MARSHA KAY CRISP v. CHARLES VERNON CRISP, JR.
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 30, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001527-MR
MARSHA KAY CRISP
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. DAVID HAGERMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-01210
v.
CHARLES VERNON CRISP, JR.
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Marsha Kay Crisp brings this appeal from a June
8, 2001 order of the Boyd Circuit Court.
We reverse and remand.
Appellant filed a petition for dissolution of marriage
in the Boyd Circuit Court.
The matter was set for hearing with
the Domestic Relations Commissioner on May 10, 2001.
It appears
that appellant's counsel and appellee's counsel negotiated prior
to the scheduled hearing, and allegedly reached an oral
settlement agreement upon the distribution of marital assets and
debts.
Thereafter, appellee's counsel prepared a written
settlement agreement, and faxed it to appellant's counsel.
disagreement arose as to the terms of the written settlement
A
agreement.
Appellant claimed she believed she would receive a
greater proportion of marital assets than the agreement allowed;
consequently, appellant refused to sign the written settlement
agreement.
Appellee filed a motion to enforce the unsigned
agreement.
Therein, appellee stated that the written agreement
reflect the oral agreement “that was reached between the parties
and [appellant], for whatever reason, has changed her mind.”
On
June 8, 2001, the Boyd Circuit Court entered an order granting
appellee's motion to enforce the agreement.
Therein, the court
concluded as follows:
A review of the record discloses that
there is no allegation of mutual mistake by
the parties. The claim of the Petitioner for
reformation of the agreement must be coupled
with evidence of fraud or misrepresentation
in order to reform the agreement on the
grounds of unilateral mistake and no such
allegation is made.
Appellant filed a motion to alter, amend, or set aside the June 8
order.
That motion was denied by the court on June 22, 2001.
This appeal follows.
Appellant contends the circuit court committed
reversible error by enforcing the unsigned agreement.
compelled to agree.
We are
In Bratcher v. Bratcher, Ky. App., 26 S.W.3d
797 (2000), the Court recognized that Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 403.180 requires a separation agreement to be in writing
and signed by the parties.
Indeed, KRS 403.180(1) specifically
states that “the parties may enter into a written separation
agreement . . . .” (Emphasis added).
To be valid and
enforceable, we think KRS 403.180 clearly requires a separation
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or settlement agreement to be in writing.
Hence, we view an oral
settlement agreement as unenforceable under KRS 403.180.
At best, the evidence indicates that the parties
reached an oral agreement as to the distribution of their marital
assets and debts.
The evidence is undisputed that the parties
had not entered into a written agreement concerning the
distribution of their marital assets and debts.
Indeed,
appellant refused to sign the written settlement agreement
tendered by appellee.
As such, we are of the opinion that
appellant cannot be bound by an alleged oral agreement concerning
the distribution of marital assets and debts.
Thus, we believe
that the circuit court committed reversible error by granting
appellant's motion to enforce the settlement agreement.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Boyd
Circuit Court is reversed and the cause remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Richard A. Hughes
Ashland, Kentucky
Bruce W. MacDonald
Greenup, Kentucky
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