MOHAMED ALI v. GHASSAN HAJHAMED
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RENDERED: AUGUST 9, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001862-MR
MOHAMED ALI
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEONARD L. KOPOWSKI, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-01324
GHASSAN HAJHAMED
AND
CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2001-CA-001955-MR
GHASSAN HAJHAMED
v.
MOHAMED ALI
APPELLEE
CROSS-APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEONARD L. KOPOWSKI, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-01324
CROSS-APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
KNOPF, MILLER, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
These appeals emanate from a proceeding in the
Campbell Circuit Court.
Mohamed Ali brings an appeal from an
order of the circuit court entered June 9, 1999.
Ghassan
Hajhamed brings a cross-appeal from a judgment entered by the
court sitting without jury on June 29, 2001.
We affirm.
The briefs in this matter are somewhat confusing.
We
do our best to analyze the complaints presented to us.
It appears that in July 1998, Ali and Hajhamed entered
into a contract whereby Hajhamed was to purchase Ali's medical
practice located in the city of Bellevue, Campbell County,
Kentucky.
Center.
The practice was identified as Riverside Medical
The agreement provided for a cash consideration whereby
Hajhamed was to acquire the entire practice, including, inter
alia, medical records of patients, certain tangible and
intangible assets, together with a right of first refusal for the
purchase of the real estate.
non-compete clause.
The purchase agreement contained a
Ali entered into possession of the property.
Subsequently, the parties fell into a dispute.
Perceiving that Hajhamed had breached the agreement, Ali filed a
district court action to dispossess him of the premises.
In
December, 1998, Ali filed an action in the circuit court to
obtain reparation for breach of contract.
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While the action was pending in circuit court, the
parties reached an agreement to settle all claims and counterclaims emanating from the litigation.
A “Settlement Agreement”
was executed and the action was dismissed upon joint motions.
The order of dismissal was entered January 25, 1999.
Subsequently, this agreement, too, fell apart, and the parties
returned to court.
There were claims and counterclaims.
Ali
alleged failure to pay and Hajhamed countered, inter alia, that
Ali violated the non-compete provision, and refused to deliver
certain assets.
Both parties moved the court to set aside the order of
dismissal.
The court refused.
order from which Ali appeals.
Ultimately, the court entered the
Later, the judgment from which
Hajhamed appeals was entered.
ALI'S DIRECT APPEAL NO. 2001-CA-001862-MR
During the course of heated exchanges and arguments
propounded to the court, the court entered an order on April 9,
1999 providing as follows:
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED AND
ADJUDGED that the balance due the Plaintiff,
Mohammed Ali, as calculated by the Defendant,
Ghassan Hajhamed, pursuant to the underlying
agreements between the parties shall be
deposited forthwith by the Defendant, Ghassan
Hajhamed, with the Court. Said payment
amount shall not prejudice either party,
which balance should be calculated and
submitted to the Clerk of Courts, and time is
of the essence. (Emphasis added).
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It is this order which Ali sought to have set aside,
and from which Ali's appeal emanates.
He wants to gain the funds
that have been deposited in the hands of the clerk.
In the June 9, 1999 order from which he prosecutes this
appeal, the court stated as follows:
The record reflects that the parties have
brought matters relating to enforcement and
implementation of the Settlement Agreement
before this Court, and have therefore invoked
its jurisdiction to adjudicate issues
presented in enforcement of the Settlement
Agreement. There appears that there still
must be a judicial resolution of the
allegations of breath, [sic] and any possible
result in damages to Defendant. The alleged
breach of Settlement Agreement still must be
litigated before this Court. This Court
finds that it would be inequitable to release
the funds pending resolution of a majority of
these issues. (Emphasis added).
It appears that Ali may have brought an appeal from an
interlocutory order.
When the court entered the June 9, 1999
order from which the appeal arises, there remained issues to be
decided.
We shall nevertheless address Ali's arguments on the
merits.
Ali argues that the impounding of the funds amounted to
an impermissible prejudgment attachment.
We disagree.
The funds
emanated from Medicare and Medicaid payments, and were the
subject of litigation.
It was only prudent that the court
exercise its equitable power to protect any funds that might
later be the subject of order or judgment.
Ky. R. Civ. P. 67.02.
Upon the whole, we can perceive no merit in Ali's appeal.
HAMJAHMED'S CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2001-CA-001955-MR
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On cross-appeal, Hajhamed argues the circuit court
erred in rejecting his claim for punitive damages.
Hajhamed
claims such damages under the authority of KRS 411.184 and .186.
We think not.
It is recognized that punitive damages are
ordinarily not permitted incident to breach of contract.
See
Wahba v. Don Corlett Motors, Inc., Ky. App., 573 S.W.2d 357
(1978).
Generally, punitive damages are recoverable only when
the act is wanton, malicious, reckless, or oppressive.
See
Ashland Dry Goods Company v. Wages, 302 Ky. 577, 195 S.W.2d 312
(1946).
Notwithstanding subsection (4) of KRS 411.186 which
provides that “[i]n no case shall punitive damages be awarded for
breach of contract,” such damages may be awarded if conduct is
tortious.
See Faulkner Drilling Company, Inc. v. Gross, Ky.
App., 943 S.W.2d 634 (1997).
under this rule.
Hajhamed seeks to brings his claim
In doing so, he must prove the tortious
elements by clear and convincing evidence.
KRS 411.184(2).
Wahba, 573 S.W.2d 357.
Upon the whole of the record, we are not convinced the
circuit court erred in refusing to submit the claim for punitive
damages.
While the acts of Ali may have been unreasonable, we
cannot conclude they formed a sufficient basis for a jury's
finding.
There was a decisive dispute between the litigants with
each claiming breach of contract.
We think Hajhamed was fully
compensated by the compensatory award.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Campbell
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
Brenda L. Bonecutter
Newport, Kentucky
R. Barry Wehrman
Convington, Kentucky
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