COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS, JOHN R. GROVES, JR., APPOINTING AUTHORITY v. DON E. LIVINGSTON AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, PERSONNEL BOARD
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RENDERED: JULY 12, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001834-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS,
JOHN R. GROVES, JR., APPOINTING AUTHORITY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00349
DON E. LIVINGSTON AND
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
PERSONNEL BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
The Department of Military Affairs (the
“Department”) appeals from a judgment of the Franklin Circuit
Court overruling a decision of the Kentucky Personnel Board (the
“Board”) that appellee, Don E. Livingston (“Livingston”), was not
penalized when reverted to his previous employment position and
salary because his promotion was void ab initio.
The circuit
court ruled that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and not
supported by substantial evidence.
After a review of the record
and the applicable law, we reverse and remand this matter to the
circuit court for an order reinstating the Board’s decision.
On October 1, 1995, the Department promoted Livingston
from the position of helicopter pilot to helicopter pilot chief.
Mark Clements, a rival applicant for the chief position, appealed
Livingston’s promotion to the Board.
By final order dated
June 16, 1996, the Board found that the Department failed to
prove that it complied with 101 KAR 1:400 Section 1(1), which
requires consideration of the qualifications, records,
performance, conduct, seniority, and performance evaluations of
each candidate.
The Board declared Livingston’s promotion void
ab initio and ordered Livingston restored to his prior position
and pay rate.
The Department, by letter dated June 26, 1996, notified
Livingston that he was being demoted pursuant to the Board’s
order.
Livingston appealed this action to the Board.
Meanwhile,
the Department eliminated the chief’s position.
On December 17, 1996, the Board entered a final order
holding that the June 16, 1996, order did not prohibit the
Department from paying Livingston a higher rate of pay and that
the Department should determine his appropriate salary.
The
Board also dismissed Livingston’s request to be reinstated as
helicopter pilot chief.
This order was based solely upon the
recommendations of the hearing officer, who failed to conduct an
evidentiary hearing.
Livingston appealed the December 17, 1996, order to the
Franklin Circuit Court.
The circuit court reversed the Board’s
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order and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.
evidentiary hearing was held on December 9, 1999.
The
At the
hearing, the hearing officer heard testimony from Roger Green,
Dale Shelton, and Livingston.
Mr. Shelton’s testimony was the
most relevant evidence for this appeal.
Mr. Shelton, the director of the Division of
Classification and Compensation for the Personnel Cabinet,
testified that the Board’s order of December 17, 1996, provided
the Department with only two options concerning Livingston’s
employment status.
The Department could either completely void
all of Livingston’s personnel actions, including his promotion,
or involuntarily demote Livingston and reduce his salary.
According to Mr. Shelton, reversions were used when career
employees were removed from unclassified positions and returned
to classified service or when classified employees were promoted
but performed unsatisfactorily during their promotional
probation.
After the six-month probationary period passed,
reversion was not possible.
Mr. Shelton testified that
Livingston completed the six-month probationary period.
On cross-examination, Mr. Shelton acknowledged that an
employee could be demoted without a reduction in pay.
In
Livingston’s case, however, Mr. Shelton testified that the
reduction in pay was carried out by the Department pursuant to
the Board’s June 1996, order.
Absent the Board’s June 1996,
order, Livingston could have been removed from the chief’s
position without losing any pay by transfer, promotion or
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demotion.
Yet, the Board’s order deprived the Department of
these options.
On February 14, 2000, the Board ordered that the
documentation in Livingston’s personnel file be amended to
reflect that Livingston was reverted to the helicopter pilot
classification.
The Board further adopted the hearing officer’s
findings that, pursuant to Bowling v. Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet, Ky. App., 891 S.W.2d 406
(1994), Livingston was not penalized because of the Board’s
actions since he had no right to a promotion that was void ab
initio.
Livingston appealed to the Franklin Circuit Court.
On July 24, 2001, the trial court entered an opinion
and order overruling the Board’s decision.
The circuit court
held that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and not supported by
substantial evidence.
Further, the trial court held that Bowling
was not applicable in this matter because Livingston was, in
fact, penalized because of an ordered salary adjustment.
This
appeal followed.
The appellate courts of this Commonwealth have, with
specificity, defined how courts must review findings of
administrative agencies.
In reviewing a decision by an
administrative agency, the reviewing court is “bound by the
administrative decision if it is supported by substantial
evidence.”
Commonwealth Transportation Cabinet v. Cornell, Ky.
App., 796 S.W.2d 591, 594 (1990).
Thus, “[i]f there is any
substantial evidence to support the action of the administrative
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agency, it cannot be found to be arbitrary and will be
sustained.”
Taylor v. Coblin, Ky., 461 S.W.2d 78, 80 (1970).
Substantial evidence is defined as evidence which, when
took alone or in the light of all the evidence, has sufficient
probative value to induce conviction in the mind of a reasonable
person.
Bowling, 891 S.W.2d at 409.
When determining whether an
administrative agency’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, the reviewing court must defer to the principle that
the trier of fact “is afforded great latitude in its evaluation
of the evidence heard and the credibility of witnesses appearing
before it.”
Id. at 410.
An agency’s decision may be supported
by substantial evidence even though a reviewing court may have
arrived at a different conclusion.
Id.
Furthermore, if an
agency’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, “the
findings will be upheld, even though there may be conflicting
evidence in the record.”
Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v.
Fraser, Ky., 625 S.W.2d 852, 856 (1981).
Simply put, “the trier
of facts in an administrative agency may consider all of the
evidence and choose the evidence that he believes.”
Cornell, 796
S.W.2d at 594.
If an agency decision is supported by substantial
evidence, the reviewing court must then determine whether the
agency applied the correct rule of law to its factual findings.
Bowling, 891 S.W.2d at 410; Commonwealth, Department of Education
v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 798 S.W.2d 464, 467 (1990), citing H &
S Hardware v. Cecil, Ky. App., 655 S.W.2d 38, 40 (1983).
“If the
court finds the correct rule of law was applied to the facts
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supported by substantial evidence, the final order of the agency
must be affirmed.”
Bowling, 891 S.W.2d at 410.
In this matter before us, we believe that the Board’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence and that the Board
applied the correct rules of law to its findings.
First, the
parties stipulated that Livingston was not lawfully promoted.
In
fact, the record shows that Livingston provided no evidence or
disputed that his promotion was not void ab initio.
Thus, since
Livingston’s promotion to helicopter pilot chief was void, he
never attained status in that classification, had no property
rights therein, and could have been removed.
There is also substantial evidence to support the fact
that Livingston was not demoted.
KRS 18A.005(11) defines
demotion as a “change in the rank of one employee from a position
in one (1) class to a position in another class having a lower
minimum salary range or less discretion or responsibility.”
However, inherent in this definition is the premise that, before
an employee can be changed to different positions in different
classes, the employee must have been legally placed in the higher
classification.
Here, Livingston was never legally placed in the
helicopter pilot chief classification.
The promotion was
rescinded and declared to be void ab initio.
Thus, any action
moving Livingston from the helicopter pilot chief class to the
helicopter pilot class fails to satisfy the definition of
demotion.
Third, the record reflects that the Board chose not to
believe Mr. Shelton’s testimony that because Livingston completed
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the six-month probationary period, reverting him to the
helicopter pilot position was not possible.
However, pursuant to
KRS 18A.005(32), a reversion occurs when a status employee is
returned “to his or her last position held in the classified
service” or the status employee “fails to successfully complete
promotional probation.”
Here, the Board simply used reversion to
return Livingston, a status employee, to the last position that
he lawfully held.
This was properly done since Livingston could
not successfully complete a promotional probation when he was
never legally promoted to the position of helicopter pilot chief.
Therefore, Livingston’s reversion to helicopter pilot was proper.
Finally, we disagree with the trial court’s
unpersuasive finding that Bowling does not control this matter
because Livingston was, in fact, penalized.
Rather, we believe
that Bowling is exactly on point with this case because it
directly addresses and rejects Livingston’s argument that he was
penalized.
In Bowling, this Court stated:
Alsip’s argument that the Board’s action in
rescinding her promotion constitutes a
penalization of her as a demotion under KRS
18A.005(8) is unfounded. The result of the
Board’s ruling is that Alsip’s promotion to
administrative secretary was void ab initio.
Alsip cannot claim legal entitlement to a
promotion that was made illegally.
Bowling, 891 S.W.2d at 411.
Here, Livingston’s rights in the position of helicopter
pilot chief were null and void.
This finding eliminated any
claim of right Livingston may have possessed concerning that
promotion.
On appeal, Livingston does not dispute that finding.
Therefore, since Livingston cannot claim legal entitlement to the
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chief’s position, he cannot be penalized because he was reverted
back to the proper employment position.
The effect of the
Board’s order was to place all of the parties in the same
position that they were prior to the improper promotion.
We feel
that the Board’s decision obtained the correct result.
Accordingly, we reverse the Franklin Circuit Court’s
order reversing the Kentucky Personnel Board, and remand this
case to that court for entry of a judgment reinstating the
Board’s decision.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, DON
LIVINGSTON:
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Donald Duff
Frankfort, Kentucky
Stuart W. Cobb
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
PERSONNEL BOARD:
Mark A. Sipek
Frankfort, Kentucky
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