DAVID BARNETT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY AND DON THOMAS, JUDGE, 58TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT and JARED D. HILL v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY AND DON THOMAS, JUDGE, 58TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT DOYLE ESTES
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 30, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001133-MR
DAVID BARNETT
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARSHALL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS R. FOUST, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00118
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY AND DON THOMAS,
JUDGE, 58TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
AND
NO.
2001-CA-001134-MR
JARED D. HILL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARSHALL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS R. FOUST, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00119
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY AND DON THOMAS,
JUDGE, 58TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
AND
NO.
APPELLEES
2001-CA-001135-MR
DOYLE ESTES
v.
APPELLEES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARSHALL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS R. FOUST, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00120
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY AND DON THOMAS,
JUDGE, 58TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
AND
NO.
APPELLEES
2001-CA-001136-MR
C. C. WOOTEN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARSHALL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS R. FOUST, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00121
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY AND DON THOMAS,
JUDGE, 58TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
AND
NO.
APPELLEES
2001-CA-001137-MR
SONJA KIRBY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARSHALL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS R. FOUST, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00188
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY AND DON THOMAS,
JUDGE, 58TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE AND MILLER, JUDGES.
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE: This is a consolidated appeal of five
cases arising from the appellants’ arrests for first offense,
driving under the influence of alcohol.
Subsequent to each
arrest, each appellant was read an “implied consent” warning in
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accordance with KRS1 189A.105.
Specifically they were informed
that refusal to submit to testing and the subsequent conviction
of violating KRS 189A.010, will subject the offender to a
mandatory minimum jail sentence twice as long as that imposed if
the driver submits to the test.
All the appellants in this
appeal submitted to tests and argue that the results are not
admissible at their trials.
The precise issue now raised was recently addressed in
Commonwealth v. Hernandez-Gonzalez,2 where the court phrased the
question as follows:
Is the Implied Consent Warning read to the
Defendant and contained in KRS 189A.105
defective on its face; and, if so does the
defect unconstitutionally coerce the
Defendant into submitting to a blood alcohol
test under KRS 189A.103, in violation of
Defendant’s right to due process of law under
both the Federal and Kentucky Constitutions?
In reaching the conclusion that although the implied
consent warning set forth in KRS 189A.105 may be defective, it
does not violate a constitutional right.
The court explained as
follows:
The present warning, as set forth in KRS
189A.105(2)(a), informs a person of the
potential consequences of refusing a test for
blood alcohol concentration. The penalty for
refusal varies and is dependent upon the
penalty that would otherwise be imposed. The
statutory language does not state that a
defendant will, in all cases, be sentenced to
mandatory jail time if he refuses the test,
but rather informs the defendant that if he
refuses to consent to the breath test, and if
there is mandatory jail time for the
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
72 S.W.3d 914 (2002).
-3-
underlying offense, then he will be sentenced
to twice that amount of jail time. Through
the use of the language, “will be subject to
a mandatory minimum jail sentence which is
twice as long as the mandatory minimum jail
sentence imposed if he submits to the tests .
. .,” the implied consent warning makes it
clear that the penalty for refusal is
conditioned upon whether conviction of the
underlying offense would result in a
mandatory minimum jail sentence had the
defendant not refused to submit to the test.
The implied consent warning in KRS
189A.105 is defective as applied to those
suspected drunk drivers not necessarily
subject to minimum jail time; however, this
defect does not rise to a violation of a
constitutional right. Although the officer
did not correctly educate Respondent in this
case on the consequences of refusal, the
warning neither offered implicit assurances
that Respondent would not be subject to jail
if he consented to the test, nor guaranteed
jail time if he refused. It merely informed
him of the possibility of additional jail
time should such be mandated for the
underlying DUI offense. Furthermore, as
consent is implied by law, one cannot claim
coercion in consenting to a test. While the
statutory warning may be inaccurate in some
circumstances, the duty to submit to testing
is foremost under the statutory scheme.
Thus, the implied consent warning contained
in KRS 189A.105 is not so defective as to
prejudice, as a matter of law, a suspected
drunk driver’s decision-making process since
there is no constitutional right to refuse to
submit to a test to determine blood alcohol
concentration.3
The issue in these cases has been resolved by our
highest court.
The results of the alcohol concentration tests in
the present cases are admissible at the trials of the respective
appellants.
ALL CONCUR.
3
Id. at 917-18.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
NO BRIEF FILED FOR APPELLEES.
Robert L. Prince
PRINCE & BRIEN, P.S.C.
Benton, Kentucky
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