GARY BUIS v. VICKI BLACK COX, ROGER P. ELLIOTT, and SHEILA H. ELLIOTT
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 6, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001779-MR
GARY BUIS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CASEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANIEL J. VENTERS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00107
v.
VICKI BLACK COX,
ROGER P. ELLIOTT, and
SHEILA H. ELLIOTT
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, HUDDLESTON, AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE: Gary Buis appeals from a default judgment, a
judgment awarding damages, and an order denying his motion to set
aside the default judgment and judgment awarding damages and to
file an answer and cross claim.
We affirm.
This case arose out of a land contract between Roger P.
Elliott and Sheila H. Elliott, as sellers, and Terry Lee Cox and
Vicki Black Cox, as buyers.1
1
On November 16, 1994, the Elliotts
Terry Lee Cox is Vicki Black Cox’s former husband. He was
originally a contracting party and a litigant. He quitclaimed
his interest in the property to Vicki Black Cox and is no longer
(continued...)
and the Coxes entered into a land contract whereby the Coxes
agreed to purchase from the Elliotts two tracts of land
containing approximately 147 acres located in Casey County,
Kentucky.
The agreed purchase price of the property was $40,000
with interest until paid.
Installment payments were to be made
by the Coxes, and they were given possession of the property upon
signing the contract.
The Coxes defaulted in their installment
payments, and on April 28, 1998, they were informed by the
Elliotts that the Elliotts were retaking the property due to the
default.
Meanwhile, the Elliotts contracted with Buis to
purchase the property for $33,000.
was reached in February 1998.
Apparently, this agreement
Buis thereafter took possession of
the property.
On June 4, 1998, Cox filed a complaint in the Casey
Circuit Court against the Elliotts for breach of contract and
against Buis for inducing the Elliotts to breach the contract.
Cox also claimed that she was entitled to damages from Buis for
damages to the property.
Buis was properly served with a summons
and a copy of the complaint on July 18, 1998.
Buis did not file an answer or other responsive
pleading to the complaint within twenty days after service of the
summons upon him as required by CR2 12.01.
Thus, Cox sought and
procured a default judgment against Buis from the trial court on
1
(...continued)
involved in this action.
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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October 13, 1998.3
Cox’s motion for default judgment was not
served on Buis, but such was not required.
See CR 55.01 and
Pound Mill Coal Co. v. Pennington, Ky., 309 S.W.2d 772, 774
(1958).
On September 9, 1999, a hearing was held on the issue
of damages to be awarded to Cox on her complaint against Buis.
Buis was present at the hearing.4
On August 18, 2000, the trial
court entered a judgment in favor of Cox and against Buis in the
amount of $16,545.22 plus attorney’s fees in the sum of $5,250.
Damages were specified as $13,279.22 for lost profit on the lost
1998 tobacco crop, $1,196 for damages to the old house on the
property due to removing wood from the porches, $600 for lost use
of pasture land for grazing and hay production, and $750 for
punitive damages.
On August 24, 2000, Buis filed a pro se motion to
vacate the judgment.
Although the motion stated that copies of
it were sent to Cox’s attorney and “all defendants,” there was no
proof of service by certificate or otherwise as required by CR
5.03.
Further, the motion was not noticed for hearing at any
3
The default judgment stated in part that Buis was liable
to Cox “for trespass, trover and conversion by his tearing down
of fences, cutting timber, plowing fields, disturbing plaintiff’s
quiet possession in said property and otherwise exercising
dominion and control over the real property, fixtures thereto and
personal property therein depriving plaintiff of her right of
possession.”
4
We have determined these facts from the parties’ briefs.
We have searched the record and have been unable to locate any
motion which led to the damages hearing. Further, there is no
record (tape or transcription) of the damages hearing. We assume
that the damages hearing was held on September 9, 1999, and that
Buis was present because Cox so stated in her brief and Buis did
not dispute these facts in his reply brief.
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specific time, date, and place.
It merely stated that it would
be “brought on for hearing at the convenience of the Court.”
As
grounds for the motion, Buis stated that he was unaware that the
matter was to be submitted for judgment, and he requested an
opportunity to be heard by the court.5
On September 5, 2000, Cox filed a notice of judgment
lien against Buis.
On October 3, 2000, a check was tendered to
Cox in satisfaction of the judgment, and the lien was thereafter
released.
On January 12, 2001, counsel for Buis entered an
appearance in the case and filed a motion to set aside the
default judgment and refund funds paid.6
By order entered by the
court on January 17, 2001, Cox’s claim against the Elliotts was
dismissed as settled.
On July 19, 2001, the trial court entered
an order denying Buis’s motion.
Therein, the court ruled that
Buis had not established excusable neglect entitling him to
relief from the default judgment under CR 60.02(a) and that there
were no extraordinary circumstances such that relief should be
granted under CR 60.02(f).
This appeal followed.
CR 55.02 provides that “[f]or good cause shown the
court may set aside a judgment by default in accordance with Rule
60.02.”
In support of his motion to set aside the default
judgment, Buis alleged grounds of excusable neglect and reasons
5
The judgment was entered approximately eleven months after
the damages trial.
6
Cox states in her
motion to set aside were
Our review of the record
and motion were filed on
brief that the entry of appearance and
filed on behalf of Buis on May 5, 2001.
indicates that the entry of appearance
January 12, 2001.
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of an extraordinary nature justifying relief.
is a ground for relief pursuant to CR 60.02(a).
Excusable neglect
Pursuant to the
terms of the rule, a motion on this ground shall be made “not
more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was
entered or taken.”
CR 60.02.
Cox argues and Buis apparently
acknowledges that his motion on this ground was not timely
filed.7
Relief based on a reason of an extraordinary nature
justifying relief “shall be made within a reasonable time.”
CR
60.02.
Buis argues that he should receive relief from the
default judgment because, soon after being served with a summons
and a copy of the complaint, he received a letter from Roger
Elliott, an appellee herein and district court judge for Casey
and Adair County, advising him that the Cox lawsuit was baseless
and that it would soon be dismissed.
Buis asserts that he
believed Elliott would understand the law, and he claims that he
thought he had nothing to worry about.
Thus, Buis maintains that
he did not hire an attorney nor file an answer or defense to the
lawsuit due to the representations of Elliott.
In support of his
argument, he cites the cases of Vanover v. Ashley, 298 Ky. 722,
183 S.W.2d 944 (1944), and Strother v. Day, Ky., 248 S.W.2d 347
(1952).
Buis states that these cases are similar to his case in
that the defendants therein relied upon promises and assertions
of other parties when they failed to file responsive pleadings
7
In his reply brief responding to Cox’s arguments, Buis
argues only that he is entitled to relief pursuant to CR
60.02(f).
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and were thereby thrown off-guard, misled, or lulled into a false
sense of security.
Cox urges us to reject Buis’s appeal on the ground
that, by paying her the amount owed in the judgment, Buis should
not have been allowed to reopen or otherwise attack the judgment.
In support of her argument, she cites Stairs v. Riley, 306 Ky.
645, 208 S.W.2d 961 (1948), Martin v. Beach, Ky., 452 S.W.2d 418
(1970), and Sharp v. Bannon, Ky., 258 S.W.2d 713 (1953).
However, those cases involved situations where a settlement for
less than the amount of the full judgment was entered as
satisfaction of the judgment.
We believe Moss v. Smith, Ky., 361
S.W.2d 511 (1962), to be applicable.
Therein, the court held
that “where a litigant pays an adverse judgment he does not
thereby impair his right to appeal.”
Id. at 514.
Thus, we hold
that Buis had a right to continue litigation concerning the
judgment even though he satisfied the judgment by payment in
full.
We now turn to the merits of Buis’s appeal.
judgments are generally not favored.
S.W.2d 757, 758 (1957).
Default
Bargo v. Lewis, Ky., 305
“Although default judgments are not
favored, trial courts possess broad discretion in considering
motions to set them aside and we will not disturb the exercise of
that discretion absent abuse.”
S.W.2d 690, 692 (1988).
Howard v. Fountain, Ky. App., 749
“The test for abuse of discretion is
whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable,
unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”
v. English, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (1999).
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Commonwealth
It has been held that factors to be considered by a
court in deciding whether to set aside a default judgment are:
whether there is a valid excuse for default, a meritorious
defense, and absence of prejudice to the other party.
Perry v.
Central Bank & Trust Co., Ky. App., 812 S.W.2d 166, 170 (1991).
“Good cause is most commonly defined as a timely showing of the
circumstances under which the default judgment was procured.”
Green Seed Co. v. Harrison Tobacco, Ky. App., 663 S.W.2d 755, 757
(1984).
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in rejecting Buis’s arguments of excusable neglect and
extraordinary circumstances in denying his motion to set aside
the default judgment.
While Buis may have had a meritorious
defense to Cox’s claim and while the setting aside of the default
judgment may not have prejudiced the other parties, Buis simply
did not demonstrate a valid excuse for default.
His assertion
that he would have hired an attorney and filed an answer to
defend the Cox complaint if not for the assurances of Roger
Elliott is not plausible.
Although Elliott was a district court
judge, it was not reasonable for Buis to rely, if he did so, on
Elliott’s representations.
After all, Elliott was a co-defendant
in the law suit filed by Cox, and Buis now asserts that he would
have even filed a cross claim against Elliott for
indemnification.
Furthermore, while Elliott allegedly
represented to Buis that the Cox complaint was without merit, he
apparently in no way suggested to Buis that he not defend against
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the claim.
In short, we agree with the trial court that Buis did
not demonstrate a valid reason for his default.
In addition to the reason cited by the trial court in
denying Buis’s motion to set aside the default judgment, we note
that it does not appear Buis filed his motion within a reasonable
time as required by CR 60.02.
The default judgment was entered
against Buis on October 13, 1998.
Although the record does not
indicate that the default judgment was served on Buis, he
undoubtedly knew of its existence when Cox moved the court for a
trial on damages.
1999.
This motion was apparently made on May 14,
Nevertheless, Buis took no action after learning of the
default judgment until he filed a motion to vacate judgment on
August 24, 2000.
In fact, that motion did not request the court
to vacate the default judgment but only to vacate the judgment
awarding damages.
The motion to set aside the default judgment
was not filed until January 12, 2001, more than two years after
the entry of the default judgment and at least twenty months
after Buis learned of its existence.
In addition to rejecting
Buis’s motion on its merits, we conclude that Buis did not
demonstrate good cause because he did not timely show the
circumstances under which the default judgment was procured by
filing his motion within a reasonable time as required by CR
60.02.
See Green Seed Co., 663 S.W.2d at 757.
The judgment and orders of the Casey Circuit Court are
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, VICKI
BLACK COX:
Bryan E. Bennett
David A. Nunery
Campbellsville, Kentucky
Theodore H. Lavit
Dean H. Sutton
Lebanon, Kentucky
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