DENNIS D. ELLIOTT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: May 24, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001255-MR
DENNIS D. ELLIOTT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENISE CLAYTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-000535
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; JOHNSON AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE: Dennis D. Elliott has appealed from a judgment of
conviction and sentence of probation entered by the Jefferson
Circuit Court on May 11, 2001, which convicted him of illegal
possession of a controlled substance in the first degree1 and
illegal possession of drug paraphernalia.2
Having concluded that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Elliott’s
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1415.
2
KRS 218A.500.
motion for a mistrial and that any errors made by the trial court
in its evidentiary rulings were harmless errors, we affirm.
On March 8, 2000, the Jefferson County grand jury
returned a three-count indictment against Elliott charging him
with the offenses of trafficking in a controlled substance in the
first degree;3 illegal possession of drug paraphernalia; and
being a persistent felony offender in the second degree (PFO
II).4
At his jury trial on February 8 and 9, 2001, Elliott was
convicted of the lesser-included offense of illegal possession of
a controlled substance in the first degree and illegal possession
of drug paraphernalia.
Elliott pled guilty to being a PFO II and
waived jury sentencing.
On May 11, 2001, the trial court entered a judgment of
conviction and sentence of probation.
Elliott was given a five-
year prison sentence for his convictions for possession of a
controlled substance and PFO II and a $500.00 fine for his
conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia.
prison sentence was probated for five years.
The five-year
This appeal
followed.
Elliott claims that the trial court erred by not
declaring a mistrial when the Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney
mentioned in his closing argument that Elliott was on parole.
Elliott also claims that the trial court erred by allowing the
3
KRS 218A.1412.
4
KRS 532.080(2).
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Commonwealth to repeatedly introduce so-called “investigative”
hearsay and to brand Elliott as a major drug dealer.
At trial, the Commonwealth called Detective Mike
Halbleib of the Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Narcotics Unit
as a witness.
Det. Halbleib testified that on November 30, 1999,
at approximately 5:30 p.m. he and his supervisor, Sergeant Chris
Dunn, were observing a location at 15th Street and Jefferson
Street in Jefferson County and observed several cars leave that
location at approximately the same time.
Det. Halbleib testified
that one of the vehicles, a white 1996 Dodge Intrepid,
Elliott as a passenger.
included
He further testified that several of the
men in the vehicles were being targeted as suspected drug
dealers, including Elliott.
Det. Halbleib testified that when the Intrepid pulled
into the parking lot of a Long John Silvers restaurant, he
stopped the vehicle by activating his emergency lights.
Det.
Halbleib testified that he approached the vehicle, knocked on the
window, and questioned Elliott, who initially stated that the
vehicle was his, but then immediately stated that it was his
mother’s car.
Det. Halbleib testified that Elliott then gave him
consent to search the vehicle.
Det. Halbleib stated that during
the search Elliott informed him that there was a scale in the
glove box.
Det. Halbleib testified that he located inside the
glove box a digital scale with a leather carrying case.
Elliott
claimed the scale was used by his mother to cook Thanksgiving
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dinner.
Det. Halbleib testified that he decided not to make an
arrest until the scale was checked for cocaine residue.
Det. Halbleib further testified that he contacted
Elliott’s mother by telephone and asked her about the digital
scale.
She indicated that she did own a scale and that she used
it to cook Thanksgiving dinner, but that her scale was not
digital and she had never owned a digital scale.5
Det. Halbleib
conceded that he waited several months before he provided the
information to the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office that led to a
grand jury indictment.
Det. Halbleib also admitted that Elliott
was approached by the police to work as a confidential informant,
but that Elliott refused to provide any information to the
police.
The Commonwealth then called Gary Boley, a forensic
drug chemist for the Kentucky State Police Regional Laboratory in
Jefferson County.
Boley testified that he performed various
tests on the digital scale and determined that there was cocaine
residue on the scale.
In fact, Boley testified that the residue
was visible to the naked eye.
The Commonwealth then called Det. Bob O’Neil of the
Louisville Jefferson County Metro Narcotics Unit as an expert
witness.
Det. O’Neil testified that he had 25 years of
experience as an officer including 16 years as a narcotics
investigator.
Det. O’Neil was called as a narcotics expert for
5
The jury was read a stipulation that Elliott’s mother would
testify accordingly.
-4-
the purpose of explaining that a digital scale is commonly used
by drug traffickers.
Det. O’Neil testified that drug traffickers
depend on repeat customers and that a scale is used to accurately
measure the quantity of drugs that they are selling.
Elliott called one witness on his behalf, Juan Ashford.
Ashford testified that he was Elliott’s friend and that he was
driving the Intrepid when it was stopped at Long John Silvers.
Ashford testified that he attempted to tell the police that he
had put the scale in the glove box, but that the police told him
to be quiet.
Ashford testified that he had been given permission
by Elliott’s mother to drive the car for the entire day.
Ashford
testified that he dropped Elliott off at barber school in the
morning and returned to pick him up later that afternoon.
He
testified that after he picked Elliott up from barber school,
Elliott stated that he needed to go to his grandmother’s house to
take a shower.
Ashford testified that while he was waiting in
Elliott’s grandmother’s front yard he noticed the digital scale
laying on the ground against some shrubbery.
He testified that
he knew he was in a high crime area and he knew that the scale
was drug paraphernalia.
He claimed that he was worried about
Elliott and Elliott’s grandmother getting into trouble, so he put
the scale in the glove box with the intention of disposing of it
later.
During cross-examination, Ashford was asked by the
Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney why he was concerned about
Elliott getting into trouble.
Ashford testified that he was
worried because Elliott was “on paper, parole.”
-5-
The defense
objected and the trial court admonished the jury to disregard the
answer.
However, for inexplicable reasons, the Assistant
Commonwealth’s Attorney chose to bring Elliott’s parole status to
the attention of the jury during his closing argument.
Once
again, the defense objected, and this time counsel asked for a
mistrial.
The trial court instead chose to admonish the jury to
disregard the comment.
The Commonwealth argues that Ashford’s statement about
Elliott being on parole should have been admitted as evidence
because it tended to establish Ashford’s bias in favor of
Elliott.6
We have reviewed the cases submitted by the
Commonwealth and we do not believe that they are on point.
In
the case sub judice, Ashford made no attempt to hide the fact
that Elliott was his friend.
In fact, he testified that he felt
like Elliott’s grandmother was his grandmother also.
He also
testified that he had been given permission by Elliott’s mother
to drive her car throughout the day.
Thus, we believe it was
quite clear that Ashford had a favorable bias toward Elliott and
there was no need to tell the jury of the prejudicial fact of
Elliott being on parole.
It certainly was not an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to conclude that this evidence
6
The Commonwealth cited this Court to United States v. Abel,
469 U.S. 45, 105 S.Ct. 465, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984); Byrd v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 825 S.W.2d 272 (1992); and People v. Layher,
464 Mich. 756, 631 N.W.2d 281 (2001).
-6-
should be excluded because its probative value was substantially
outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice.7
When Elliott’s counsel objected to the Assistant
Commonwealth’s Attorney’s remark during closing arguments, he
pointed out that the trial court had already admonished the jury
during Ashford’s testimony.
The Assistant Commonwealth’s
Attorney acknowledged the previous admonishment, but then he
argued that the admonishment only prevented him from using the
statement as to Elliott’s guilt or innocence and not for other
purposes.
record.
We find this argument to be totally refuted by the
The record shows that the trial court sustained the
defense objection to the question which had elicited the answer
concerning Elliott’s parole status and the trial court clearly
admonished the jury to disregard the answer.
The trial court did
not give the jury a limited admonition, such as an admonition
that is given when a defendant who has a prior felony conviction
testifies.
While the trial court refused to grant the defense a
mistrial based on the improper closing argument, it did instruct
the Commonwealth not to make any further reference to Elliott
being on parole, and it admonished the jury to disregard the
previous statement made by the Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney.
While we agree with Elliott that the statement by the
Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney in closing arguments concerning
his being on parole was improper, it did not rise to such a level
for us to hold that the trial court abused its discretion by
7
Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 403.
-7-
denying the motion for a mistrial, nor do we believe that it was
so prejudicial as to affect the outcome of the trial.
In Gosser
v. Commonwealth8, the Supreme Court of Kentucky stated:
A defendant’s motion for a mistrial should
only be granted where there is a “manifest
necessity for such an action or an urgent or
real necessity.” Skaggs v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
694 S.W.2d 672 (1985), cert denied, 476 U.S.
1130, 106 S.Ct. 1998, 90 L.Ed.2d 678 (1986).
The trial court has broad discretion in
determining when a mistrial is necessary. As
explained in Wiley v. Commonwealth, Ky.App.,
575 S.W.2d 166 (1979), “Where, for reasons
deemed compelling by the trial judge, who is
best situated intelligently to make such a
decision, the ends of substantial justice
cannot be attained without discontinuing the
trial, a mistrial may be declared. . . .” Id.
at 169, quoting Gori v. United States, 367
U.S. 364, 81 S.Ct. 1523, 6 L.Ed.2d 901
(1961).
We have reviewed the videotape of the entire trial; and
when we consider the case as a whole, we do not believe that the
trial court abused its discretion by denying Elliott’s motion for
a mistrial.
Although we agree that the comment on Elliott’s
parole status was clearly improper, we do not believe that the
error created an “urgent or real necessity” for the trial court
grant a mistrial.
The comment was not a point of emphasis for
the Commonwealth and the trial court admonished the jury to
disregard the statement.
There was no manifest necessity
requiring a mistrial; the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Elliott’s motion.
8
Ky., 31 S.W.3d 897, 907 (2000).
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Elliott’s final claim of error is that the trial court
erred by allowing the Commonwealth to portray him as a major drug
dealer through the repeated introduction of so-called
“investigative” hearsay.
The theory of the case as set forth by
the Commonwealth from its opening statement was that Elliott was
a target of a major drug investigation.
The Commonwealth
elicited testimony from Det. Halbleib that the center of the
investigation was Derrick Smith, Reggie Rice and Dennis Elliott.
During his opening statement, the Assistant
Commonwealth’s Attorney stated that the Commonwealth would prove
that Elliott was “in the business of selling cocaine.”
Further,
the Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney stated that officers would
testify that they were investigating Elliott and the officers
only worked on cases involving “medium to large scale drug
dealers.”
During Det. Halbleib’s testimony for the Commonwealth,
he testified that his duties included investigating all aspects
of the drug community.
He testified that he is “assigned to the
major case unit” that “investigates mid to upper level
traffickers in Louisville metro area.”
Elliott argues that the Assistant Commonwealth’s
Attorney’s opening statement and the testimony of Det. Halbleib
interjected inadmissible “investigative” hearsay into the trial.
In Gordon v. Commonwealth,9 our Supreme Court stated:
9
Ky., 916 S.W.2d 176 (1995).
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In the case at bar, it was not improper
to admit evidence that appellant had become a
suspect in the county-wide drug
investigation. This avoided any implication
that appellant had been unfairly singled out
and explained why the police equipped an
informant with a recording device and money
with which to attempt a drug buy from
appellant. The next question, however, was
utterly unnecessary and unfairly prejudicial.
There was no legitimate need to say or imply
that appellant was a drug dealer or that he
was suspected by the police department of
selling drugs in a particular vicinity. Such
testimony was admittedly based in part on
hearsay and was thus unassailable by
appellant. Admission of this evidence
branded appellant a drug dealer, violated his
right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, denied his right to be tried only
for the crime charged, and in general,
bolstered the credibility of the police
informant to the point where appellant’s
denial of criminal conduct would have
appeared preposterous.
In view of the foregoing, the conviction
must be reversed and a new trial granted.10
We do not believe that the testimony in the present
case branded Elliott as a drug dealer to the extent of the
prejudicial evidence in Gordon.
In the case at bar, the claim
by the Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney in his opening statement
that the evidence at trial would support a finding that the
Elliott was a drug dealer was proper since Elliott was indeed
charged with trafficking in cocaine.
The statement did not
allege that Elliott had a history of drug dealing other than to
the extent that he was being charged for trafficking in cocaine.
10
Id. at 179.
-10-
The testimony that is alleged to be in error is more
closely akin to the testimony that was held to be proper in
Gordon.
The testimony by Det. Halbleib on direct examination
that he was a drug investigator and that Elliott was a target of
his investigation was used to explain why the officers were
watching Elliott and subsequently approached his mother’s car in
the Long John Silvers parking lot.
Since Det. Halbleib conceded
that Ashford was not cited for a traffic violation and that the
traffic violation for which he was pulled over was minor and in
fact served only as a pretext for pursuing a drug investigation,
an explanation concerning the fact that Elliott and some other
men who were Elliott’s acquaintances were targets of a drug
investigation was proper.
The testimony by Det. Halbleib on re-
direct examination that he had asked Elliott to work as an
informant because he knew Elliott was involved in drug dealing
with Smith and Rice was proper since it explained his responses
to questions of him during the cross-examination by the defense.
Defense counsel apparently was attempting to show that Elliott
had refused to cooperate with the police by working as an
informant because he did not have any information that would be
helpful.
Conversely, the Commonwealth was entitled to attempt to
show that Elliott in fact had been involved in drug dealing with
a couple of drug dealers (Smith and Rice) but he just did not
want to cooperate with the police.
-11-
Finally, even assuming it was error to admit the
evidence, we hold the errors to be harmless errors.11
Elliott
has argued that these statements were prejudicial because he was
branded as a major drug dealer from the outset of trial.
However, as evidenced by the jury’s verdict, the jury flatly
rejected the Commonwealth’s theory of the case and returned a
verdict only for the lesser-included offense of possession of
cocaine.
Also, Elliott waived jury sentencing and was given the
minimum sentence possible by the trial court and his sentence was
probated.
Thus, we cannot say that Elliott was harmed by any of
the comments made by the Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney or by
Det. Halbleib’s testimony.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Richard L. Receveur
Louisville, Kentucky
Ian G. Sonego
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Ian G. Sonego
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
11
RCr 9.24.
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