SHANNON C. (PENN) CASTLE; DARRYN JEFFRIES v. ANDERSON COUNTY FISCAL COURT, AND/OR THEIR SUCCESSORS, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS MAGISTRATES AND MEMBERS OF THE ANDERSON FISCAL COURT; ANDERSON COUNTY KENTUCKY; AND THOMAS D. COTTON IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COUNTY JUDGE/ EXECUTIVE AND AS A MEMBER OF THE ANDERSON FISCAL COURT
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 27, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001724-MR
SHANNON C. (PENN) CASTLE;
DARRYN JEFFRIES
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM ANDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM F. STEWART, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 95-CI-00146; 95-CI-00147
ANDERSON COUNTY FISCAL COURT,
AND/OR THEIR SUCCESSORS, IN
THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS MAGISTRATES
AND MEMBERS OF THE ANDERSON FISCAL COURT;
ANDERSON COUNTY KENTUCKY; AND THOMAS D. COTTON
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COUNTY JUDGE/
EXECUTIVE AND AS A MEMBER OF THE ANDERSON
FISCAL COURT
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, HUDDLESTON, and JOHNSON, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE:
Shannon C. Penn (now Castle) and Darryn
Jeffries appeal from an order and judgment of the Anderson
Circuit Court granting summary judgment in a lawsuit stemming
from an automobile accident.
The appellants contend that the
appellees were negligent for failing to maintain a safe roadway
at the accident site.
The trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of the appellees on the basis that each of the appellees
was immune from lawsuit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
We affirm.
On August 20, 1994, Brian Riddle was driving a 1989
Pontiac Grand Am on Ashby Road in rural Anderson County.
Chastity Price was riding in the front passenger seat, and Castle
and Jeffries were riding in the back seat.
At approximately 8:20
p.m., Riddle ran off the right-hand side of the road, and the car
struck a tree stump.
As a result of the accident, Castle broke
her back and tore her colon, causing her to be hospitalized for
several weeks and requiring her to have three major surgeries.
Jeffries was thrown forward upon impact, suffering serious
injuries to his face and teeth.
On August 18, 1995, Jeffries and Ella Penn,
individually and as parent and guardian of Shannon C. Penn,1
filed separate complaints, which were later consolidated, in the
Anderson Circuit Court.
Named as defendants were Anderson County
Fiscal Court and/or their successors in their official capacities
as magistrates and members of the Anderson County Fiscal Court;
Anderson County, Kentucky; and Thomas D. Cotton in his official
capacity as county judge-executive and as a member of the
Anderson County Fiscal Court.
The complaints alleged, among other things, that the
defendants were negligent in that they failed to design,
maintain, or keep Ashby Road and the adjacent county right-of-way
1
Having attained the age of majority, by order entered
February 12, 2001, Shannon was substituted as a plaintiff in her
own right.
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at, and approaching, the accident site in a reasonably safe
condition for travel.
The complaints also alleged that the
defendants failed to provide proper safeguards and to give
adequate warning of dangerous conditions and failed to remedy,
warn, or guard against potential dangers in the highway and its
shoulders.
Furthermore, the complaints alleged that to the
extent the defendants might be entitled to invoke the defense of
sovereign immunity, the defense had been waived by the county’s
purchase of liability insurance.
Following discovery, the
defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
plaintiff’s claims were barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity and that Anderson County’s participation in a county
insurance fund did not waive the defense of sovereign immunity.
On May 23, 2001, the trial court entered an order and
judgment granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on
grounds of sovereign immunity.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs
filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate, and a motion to amend
their consolidated complaint to add James E. Doss, the Anderson
County road supervisor, as a defendant.
On July 12, 2001, the
trial court entered an order and amended judgment again granting
summary judgment to the defendants and denying the motion to add
the road supervisor as a defendant.
This appeal followed.
The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment
is whether the trial court correctly found that there were no
genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party
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CR2 56.03.
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
“The
record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be
resolved in his favor.”
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service
Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991).
“Summary judgment
is only proper where the movant shows that the adverse party
could not prevail under any circumstances.”
Id., citing
Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose, Ky., 683 S.W.2d 255 (1985).
Consequently, summary judgment must be granted “[o]nly when it
appears impossible for the nonmoving party to produce evidence at
trial warranting a judgment in his favor[.]”
Steelvest at 482.
First, the appellants contend that sovereign immunity
does not apply to this case because the purchase of commercial
insurance by the county estops it from asserting sovereign
immunity.
We disagree.
In the course of discovery, it was disclosed that
Anderson County participates in a trust, the Kentucky All Lines
Fund, sponsored by the Kentucky Association of Counties.
In
Franklin County v. Malone, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 195 (1997) (overruled
in part by Yanero v. Davis, Ky., 65 S.W.3d 510, 523 (2001), and
Board of Claims v. Harris, Ky., 59 S.W.3d 896 (2001)), a case
brought against Franklin County, a state trooper, and various
county officials as a result of a post-arrest suicide in a
Franklin County jail restroom, the Kentucky Supreme Court
concluded that Franklin County’s participation in the Kentucky
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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All Lines Fund did not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity.
The court stated:
Franklin County does not have what is
generally considered to be commercial
insurance. The county participates in a
trust, the Kentucky All Lines Fund, sponsored
by the Kentucky Association of Counties.
Counties have associated to self-insure
pursuant to KRS 65.150(3) under the
authority of KRS 65.210 et seq., the
Inter-local Cooperation Act. There is
clearly a difference between a fund of money
contributed to by local governments and held
in trust for the indemnification of the
participating members, officers and employees
from the purchase of commercial liability
insurance coverage. It could be argued that
when a local government pays a premium to a
commercial insurance company, that public
funds have been expended. It may be
appropriate to exempt commercial insurance
companies from the protection of sovereign
immunity and require such companies to pay a
proper claim. However, in a self-insurance
group, the funds have not been expended until
a claim is made and such funds could be used
to reduce contributions or make refunds in
the following years. In regard to commercial
insurance, any loss sustained is the loss of
the insurance carrier. We agree with the
Supreme Court of Maine which distinguished
participation in state-sponsored
self-insurance funds from the purchase of
commercial insurance and determined that the
participation in a self-insurance fund did
not constitute a waiver of sovereign
immunity. Maynard v. Com'r of Corrections,
681 A.2d 19 (Me. 1996).
Malone, 957 S.W.2d at 204.
The appellants contend that Malone is distinguishable
from the present case because their discovery disclosed that, in
fact, there is a commercial insurance aspect to the All Lines
Fund.
Specifically, the appellants cite the deposition of Joseph
R. Greathouse, the Director of Insurance Programs for the
Kentucky Association of Counties.
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Greathouse explained that, in
practice, the All Lines Fund pays the first $250,000.00 of any
insured claim out of the self-insurance fund, but that for claims
above that amount, Kentucky Reinsurance Trust pays 30 percent and
Lloyds of London pays 70 percent.
The appellants argue that since it has now been brought
to light that there is a commercial insurance aspect to the All
Lines Trust, the statement in Malone that “[i]t may be
appropriate to exempt commercial insurance companies from the
protection of sovereign immunity and require such companies to
pay a proper claim” should be interpreted so as to construe
Anderson County’s participation in the fund as a waiver of
sovereign immunity.
However, this court is bound by and must
follow precedents established by opinions of the Kentucky Supreme
Court.
SCR3 1.030(8)(a); Smith v. Vilvarajah, Ky. App., 57
S.W.3d 839, 841 (2000).
In light of the Kentucky Supreme Court’s
explicit holding in Malone that a county’s participation in the
All Lines Fund does not constitute a waiver of sovereign
immunity, we are constrained to reject the appellants’ argument
that Anderson County’s participation in the fund constituted such
a waiver.
Further, even if we were able to accept the appellants’
argument, it appears that under their theory, at best, sovereign
immunity would be waived only for that portion of a judgment in
excess of $250,000.00.
The circuit court record does not
disclose with specificity the damages sought by each appellant;
however, it appears unlikely that, after apportionment of fault
3
Rules of the Supreme Court.
-6-
to the driver, the claim of either appellant against the
appellees exceeds the $250,000.00 threshold.
Assuming so, it
appears that any potential waiver would not benefit the
appellants in any event.
Next, the appellants contend that sovereign immunity
does not apply to the case at bar because the appellees were not
performing discretionary acts but, rather, were failing to
perform mandatory statutory acts.
We disagree.
While relevant in lawsuits against public officials
sued in their individual capacities, in the present case the
distinction between discretionary acts and ministerial acts4 is
not relevant.
The complaints initiating this lawsuit
unambiguously indicate that the members of the fiscal court and
the county judge-executive are being sued in their official
capacities.
“Any action against fiscal court members in their
official capacities is essentially an action against the county
which is barred by sovereign immunity.”
Malone at 201, citing
Ky. Const. § 231 and Littlejohn v. Rose, 768 F.2d 765 (6th Cir.
1985).
“The absolute immunity from suit afforded to the state
also extends to public officials sued in their representative
(official) capacities, when the state is the real party against
which relief in such cases is sought.”
Yanero v. Davis, Ky., 65
S.W.3d 510, 518 (2001)(citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756,
119 S.Ct. 2240, 2267, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999); 72 Am.Jur.2d,
States, Territories and Dependencies § 104 (1974);
4
Tate v.
Consistent with standardized terminology, we construe the
appellants’ use of the term “mandatory statutory acts” as
referring to “ministerial acts.”
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Salmon, 79 Ky. 540, 543 (1881); and Divine v. Harvie, 23 Ky. (7
T.B. Mon.) 439, 441 (1828)).
The distinction regarding discretionary functions and
ministerial functions applies only if a government official is
sued in his individual capacity.
See Yanero at 522.
In such
cases the official receives only qualified official immunity and
is afforded no immunity from tort liability for the negligent
performance of a ministerial act, i.e., an act that requires only
obedience to the orders of others, or when the officer’s duty is
absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of
a specific act arising from fixed and designated facts.
Id.
Because the fiscal court members and the county judge-executive
were sued only in their official capacities, and not their
individual capacities, absolute immunity applies, not qualified
official immunity.
Because they have absolute immunity, summary
judgment in favor of the members of the fiscal court and the
county judge-executive was proper.
Next, the appellants contend that the application of
sovereign immunity violates the appellants’ jural rights.
The
“jural rights” doctrine operates to preserve rights of action
that existed prior to the adoption of the present state
constitution in 1891.
772, 776 (1999).
See Gilbert v. Barkes, Ky., 987 S.W.2d
However, the doctrine of sovereign immunity
preexisted our 1891 constitution, and the application of the
doctrine to bar lawsuit against the appellees does not abrogate
or abolish any right of action which existed prior to 1891.
See
Wood v. Board of Education of Danville, Ky., 412 S.W.2d 877, 879
-8-
(1967).
Inasmuch as the doctrine of sovereign immunity would
have applied in these circumstances prior to 1891,
we conclude
that the jural rights doctrine does not provide a remedy for the
appellants.
See Clevinger v. Board of Educ. of Pike County, Ky.,
789 S.W.2d 5, 11 (1990); Poole Truck Line, Inc. v. Commonwealth,
Transportation Cabinet, Ky. App., 892 S.W.2d 611, 614-15 (1995).
Next, the appellants contend that the application of
sovereign immunity is an unfair and antiquated concept which
should be abandoned.
The Kentucky Supreme Court
has repeatedly
upheld the doctrine of sovereign immunity, including the general
rule that a county has the same sovereign immunity as the state.
Malone at 203;
see also Cullinan v. Jefferson County, Ky., 418
S.W.2d 407 (1967);
(1967);
Moores v. Fayette County, Ky. 418 S.W.2d 412
Calvert Investments, Inc. v. Louisville and Jefferson
County Metropolitan Sewer District, Ky., 805 S.W.2d 133 (1991);
and Yanero, supra.
In view of the Kentucky Supreme Court’s long-
standing and consistent affirmation, approval, and acceptance of
sovereign immunity, we are without the authority to abolish the
doctrine as “unfair and antiquated.”
SCR 1.030(8)(a).
Next, the appellants contend that allowing other
injured parties a legal remedy before the Kentucky Board of
Claims while preventing such relief to the appellants violates
their equal protection and due process rights.
Specifically, the
appellants contend that by allowing the victims of accidents
occurring on state roads to bring an action before the Board of
Claims while denying the right to victims of accidents occurring
on county roads, the latter group is discriminated against.
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Less than a year ago, in Board of Claims v. Harris,
Ky., 59 S.W.2d 896 (2001), the Kentucky Supreme Court explicitly
held that the Board of Claims does not have jurisdiction over
claims against counties, county agencies, officers, or employees.
While Harris did not specifically address equal protection and
due process issues, nevertheless, the appellants seek to have us
overrule Harris, albeit on alternative grounds.
authority to do this.
We are without
SCR 1.030(8)(a).
In any event, the equal protection and due process
claims asserted by the appellants concern socioeconomic issues,
and the legislatures’s decision to grant a forum for state-road
accident victims while denying the same right to county-road
accident victims need only be supported by a rational basis.
Unless a classification requires some form of heightened review
because it jeopardizes the exercise of a fundamental right or
categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic,
the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution requires
only that the classification be analyzed under the rational basis
test.
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976);
Commonwealth v. Howard,
Ky., 969 S.W.2d 700, 702-703 (1998).
Our General Assembly, under the Equal Protection
Clause, has great latitude to enact legislation that may appear
to affect similarly situated people differently.
Clements v.
Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 2843, 73 L.Ed.2d. 508
(1982).
Legislative distinctions between persons, under
traditional equal protection analysis, need only bear a rational
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relationship to a legitimate state end.
Id.;
Coal Corp., Ky., 519 S.W.2d 390, 393 (1975).
Chapman v. Eastern
“Under this test,
statutorily created classifications will be held invalid when
these classifications are totally unrelated to the state's
purpose in their enactment, and when there is no other
conceivable purpose for continued viability.”
Gorman, Ky., 839 S.W.2d 232, 239-240 (1992).
Chapman v.
Furthermore, "those
attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have
the burden 'to negate every conceivable basis which might support
it.'"
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113,
S.Ct. 2096, 2102, 124 L.Ed.2d 211, 222 (1993), quoting Lehnhausen
v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364, 93 S.Ct. 1001,
1006, 35 L.Ed.2d 351, 358 (1973).
We are persuaded that the General Assembly’s decision
to exclude counties from actions before the Board of Claims including claims involving accident victims on county roads - is
rationally related to the legitimate state purpose of exercising
fiscal restraint and control over the state budget by imposing
constraints and limits on the expenditure of taxpayer funds in
the settlement of Board of Claims actions.5
Finally, the appellants contend that the trial court
erred by failing to allow them to amend their complaint to name
James E. Doss, the Anderson County road supervisor, as a
defendant in the case.
5
Further, we note that other injured persons situated such
as these appellants are not without a remedy in all cases. Where
appropriate, actions may be brought against county officials in
their individual capacities. Yanaro, supra.
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On May 31, 2001, the appellants filed a motion to amend
their complaint in light of Ezell v. Christian County, Kentucky,
245 F.3d 853 (6th Cir. 2001).
Ezell held that under Kentucky
law, the administrator of the estate of a motorist who was killed
in an automobile accident could maintain a private right of
action against a county road engineer who allegedly failed to
comply with his statutory duty to maintain county bridges and
roads in a safe condition.
The trial court subsequently denied
the motion to amend.
CR 15.01 provides that a party may amend a pleading
once as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served
or within a certain time frame; "[o]therwise a party may amend
his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so
requires."
Relevant factors for consideration of leave to amend
under CR 15.01 include timeliness, excuse for delay, and
prejudice to the opposite party.
S.W.2d 162, 164 (1961).
Lawrence v. Marks, Ky., 355
The granting or denial of an opportunity
to amend is within the discretion of the trial court and should
not be disturbed unless abuse of discretion is clearly shown.
Johnston v. Staples, Ky., 408 S.W.2d 206, 207 (1966).
We are persuaded that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the appellants’ motion to amend.
original complaints were filed on August 18, 1995.
The
The
appellants filed their motion for summary judgment August 18,
1999.
The initial order granting summary judgment was entered on
May 23, 2001.
The motion to amend was filed on July 5, 2001.
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Based upon this time line, the motion to amend was filed almost
six years after the initial complaint and after the initial order
granting summary judgment had been entered.6
A lengthy passage
of time before filing a motion to amend is a significant factor
to be weighed in whether to grant a motion to amend.
See Floyd
v. Humana of Virginia, Inc., Ky. App., 787 S.W.2d 267, 269
(1989).
In light of the untimeliness of the motion to amend, we
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
it.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Anderson
Circuit Court granting summary judgment to the appellees is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT DARRYN
JEFFRIES:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Roy C. Gray
Frankfort, Kentucy
Shelby C. Kinkead, Jr.
Kinkead & Stilz, PLLC
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT SHANNON C.
(PENN) CASTLE:
David L. Holmes
Frankfort Kentucky
6
The appellants’ motion to alter, amend, or vacate the
original order was limited to errors in the caption of the order.
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