COLUMBIA GAS OF KENTUCKY, INC. v. JAMES M. WELLS AND ROBERT L. ABELL
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RENDERED: AUGUST 9, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001105-MR
COLUMBIA GAS OF KENTUCKY, INC.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-03699
v.
JAMES M. WELLS
AND ROBERT L. ABELL
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, McANULTY, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
Appellant, Columbia Gas of Kentucky, Inc.
(“Columbia”), seeks review of a judgment of the Fayette Circuit
Court entered on a jury verdict in favor of the Appellee, James
M. Wells (“Wells”), in this age discrimination case.
Wells’s
attorney, Robert L. Abell, is also named as an appellee.
On October 20, 1999, Wells filed a complaint in the
Fayette Circuit Court against Columbia, Judith Christopher and
Kay Hardin.
According to the complaint, Wells, a 58 year old
male, worked for Columbia from May 1961 until April 1, 1999.
Wells alleged that Hardin, a Columbia residential customer, and
Christopher, a dispatcher for Columbia1, had made untrue
statements to agents and employees of Columbia that Wells had
sexually harassed them.
Wells further alleged that Columbia
decided to terminate his employment based upon this untrue
information as a pretext to hide the real reason for Columbia’s
decision — Wells’s age within the meaning of KRS 344.0402
The jury found for Wells, being satisfied from the
evidence that his age was a substantial and motivating factor in
Columbia’s decision to fire him.
The jury awarded Wells the sum
of $165,377.00 representing $90,377.00 in lost wages and
benefits, $25,000.00 for embarrassment and humiliation or
emotional distress and mental anguish, and $50,000.00 in punitive
damages.
Columbia raises several issues on appeal.
First,
Columbia asserts that the “trial court had four chances to grant
. . . judgment as a matter of law, but erroneously declined them
all”
- when Columbia moved for summary judgment, twice, at
trial, when Columbia moved for a directed verdict at trial, and
after trial, when Columbia moved for judgment NOV.
Denial of a
1
Hardin filed a counterclaim against Wells for abuse of process;
she filed a cross-claim against Columbia for fraudulent
misrepresentation, negligence, breach of contract, and breach of
implied covenant of good faith dealing. Hardin’s claims were
subsequently dismissed. Wells subsequently withdrew his
complaint against Christopher. Neither Hardin, nor Christopher,
is a party to this appeal.
2
KRS 344.040(1) provides that it is an unlawful practice for an
employer “[t]o fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against an individual
with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of the individual’s race, color, religion,
national origin, sex, age forty (40) and over, . . . .”
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motion for summary judgment is not reviewable on appeal.
Harmon, Ky. App., 284 S.W.2d 812, 814 (1955).
Bell v.
Nor is there any
appellate review of whether the plaintiff submitted a prima facie
case of discrimination.
Following trial on the merits in a Title
VII action, a reviewing court should look to the ultimate
question — whether the plaintiff has proven that the discharge
was intentionally discriminatory.
Gray v. Toshiba America
Consumer Products, Inc., 263 F.3d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 2001)3
The
court explained:
This does not mean, however, that plaintiff's
failure to present evidence sufficient to
make out a prima facie case is not relevant
to our review of that ultimate question. In
employment discrimination cases, if the
plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to
make out a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the employer to produce evidence of
a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
the action taken; this burden is one of
production only, not of persuasion. Texas
Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207
(1981). If the employer does so, the burden
returns to the plaintiff to prove that the
employer's stated reason is pretextual. Id.
at 255, 101 S.Ct. 1089 . . . .
. . . .
The Supreme Court has recently revisited the
question of what is the plaintiff's
evidentiary burden in an employment
discrimination case. In Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147,
120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) . . .
Proof that the defendant’s explanation is
unworthy of credence is simply one form of
circumstantial evidence that is probative of
3
Columbia moved for leave for consideration of this decision as
additional authority; the motion was granted by order of this
Court entered January 30, 2002.
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intentional discrimination, and it may be
quite persuasive. See [St. Mary's Honor Ctr.,
509 U.S.] at 517, 113 S.Ct. 2742 . . . .
Thus, a plaintiff's prima facie case,
combined with sufficient evidence to find
that the employer's asserted justification is
false, may permit the trier of fact to
conclude that the employer unlawfully
discriminated.
Toshiba, at 599-600 (Emphasis original.)
The fact-finder must review all of the facts together
to determine whether evidence of pretext is sufficient to support
a finding of discrimination, rather than analyze each piece of
evidence in isolation.
An employer’s changing rationale for
making an adverse employment decision can be evidence of pretext.
Thurman v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. 90 F.3d 1160, 1167 (6th
Cir. 1996).
Kentucky’s age discrimination statute is specially
modeled after the Federal law.
Consequently, in this particular
area, the court must consider the way the Federal act has been
interpreted.
Harker v. Federal Land Bank of Louisville, Ky., 679
S.W.2d 226, 229 (1984).
In age discrimination cases, a plaintiff
can establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that (1) he was
a member of a protected class; (2) he was discharged; (3) he was
qualified for the position; and (4) he was replaced by a younger
person. Roush v. KFC Nat. Management Co., 10 F.3d 392, 396 (6th
Cir. 1993).
In the case sub judice, evidence was presented that
Wells was 57 and a half years old when he left Columbia in 1999.
Lori Johnson, Director of Human Resources, testified that “Mr.
Wells was an employee who held an important job with Columbia,
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had — we had invested years of training him to perform that job.”
Johnson explained that Columbia was going to give Wells a
termination letter, because of his actions at the home of a
customer — Kay Hardin.
Columbia did not give Wells the
termination letter because his union representative asked if
Wells could be allowed to retire instead, and Columbia agreed
that he could.
Wells explained that his request to retire was
“granted with some restrictions.”
He was asked to give up his
pending union grievance over his suspension.4
Wells’s position
at Columbia was filled by a younger employee — a man named Orwin
Whitt — who was assumed to be “almost 40" according to Lori
Johnson.5
“[T]he considerations governing a proper decision on
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict are exactly as
those first presented on a motion for a directed verdict at the
close of all of the evidence.”
We “must draw all fair and
rational inferences from the evidence in favor of the plaintiff,
and the evidence of such party’s witnesses must be accepted as
true.”
Cassinelli v. Begley, Ky., 433 S.W.2d 651, 655 (1968).
4
Lori Johnson testified that Wells had the right, under the
union contract, to have drawn retirement and at the same time
pursue a union grievance. Johnson admitted that the grievance
could have led to Wells’ reinstatement.
5
In its reply brief, Columbia states that Wells’ post was
offered to all the “older employees, who turned it down because
they disliked the night shift.” The record actually reflects
that in order to fill the vacancy created by Wells’ “departure,”
“[t]he supervisor had to poll the employees who were eligible by
classification to do this work by seniority, and the most senior
ones, as normally would, turned it down.” Nothing was said about
“older workers, as Columbia would have us believe. Years of
service and age are analytically distinct concepts. Hazen Paper
Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611; 113 S.Ct. 1701, 1707; 123
L.Ed. 338, 348 (1993).
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Here, the evidence was in conflict.
Sufficient evidence was
presented from which the jury could have concluded that
Columbia’s preferred reason for terminating Wells’s employment
was false.
Wells observes that what was initially reported to
Columbia — that he tried to hug Hardin, and she had to push him
off — never happened.
At trial, Hardin testified that Wells
touched her on the shoulder as he was going out the door.
not try to hug her.
He did
He did not try and pull her toward him.
Greg Hatton, an operations supervisor for Columbia,
testified that he received a complaint from Hardin, on February
16, 1999.
According to Hatton, Hardin said that Wells had hugged
her and made her very uncomfortable.6
Hatton did not recall
Hardin’s telling him anything else that violated any Columbia
policy, besides the report of hugging.
Hatton took the matter to
Mary Tigges, in human resources.
Tigges testified that Hatton brought her some notes
about a customer who called in and complained about how Wells had
behaved in her home.
At trial, Tigges explained that the
allegations were that Wells had touched Hardin and that she was
uncomfortable around him.
Hardin was concerned that Wells might
come to her work (a Bob Evans restaurant) because he had asked if
would she take good care of him if he came there.
In her earlier
deposition testimony, Tigges gave a different account of the
matter.
Tigges had testified that Hardin complained Wells had
6
Hatton was not aware Hardin had denied that Wells hugged her in
her testimony.
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“tried to hug her, put his hand on her shoulder and she had to
push him away.”
According to Lori Johnson, Greg Hatton is the
only person with Columbia whoever had any conversation with
Hardin about the substance of events involving Wells.
Tigges testified that Hardin had advised her, at a
later date,7 that she wanted to withdraw her complaint;
nevertheless, Tigges told Hardin that she still had the
obligation to investigate it, “as our policy states that if the
complaint is brought to you, you have an obligation to
investigate it.”
Lori Johnson was questioned about Columbia’s policy on
servicemen’s conduct towards customers.
Johnson explained that
the policy is the same across the board for all servicemen who
work in Kentucky, regardless of location or supervisor.
Johnson
testified about the handling of a complaint made in March 2000
against another Columbia gas serviceman, Johnny Farris.
In
Johnson’s words, the customer advised her that Farris “had
touched his genital area and made a statement — during the course
of the conversation, at one point he touched himself and made a
statement about how easy it is for him to whip it out, and then
something about the type of underwear that he wore being silk.”
Johnson testified that Farris was suspended with pay during the
investigation.
She could not recall Wells’s “pay status,” when
he was suspended; however, Wells testified that he was suspended
7
Tigges explained she had called Hardin to verify if she had
called 911 to have Wells removed from her home, because an
employee reported having heard something to that effect. Hardin
denied calling 911. Tigges never spoke to Hardin about the
alleged touching or hugging.
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without pay.
According to Johnson, Farris was in his late 40's
at the time.8
Actually, he was about 46 years old.
for early retirement at Columbia is age 55.
Eligibility
The Farris matter
was dropped because the customer was unwilling to stand behind
the statements she had made.
According to Johnson, had she
pursued the matter, Farris would have been terminated, and the
union arbitration process would have required that the customer
testify, but she was unwilling to do so.
When asked if she was
aware that Hardin wanted to withdraw her complaint prior to
Wells’s termination, Johnson replied that she did not remember.
Wells testified that Hatton, his immediate supervisor
at the time, had asked him about his retirement plans on two
occasions.
Wells explained that he could not recall a specific
date — the first time was during a period when quite a few
employees were retiring.
Wells told Hatton he did not want to
retire until he was 59 and a half.
Possibly six months later,
Hatton again asked Wells if he had thought about retiring.
According to Wells, this occurred three to five months before he
left.
Under the circumstances, we believe that a reasonable
jury could have found that Columbia’s reason for terminating
8
At trial, on March 20 2001, Farris testified that he was 45
years old, although his birth date was 1/29/54, making him 47
years old, at the time. Assuming the date of birth is correct,
Farris would have been 46 years old at the time of the incident.
Farris testified that he did not lose any pay over the incident
or get a write up, he just went back to doing his normal job,
because the customer did not want to pursue it.
-8-
Wells was not worthy of belief.9
We therefore conclude that the
court did not err in denying Columbia’s motions.
Columbia asserts that admitting any evidence of the
“Farris incident” constituted reversible error, because (1) the
incident was irrelevant, having arisen a year after Wells’s
retirement in lieu of termination; (2) Farris was identified on a
supplemental witness list, a month after the final witness lists
were due; and (3) Farris’ testimony, on direct — that he was
under the impression he would be punished if he testified on
Wells’s behalf — was inflammatory.
The standard of review for a trial court’s evidentiary
rulings is abuse of discretion. “The test for abuse of discretion
is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, Ky., 11 S.W.3d 575, 581
(2000).
We affirm the trial court’s rulings relating to Farris.
We agree with Wells that Farris’s testimony was relevant to the
issue of policy and enforcement by management, especially in
light of testimony that Columbia had a “zero tolerance” policy
9
“Columbia argues that a plaintiff must “adduce cold hard facts”
in an age discrimination case, citing Harker, supra; however,the
quotation from Harker is in the context of withstanding a summary
judgment motion. “As a general rule, the plaintiff need not
establish a prima facie case simply because there is a motion for
summary judgment. In an age discrimination case there is a
different standard on summary judgment. . . . . rather than
requiring that the pleadings and depositions foreclose the
possibility that plaintiff can prove a case at the time of trial,
the special rule for age discrimination summary judgments is
whether the plaintiff has proof of “cold hard facts creating an
inference showing age discrimination was a determining factor” in
the discharge.” Harker, at 229.
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for sexual harassment.
KRE 401, 402.
We find no merit in
Columbia’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion in
allowing Farris’s name to be added to the witness list.
Wells
observes that Columbia declined the trial court’s “invitation to
move for a continuance.”
reply brief.
Columbia does not dispute this in its
Nor do we find any merit in Columbia’s argument
that the trial court erred in allowing Farris’s testimony that he
might get in trouble, if he testified on Wells’s behalf.
Columbia maintains that this testimony was “very prejudicial and
inflammatory.”
We disagree.
Farris admitted on cross-
examination that his supervisor, Charles Knuckles, never
specifically said that if Farris testified on behalf of Wells he
would get into trouble.
Farris admitted that he did not believe
that Knuckles would retaliate against him.
There is no ground
for reversal.
Next, Columbia asserts that the trial court erred in
excluding evidence that Columbia maintains would have shown the
“full scope” of its investigation.
Columbia advises that the
jury did not hear from “key participants” such as Judith
Christopher and Wilson Hensley, regarding other complaints about
Wells.
Wells responds that Joseph Kelly, Columbia’s CEO,
testified that nothing other than Hardin’s complaint was
considered in reaching the decision to terminate Wells; thus, the
excluded testimony was not relevant to this case.
We agree.
trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
evidence.
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The
Columbia asserts that the trial court erred in refusing
to instruct the jury about the “business judgment rule.”
Columbia acknowledges that Kentucky law does not require that the
rule be included in jury instructions but urges us to adopt the
Eighth Circuit’s position.
Wells notes that Columbia presented
its “business judgment” argument to the jury in summation.
As
Wells argues, the trial court’s function is confined to setting
forth the bare essentials for the jury.
Counsel’s duty to see to
it that the jury clearly understands what such instructions mean,
or do not mean.
531 (1973).
Collins v. Galbraith, Ky. App., 494 S.W.2d 527,
Accordingly, we agree with the trial court’s
findings.
Columbia asserts that the trial court also erred by
failing to give a separate instruction on mitigation of damages.
We disagree.
Columbia provides no authority that a separate
instruction is required in this instance.
Wells responds that
the jury was properly instructed that it should reduce any award
of back pay by “any compensation, including fringe benefits,
during that period of time that he has received from other
employment or could have earned through the exercise of
reasonable diligence to secure other employment.”
Whether
separate instructions should be submitted to jury rests in trial
court’s discretion.
Massie v. Salmon, Ky. App., 277 S.W.2d 49,
52 (1955).
Columbia asserts that the trial court erred in giving a
punitive damages instruction and that the punitive damages
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awarded were excessive.10
Insofar as the instruction, Columbia
argues that Wells produced “absolutely no evidence” of any evil
intent, malicious spirit, or conscious wrongdoing on Columbia’s
part, a requirement under “longstanding Kentucky law.”
In City of Middlesboro v. Brown, Ky., 63 S.W.3d 179,
181 (2001) the Supreme Court explained that:
Kentucky Instructions To Juries articulates
the standard for awarding punitive damages as
“if D acted ... in reckless disregard for the
lives, safety or property of others.” Gross
negligence should be defined as “reckless
disregard for the [rights] [lives and safety]
of other persons.” The comment to this
section states that “though ‘gross
negligence’ in the abstract is defined as the
absence of slight care, in order to serve as
a basis for punitive damages it must be
specifically defined to include the essential
element of reckless indifference or disregard
for the rights of others.”
In the case sub judice, the jury was instructed that
“[i]f you find for plaintiff James M. Wells and awarded him
damages under Instruction No. 2 and if you are further satisfied
from the evidence that in discriminating against James M. Wells
defendant Columbia Gas acted in reckless disregard for his
rights, you may, in your discretion award punitive damages
10
The issue of whether punitive damages are available under KRS
344.450 has not been raised on this appeal. Nevertheless, we
note that the issue has not been resolved by the Kentucky courts.
In Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. McCullough, Nos.1998-CA001403-MR. 1998-CA-001422-MR, 2000 WL 707953, pending on appeal
before the Kentucky Supreme Court, this Court held that punitive
damages are available under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act.
Kentucky federal district courts have held that punitive damages
are not available under KRS 344.450. See Messick v. Toyota Motor
Mfg., Kentucky, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 578, 581-82 (E.D.Ky.1999).
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. . . .”
Wells provides numerous references to the evidence
from which “the jury could find that appellant systematically
violated its own policies and procedures in proceeding to fire
Wells and recklessly disregarding his rights.”
We agree.
Columbia also asserts that the punitive damages awarded
were excessive under the “first blush rule.”
In May 2001, the
United States Supreme Court decided Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 121 S.Ct. 1678, 149
L.Ed.2d 674 (2001), which held that courts of appeal should apply
a de novo standard of review when passing on district courts’
determinations of the constitutionality of punitive damages
awards.
The three “guideposts” a reviewing court must consider
in determining whether a punitive damages award is excessive are:
(1) the “degree of reprehensibility” of the wrongdoing, (2) “the
disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered and the
punitive damages award,” and (3) the difference between this
remedy and civil penalties comparable cases.
See E.E.O.C. v.
Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 514 -519 (6th Cir. 2001).
Applying this analysis, we conclude that the award of
$50,000.00 in punitive damages was not excessive and affirm.
Columbia’s conduct was sufficiently reprehensible.
While priding
itself on a “zero tolerance” policy for sexual harassment,
Columbia engaged in its own brand of prohibited conduct in
violation of KRS Chapter 344, under the guise of handling of a
(questionable) customer complaint.
The disparity between the
harm suffered and the punitive damages award was not great.
The
punitive damages award was substantially less than the award of
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compensatory damages.
As Wells notes, the Kentucky Supreme Court
has rejected arguments that punitive damage were excessive where
the awards were a multiple of compensatory damages.
Columbia asserts that the evidence was insufficient to
support the jury’s verdict.
We have reviewed the evidence
presented in great detail as outlined above.
substantial evidentiary basis.
855, 860 (1988).
The verdict has a
NCAA v. Hornung, Ky., 754 S.W.2d
Thus, we affirm.
Columbia asserts that it should not have to pay attorney
fees for Wells’s abandoned claims, for time spent prosecuting his
suit against Hardin, or for costs which were not sufficiently
documented.
KRS 344.450 is mandatory and provides that:
Any person injured by any act in violation of
the provisions of this chapter shall have a
civil cause of action in Circuit Court to
enjoin further violations, and to recover the
actual damages sustained, together with the
costs of the law suit. The court's order or
judgment shall include a reasonable fee for
the plaintiff’s attorney of record and any
other remedies contained in this chapter.
In Meyers v. Chapman Printing, Co., Inc., Ky., 840
S.W.2d 814, 826 (1992), the Supreme Court held that:
[T]he controlling case in deciding upon an
appropriate award of attorneys’ fees where
authorized by statute to insure effective
access to the judicial process for persons
with civil rights grievances is Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 US 424, 103 SCt 1933, 76 LEd
2d 40 (1983). This case was decided under
the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act
of 1976 . . . patterned in part on Title VII
of the Federal Civil Rights Act. . . . .
[T]he attorney's fee awarded should consist
of the product of counsel’s reasonable hours,
multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, which
provides a “lodestar” figure, which may then
be adjusted to account for various special
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factors in the litigation . . . none of the
arguments presented begins to approach a
substantial showing the trial court made any
significant miscalculation, much less that it
abused its discretion.
In the case sub judice, the argument presented does not
approach a substantial showing that the trial court made a
significant miscalculation or abused its discretion.
The trial
court provided a detailed explanation of the attorney fee award.
The court found “that the 238.5 hours is reasonable taking into
consideration an appropriate reduction for unsuccessful claims
from the total time expended by Plaintiff’s counsel.”
(Emphasis
added.)
We cannot agree with Columbia that certain costs should
be disallowed because they were not sufficiently documented.
Although the better practice would have been to attach statements
or receipts for each item, the trial court found that these items
were “reasonable and compensable” based upon an itemization
contained in a sworn affidavit.
We affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
We affirm the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court and
the order awarding attorney fees and costs.
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Debra H. Dawahare
Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP
Lexington, Kentucky
Robert L. Abell
Lexington, Kentucky
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