WILLIAM B. HENRY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: May 24, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001305-MR
WILLIAM B. HENRY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TYLER L. GILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-00062 & 00-CR-00062-001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
William B. Henry appeals his conviction and
sentence for trafficking in a controlled substance, cocaine.
Because the trial court erred in failing to conduct an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of appellant’s competency to
stand trial, we vacate and remand.
On March 22, 2000, Detective Joe Higgins of the
Russellville Police Department conducted a controlled drug buy
with a confidential informant.
The informant went to the
residence shared by appellant and Belinda Morris at 458 E. Second
Street in Russellville, Kentucky, where he purchased rock
cocaine.
As a result, appellant was indicted on one count of
trafficking in a controlled substance, cocaine.
A jury trial was
held on August 18, 2000, at which differing versions of events
were presented.
At trial, the informant, Pat Baugh, testified that,
prior to March 22, 2000, he regularly went to the residence where
appellant and Belinda lived.
Baugh testified to the details of
the March 22, 2000 controlled buy as follows.
Baugh testified
that when he came up to the residence, appellant was at the door,
and had been going between the kitchen and patio, cooking ribs.
Baugh testified that he and appellant greeted each other, and
then Baugh walked in the door, gave appellant the $20 bill that
Detective Higgins had given him, and said he needed a $20 piece.
Baugh testified that appellant gave the $20 to Belinda, and she
went in the back room and came out and placed a rock of cocaine
on the table and appellant said “there you go.”
Baugh testified
that he (Baugh) then picked up the cocaine and that appellant saw
him do this.
Baugh then left to meet Higgins and turned the
cocaine over to him.
Belinda Morris testified that she and appellant were
living at the residence on March 22, 2000.
Belinda testified
that she had smoked crack with Baugh before, and that Baugh came
to her house a lot.
Belinda testified that sometimes when Baugh
came he would ask her to go get cocaine for him, which she would
do.
She testified that on the date at issue, she got the crack
for Baugh, although she couldn’t remember whether she sold Baugh
some crack she had already purchased for herself but hadn’t
smoked yet, or if she left and went somewhere to get it for him.
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Belinda testified that appellant took the money that day because
he “always wanted to take the money.”
Appellant testified that on March 22, 2000, when Baugh
came up to the house, he was cooking ribs on the patio, and going
inside and outside of the house.
Appellant testified that he
hadn’t met Baugh before that day.
Appellant testified that Baugh
went in the house, and then appellant went in the house, and that
Baugh asked where Belinda was.
Appellant testified that Baugh
sat at the table and smoked some crack.
Baugh set money on the table.
Appellant testified that
Appellant testified that he
[appellant] gave the money to Belinda and that he didn’t know
what it was for.
Appellant testified that he knew the money must
have been for Belinda because he knew that it wasn’t his.
Appellant also testified that Baugh said “this is for Belinda.”
Appellant stated that he was in and out of the house while Baugh
was there.
Appellant testified that he offered Baugh some ribs
but Baugh left.
Appellant testified that he knew Belinda smoked
crack but didn’t know that she sold it.
The jury was instructed on trafficking in a controlled
substance, and complicity to traffic in a controlled substance.
The jury found appellant guilty of trafficking in a controlled
substance.
Following the verdict, just prior to the penalty
phase, appellant’s counsel informed the court that he was
concerned whether appellant was competent to go forward with the
penalty phase.
Counsel explained that his understanding about
appellant’s competency had changed, in that he didn’t realize
that appellant might not be competent until during the time he
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and appellant were waiting and talking prior to the verdict, as
well as during appellant’s testimony.
Counsel noted that
appellant took Prozac, and that counsel believed that appellant
had mental problems.
Counsel stated that appellant was not able
to assist him to prepare for the penalty phase, in that although
there were church people and relatives who apparently would
testify in support of appellant, appellant would not respond to
counsel’s urging to get them to court.
Counsel therefore moved
the court, per RCr 8.06, to postpone the penalty phase in order
for appellant to undergo a mental evaluation.
The trial court,
noting that “[appellant] seems to be able to testify alright,”
subsequently denied the motion and proceeded with the penalty
phase.
The jury recommended the minimum sentence of five years
imprisonment.
Prior to the final sentencing, per an order entered
October 27, 2000, the trial court ordered a psychiatric
evaluation of appellant.
The order stated that it appears that
“there is reason to believe that [appellant] is not mentally
capable of understanding the charges against him or aiding his
counsel in the trial of said case.”
Per a referral from the
Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC), appellant was
first examined by clinical psychologist Robert B. Sivley, PhD.
In a report dated December 1, 2000, Dr. Sivley diagnosed
appellant as suffering from mild mental retardation, but
concluded, however, that appellant understood the charges and “is
able to present rational information in his own defense” and that
“[appellant] is competent to do so.”
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On December 20, 2000, appellant’s counsel moved the
court to order a reevaluation of appellant.
The court granted
counsel’s motion and ordered appellant to KCPC again.
In a
report dated March 1, 2001, prepared by clinical psychologist
Richard K. Johnson, PhD, appellant was again found to be mildly
mentally retarded.
Dr. Johnson concluded, however, that
appellant was competent to stand trial.
After having been continued several times, final
sentencing was held on April 4, 2001.
Appellant’s counsel moved
the court to postpone the sentencing in order for appellant to
obtain an independent mental evaluation.
The court denied the
motion, noting that appellant had been found competent in the two
aforementioned evaluations.
Based on the two evaluations, the
court found appellant was competent to be sentenced, and
sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment in accordance with the
jury’s recommendation.
On May 17, 2001, the court entered its
final judgement and sentence of imprisonment.
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in
failing to continue the penalty phase of the trial after
appellant’s counsel raised concerns about his competency, and
erred in failing to hold a competency hearing after ordering the
evaluations of appellant.
The standard for competency is whether
the accused has “the capacity to appreciate the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against him or to participate
rationally in his defense.”
S.W.2d 665, 682 (1990).
Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 801
The question of competency can be raised
at any time in the proceedings.
RCr 8.06; KRS 504.100.
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See
also, Gabbard v. Commonwealth, Ky., 887 S.W.2d 547 (1994);
Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 109 (2000).
RCr 8.06 provides:
[i]f upon arraignment or during the
proceedings there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the defendant lacks the capacity
to appreciate the nature and consequences of
the proceedings against him or her, or to
participate rationally in his or her defense,
all proceedings shall be postponed until the
issue of incapacity is determined as provided
by KRS 504.100.
KRS 504.100 states, in pertinent part:
(1) If upon arraignment, or during any stage
of the proceedings, the court has reasonable
grounds to believe the defendant is
incompetent to stand trial, the court shall
appoint at least one (1) psychologist or
psychiatrist to examine, treat and report on
the defendant’s mental condition.
. . . .
(3) After
reports),
determine
competent
the filing of a report (or
the court shall hold a hearing to
whether or not the defendant is
to stand trial.
“Criminal prosecution of a defendant who is incompetent
to stand trial is a violation of due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment.”
Mills v. Commonwealth, Ky., 996 S.W.2d
473, 486 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1164, 120 S. Ct. 1182,
145 L. Ed. 2d 1088 (2000), citing Medina v. California, 505 U.S.
437, 439, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2574, 120 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1992).
“[O]nce facts known to a trial court are sufficient to place a
defendant’s competence to stand trial in question, the trial
court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the
question.”
Mills, 996 S.W.2d at 486, citing Drope v. Missouri,
420 U.S. 162, 180, 95 S. Ct. 896, 908, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1975).
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The competency hearing of KRS 504.100(3) is mandatory.
Mills,
996 S.W.2d at 486; Thompson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 56 S.W.3d 406
(2001).
The standard of review of a trial court’s failure to
hold a competency hearing is “[w]hether a reasonable judge,
situated as was the trial court judge whose failure to conduct an
evidentiary hearing is being reviewed, should have experienced
doubt with respect to competency to stand trial.”
Mills, 996
S.W.2d at 486, quoting Williams v. Bordenkircher, 696 F.2d 464,
467 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916, 103 S. Ct. 1898,
77 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1983).
We believe the case of Thompson v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
56 S.W.3d 406 (2001) is controlling of the present case.
In
Thompson, the trial court ordered a defendant to be transferred
to KCPC for evaluation to determine his competency to stand
trial.
The trial court’s order stated that mental problems had
been brought to the court’s attention “which may affect
defendant’s ability to perceive and interpret information
provided to him by counsel.”
Id. at 407-408.
At the hearing at
which the court accepted the defendant’s guilty plea, defense
counsel conceded the issue of the defendant’s competency.
In
accepting the plea, the trial court relied on the defense
counsel’s concession and a review of the reports generated by the
doctors who examined the defendant.1
Id. at 408.
court did not hold a competency hearing.
The trial
The Supreme Court held
that “the trial court’s own order establishes the sufficiency of
1
As in the present case, the Thompson dissent indicates
that the evaluation of the defendant, performed by a KCPC
psychiatrist, found him competent to stand trial.
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the trial judge’s level of doubt as to Thompson’s competence to
plead guilty.”
Id. at 408.
As a result, the Court held that,
per KRS 504.100, an evidentiary hearing was required, and the
trial court’s failure to hold such hearing violated the
appellant’s due process rights.
In Mills v. Commonwealth, Ky., 996 S.W.2d 473 (1999),
however, the Supreme Court held the trial court’s failure to hold
an evidentiary hearing to be harmless error.
In Mills, the
appellant had given notice that he intended to introduce evidence
concerning mental illness, insanity, or mental defect pursuant to
KRS 504.070.
Mills, 996 S.W.2d at 485.
The trial court ordered
a mental examination, the report pursuant to which found Mills to
be competent.
Based on the fact that the report found him
competent, the fact that Mills “point[ed] to nothing else that
should have caused the trial court to question his competency to
stand trial,” and the fact that “the trial judge did not order
the psychiatric examination due to a belief that there were
reasonable grounds to question Mills’ competency to stand trial,”
but “merely ordered the examination out of expediency in response
to Mills’ notice . . . ,” the Supreme Court found that Mills
“failed to establish any factual basis which should have caused
the trial court to experience reasonable doubt as to Mills
competence to stand trial” and held the trial court’s failure to
hold a competency hearing to be harmless error.
Mills, 996
S.W.2d at 486.
Although, in the present case, as in Mills, the
appellant was found competent by the mental evaluations, it can
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be distinguished from Mills in that the language of the trial
court’s own order indicates that the court had a sufficient level
of doubt as to appellant’s competency.
at 408.
See Thompson, 56 S.W.3d
In its October 27, 2000 order, ordering the mental
evaluation of appellant, the trial court stated that “there is
reason to believe that [appellant] is not mentally capable of
understanding the charges against him or aiding his counsel in
the trial of said case.”
Accordingly, we believe we are
compelled to follow Thompson, and hold that in this case the
trial court was required to hold a competency hearing.
In Thompson, our Supreme Court outlined the remedy for
the situation, as in the present case, where a trial court was
required but failed to hold a competency hearing.
The Court held
that a retrospective competency hearing is permissible depending
on the facts of a particular case.
Thompson, 56 S.W.3d at 409.
A retrospective competency hearing, “may
satisfy the requirements of due process
provided it is based on evidence related to
observations made or knowledge possessed at
the time of trial.” Cremeans v. Chapleau, 62
F. 3d [167, 169 (6th Cir. 1995).] Other
factors bearing on the constitutional
permissibility of a retrospective hearing
include: (1) the length of time between the
retrospective hearing and the trial; (2) the
availability of transcript or video record of
the relevant proceedings; (3) the existence
of mental examinations conducted close in
time to the trial date; and (4) the
availability of the recollections of nonexperts — including counsel and the trial
judge — who had the ability to observe and
interact with the defendant during trial
[citation omitted]. These factors are not
inclusive and none are necessarily
determinative. Rather, the question is
decided on a case-by-case basis. [citation
omitted]. In evaluating these factors, we
note that the passage of a considerable
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amount of time is not an insurmountable
obstacle. See, e.g., Cremeans v. Chapleau,
62 F. 3d at 170 (passage of almost seven
years between trial and competency hearing
did not violate defendant’s due process
rights).
The test to be applied in determining whether
a retrospective competency hearing is
permissible is whether the “quantity and
quality of available evidence is adequate to
arrive at an assessment that could be labeled
as more than mere speculation.” Martin v.
Estelle, 583 F.2d 1373, 1374 (5th Cir. 1978).
Further, the Commonwealth has the burden to
show that a retrospective competency hearing
is permissible. Lokos v. Capps, 625 F.2d
1258, 1262 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 409-410.
Thompson concluded that the determination of
whether a retrospective competency hearing is permissible should
be left to the trial court.
Id. at 410.
If the trial court
determines that a retrospective competency hearing is
permissible, Thompson indicates that the trial court is to
conduct such hearing.
Id. If the trial court rules that a
retrospective competency hearing is not permissible, Thompson
indicates that a new trial should be granted.
Id.
Because
Thompson requires this case be remanded, appellant’s argument
that the trial court erred in failing to postpone the proceedings
per RCr 8.04 is rendered moot.
Appellant finally argues that the trial court erred in
failing to instruct the jury on facilitation.
Appellant did not
request an instruction on facilitation and concedes that this
issue was not preserved for review.
“RCr 9.54(2) [] requires a
party to make a specific objection to the giving or the failure
to give an instruction before the Court instructs the jury . . .
in order to preserve that issue for review on appeal.”
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Commonwealth v. Collins, Ky., 821 S.W.2d 488, 492 (1991).
Appellant therefore requests we review the issue for palpable
error per RCr 10.26.
A palpable error is one which results in
manifest injustice, which occurs when there is a substantial
possibility that the outcome would have been different except for
the error.
Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219 (1996).
“A defendant is guilty of criminal facilitation when he
knowingly provides another with the means or opportunity to
commit a crime, KRS 506.080, by, for instance, loaning a car to
another knowing that it will be used in a robbery.”
Adkins v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 647 S.W.2d 502, 505 (1982), citing
Luttrell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 554 S.W.2d 75 (1977).
In the
present case, there is no evidence to show that appellant merely
provided the means or opportunity for Belinda Morris to traffic
in cocaine.
participant.
Rather, by taking the money, appellant was an active
Accordingly, a facilitation instruction was not
warranted, and hence, no palpable error occurred.
Churchwell v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 843 S.W.2d 336 (1993); Adkins, 647 S.W.2d
502.
For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the
Logan Circuit Court is vacated and the case remanded for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART
AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART: The majority opinion vacates Henry’s conviction and
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sentence so that the case can be remanded to the trial court for
either a retrospective competency hearing or a new trial.
respectfully dissent from this portion of the opinion.
I
In my
opinion, Henry is entitled to only a new sentencing hearing at
the most.
There was no indication to either the judge, the
prosecutor, or defense counsel that Henry might not be competent
until after the jury rendered its verdict finding him guilty of
the offense.
After the jury returned its guilty verdict but
before the penalty phase commenced, defense counsel expressed his
concern to the court that there had been a change in Henry’s
demeanor since the jury returned its verdict and that the
proceedings should be continued in order for a competency
evaluation to be completed.
Henry had testified during the guilt
phase of the trial, and the court stated that “he seemed to
testify alright.”
Further, the trial court found that Henry’s
unresponsiveness to defense counsel’s pleas to gather penalty
phase witnesses and Henry’s depression and taking of Prozac were
insufficient grounds to order a competency evaluation and
continue the penalty phase hearing.
A trial judge is given wide latitude in determining
whether a defendant should be evaluated to determine competency.
Conley v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 569 S.W.2d 682, 685 (1978).
The trial judge had the opportunity to observe Henry testify
during the guilt phase of the trial and then heard arguments from
defense counsel that Henry was depressed and on Prozac.
I
perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to
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continue the penalty phase proceedings and order a competency
evaluation.
Thus, in my opinion the guilty verdict and the
jury’s sentence recommendation should stand.
I agree with the majority opinion that the court’s
imposition of the sentence should be vacated pursuant to the
Thompson case.
I believe the proper action for this court to
take is to vacate the sentence and remand the case to the trial
court for a retrospective competency hearing concerning whether
Henry was competent when he was sentenced by the court or for a
new sentencing hearing.
However, under the majority opinion, the
trial court could order a new trial entirely if it found Henry
was not competent during the guilt phase and the penalty phase of
the trial.
I disagree with this procedure because there was no
question of competency during the guilt phase and because the
trial court was within its discretion in denying the competency
evaluation during the penalty phase.
This situation is somewhat akin to the circumstances in
Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 109 (2000).
In that case
the issue of competency did not arise until after the trial but
before the final sentencing.
Id. at 111.
The trial court
therein ordered a competency evaluation prior to sentencing the
defendant.
Id.
After the reports were filed indicating that the
defendant was competent, the court sentenced the defendant
without holding an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
competency.
Id.
Ultimately, the Kentucky Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal as premature because other post-trial
motions were still pending.
Id. at 114.
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The court also directed
the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing and to rule on the
issue of the defendant’s competency to stand trial.
Id.
I agree
with Justice Keller’s opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part wherein he stated he would limit the scope of the
competency hearing to the question of whether the defendant was
competent at the time of his sentencing.
Id.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Euva D. Hess
Frankfort, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Janine Coy Bowden
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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