W. DENIS O'CONNELL, D/B/A ACQUISITION ALLIANCE v. DAVID L. HART, AND HART TO HART, INC.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
APRIL 26, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001092-MR
W. DENIS O'CONNELL,
D/B/A ACQUISITION ALLIANCE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. WALLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00775
v.
DAVID L. HART, AND
HART TO HART, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; JOHNSON, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
TACKETT, JUDGE:
W. Denis O’Connell d/b/a Acquisition Alliance
appeals from an order of the Bullitt Circuit Court granting
summary judgment in favor of David L. Hart and Hart to Hart, Inc.
We affirm.
On February 19, 1998, O’Connell, on behalf of
Acquisition Alliance, and Hart, as president of DLH
Environmental, Inc. (DLH), (now known as Hart to Hart, Inc.),
entered into a contract entitled “Finder’s Fee Agreement.”
The
purpose of this contract was for DLH to retain Acquisition
Alliance to act as its “agent with sole and exclusive right to
seek out and identify” buyers of DLH or its business assets.
DLH’s principal business was the removal of asbestos and lead
paint.
Prior to the execution of this agreement, Hart
expressed reservations concerning the “sole and exclusive right”
language found in the contract’s first paragraph.
O’Connell
testified that he pointed out to Hart that the agreement was a
sole and exclusive agency agreement.
With this explanation, Hart
explained he believed this provision to be exclusive to
O’Connell’s clients only in order that O’Connell’s clients could
not purchase DLH without first going through Acquisition
Alliance.
Hart further stated that he did not want Acquisition
Alliance to be the sole and exclusive agent.
O’Connell assured
Hart that the agreement was simply a finder’s fee agreement
whereby if Acquisition Alliance failed to bring forward a
satisfactory purchaser for DLH, Hart would owe O’Connell or his
company no commission.
With this discussion in mind, Hart
proceeded to execute the contract.
In July 1998, O’Connell received a proposal from Jim
Rogers concerning the purchase of DLH.
Rogers informed O’Connell
that he wanted to purchase the assets of DLH for $432,000.00, a
figure that was significantly less than the $1.2 million Hart
demanded.
Hart rejected this offer and informed O’Connell not to
bring another offer concerning DLH to his attention unless it was
close to his asking price.
According to the record, this was the
only legitimate offer O’Connell brought to Hart’s attention.
-2-
Frustrated with O’Connell’s efforts, Hart met with Al
Temple concerning Temple’s interest in purchasing DLH.
Hart and
Temple met three times between August 20, 1998, and September 9,
1998.
During the September 9, 1998 meeting, Temple presented
Hart and his wife with an agreement granting Temple the
“exclusive right” to pursue the purchase of DLH and expressly
forbade the Harts from engaging in negotiations or discussions
with any other potential purchasers of this company.
The Harts
executed this document after Temple expressed to them that the
document represented his intent to purchase the business.
At no
time was O’Connell ever notified about these meetings, nor was
Temple ever a client of O’Connell’s Acquisitions Alliance.
On September 10, 1998, following the advice of counsel,
Hart forwarded a letter to O’Connell terminating the Finder’s Fee
Agreement after the contractually required ten-day notice period.
After receiving the letter, O’Connell telephoned Hart to discuss
the matter.
The discussion between Hart and O’Connell led to
O’Connell’s decision to offer his services on a non-exclusive
basis to Hart.
Hart testified during his deposition that, to the
best of his understanding, this arrangement was the relationship
the parties had enjoyed all along.
O’Connell’s employment on a
non-exclusive basis did not, however, result in the
identification of any additional prospective purchasers for DLH.
Temple and the Harts met again on November 6, 1998.
During this meeting, the parties reached an agreement whereby
Temple purchased DLH with Hart netting a profit of approximately
one million dollars after taxes.
-3-
O’Connell eventually discovered
DLH’s sale to Temple and notified Hart that he was making a
demand for compensation under the Finder’s Fee Agreement.
Hart
refused to pay O’Connell the requested commission, and O’Connell
promptly filed suit in the Bullitt Circuit Court seeking
$108,000.00, the amount he claimed as a commission.
After a period of discovery, both sides filed motions
for summary judgment with the trial court.
On May 3, 2001, the
trial court entered an order without an opinion granting summary
judgment to Hart.
The trial court denied O’Connell’s motion to
alter, amend, or vacate the order.
This appeal followed.
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue
of material fact exists and a party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center,
Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991).
Additionally, “a party
opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion cannot
defeat it without presenting at least some affirmative evidence
showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for
trial.”
Id. at 482.
“On appeal, the standard of review of a
summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that
there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving
party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Moore v.
Mack Trucks, Inc., Ky. App., 40 S.W.3d 888, 890 (2001).
It is undisputed that Hart and O’Connell entered into a
contract on February 19, 1998.
The issue is whether the terms of
the contract unambiguously granted O’Connell an exclusive
privilege to sell Hart’s business and collect a commission even
if he failed to provide Hart with a suitable buyer.
-4-
O’Connell argues that the terms of the contract are
clearly expressed and are unambiguous.
Specifically, O’Connell
argues that the language “sole and exclusive right” clearly
provides his company with an exclusive privilege to sell the
company and to collect the commission allowed therein even if a
sale occurs without his involvement.
We disagree.
A contract provision is ambiguous if a court determines
that it is susceptible to inconsistent interpretations.
Transport Ins. Co. v. Ford, Ky. App., 886 S.W.2d 901 (1994).
In
the case sub judice, the phrase “sole and exclusive” may be
interpreted to mean that O’Connell’s company was granted either
an exclusive privilege or an exclusive agency to act on Hart’s
behalf.
If O’Connell were granted an exclusive privilege to sell
the business, the sale of the business was prohibited by any
other person, including Hart, the owner of the property, and if
indeed it were sold by another person, O’Connell would be
entitled to his commission as provided within the agreement.
Boggess Realty Co. v. Miller, Ky., 14 S.W.2d 140, 227 Ky. 813
(1929).
If terms granting an exclusive agency were used,
however, Hart, as owner of DLH would be able to sell the business
because an exclusive agency contract only prohibits any other
agent from selling it.
Id.
The language “sole and exclusive
right,” by itself, does not fall neatly into either of these
categories.
O’Connell argues that Miller supports his assertion
that the contract provides his company with an exclusive
privilege to identify purchasers for DLH.
-5-
In Miller, the court
declared that the contract at issue which gave Boggess Realty
“sole and exclusive” right to sell property, was ambiguous and
therefore granted only an exclusive agency.
Id. at 140-141.
The
Miller court reached this conclusion by finding that the contract
executed between the parties was prepared by the realty company
and, because of its ambiguity, should be construed most strongly
against the real estate firm.
Id., at 141.
This principle has
also been reasserted in Boyd v. Phillips Petroleum Company, Ky.,
418 S.W.2d 736, 738 (1966); Pulliam v. Wiggins, Ky. App., 580
S.W.2d 228, 231 (1979); and Wiggins v. Schubert Realty &
Investment Company, Ky. App., 854 S.W.2d 794, 796 (1993).
Here,
it is undisputed that O’Connell drafted the Finder’s Fee
Agreement.
If he meant to provide his company with an exclusive
privilege to sell DLH and protect his commission, he was required
to clearly express this intent in the contract.
O’Connell’s reliance on Messick v. Powell, Ky., 236
S.W.2d 897, 314 Ky, 805 (1951) and Shanklin v. Townsend, Ky., 431
S.W.2d 874 (1968) is misplaced.
Messick involved a contract that
specifically stated that the broker was entitled to his
commission if the property was sold to any person brought to the
seller’s attention by the broker and the broker had already
commenced negotiations with that person.
Messick at 901.
Shanklin involved a contract where the sellers of property agreed
to pay the commission to the brokers regardless of whether the
broker actually sold the property as long as the land was sold
within a specific time frame.
Shanklin at 875.
The contract
here, on the other hand, failed to specifically grant O’Connell
-6-
his commission if the property was sold by Hart to a buyer who
was never identified by O’Connell.
Hart was relieved of his
obligation to pay a commission if O’Connell was unable to find a
suitable buyer.
Since O’Connell drafted the instrument, he
should have protected his right to the commission through
specific language within the confines of the contract.
In construing a contract, in order to determine the
meaning of any portion of the contract, as well as the parties’
intent, the court must look to the instrument as a whole and
consider the portion in question in connection with the
remainder.
Prestonsburg Water Company v. Dingus, Ky., 111 S.W.2d
661, 271 Ky. 240 (1937).
Additionally, phrases are to be
interpreted in light of their context.
Fidelity-Phenix-Fire Ins.
Co. v. Duvall, Ky., 106 S.W.2d 991, 269 Ky. 300 (1937).
With
this in mind, other paragraphs found in the Finder’s Fee
Agreement further support our conclusion that this contract
merely granted O’Connell an exclusive agency with respect to the
sale of DLH.
Paragraph two (2) of the Finder’s Fee Agreement states
that “unless and until an offer has been accepted, Finder
(O’Connell/Acquisition Alliance) shall be due no contingent
compensation hereunder.”
The provisions of paragraph three (3)
apply only if Acquisition Alliance finds a satisfactory purchaser
for Hart.
Additionally, paragraph six (6) states that “Client
(Hart) agrees to provide Finder with copies of all correspondence
between Client and any Buyer prospects duly provided to it by
Finder as provided for herein.”
That paragraph also required
-7-
Hart to notify O’Connell of the date and time of any transaction
so that O’Connell can be present at closing.
We conclude from
reviewing this contract that Hart was required to pay O’Connell a
commission only if Acquisition Alliance brought forward a
satisfactory buyer.
Furthermore, Hart was required to disclose
to Acquisition Alliance correspondence between Hart and a
potential buyer only if that potential buyer was identified by
O’Connell and/or Acquisition Alliance.
Here, Acquisition
Alliance never identified Temple as a prospective buyer.
Therefore, the contract did not require Hart to inform O’Connell
of any negotiations with Temple.
Simply put, the language of the
contract clearly suggests that the relationship between the
parties was one of exclusive agency, not exclusive privilege.
We believe the circuit court was correct in granting
summary judgment because it is undisputed that O’Connell never
brought forward a suitable buyer.
O’Connell fully acknowledged
that he only brought Hart one offer, from Jim Rogers, concerning
the potential purchase of DLH.
Temple, by O’Connell’s admission,
was never identified by Acquisition Alliance as a potential
buyer, nor was any evidence presented that O’Connell was even
inquiring about Temple’s interest in purchasing DLH.
Rather, it
is apparent O’Connell stayed focused on Rogers’ interest in the
business despite Hart’s repeated rejection of Rogers’ proposals.
With no satisfactory purchaser identified and, more importantly,
no language in the contract he drafted granting a commission
regardless of who actually sold DLH, O’Connell has failed to
present a genuine issue as to a material fact as to whether he is
-8-
entitled to a commission for his services.
Thus, the circuit
court’s summary judgment in favor of Hart was appropriate.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Bullitt Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kenneth A. Bohnert
Wendell L. Jones
Conliffe, Sandmann & Sullivan
Louisville, Kentucky
Donald E. Meyer
Ford, Klapheke & Meyer
Louisville, Kentucky
Joseph J. Wantland
Shepherdsville, Kentucky
-9-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.