IRENE JONES v. JEFF HUMBLE, D/B/A DOUBLE J. STABLES AND JOANN HUMBLE, D/B/A DOUBLE J. STABLES
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 4, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED: OCTOBER 25, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001339-MR
IRENE JONES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WAYNE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDIE C. LOVELACE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00061
v.
JEFF HUMBLE, D/B/A DOUBLE J. STABLES
AND
JOANN HUMBLE, D/B/A DOUBLE J. STABLES
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND COMBS, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
Appellant, Irene Jones (“Jones”), appeals from a
judgment of the Wayne Circuit Court in favor of Appellees, Jeff
and Joann Humble d/b/a Double J Stables (“the Humbles”), in the
amount of $12,500.00, plus interest and costs.
Finding no error,
we affirm.
On February 29, 2000, the Humbles filed a complaint
against Jones alleging that she had failed and refused to pay for
the care and keeping of her horses, and for stud fees.
The
Humbles maintained that Jones had delivered two horses to them,
“Cumberland’s Lass,” and “She’s My Fancy,” and had authorized
their sale.
Further, that a reasonable and customary charge for
the feeding and care of the horses was $200.00 per month, per
horse; that Jones had failed to pay any sums for the care and
keeping of the horses, and that pursuant to KRS 376.400, the
Humbles had “in effect” an agister’s lien on the horses.
The
Humbles also alleged that they were obligated to pay stud fees in
the amount of $300.00 per horse, because Jones had failed to
provide registration papers for the horses, after they had
arranged for their sale and breeding.
The Humbles demanded
judgment against Jones in the amount of $4,800.00 through the
date of filing the complaint, with an additional $200.00 per
month, per horse, until paid, the sum of $600.00 for stud fees,
as well as their costs expended.
On April 19, 2001, following a bench trial, the circuit
court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment,
concluding that:
Humble should recover from Jones the sum of
$9,800.00 for the boarding, feeding,
watering, trimming and worming of
Cumberland’s Lass and She’s My Fancy. This
Court also concludes that this sum of money
encompasses money expended for labor in the
cleaning of the stalls where the two(2)mares
were housed. This sum of money takes into
consideration and encompasses the three (3)
week hiatus of She’s My Fancy from Humble’s
stables.
. . . the foal of Cumberland Lass has also remained at
Humble’s stables for a period of 13 months and that he
shall recover from Jones the sum of $2,600.00 for the
services rendered by his stables.
. . . Humble should recover from Jones the sum of
$600.00 for stud fees. . . .
-2-
The Court ordered Jones to pay the above sums, with
accrued interest to Humble within 30 days.
In the event Jones
failed to pay the judgment, the court directed that a Special
Master Commissioner be appointed to sell the mares and the foal,
with any money over and above the amount of the judgment and
Commissioner’s costs, to be paid to Jones.
By order entered June
5, 2001, the court denied Jones’ motion to alter, amend or
vacate.
On June 19, 2001, Jones filed a notice of appeal; on
June 27, 2001, Jones filed an amended notice of appeal.1
On
appeal, Jones asserts: (1) that the court erred in not requiring
the plaintiff to follow the procedure set out in the applicable
statute KRS 346.400; (2) that the court erred in awarding sums of
money to extend beyond a one-year period under KRS 376.410; and
(3) that the plaintiff was not entitled to a lien, for he made
personal use of the animals while they were in his possession.
(1) & (2)
Jones maintains that the court did not follow the
procedure for enforcement, and lacks jurisdiction to enforce an
1
On August 7, 2001, the trial court entered an Agreed Order that
the mares and foal be sold “in recognition of the fact that “
Jones had filed a notice of appeal, but had not posted a
supersedeas bond to stay enforcement of the judgment pending
appeal.
On August 21, 2001, a report of sale was filed by the
auctioneer, reflecting that Cumberland’s Lass sold for $2,200.00,
the foal sold for $170.00, and She’s My Fancy sold for $100.00;
further that the proceeds were placed in escrow pending further
order of the court. On August 28, 2001, an Agreed Order of
Distribution was filed confirming the sale of the horses and
giving Jones a credit for the remaining amount due on the
judgment.
-3-
agister’s lien.
Jones also maintains that under the statute, the
lien is limited to one year.
Jones’ arguments are not relevant,
because the statute does not provide the sole remedy for the
collection of this type of claim.
KRS 376.410, entitled “Enforcement of Lien for Care of
Livestock,” provides:
Any person in whose favor a lien provided
for in KRS 376.400 exists may, before the
district court of the county where the cattle
were fed or grazed, by himself or agent, make
affidavit of the amount due him and in
arrears for keeping and caring for the
cattle, and describing as nearly as possible
the cattle so kept by him. The court shall
then issue a warrant, directed to the sheriff
or any constable or town marshal of the
county, authorizing him to levy upon and
seize the cattle for the amount due, with
interest and costs. If the cattle are
removed with the consent and from the custody
of the livery stable keeper or the person
feeding or grazing them, the lien shall not
continue longer than one (1) year from and
after the removal, nor shall the lien in case
of such removal be valid against a bona fide
purchaser without notice at any time after
the removal. The warrant may be issued to a
county other than that in which the cattle
were fed or grazed, and the lien may also be
enforced by action as in the case of other
liens.
The trial court did not issue a warrant in this case;
the trial court issued a common law judgment against Jones for
money owed.
In Benjamin v. Goff, Ky. 314 Ky. 639, 236 S.W.2d 905
(1951), Kentucky’s high court held that the statutes did not
provide the exclusive remedy for the collection of this type of
claim.
There, the defendant had filed a claim against a
decedent’s estate for amounts due for stallion fees and board of
horses for various periods of time from 1946 through 1949.
-4-
The
Administratrix questioned her right to pay the claim on the
theory that Sections 376.400 and 376.420 of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes barred the claim.
[The version of ] KRS 376.4002 [in effect at
that time provided] . . . in part: 'Any owner
or keeper of a livery stable, and a person
feeding or grazing cattle for compensation,
shall have a lien upon the cattle placed in
the stable or put out to be fed or grazed by
the owner, for his reasonable charges for
keeping, caring for, feeding and grazing the
cattle. * * * The lien shall be subject to
the limitations and restrictions placed upon
a landlord's lien for rent.'
Id. at 905.
In Benjamin, the parties agreed that the time had
lapsed for enforcement of any lien which the creditor may have.
The court held that the creditor was entitled to assert a claim
against the decedent’s estate for money due, notwithstanding that
the lien was barred by limitations, because nothing about the
statutes suggested that they provided the exclusive remedy or
intended to repeal the common law.
(3)
2
The current version of the statute provides: Any owner or keeper
of a livery stable, and a person feeding or grazing cattle for
compensation, shall have a lien for one (1) year upon the cattle
placed in the stable or put out to be fed or grazed by the owner,
for his reasonable charges for keeping, caring for, feeding, and
grazing the cattle. The lien shall attach whether the cattle are
merely temporarily lodged, fed, grazed, and cared for, or are
placed at the stable or other place or pasture for regular board.
The lien shall take priority over a lien created pursuant to KRS
376.420(1).
-5-
Jones also argues that the Humbles were not entitled to
a lien, because they made personal use of the animals while they
were in their possession.
Jones also argues that one of the
horses was not the same horse she had left with the Humbles.
The
trial court has already decided these issues adversely to Jones.
The only issue before us is whether the trial court’s findings
are clearly erroneous.
“Findings of fact shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.”
CR 52.01.
We agree with the Humbles that the trial
court’s findings are based upon substantial evidence.
There is
no ground for reversal.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Gordon T. Germain
Monticello, Kentucky
John Paul Jones II
Monticello, Kentucky
-6-
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