CARA SWORD WHEELER v. GORDON LEE WHEELER AND MARTHA ROSENBERG
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 6, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-002025-MR
CARA SWORD WHEELER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA M. OVERSTREET, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-04099
v.
GORDON LEE WHEELER AND
MARTHA ROSENBERG
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, GUIDUGLI AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Cara Sword Wheeler (hereinafter “Cara”) has
appealed from the portion of the Fayette Circuit Court’s
September 13, 2001, order denying her motion for a judgment
against attorney Martha Rosenberg (hereinafter “Rosenberg”) for
interest and attorney fees.
In an earlier appeal1, this Court
reversed the circuit court’s judgment ordering Cara to pay
$3637.50 in attorney fees to Rosenberg, who represented her exhusband, Gordon Lee Wheeler (hereinafter “Cappy”) in their
1
Appeal No. 1998-CA-002762-MR.
dissolution action.
Having considered the parties’ briefs, the
record, and the applicable case law, we affirm.
The majority of the facts in this case were set out
in the Court’s previous opinion rendered April 27, 2001.
Therefore, we shall set only forth those facts that are pertinent
to this appeal.
On November 3, 1998, the circuit court ordered
Cara to pay Rosenberg $3637.50 in attorney fees, which money was
to be withheld from the $30,000 Rosenberg was holding in her
trust account on Cara’s behalf.
Cara then filed an appeal from
that order, arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion
in ordering her to pay attorney fees to Cappy’s attorney.
She
did not file a supersedeas bond pursuant to CR 62.03 and CR 73.04
to stay the judgment as the money had already been paid to
Rosenberg.
This Court eventually reversed the circuit court’s
decision, determining that the circuit court abused its
discretion in ordering Cara to pay attorney fees to Rosenberg.
Once the opinion became final on May 27, 2001, counsel for Cara
sent a letter to Rosenberg requesting that she reimburse her for
the amount previously paid, as well as interest.
After no check
had been received, Cara filed a motion on June 8, 2001, for the
circuit court to enter a judgment against Rosenberg requesting
the original amount paid, interest on that amount, and attorney
fees.
Counsel for Cara then received a check from Rosenberg for
the original amount of the fee paid and the $125.00 filing fee
ordered to be paid by this Court.
did not include any interest.
The total amount of the check
Cara later filed an amended motion
to enter a judgment requesting $1303.37 in interest and a
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reasonable attorney fee.
Following a hearing, the circuit court
denied Cara’s motion for a judgment against Rosenberg on
September 13, 2001.
This appeal followed.
Cara argues that she is entitled to retroactive
interest at a rate of 12% from November 3, 1998, until the date
she received reimbursement because Rosenberg had the use of
Cara’s money during that time.
Cara cites KRS 360.040 in support
her argument, which provides that “[a] judgment shall bear twelve
percent (12%) interest compounded annually from its date.”
On
the other hand, Cappy and Rosenberg argue that Cara is not
entitled to retroactive interest, but at most should be limited
to interest from the date the opinion of the Court of Appeals
became final until the date the reimbursement was made.
We believe that before KRS 360.040 may be applied,
there must be a judgment in place.
CR 54.01 defines a judgment
as “a written order of a court adjudicating a claim or claims in
an action or proceeding.”
Here, had Cara not previously paid the
attorney fee and not been successful in her earlier appeal, she
clearly would have had to pay Rosenberg interest on the judgment
pursuant to the statute.
However, she was successful on appeal,
which rendered the judgment awarding the attorney fee a nullity.
At that point there was no longer a judgment, and there certainly
was no judgment against Rosenberg.
Rosenberg merely had to
reimburse Cara for the previously paid attorney fees, which she
did.
Because there is no judgment, KRS 360.040 does not apply
and interest cannot accrue.
The circuit court did not err in
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denying Cara’s motion for a judgment regarding her request for
interest.
Cara also argues that she is entitled to reasonable
attorney fees for the cost of bringing about the repayment of the
reversed judgment.
It is well settled that the award of costs
and attorney fees is within the discretion of the circuit court.
Glidewell v. Glidewell, Ky.App., 859 S.W.2d 675 (1993); Gentry v.
Gentry, Ky., 798 S.W.2d 928 (1990); Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, Ky., 521
S.W.2d 512 (1975).
Here, we cannot say that the circuit court
abused its discretion in denying the motion for attorney fees in
light of the fact that Rosenberg timely reimbursed Cara and our
holding that the circuit court properly denied her request for
interest.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bobby G. Wombles
Lexington, KY
Martha A. Rosenberg
Lexington, KY
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