ROBERT W. NOFFSINGER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JUNE 14, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001118-MR
ROBERT W. NOFFSINGER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID H. JERNIGAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00026
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, COMBS, and JOHNSON, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Following his entry of a conditional plea of
guilty, Robert W. Noffsinger appeals from an order of the
Muhlenberg Circuit Court which denied his motion to suppress a
statement given to police following a vehicular stop and ensuing
arrest.
By means of an Anders Brief, Noffsinger contends that
the circuit court erred in overruling his motion to suppress.
He
argues that there was no probable cause to stop his vehicle; that
his arrest was, therefore, illegal; and that his subsequent
statement to the police was illegally obtained.
On February 23, 2001, Noffsinger was indicted for the
offense of manufacturing methamphetamine (KRS1 218A.1432).
The
charge resulted from evidence that on January 25, 2001,
Noffsinger and a co-defendant, Michael D. Robinson, manufactured
methamphetamine or possessed the chemicals and/or the equipment
for the manufacture of methamphetamine with the intent to
manufacture methamphetamine.
On March 12, 2001, Noffsinger filed
a motion to suppress some of the evidence obtained during the
police investigation — including a statement which he gave to
police following his arrest in which he confessed to
manufacturing methamphetamine.
On March 28, 2001, an evidentiary hearing was held on
the motion.
On March 30, 2001, the circuit court entered an
order denying the motion to suppress.
Noffsinger subsequently
entered a conditional plea of guilty, in which he pled guilty to
the amended charge of criminal facilitation to manufacture
methamphetamine in exchange for a recommended sentence of fiveyears’ imprisonment.
Under the terms of his plea agreement and
pursuant to RCr2 8.09,
Noffsinger reserved his right to appeal
the denial of his motion to suppress.
On April 24, 2001, the
circuit court entered final judgment and sentencing pursuant to
the plea agreement.
This appeal followed.
Noffsinger contends that there was no probable cause to
stop his vehicle.
As a consequence, the ensuing arrest was
illegal, tainting his subsequent confession as “fruit of the
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
-2-
poisonous tree.”
Appellate counsel filed Noffsinger’s brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18
L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).3
In its order denying the motion to suppress, the
circuit court recited the following findings of fact:
On January 25, 2001, Muhlenberg County
Sheriff’s Deputy Eddie Brown received a call
from dispatch about a complaint alleging that
methamphetamine was being cooked or processed
at Kathy Noffsinger’s residence. Based upon
the complaint, Deputy Brown went to the
Noffsinger residence in the Bremen area of
Muhlenberg County, Kentucky. Upon his
arrival, he immediately detected a strong
odor of ammonia. From his training and
experience, Deputy Brown was aware that the
odor of ammonia was associated with the
manufacture of methamphetamine.
Deputy Brown spoke with the owner of the
residence, Kathy Noffsinger, and requested
that she step out onto the front porch where
she could also smell the odor. Upon Deputy
Brown’s request, Ms. Noffsinger gave the
officer permission to search the property.
Ms. Noffsinger further advised that her son,
Defendant Noffsinger, had been there earlier
in the day.
Because the adjoining property was owned by
Paul Noffsinger, Deputy Brown also obtained
permission from Mr. Noffsinger to search the
premises, including an outbuilding. Mr.
Noffsinger advised that both Defendants had
been in and around this outbuilding earlier
in the day.
A search of the outbuilding resulted in the
seizure of several items used to make
methamphetamine. In fact, there was an
active lab in and around the outbuilding at
the time of the search.
Deputy Brown was familiar with both of the
Defendants and knew that both had a history
3
Appellate counsel concedes that “there appears to be no
meritorious basis for the appeal[.]”
-3-
of involvement with methamphetamine,
including the manufacture of same. Because
of this knowledge, the items seized at the
property and the statements obtained from
Paul and Kathy Noffsinger, Deputy Brown
contacted dispatch and requested all officers
be on the look out for a vehicle which had
been described by Kathy Noffsinger as being
her son’s vehicle. Deputy Brown also
requested that any officer locating the
Defendants to detain them until he (Brown)
could effect a formal arrest.
Sometime later, Deputy Brown received
information that the Defendants had been
located in Greenville and had been taken to
the Muhlenberg County Jail. At the
Muhlenberg County Jail, Deputy Brown read
both Defendants their constitutional rights
and each Defendant signed a waiver of same.
Each Defendant gave a statement and, in fact,
Defendant Robinson gave two separate
statements.
In reviewing the decision of a circuit court on a
suppression motion following a hearing, our standard of review is
twofold in nature.
First, we review the trial court’s factual
findings for clear error.
When a trial court holds a pre-trial
suppression hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence
obtained during a search, its findings of fact are conclusive if
they are supported by substantial evidence.
Commonwealth, Ky., 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (1998).
RCr 9.78; Adcock v.
In this case, the
court’s factual findings consist of a succinct but thorough
summary of the uncontradicted testimony presented at the
suppression hearing.
Consequently, its findings are supported by
substantial evidence.
The second aspect of our review involves a de novo
examination to determine whether the court’s decision is correct
as a matter of law.
Stewart v. Commonwealth, Ky., 44 S.W.3d 376,
-4-
380 (2000).
The findings of fact reveal underlying probable
cause to justify the stop of Noffsinger’s vehicle by the
Greenville police.
Therefore, his arrest was lawful, and his
confession as to his involvement with the manufacture of
methamphetamine was not the product or fruit of an illegal
vehicular stop and/or arrest.
In order to justify an investigatory stop of an
automobile, the police must have a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that the persons in the vehicle are — or are about to
become — involved in criminal activity.
United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); Taylor v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 987 S.W.2d 302, 305 (1998).
“[I]f police have
a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable
facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted
in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry4 stop may be
made to investigate that suspicion.”
United States v. Hensley,
469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S. Ct. 675, 680, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985).
An officer may stop and question a person if there are reasonable
grounds to believe that person is wanted for past criminal
conduct.
Cortez, supra at 417, n2.
In order to determine
whether there was a reasonable, articulable suspicion, the
reviewing appellate court must weigh the totality of the
circumstances.
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412,
110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990); Taylor, supra at 305.
A police officer
may stop a vehicle based upon information from other police
4
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d
889 (1968).
-5-
officers.
Hensley, supra; Commonwealth v. Hagan, Ky., 464 S.W.2d
261 (1971).
The uncontradicted testimony at the suppression hearing
was that Muhlenberg County Sheriff Department officers discovered
an active, presently producing, methamphetamine lab at the
residence of Noffsinger’s mother.
The officers additionally
obtained information that Noffsinger was responsible for the
presence and operation of the lab.
The officers were also aware
that Noffsinger had a history of involvement with the production
of methamphetamine.
The Muhlenberg County officers dispatched
this information from the crime scene to the Greenville officers.
After receiving information concerning the commission of a felony
from officers at an active crime scene, the Greenville Officers
had a reasonable and justifiable basis for stopping Noffsinger’s
vehicle.
Noffsinger had been identified as a suspect in the
commission of a felony5 — the operation of a methamphetamine lab
-- leading the Greenville police to the reasonable suspicion that
the vehicle might have been occupied by a felony suspect and/or
might contain the fruits of methamphetamine production.
Additionally, as an extra and independent basis for his arrest,
Noffsinger was intoxicated when he was apprehended.
If a police
officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a suspect has
committed a felony, he may make an arrest without a warrant.
Crawford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 824 S.W.2d 847, 849 (1992);
Commonwealth v. Hagan, supra., at 264.
5
Manufacture of methamphetamine is a Class B felony for the
first offense and a Class A felony for a second or subsequent
offense. KRS 218A.1432(2).
-6-
Noffsinger does not contend that his subsequent
confession given at the police station was not freely and
voluntarily given.
Because the confession was not the product of
an illegal stop or arrest and was freely and voluntarily given,
the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress.
The judgment of the Muhlenberg Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kimberly A. Brooks
Covington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Michael L. Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
