investigator and the testimony of Dixon were sufficient to support
the Adjustment Committee's decision.
Furthermore, the Adjustment
Committee's written factual findings in the disciplinary report
were sufficient to satisfy the minimal due process requirements
associated with prison disciplinary proceedings.
Since Gibson has not identified any facts justifying a
finding that the evidence relied upon to punish him was unreliable,
or that his due process rights were otherwise violated, the order
from which this appeal is prosecuted is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Quantez Gibson, pro se
Eddyville, Kentucky
M. Lee Turpin
Justice Cabinet
Department of Corrections
Frankfort, Kentucky
-9-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
