COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. HAROLD EDWIN PULLIAM III
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RENDERED:
August 16, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001609-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGHLAS M. GEORGE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-XX-00002
v.
HAROLD EDWIN PULLIAM III
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, HUDDLESTON, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
The Commonwealth of Kentucky brings this matter
on discretionary review from a July 2, 2001 Opinion and Order of
the Marion Circuit Court.
We affirm.
On December 17, 2000, Harold Edwin Pulliam III was
charged with driving under the influence (DUI) of intoxicants in
violation of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 189A.010(1)(a).
Pulliam registered .085 upon an Intoxilyer (breath) test.
His
case was duly docketed in the Marion District Court.
In the district court, the Commonwealth filed a motion
in limine to prohibit introduction of evidence showing that
Pulliam was not under the influence of alcohol.
The Commonwealth
sought to exclude, inter alia, evidence of field sobriety tests.
The Commonwealth argued that the field sobriety tests were simply
irrelevant to an offense under KRS 189A.010(1)(a), which is
sometimes referred to as the per se DUI statute.
See
Commonwealth v. Wirth, Ky., 936 S.W.2d 78 (1996).
The district court ultimately granted the
Commonwealth's motion.
The court recognized that field sobriety
tests have long been used to prove or disprove that an accused
was driving under the influence; however, the court reasoned that
impaired driving is not at issue under the per se DUI statute
and, perforce, such evidence is irrelevant.
Consequently,
Pulliam entered a conditional plea of guilty, thereby reserving
the right to appeal the district court's evidentiary ruling.
Ky.
R. Crim. P. 8.09.
Pulliam appealed to the circuit court.
On July 2,
2001, the circuit court entered an Opinion and Order Reversing
and Remanding.
Therein, the circuit court concluded as follows:
The Commonwealth asserts that the
defense should not be allowed to introduce
evidence to show that the Defendant was not
under the influence because that issue
becomes irrelevant as a breath-alcohol
content of .10 or greater itself becomes the
crime. While there is merit in this
contention that the alcohol level itself
becomes the crime, the breathylizer result is
still subject to impeaching evidence. If the
Commonwealth's argument were to be
successful, then the results of a
breathylizer test would be the only relevant
evidence in a per se DUI prosecution. The
only defense of the accused would be expert
testimony to refute the results of the
machine. An individual would be prohibited
from introducing evidence that may be
exculpatory and may impeach the reliability
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of the machine. This Court feels that
evidence concerning field sobriety tests and
any other exculpatory evidence which may show
the Defendant was not under the influence
would be relevant evidence to challenge the
breathylizer results. The jury would be able
to give this evidence the proper weight in
deciding whether the results of the machine
are accurate. To prevent the Defendant from
introducing exculpatory evidence would cause
a denial of an accused's constitutional
rights.
The Commonwealth then filed a motion for discretionary
review with the Court of Appeals.
Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.20.
On
October 4, 2001, this Court entered an order granting review.
This appeal follows.
The issue presented for our consideration is the
relevancy of evidence in a prosecution under the per se DUI
statute (KRS 189A.010(1)(a)).
Relevant evidence is defined by Ky. R. Evid. 401:
“Relevant evidence” means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.
It has been observed that evidence is relevant which “renders a
material ultimate fact more probable or less probable than it
would be without the item.”
Ford Motor Company v. Fulkerson,
Ky., 812 S.W.2d 119, 127 (1991).
Stated differently, evidence
that tends to prove or disprove an element of a criminal offense
is “of consequence to the determination of the action” and, thus,
relevant.
See Springer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 439, 449
(1999).
Our per se DUI statute requires proof of only two
elements or material ultimate facts: (1) that a person was
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operating or in control of a motor vehicle, and (2) said person
had an alcohol concentration of .08 or more.1
A violation of the
statute is said to occur:
[W]hen a person operates or is in physical
control of a motor vehicle while the alcohol
concentration in his blood or breath is .10
or greater. This is usually referred to as
the “per se” statute and requires proof only
of .10 or more alcohol concentration without
regard to its effects on motor vehicle
operation. (Citation omitted).
Wirth, 936 S.W.2d at 80.
We must emphasize that whether an
individual is under the influence of intoxicants becomes
immaterial under the per se DUI statute.2
Id.
In King v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 875 S.W.2d 902
(1993) the Court, in dicta, expounded upon the elements
comprising the per se DUI statute and the evidence relevant to
prove such elements:
KRS 189A.010(1)(a) creates a criminal
offense for operating a motor vehicle while
having an alcohol concentration of .10 or
above, regardless of available evidence that
the accused is not under the influence of
alcohol. This is commonly referred to as
“per se under the influence.” With this
reading in evidence, the Commonwealth doesn't
need to go further, nor can the defense
introduce evidence to show the defendant was
not under the influence. That issue becomes
1
We observe that Kentucky Revised Statutes 189A.010(1)(a)
was amended to lower the minimum legal level of alcohol
concentration from .10 to .08 effective October 1, 2000.
2
A distinction must be drawn between a material fact and an
evidentiary fact. A material fact (factum probandum) is that
which proves or disproves the proposition at issue. An
evidentiary fact (factum probans) is, inter alia, that which
proves or disproves a material fact. See R. Lawson, The Kentucky
Evidence Law Handbook, § 2.05 (3d ed. 1993); 29 Am. Jur. 2d
Evidence § 304 (1994).
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irrelevant as the content of .10 or more in
and of itself, becomes the crime, unlike in
Allen v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 817 S.W.2d
458 (1991). As such, the .10 alcohol
concentration becomes an element of the
crime, not merely evidence of a DUI.
(Emphasis added).
The Court in King recognized that the “issue” of
whether the accused is driving “under the influence of alcohol”
is immaterial to a per se DUI offense; instead, the Court
identified the material issue or element as the alcohol
concentration of .10 or above.
Because the issue of being under
the influence was immaterial, the Court naturally viewed evidence
of sobriety as irrelevant.
Simply put, evidence of alcohol
intoxication is irrelevant if offered solely to prove or disprove
that the accused was driving under the influence.
We do not,
however, think King stands for the proposition that evidence
concerning alcohol intoxication3 is never relevant to a
prosecution under the per se DUI statute.
King so broadly.
We do not interpret
Under certain circumstances, we conclude such
evidence is, indeed, relevant.
At trial, an accused could charge that the blood or
breath alcohol concentration test must have been in error because
he was only slightly intoxicated or not intoxicated at all.
To
support this position, he could seek to introduce evidence
concerning alcohol intoxication.
For example, an accused could
offer proof that he suffers a severe alcohol allergy, thus
3
In this opinion, we use the phrase “evidence concerning
alcohol intoxication” to encompass proof of the accused's degree
of intoxication or complete lack of intoxication.
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preventing him from consuming alcohol, or he could offer proof
that he only consumed a single alcoholic beverage a considerable
time before administration of the alcohol concentration test.
Clearly, the evidence in the above examples would tend to impugn
the results of a blood or breath alcohol concentration test.
An
impugned test result is relevant evidence because it makes less
probable a material element of the per se DUI offense — whether
the accused's alcohol concentration was, in fact, .08 or above.
Cf. Fulkerson, 812 S.W.2d at 119.
Succinctly stated, we are of the opinion that evidence
concerning alcohol intoxication can constitute circumstantial
proof challenging the accuracy of breath and blood alcohol
concentration tests.
Cf. Springer, 998 S.W.2d at 439, and
Dillingham v. Commonwealth, Ky., 995 S.W.2d 377 (1999).
If
offered to impugn the results of a blood or breath alcohol
concentration test, we hold that evidence concerning alcohol
intoxication is relevant to a prosecution under the per se DUI
statute.
In the matter at hand, we are of the opinion that the
district court erred by granting the Commonwealth's motion to
prohibit introduction of evidence tending to show Pulliam was not
under the influence of alcohol.
We, thus, agree with the holding
of the circuit court.
For the foregoing reasons, the Opinion and Order of the
Marion Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Joseph H. Mattingly III
Lisa K. Nally-Martin
Office of Marion
County Attorney
Lebanon, Kentucky
Samuel Todd Spalding
Jonathan R. Spalding
Lebanon, Kentucky
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