ROBERT WAYNE AVERY v. DELTA AIRLINES, INC.; HON. DONNA H. TERRY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: JULY 12, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001247-WC
ROBERT WAYNE AVERY
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-94-53105
v.
DELTA AIRLINES, INC.; HON. DONNA H.
TERRY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, JOHNSON AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Robert Wayne Avery has petitioned this Court for
review of an opinion by the Workers’ Compensation Board which
affirmed the Administrative Law Judge’s opinion and award.
The
ALJ awarded Avery a 20% permanent partial disability as a result
of his bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.
However, she dismissed
the claims related to Avery’s cervical spine problems on the
grounds they were not work-related and that he had failed to give
due and timely notice of these injuries; and she also dismissed
his claims related to left cubital tunnel syndrome and bilateral
thoracic outlet compression syndrome on the grounds that to the
extent these conditions were alleged to have been disabling
beyond the bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome they did not result
in any additional occupational disability and that he had failed
to give due and timely notice of these injuries.
Having
concluded that the Board has not overlooked or misconstrued
controlling statutes or precedent or committed an error in
assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice,
we affirm.
The Board’s opinion summarized the facts as follows:
This is an interesting matter in that it
has a multitude of medical evidence and is
somewhat complicated procedurally. The
original claim was filed pro se on December
20, 1994 with an allegation of bilateral
carpal tunnel syndrome. There was a request
to place the claim in abeyance on February 1,
1995. The matter remained in abeyance until
November 20, 1998. As the claim began, it
was assigned to an ALJ/Acting Arbitrator.
There was a motion to amend made on February
18, 1999 alleging cervical problems as well
as cubital tunnel syndrome. The matter was
transferred to an ALJ on March 10, 1999 and
an order amending the claim was entered on
March 18, 1999 to include thoracic outlet
compression, cubital tunnel syndrome and
cervical problems. A second motion to amend
was made on September 29, 1999 alleging
cumulative trauma with a further request for
amendment seeking an allegation of a
disability manifestation date, that order
being entered on March 9, 2000. The Opinion
of the ALJ was rendered December 7, 2000.
Avery began working for Delta in 1968
and worked there for approximately thirty-one
years. He took early retirement on September
30, 1999 because he did not believe he could
continue the activities necessary for his
job. He worked as a customer service agent,
which required him to check passengers and
handle and load luggage. Most of his work
for Delta had been at the Louisville Airport
but, according to him because he had to work
by himself frequently there, he sought a
transfer to the Cincinnati Airport. He was
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able to effect that transfer in 1995.
Apparently, he commuted to that job.
In either 1991 or 1992 Avery began to
experience problems in his hands and wrists.
Apparently, there was an incident while he
was loading some luggage in 1991 in which he
felt pain in his shoulder and left bicep. He
came under the care of Dr. Vasudeva Iyer, who
performed EMG and NCV studies and diagnosed
carpal tunnel syndrome. This was sometime in
1994. He was referred to Dr. Breidenbach in
November of 1994. Dr. Briedenbach initially
began treating Avery conservatively with
steroid injections, splits and vitamins. He
testified with these conditions that Dr.
Breidenbach recommended he limit some of his
activities. He eventually underwent surgery
for a right carpal tunnel release in March of
1995 and then a left carpal tunnel release in
December of 1995. While off, he was paid
wage continuation and other benefits from
Delta. After his surgeries, he underwent
physical therapy and eventually returned to
work with recommendations of no lifting over
70 pounds. However, even with his attempt to
limit his activities he began to experience
symptomatology, particularly in the left
hand, and had a second left carpal tunnel
release in January of 1997. As he continued
to work, Avery began to develop additional
problems further up into his arms and even
into his neck. Eventually, he reached the
point where he could no longer engage in a
full range of activities.
Avery testified he was not actually
diagnosed with cervical problems until
sometime in 1999. He acknowledged there were
occasions when he would have stiffness in his
neck and shoulders but he did not necessarily
attribute these to problems in his neck.
From 1991 or 1992 he would have periodic
problems in both of his upper extremities in
different forms. In addition to being
diagnosed with cervical difficulties and
bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, he’s also
been diagnosed with bilateral thoracic outlet
compression and bilateral cubital tunnel
syndrome. He has seen a multitude of
physicians.
Avery testified his employer was aware
he was having some difficulties and that on
occasion he was on restricted activities. He
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could not recall whether he ever specifically
advised Delta that he believed his problems
were related to work with the exception of
the carpal tunnel syndrome. Avery denied
having any specific incidents involving
either his neck or upper extremities other
than specifically the one occasion in 1991
reflected in the doctor’s notes.
Avery does not believe he has the
capability of returning to active gainful
employment, certainly cannot return to the
type of work he was doing for Delta and he
has now applied for Social Security
disability, although at the time of the
hearing he had received no determination.
All of the medical testimony was
presented by way of Form 107s or reports.
This includes medical information from Dr.
Petruska, Dr. Goldman, Dr. Gabriel, Dr.
Collis, Dr. Dues, Dr. Iyer, Dr. Garcia, Dr.
Stewart, and Dr. Breidenbach and from
University Neurologists.
Rather than trying to individually
summarize the testimony from these
physicians, we will attempt to piece it all
together.
The first reported problems began in
1991 with a history of placing luggage on an
airplane or taking it off and feeling pain in
the shoulder and bicep area. Shortly
thereafter, Avery began to develop additional
pain and when he came to see a physician,
EMGs and NCVs studies were performed which
revealed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.
Although he had complaints of hand and wrist
difficulties, it appears Avery’s primary
complaints were in the shoulder region.
Avery was treated primarily with conservative
care and recommended to limit his activities
involving his upper extremities. He
underwent steroid injections as well as wrist
splinting. In some of the early medical
reports there were questions raised by one of
the physicians as to whether this might be
cervical radiculopathy, although the
physician raising that question did not
believe the symptomatic complaints were
consistent with a true radiculopathy.
Thereafter, the treatment was focused
upon Avery’s hands and wrists through the
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care of Dr. Breidenbach. Having been
diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel and
noting that upon each release to return to
work there seemed to be a reoccurrence of the
severity of the symptomatology, eventually
Avery underwent surgery on both wrists.
Salary continuation was paid and medical
expenses for this treatment were covered by
Delta. Dr. Breidenbach, in some of his
notes, indicates that while it is evident
Avery has carpal tunnel syndrome, that
condition would not explain either his bicep
or shoulder problems. At that time, it was
thought Avery might have referred pain into
his arm from a shoulder strain.
As the years continued, particularly
while this claim remained in abeyance, Avery
continued to see a variety of physicians.
During that time for the first time in early
1997 there is reference to likely cervical
involvement. There are indications in the
medical reports that on at least one occasion
Avery reported having a stiff neck and
problems into the upper extremities. At that
time, the doctor suggested to him that he
might have radiculopathy (although Avery
contends this did not indicate to him that he
had problems in the neck). Although he
continued to be seen by physicians throughout
1997 and 1998, most of the treatment
continued to be focused upon carpal tunnel,
although diagnoses for cubital tunnel and
possible thoracic outlet compression were
also noted. Again, during this time, there
is some reference to the possibility of
cervical radiculopathy and spondylosis.
As the medical treatment continued,
Avery came to see Dr. Petruska and Dr.
Tinsley Stewart. Apparently, each of these
physicians eventually had the opportunity to
review specialized testing, noted he had
cervical spondylosis, degenerative changes in
the cervical spine and that he had a
radiculopathy. Throughout their treatment,
there is no reference to any specific
incident occurring at work and actually
minimal discussion of what his work
activities [were]. With his cervical spine
as well as the cubital tunnel syndrome, Avery
has been treated conservatively.
Eventually, the diagnosis of cervical
difficulties was confirmed and Avery has been
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assessed with impairment ratings from
anywhere from 2 to 18%. Recommended lifting
restrictions were imposed as early as 1998
which were more restrictive than the original
70 pound limitation.
The ALJ, in an opinion and award dated December 11,
2000, made a finding that, with the exception of the bilateral
carpal tunnel syndrome, Avery’s conditions were not work-related
and that he had failed to give due and timely notice of his
injuries.
On May 9, 2001, the Board entered an opinion affirming
the ALJ’s decision.
This petition for review followed.
The claimant in a workers’ compensation case bears the
burden of proving each and every essential element of his claim.1
For an unsuccessful party who had the burden of proof before the
ALJ to succeed on appeal, he must establish that the evidence
compelled a finding in his favor.2
To be compelling evidence,
the evidence must be so overwhelming that no reasonable person
could reach the same conclusion as the ALJ.3
It is not enough
for the claimant to show that there was substantial evidence
which could have supported a contrary conclusion.4
This Court’s
function in reviewing the Board’s decision is “to correct the
Board only where the [ ] Court perceives the Board has overlooked
or misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or committed
1
Snawder v. Stice, Ky.App., 576 S.W.2d 276 (1979).
2
Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, Ky.App., 673 S.W.2d 735
(1984).
3
REO Mechanical v. Barnes, Ky.App., 691 S.W.2d 224 (1985).
4
McCloud v. Beth-Elkhorn Corp., Ky., 514 S.W.2d 46 (1974).
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an error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross
injustice.”5
Avery first argues that the ALJ improperly relied upon
the opinion of Dr. Goldman to support her conclusion that Avery’s
cervical spine conditions were not work-related, because his
opinion was based upon “insufficient, and [ ] therefore,
inaccurate [ ] history[.]”
We believe the Board thoroughly
addressed this issue by stating:
Dr. Goldman, whom Avery thinks is a
fraud, believed the entirety of the cervical
spine problems related to the natural aging
process, i.e. the development of degenerative
disk disease and osteoarthritis. While Avery
makes a strong attack upon Dr. Goldman’s
analysis of the history, we cannot accept
Avery’s conclusions. In reviewing Dr.
Goldman’s report, he indicated he reviewed
medical records going back to 1991. While
his report does not contain a detailed
explanation of the activities reported by
Avery, these medical reports do. Contrary to
the arguments of Avery, we do not believe the
only reasonable interpretation of Dr.
Goldman’s conclusion to be that since there
was no specific incident identified, there
could not be a work injury. Rather, an
equally reasonable interpretation of Dr.
Goldman’s evidence is that considering the
totality of the medical treatment from 1992
to 2000, considering the onset of the
symptomatology and how it developed and
having an understanding of the work
activities engaged in by Avery would lead one
to conclude his work activities and
particularly that he had been restricted for
some period of time, did not constitute a
cumulative trauma. Although Avery makes much
of the point that Dr. Goldman is a “hired
gun”, Kentucky workers’ compensation law has
long provided that the fact finder may rely
upon either a treating physician or an
examining physician and may rely upon
5
Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685,
687-88 (1992).
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differing specialties as the fact finder sees
fit [citation omitted].
While a different ALJ may have made a different finding
as to whether Avery’s cervical spine complaints were the result
of work activities or due to degenerative disc and joint disease
which are part of the natural aging process, as long as the
findings of this ALJ are supported by substantial evidence, the
Board and this Court cannot set those findings aside.6
We are
in agreement with the Board that Dr. Goldman was adequately
informed of Avery’s work activities and medical treatments.
Avery makes two primary arguments regarding this issue.
First, he claims that the medical reports referred to by Dr.
Goldman in his report “DO NOT describe a history of Mr. Avery’s
work for Delta over the 31 years of Mr. Avery’s employment
there.”
Second, he claims that Dr. Goldman “clearly did not
consider the issues applicable to whether or not Mr. Avery had
sustained a cumulative trauma to his cervical spine[.]”
We have
reviewed Dr. Goldman’s report and we agree with the Board’s
conclusions.
While there is no doubt that more specific
information concerning Avery’s work history would have been
helpful to understanding Dr. Goldman’s report, the report does
note that Avery retired from Delta Airlines in 1999 after working
as a baggage handler.
In assessing the cause of Avery’s cervical
spine problems, we believe a more significant aspect of Dr.
Goldman’s report is his reference to Dr. Petruska’s treatment of
Avery.
Dr. Goldman’s report states that Avery was seen by Dr.
Petruska on September 28, 1999, for “the first in a series of
6
Special Fund v. Francis, Ky., 708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (1986).
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visits involving an MRI which showed degenerative changes at C45, C5-6, and C6-7, and a myelogram and post-myelographic CT scan
which showed cervical spondylosis at those levels[.]” Certainly,
these medical findings constitute substantial evidence in support
of the ALJ’s finding that Avery’s cervical spine problems were
caused by the natural degenerating of the vertebrae and not by
cumulative trauma.
Thus, we hold that Dr. Goldman’s findings and
the medical findings relied upon by him are competent evidence
and the ALJ was not “clearly erroneous” in relying on these
findings.7
Furthermore, the ALJ has the right to believe part of
the evidence and disbelieve other parts, even if it comes from
the same witness.8
We find it noteworthy that Avery’s own
physicians were not in agreement as to what caused his alleged
condition.
The Board stated:
One believed there was an arousal of a preexisting condition by the “work-injury”; the
other believes there was not. One believes
there was an acceleration of the aging
process by the work injury; the other does
not. Very simply, the medical testimony on
causation is varied and would support any
number of conclusions.
We hold that there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s
finding that Avery’s cervical spine condition was not workrelated, and that the evidence did not compel a finding in his
favor.
7
Hudson v. Owens, Ky., 439 S.W.2d 565, 568 (1969).
8
Id.
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In challenging the ALJ’s determination that he failed,
in accordance with KRS9 342.185(1),10 to give due and timely
notice to Delta of his cervical spine condition, Avery argues:
(1) that Delta should be estopped from claiming it did not have
notice because it paid medical benefits under its workers’
compensation program for his cervical spine condition; and (2)
that any inference drawn by the ALJ that Avery knew in either
1997 or 1998 that “he might have a work-related condition
involving his neck and upper extremities beyond simply the carpal
tunnel syndrome” was not supported by the evidence.
9
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
10
This provision provides:
Except as provided in subsection (2) of
this section, no proceeding under this
chapter for compensation for an injury or
death shall be maintained unless a notice of
the accident shall have been given to the
employer as soon as practicable after the
happening thereof and unless an application
for adjustment of claim for compensation with
respect to the injury shall have been made
with the department within two (2) years
after the date of the accident, or in case of
death, within two (2) years after the death,
whether or not a claim has been made by the
employee himself for compensation. The
notice and the claim may be given or made by
any person claiming to be entitled to
compensation or by someone in his behalf. If
payments of income benefits have been made,
the filing of an application for adjustment
of claim with the department within the
period shall not be required, but shall
become requisite within two (2) years
following the suspension of payments or
within two (2) years of the date of the
accident, whichever is later.
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The issue of due and timely notice presents a mixed
question of law and fact.11
In Special Fund v. Clark,12 the
Supreme Court of Kentucky stated:
Once a worker is aware of the existence
of a disabling condition and the fact that it
is caused by work, the worker would also be
aware that continuing to perform the same or
similar duties was likely to cause additional
injury. For that reason, the rationale which
supports the decision in Randall Co. v.
Pendland does not support tolling the period
of limitations for whatever additional injury
is caused by trauma incurred after the worker
discovers the existence of a work-related
gradual injury. It follows, therefore, that
where a claim is not filed until more than
two years after the worker’s discovery of an
injury and the fact that it was caused by
work, KRS 342.185 would operate to prohibit
compensation for whatever occupational
disability is attributable to trauma incurred
more than two years preceding the filing of
the claim.
We are not aware of any workers’ compensation case law
that supports Avery’s estoppel argument.
However, as noted by
the Board, the Court in General Electric Co. v. Morris,13
observed that employers are encouraged to pay temporary total
disability benefits and medical benefits on a voluntary basis;
and if such a payment were deemed to constitute an estoppel to
raising issues in the employer’s defense, the employer would
hesitate in making voluntary payments.
Avery also argues that
Delta was not prejudiced in any way by his failing to provide
timely notice, but lack of prejudice is not a factor to consider
11
Harry M. Stevens Co. v. Workers’ Compensation Board,
Ky.App., 553 S.W.2d 852 (1977).
12
Ky., 998 S.W.2d 487, 490 (1999).
13
Ky., 670 S.W.2d 854 (1984).
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in determining compliance with the requirements of KRS
342.185(1).14
Avery also claims that the evidence did not support the
inference made by the ALJ concerning when he became aware of his
cervical spine condition.
Avery did not amend his application to
include allegations of cervical radiculopathy until March 18,
1999.
The ALJ found that these conditions were diagnosed by Dr.
Breidenbach between May 1, 1997, and October 17, 1997.
addressed the ALJ findings as follows:
The instant action presents at best a
muddy picture of what Avery did or did not
understand. He certainly understood he was
engaged in repetitive activities. While he
understood that as early as 1997 a physician
was suggesting he had “radiculopathy”, he
testified he did not understand this to be
related to his cervical spine. He did
acknowledge he made reference to a stiff neck
and periodically experiencing a stiff neck
since the early 1990s. The ALJ, we believe,
drew a reasonable inference from the record
that by 1997, or 1998 at the latest, Avery
understood he might have a work-related
condition involving his neck and his upper
extremities beyond simply the carpal tunnel
syndrome.
Avery, in his testimony, was less than
clear as to the verbal information he
provided his employer and it is argued the
first actual notice that he was claiming
either cervical spine problems, thoracic
outlet problems or cubital tunnel problems
was February of 1999 when there was a motion
to amend his 101. The ALJ, believing he had
sufficient information to reach such a
conclusion long before that, deemed this to
be lacking in due and timely notice. This
called for a reasonable inference on the part
of the ALJ. Reasonable inferences, so long
as they are borne out by the record, are
solely for the ALJ and not this Board.
14
Special Fund, supra at 644.
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The Board
Jackson vs. General Refractories Co., Ky.,
581 SW2d 10 (1979).
We hold that there was substantial evidence in the record to
support the ALJ’s finding that Avery failed to give Delta due and
timely notice of his cervical spine condition.
For the foregoing reasons, the opinion of the Workers’
Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, DELTA
AIRLINES, INC.:
Freeda M. Clark
Louisville, Kentucky
George T. T. Kitchen, III
Louisville, Kentucky
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