BROOKS MOREHOUSE v. W. JEFFREY SCOTT AND W. JEFFREY SCOTT P.S.C.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
APRIL 26, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001090-MR
BROOKS MOREHOUSE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CARTER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAMUEL C. LONG, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00183
v.
W. JEFFREY SCOTT
AND W. JEFFREY SCOTT P.S.C.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; BARBER AND GUIDUGLI, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
Appellant, Brooks Morehouse (“Morehouse”), seeks
review of an order of the Carter Circuit Court, granting judgment
on the pleadings in favor of W. Jeffery Scott and W. Jeffrey
Scott, P.S.C., the Appellees (“Scott”).
Finding no error, we
affirm.
The underlying action involves a complaint that
Morehouse filed against her former attorney, Scott.
Morehouse
alleged that Scott had withdrawn from legal representation
“without cause,” leaving her “in the position of having to try
her jury trial case by herself and without any legal assistance.”
Scott had represented Morehouse in a lawsuit she had filed in the
Rowan Circuit Court on July 17, 1995, against Tracy Sparks for
injuries allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident.
Morehouse’s first attorney had been granted leave to withdraw for
good cause shown by order entered June 13, 1996.
Scott and
Morehouse entered into an attorney-client agreement dated July
11, 1996.
Shortly before the trial date in the Sparks lawsuit,
Morehouse had asked Scott to request a continuance on her behalf.
The record reflects that Morehouse’s husband had furnished Scott
with a statement from a psychiatrist, Dr. Murthy, in Milford
Ohio, dated April 30, 1999, stating that Morehouse was under
increased stress and was unable to handle legal problems or go to
court for at least 60 days.
On May 3, 1999, Scott served a
motion to continue the trial, advising that he had been informed
earlier that week that his client was receiving psychiatric
treatment.
The defendant, Sparks, objected to the continuance, on
the ground that Morehouse had not been diligent in prosecuting
her case.
Sparks stated that the case was first set for trial on
September 9, 1996, that it had been continued by Morehouse, and
that non-binding mediation was ordered, for which Morehouse
failed to appear.
The case was reset for trial on January 29,
1997, and Morehouse again requested a continuance, alleging that
future surgery was necessary.
That continuance was granted.
case was again reset for trial on October 6 and 7, 1997;
Morehouse again sought a continuance on the ground of the
necessity of future surgery, which was granted.
-2-
The case was
The
reset for trial on August 31, 1998, and Morehouse again moved for
continuance on the ground of the necessity of future surgery, and
that motion was granted.
10 and 11, 1999.
The case was then set for trial on May
In her objection, Sparks also advised the Rowan
Circuit Court that Morehouse “had filed another suit as result of
another auto accident occurring in Hamilton County, Ohio, on May
20, 1996, . . . .”
That accident occurred less than two months
before Morehouse had retained Scott, a fact which Morehouse had
apparently concealed from her attorney.
On May 5, 1999, Scott served a combined reply to
Sparks’s objection/motion for leave to withdraw, requesting that
he be allowed to withdraw as Morehouse’s counsel.
Scott
explained that he believed his continuing representation would be
in violation of SCR 3.130.1
He requested that Morehouse be
allowed time within which to obtain new counsel and that the
trial be continued.
Scott also explained that he had agreed to
take a doctor’s deposition on May 7, 1999, and that he “would
honor that agreement” and take the previously-scheduled
deposition.
By order entered May 7, 1999, the trial court
granted Scott’s motion for leave to withdraw “for good cause
shown.
However, the motion for continuance is denied.
The
reasons for delay in trying this case are attributable solely to
the Plaintiff, and further delay will prejudice the Defendant.”
On May 10, 2000, Morehouse filed a complaint against
Scott in the Carter Circuit Court alleging breach of the
1
Scott apparently did not know about Morehouse’s other accident
and lawsuit, until Sparks informed the court about it in her
objection to Morehouse’s motion for a continuance.
-3-
attorney-client contract — that Scott withdrew from
representation “without cause,” leaving her in the position of
trying her case without an attorney.
On June 5, 2000, Scott
filed an answer raising several defenses, including statute of
limitations, estoppel, and breach by Morehouse.
On December 6,
2000, Scott filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
prosecute/motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Scott
maintained, inter alia, that Morehouse had essentially abandoned
her case; further, Morehouse should have challenged the Rowan
Circuit Court’s order by way of an appeal, instead of attempting
to relitigate her case in the Carter Circuit Court.
On December 21, 2000, Morehouse filed a motion for
summary judgment, as well as a response to Scott’s motion to
dismiss.
In her response, Morehouse states that she “has filed
an appeal in the Morehouse v. Sparks case in order to mitigate
the damages that the Defendants will ultimately have to pay as a
result of the breach of contract.”
(Emphasis original.)
On
January 5, 2001, Scott filed a response to Morehouse's motion for
summary judgment, noting that it was the first he had heard of an
appeal in the Sparks case.
By order entered May 7, 2001, the
Carter Circuit Court entered an order denying Morehouse’s motion
for summary judgment and granting Scott’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings.
On May 18, 2001, Morehouse filed a notice of appeal to
this court.
On May 31, 2001, Morehouse filed a Civil Appeal
Prehearing Statement.
In response to question No. 8 on the form,
“Is there any known case involving substantially the same issue
-4-
now pending before either appellate court of this state?”
Morehouse responded, “Not known.”
In her briefs filed in this
Court, Morehouse never mentions that she had appealed Sparks.
Morehouse only asserted that “the court order in the former
[Sparks] case is not a final decision or judgment on the merits.”
Morehouse maintained that Scott could not rely upon collateral
estoppel because she did not have an opportunity to fully and
fairly present her case in the Rowan Circuit Court.
Morehouse’s propensity for concealing litigation is not
confined to the earlier proceedings.
On March 2, 2001,
approximately two and a half months before she filed this appeal,
another panel of this Court rendered an opinion in Brooks
Morehouse v. Tracy Sparks, No. 1999-CA-001841.2
The majority
opinion provides, in pertinent part:
On appeal, Morehouse alleges that the trial
court erred in denying her motion for a
continuance of the trial date. We affirm.
. . . .
On May 4, 1999, Morehouse’s request for a
continuance because of mental distress was
denied. On May 6, 1999, Morehouse’s attorney
moved for leave to withdraw as counsel . . .
The trial court granted the motion to
withdraw but denied Morehouse’s motion for a
continuance stating that the delay in the
trial of the case was attributable to her
actions and further delay would prejudice
Sparks.
2
The Opinion reflects that Morehouse’s counsel in that
appeal is the same as in the present appeal. On April 2,
2001, Morehouse filed a motion for discretionary review with
the Supreme Court; her request was denied on February 13,
2002.
-5-
There is no constitutional right to legal
counsel in a civil trial.
Whether to
continue a trial at the request of a party is
clearly within the sound discretion of the
trial court. “It is necessary for the trial
court to have power to control the course of
litigation. The effect of granting a
continuance must be considered from the
standpoint of all concerned.” This case has
been pending since June 17, 1995, and at
every opportunity Morehouse sought to delay
its resolution. The withdrawal of her
counsel days prior to trial was attributable
to her own actions. Her lack of cooperation
with counsel, concealment of her mental
history and other facts germane to her case,
left counsel with no alternative but to
conclude that he could not represent her at
trial. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Morehouse’s motion for
continuance.
(Internal citations omitted; emphasis added.)
The final decision of the Court of Appeals — that
withdrawal of Morehouse’s counsel was attributable to her own
actions and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying her motion for continuance — effectively precludes
Morehouse from maintaining an action against Scott for breach of
contract in this case.
There is an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in every contract.
Ranier v. Mount
Sterling Nati’l. Bank, Ky., 812 S.W.2d 154 (1991).
Clearly,
Morehouse was the party in breach, leaving Scott with no
alternative but to seek leave to withdraw, due to her “lack of
cooperation with counsel, concealment of her mental history and
other facts germane to her case, . . . .”
Collateral estoppel
applies to prevent Morehouse from religitating the reasons and
justification for Scott’s withdrawal.
-6-
Napier v. Jones By &
Through Reynolds, Ky. App., 925 S.W.2d 193 (1996).
We affirm the
order of the Carter Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Bobby G. Wombles
Lexington, Kentucky
Sean M. Whitt
Carl D. Edwards, Jr.
Ashland, Kentucky
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
