ROY M. CUTWRIGHT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 23, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001979-MR
ROY M. CUTWRIGHT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN R. ADAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00199
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, GUIDUGLI AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Roy M. Cutwright (hereinafter “Cutwright”) has
appealed from the Fayette Circuit Court’s final judgment entered
August 15, 2001, following the entry of a conditional guilty plea
pursuant to RCr 8.09.
On the day of trial, the circuit court
ruled that the Commonwealth could elicit testimony from the
officers to the effect that they observed and could identify
Cutwright in a surveillance videotape of the incident and that
they knew him from prior contact.
Having determined that the
circuit court’s ruling was proper, we affirm.
On February 20, 2001, the grand jury indicted Cutwright
on one count of Burglary Third Degree pursuant to KRS 511.040 and
for being a Persistent Felony Offender First Degree (hereinafter
“PFO I”), pursuant to KRS 532.080.
Detective John Carey
(hereinafter “Det. Carey”) swore out a criminal complaint on
August 21, 2000, naming Cutwright as having unlawfully committed
burglary on August 18, 2000, when he broke out the door of a
Dairy Mart, entered the building, and removed cigarette cartons.
A Dairy Mart employee provided investigators, Sergeant Patrick
Murray (hereinafter “Sgt. Murray”) and Detective William Goldey
(hereinafter “Det. Goldey”), with a surveillance videotape
recorded during the burglary.
According to Det. Carey’s
complaint, both Sgt. Murray and Det. Goldey positively identified
Cutwright as the subject in the surveillance videotape as they
had previously interviewed him in reference to other burglaries.
The matter proceeded to trial on July 12, 2001.
Following roll call, the circuit court had the jury pool leave
the courtroom to allow for a ruling on an evidentiary matter.
Cutwright requested that the circuit court not allow officers to
testify that they identified him from the surveillance videotape
because of their prior contact with him.
After allowing counsel
to argue their respective positions, the circuit court denied
this request, noting that the officers would not be testifying
that Cutwright was the subject of prior investigations.
Following this ruling, Cutwright moved to enter a conditional
guilty plea.
The circuit court accepted his plea and entered a
judgment accordingly, sentencing him to one year on the burglary
count enhanced to ten years under the PFO I count pursuant to the
Commonwealth’s recommendation.
This appeal followed.
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In his brief, Cutwright argues that allowing the
officers to offer identification testimony invades the province
of the jury as it goes to the ultimate question of the
perpetrator’s identity.
Additionally, the testimony improperly
inferred prior bad acts on Cutwright’s part.
Moreover, such
testimony would not be helpful to the jury in deciding a fact in
issue because the testimony would decide the issue for it.
The
Commonwealth argues that the identification testimony would not
decide the ultimate issue.
The jury would still have the
opportunity to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and
determine whether the individual in the surveillance videotape
was actually Cutwright.
Both sides rely upon state and federal
decisions to support their positions.
It is well-settled in the Commonwealth that a trial
court’s ruling on an evidentiary matter will not be disturbed in
the absence of an abuse of discretion.
Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219 (1996).
Partin v. Commonwealth,
Therefore, the circuit court’s
decision to allow the officers to testify regarding their
identification of Cutwright from the surveillance videotape will
not be reversed unless he establishes that the circuit court
abused its discretion in so ruling.
KRE 701, which mirrors its federal counterpart,
provides that “[i]f the witness is not testifying as an expert,
the witness’ testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is
limited to those opinions or inferences which are: (a) Rationally
based on the perception of the witness; and (b) Helpful to a
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clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue.”
The Supreme Court of Kentucky has addressed the two
prong test contained within KRE 701 in several recent opinions.
However, these cases generally deal with the collective facts
rule, a corollary to the general rule that nonexpert witnesses
may testify to an opinion rationally based upon a perception and
helpful to the determination of a fact in issue.
The collective
facts rule allows lay witnesses to testify to a conclusion or
opinion in order to describe an observation that the witness can
describe in no other way.
See Crowe v. Commonwealth, Ky., 38
S.W.3d 379 (2001)(that a substance on a kitchen floor appeared to
be blood); Clifford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 7 S.W.3d 371
(1999)(that a voice on an audio tape sounded like that of a black
male); and Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 942 S.W.2d 293
(1999)(that an individual gave him an “intense” look).
In each
instance, the court held that the opinion or inference was
rationally based on the witness’ perception and was helpful to
the determination of the fact in issue.
Several federal appellate courts have addressed the
issue of lay witness testimony in particular by policemen and
parole officers.
In United States v. Calhoun, 544 F.2d 291 (6th
Cir. 1976), the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the use of
testimony by a probation officer identifying the defendant from a
bank surveillance photograph, holding that “its probative value
[was] substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
as defined by Rule 403.”
Id. at 296.
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If such testimony were
admitted, the defendant would not be able to freely examine the
relationship between himself and the witness.
However, in United
States v. Butcher, 557 F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1977), police officers
and a parole officer1 were permitted to testify that the person
in surveillance photographs was the defendant based upon their
prior contact.
Similarly, two Government witnesses were
permitted to identify the defendant from surveillance photographs
because they were friends with whom the defendant temporarily
resided at the time of the robbery.
United States v. Ingram, 600
F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1979).
As applied to the present case, we believe that Sgt.
Murray’s and Det. Goldey’s identification of Cutwright from the
surveillance videotape was properly admissible.
First, it met
the two requirements of KRE 701, namely, that it was based on
their perception and would have been helpful to a determination
of a fact in issue, i.e., the identification of the defendant as
the perpetrator.
We do not believe that the admission of such
testimony would have been unduly prejudicial to Cutwright.
The
circuit court limited the officers’ testimony, only allowing them
to testify that they had prior contact with Cutwright and had
prior conversations with him.
They were not permitted to testify
that he was the subject of prior criminal investigations.
Cutwright could also have cross-examined the officers as to any
type of bias they might have.
As the circuit court stated, it is
1
The parole officer was identified merely as a state
employee, while the police officers were identified as police
officers.
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unfair to project that anyone a police officer knows is a
criminal, an accused, or is under investigation.
Therefore, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse
its discretion in ruling that the Commonwealth could elicit
identification testimony from the investigating police officers
based upon their prior contacts and conversations with Cutwright.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James N. Payne
Lexington, KY
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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