ROBERT L. WHITTAKER, DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL FUND v. KAY F. BROOKS; KENTUCKY TRANSPORTATION CABINET; JOHN EARL HUNT, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
APRIL 26, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001871-WC
ROBERT L. WHITTAKER,
DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL FUND
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-92-07327
v.
KAY F. BROOKS;
KENTUCKY TRANSPORTATION CABINET;
JOHN EARL HUNT, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
KNOPF, DYCHE, AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE.
The Special Fund, through its director, Robert L.
Whittaker, appeals from an August 1, 2001, opinion of the
Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) which affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded a December 21, 2000, opinion and
award.
In the December 21, 2000, opinion and award, Hon. John
Earl Hunt, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), granted Kay F. Brooks’
(Brooks) motion to reopen; found that Brooks had suffered a
worsening of her physical condition; found that she suffered from
a disabling psychological condition which became manifest as of
the original settlement date, and found her totally
occupationally disabled.
The Board affirmed in part but reversed
in part and remanded regarding the credit due the Special Fund
and the employer, Kentucky Transportation Cabinet (the Cabinet),
for Brooks’ previous award.
After review, we affirm.
Brooks worked for the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet
as an executive secretary and later as an administrative manager.
On March 6, 1991, Brooks injured her low back, left arm, and neck
when she attempted to move a large executive desk.
Brooks filed
a workers’ compensation claim that was settled on November 8,
1993.
In the settlement agreement, Brooks received a lump sum
payment of $10,256.20 which represented a 10.4% permanent partial
occupational disability for 425 weeks.
The Cabinet paid
$5,538.35 of the lump sum and the Special Fund paid the remaining
$4,717.85.
On September 23, 1999, Brooks filed a motion to reopen
her claim.
Brooks claimed that she had been receiving treatment
for her injured neck since 1991, and the Cabinet’s insurance
carrier had paid for the treatments.
After Brooks moved to
Georgia, she asked the insurance carrier to approve a new
physician and to approve additional cervical treatment.
the insurance carrier refused.
However,
The insurance carrier explained
that Brooks’ claim and her settlement agreement covered her low
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back injury only; therefore, the carrier was not required to pay
for her cervical treatment.
Brooks moved to reopen her claim and
argued that her cervical problems were covered by the settlement
agreement and that the insurance carrier who had paid for
cervical treatments for several years must continue to do so.
On August 14, 2000, Brooks filed another motion to
reopen and moved to supplement her Form 101 to include
psychological injury, including depression, that resulted from
her physical injuries.
The ALJ sustained the motion to
supplement and both motions to reopen were consolidated and set
for hearing.
After the hearing and after both parties briefed
the issues, the ALJ issued an opinion and award on December 21,
2000.
The ALJ concluded that Brooks had suffered a cervical
injury on March 6, 1991, and that she was entitled to medical
treatment for it.
The ALJ concluded that Brooks suffered from a
psychological condition and that it was the result of the
injuries sustained on March 6, 1991.
The ALJ stated, “[a]t the
time of the agreement, the plaintiff was a forty-four year old
person who had 10.4% occupational disability.”
He then concluded
that Brooks was now 100% permanently and totally disabled,
pursuant to Osborne v. Johnson, Ky., 432 S.W.2d 800 (1968).
On December 28, 2000, the Special Fund filed a petition
for reconsideration and argued that the ALJ failed to make a
finding regarding Brooks’ actual occupational disability at the
time of the 1993 settlement as required by Whittaker v. Rowland,
Ky., 998 S.W.2d 474 (1999).
The Special Fund argued this was
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important because the original award would have continued to July
25, 2000, and would have overlapped with the new award.
Pursuant
to Whittaker v. Rowland, the Special Fund asserted that it was
entitled to a credit for the overlap.
The Special Fund also
requested specific findings regarding when Brooks’ psychological
condition became manifest because if it were present at the time
Brooks filed her original claim, then she would be barred from
raising it upon reopening pursuant to Slone v. Jason Coal
Company, Ky., 902 S.W.2d 820 (1995).
The ALJ subsequently denied the Special Fund’s motion
and both the Special Fund and the Cabinet appealed to the
Workers’ Compensation Board.
As noted above, the Board affirmed
in part but reversed in part and remanded to the ALJ regarding
the credit due the Special Fund and the Cabinet for Brooks’ prior
award from the date of the reopening through the date that the
original award expired.
The Special Fund, but not the Cabinet,
appealed.
Upon appeal, the Special Fund raises two issues for our
consideration: 1) whether Brooks met her burden of proving that a
work-related psychological condition developed or increased since
prior settlement and 2) whether the ALJ provided sufficient
findings as to the extent of Brooks’ prior occupational
disability.
We will address each in turn.
The Special Fund contends that Brooks failed to met her
burden on reopening of proving that her psychological disability
increased and that the increase was related to the March 6, 1991,
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injury.
The Special Fund argues that a person cannot claim a
psychological condition upon reopening if the condition existed
at the time of the original claim but was not litigated.
v. Jason Coal Company, supra.
Slone
Further, the Special Fund argues
that the only medical evidence that supports the finding with
regard to Brooks’ psychological condition was the report of Dr.
Richard Sheridan, an orthopedic surgeon.
The Special Fund
contends that Dr. Sheridan’s report is insufficient because: 1)
he is an orthopedic surgeon not a psychiatrist; 2) it does not
contain findings as to when Brooks’ psychological condition
manifested; 3) it does not contain findings that Brooks’
psychological condition was connected to her occupational
disability and 4) it does not contain findings that Brooks’
occupational disability has increased due to her psychological
condition.
In conjunction with Brooks’ own testimony, however,
Dr. Sheridan’s report is more substantial than the Special Fund
contends.
When reviewing decisions of the Workers’ Compensation
Board, this Court’s function “is to correct the Board only when
we perceive that the Board has overlooked or misconstrued
controlling law or committed an error in assessing the evidence
so flagrant as to cause gross injustice.”
Daniel v. Armco Steel
Company, Ky, App., 913 S.W.2d 797, 798 (1995).
Furthermore, where an ALJ has found in favor of the
claimant, who bears the burden of proof, which in this case is
Brooks, we must determine whether the ALJ’s findings were
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supported by substantial evidence. Special Fund v. Francis, Ky.,
708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (1986); See Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum,
Ky. App. 673 S.W.2d 735 (1984).
The Kentucky Supreme Court has
defined substantial evidence as, “some evidence of substance and
relevant consequence, having the fitness to induce conviction in
the minds of reasonable people.”
Smyzer v. B.F. Goodrich
Chemical Co., Ky., 474 S.W.2d 367, 369 (1971).
Furthermore, the
ALJ, not the Board or this Court, has the sole discretion to
determine the quality, character, and substance of the evidence
before it.
Whittaker v. Rowland, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 479, 481
(1999), quoting Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, Ky., 695
S.W.2d 418 (1985); See Snawder v. Stice, Ky. App., 576 S.W.2d 276
(1979).
Also, as fact-finder, the ALJ may choose to believe or
disbelieve any part of the evidence presented, regardless of its
source. Whittaker v. Rowland, supra at 481, quoting Caudill v.
Maloney’s Discount Stores, Ky., 560 S.W.2d 15, 16 (1977).
In Dr. Sheridan’s report, he stated:
In reference to her psychological impairment,
I think that according to the Table on Page
301 in the 1993 AMA Guides Fourth Edition,
she is most appropriately a Class III, which
is moderate impairment. I think she requires
restrictions in the workplace and I have
outlined those on the enclosed forms.
Transcript of the Record, page 551.
Furthermore, Dr. Sheridan opined that Brooks suffered a 23%
permanent whole-body impairment according to the AMA Guides to
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment.
In support of her motion, Brooks testified at the
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hearing before the ALJ.
She stated that she was once a very
active person but at the time of the hearing she was no longer
active and felt very depressed.
She testified that she felt so
depressed that she could not get excited about the birth of her
new granddaughter.
Furthermore, she testified that the pain that
she experienced had emotionally wrecked her life.
Brooks
explained that she rarely left her home; that she did not wish to
see or be seen by anyone nor would she answer the telephone.
She
quite frankly admitted that most of the time she felt that she
did not want to live.
She further testified that she could no
longer concentrate enough to read or carry on a simple telephone
conversation.
Transcript of the Record, pages 855-859.
As stated above, the ALJ had sole discretion to weigh
the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has held that where
medical evidence shows the actual bodily condition, lay testimony
can be used to show the extent of occupational disability.
v. Abrams, Ky., 584 S.W.2d 48, 50-51 (1979).
Hush
ALJ Hunt was within
his discretion to infer from Dr. Sheridan’s report that Brooks
suffered a psychological condition and to infer from Brooks’ own
testimony that it was caused by the March 6, 1991, injury and it,
along with her physical problems, caused an increase in her
occupational disability.
The Special Fund also argues that Slone v. Jason Coal
Company, supra, bars Brooks psychological claim.
In Slone, the
appellant moved to reopen his workers’ compensation claim due to
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a psychological condition.
However, this condition existed at
the time he filed his original claim, although he inexplicably
did not include it.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that a
claimant could not base a reopening on a psychological condition
known to the claimant during the original action but which was
not litigated.
Id. at 822.
The case sub judice is
distinguishable in that there is no evidence that Brooks suffered
from a psychological condition at the time she filed her original
claim.
Rather, this case is more like Fischer Packing Co. v.
Lanham, Ky., 804 S.W.2d 4 (1991), where claimant’s psychological
condition became manifest after the original claim and the
Supreme Court found that it was a proper basis for a motion to
reopen.
The Special Fund also argues that the ALJ did not
comply with Whittaker v. Rowland, supra.
The Special Fund
contends that the ALJ did not make a finding regarding Brooks’
actual degree of occupational disability as it existed at the
time of the original settlement.
However, as stated above, the
ALJ in one sentence stated, “[a]t the time of the agreement, the
plaintiff was a forty-four year old person who had 10.4%
occupational disability.”
The Board on appeal held that this
statement complied with Whittaker v. Rowland, although the Board
noted that the ALJ could have stated more clearly that he found
Brooks’ actual degree of occupational disability to be the same
as the amount for which she settled.
both points.
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We agree with the Board on
Since the Board did not misconstrue controlling law or
commit an error in assessing the evidence, and since the ALJ’s
decision was based on substantial evidence, we affirm
the
Workers’ Compensation Board and the Administrative Law Judge.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, KAY F.
BROOKS:
Joel D. Zakem
Attorney for Special Fund
Frankfort, Kentucky
Christopher P. Evensen
Tamara Cotton & Associates
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, KENTUCKY
TRANSPORTATION CABINET:
W. Charles Jobson
Ferreri & Fogle
Louisville, Kentucky
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