LANDON N. PRICE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: April 19, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001060-MR
LANDON N. PRICE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00889
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Landon D. Price has appealed from an order of
the Fayette Circuit Court entered on January 24, 2001, which
denied his RCr1 11.42 motion seeking to vacate his jury
conviction on two counts of first-degree trafficking in a
controlled substance and being a persistent felony offender in
the first degree.
Having concluded that Price has not shown that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm.
On March 4 and 13, 1998, Tara and Bill Babb, who were
acting as confidential informants, purchased cocaine from Price
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
at his home.
As part of the undercover operation, Bill Babb was
wearing an audio transmission device and both transactions were
recorded.
On September 1, 1998, the Fayette County grand jury
indicted Price on two felony counts of first-degree trafficking
in a controlled substance (cocaine)2 and being a persistent
felony offender in the first degree (PFO I).3
During a one-day trial on March 10, 1999, the witnesses
included Sergeant Greg Jennings, a narcotics officer who was
working with the Babbs, Tara and Bill Babb, Landon Price, and
Christy Stokly, Price’s girlfriend.
entrapment defense.
Price presented an
The jury found Price guilty on all three
counts and recommended consecutive sentences of ten years
enhanced to fifteen years on each of the two trafficking offenses
based on the PFO I conviction.
Price waived his right to a
presentence investigation report and the trial court immediately
sentenced him to thirty years in prison consistent with the
jury’s recommendation.
On direct appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed
the convictions but reversed the sentence.4
The Court rejected
Price’s complaint concerning Sgt. Jennings’s reference to his
extensive criminal record because it was initiated by a question
from defense counsel.
The Court also found that several
instances of hearsay evidence not objected to by defense counsel
2
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 218A.1412.
3
KRS 532.080.
4
Price v. Commonwealth, 99-SC-297-MR (unpublished memorandum
opinion rendered January 20, 2000).
-2-
did not rise to the level of palpable error under RCr 10.26.
It
did, however, find that the sentence exceeded the maximum under
KRS 532.110(1)(c) and KRS 532.080(6)(b), and remanded the case
for resentencing not to exceed twenty years.5
On September 28, 2000, Price filed a motion to vacate
the judgment pursuant to RCr 11.42 with an extensive accompanying
memorandum of law.
In the motion, Price raised three issues of
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and a claim of
cumulative errors based on ineffective assistance.
On
December 1, 2000, the Commonwealth filed an extensive response
disputing the claims.
On January 22, 2001, Price filed a motion
for an evidentiary hearing.
On January 24, 2001, the trial court
denied the motion without a hearing, ruling that the situations
described in the motion could have involved trial strategy by
defense counsel and therefore did not constitute ineffective
assistance.
This appeal followed.
Price contends that his attorney rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel with respect to several instances of
testimony involving his prior criminal record and information
about his alleged drug activity.
In order to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a person must satisfy a two-part test showing both that
counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency
caused actual prejudice resulting in a proceeding that was
5
On January 24, 2001, the trial court entered an amended
judgment sentencing Price to two fifteen-year sentences but
running ten years of Count 2 concurrently and five years
consecutively with the sentence on Count 1 for a total sentence
of twenty years.
-3-
fundamentally unfair.6
The burden is on the defendant to
overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s assistance was
constitutionally sufficient or that under the circumstances,
counsel’s action might be considered “trial strategy.”7
A court
must be highly deferential in reviewing defense counsel’s
performance and should avoid second-guessing counsel’s actions
based on hindsight.8
In assessing counsel's performance, the
standard is whether the alleged acts or omissions were outside
the wide range of prevailing professional norms based on an
objective standard of reasonableness.9
In order to establish
actual prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different or
was rendered fundamentally unfair.10
Where the movant is
6
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); accord Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702
S.W.2d 37 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S. Ct. 3311,
92 L. Ed. 2d 724 (1986); Foley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 17 S.W.3d
878, 884 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1055, 121 S. Ct. 663, 148
L. Ed. 2d 565 (2000).
7
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065; Moore v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 983 S.W.2d 479, 482 (1998), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 842, 120 S. Ct. 110, 145 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1999); Sanborn v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 905, 912 (1998), cert. denied, 526
U.S. 1025, 119 S. Ct. 1266, 143 L. Ed. 2d 361 (1999).
8
Harper v. Commonwealth, Ky., 978 S.W.2d 311, 315 (1998),
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1056, 119 S. Ct. 1367, 143 L. Ed. 2d 527
(1999); Russell v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 992 S.W.2d 871, 875
(1999).
9
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65;
Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 836 S.W.2d 872, 878 (1992), cert.
denied, 507 U.S. 1034, 113 S. Ct. 1857, 123 L. Ed. 2d 479 (1993),
overruled in part on other grounds, St. Clair v. Roark, Ky., 10
S.W.3d 482 (1999); Harper, 978 S.W.2d at 315.
10
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068; Bowling
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 981 S.W.2d 545, 551 (1998), cert. denied,
(continued...)
-4-
convicted by trial, a reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the
proceeding considering the totality of the evidence before the
jury.11
Because a defendant must show both deficient performance
and actual prejudice, a reviewing court need not analyze both
prongs where he fails to establish either of the two elements.12
RCr 11.42 provides persons in custody under sentence a
procedure for raising collateral challenges to a judgment of
conviction entered against them.
A movant, however, is not
automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the motion.13
An evidentiary hearing is not required on an RCr 11.42 motion
where the issues raised in the motion are refuted on the record,
or where the allegations, even if true, would not be sufficient
to invalidate the conviction.14
Even claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel may be rejected without an evidentiary
hearing if they are refuted on the record.15
10
(...continued)
527 U.S. 1026, 119 S. Ct. 2375, 144 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1999).
11
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95, 104 S. Ct. at 2068-69.
See also Moore, 983 S.W.2d at 484, 488; Foley, 17 S.W.2d at 884.
12
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069;
Brewster v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 723 S.W.2d 863, 864-65
(1986).
13
Harper, 978 S.W.2d at 314; Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
975 S.W.2d 901, 904 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1023, 119 S.
Ct. 1263, 143 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1999).
14
Sanborn, 975 S.W.2d at 909; Haight v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
41 S.W.3d 436, 442 (2001).
15
Haight, 41 S.W.3d at 442.
-5-
In his direct testimony, Sgt. Jennings stated that
after being arrested on a drug transaction, Tara Babb initially
became a confidential informant as part of an agreement not to
prosecute her.
During cross-examination of Sgt. Jennings,
defense counsel asked him if he had offered Price the option of
becoming a confidential informant in return for not prosecuting
him for the two March drug transactions.
simply, “No.”
Sgt. Jennings responded
On re-direct examination, the trial court allowed
the prosecutor to elicit testimony from the officer that Price’s
“extensive record” was one reason for this decision.
The trial
court overruled defense counsel’s objection to Sgt. Jennings’s
use of the word “extensive” as unfairly prejudicial based on
KRE16 403.
Price asserts that counsel’s action constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel by opening the door to evidence
of his prior criminal history otherwise inadmissible under KRE
404(b).
First, it is not clear that this testimony was
inadmissible under KRE 404(b), which states that “[e]vidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith.”
(Emphasis added.)
The testimony went to Sgt.
Jennings’s reason for not offering Price an immunity deal rather
than to show his character and conformity with his drug dealing
with the Babbs.
Even assuming it was otherwise inadmissible, this
situation did not constitute ineffective assistance.
16
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
-6-
Counsel
asked the question in an attempt to show bias by the police in
failing to treat Price similarly to Tara Babb, who was offered an
immunity deal.
While the answer elicited some detrimental
information, it did establish the differential treatment.
In
addition, this testimony did not rise to the level of actual
prejudice.
Sgt. Jennings was not allowed to elaborate on the
specifics of Price’s criminal record.
As defense counsel noted
during discussion of his objection, the fact that Price was a
convicted felon was revealed to the jury when he took the stand
to testify.
Price admitted having engaged in the two drug
transactions with the Babbs.
We cannot say that counsel’s action
was not legitimate trial tactics or that admission of this
limited testimony affected the outcome of the trial.
Price also complains about several instances of defense
counsel’s failure to object to alleged hearsay evidence.
First,
Sgt. Jennings testified that the police department had received
several anonymous tips that Price was selling drugs from his
residence and that the Babbs stated to him that an acquaintance
of Price’s, Jack (Dusty) Wigal, had told them that Price had
cocaine to sell them.
Second, Tara Babb testified that Jack
Wigal’s girlfriend told her that Price and Wigal had a single
supplier for drugs that they sold.
Third, Tara Babb also
testified that Wigal told her that both he and Price had drugs to
sell her.
Fourth, Bill Babb testified that he had been told
Price was selling drugs and it was known in the neighborhood that
Price sold drugs.
-7-
As an initial matter, it is questionable whether any of
this testimony constituted “hearsay” evidence.
Under KRE 801(c),
“hearsay” is an out-of-court statement “offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
The examples cited by
Price all involve testimony in part offered to describe the
circumstances leading to the drug transactions by the informants
with Price.
They were not necessarily offered to prove that
Price was, in fact, a drug dealer but that the police and the
Babbs believed that he would possibly sell them drugs.
The use
of out-of-court statements to show the state of mind of the
recipient after hearing the statements rather than for the truth
of the matter asserted is a legitimate nonhearsay use where the
recipient’s state of mind is an issue in the case.17
The
circumstances and reason why the Babbs targeted Price for a
possible drug transaction were major issues raised by Price’s
defense.
Price cites to Hughes v. Commonwealth18 and Gordon v.
Commonwealth,19 which condemned the use of so-called
“investigative hearsay” based on the confrontation clauses of the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 11
17
See Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook §
8.05 at 365-66 (3rd ed. 1993); Moseley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 960
S.W.2d 460, 462 (1997); Kenyon v. State, 986 P.2d 849 (Wyo. 1999)
(listing cases); State v. Ninci, 262 Kan. 21, 936 P.2d 1364
(1997). For example, oral threats made to a defendant are
admissible to show his state of mind with respect to a belief in
self-defense. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Davis, Ky., 14 S.W.3d
9, 14 (1999); Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 880 S.W.2d 877
(1994); Haynes v. Commonwealth, Ky., 515 S.W.2d 240, 241 (1974).
18
Ky., 730 S.W.2d 934 (1987).
19
Ky., 916 S.W.2d 176 (1995).
-8-
of the Kentucky Constitution.
In Gordon, the Court stated that
generally, a police officer may testify that a defendant had
become a suspect but may not provide testimony linking him to
specific crimes if based on information from third parties.20
Price’s reliance on these cases, however, is misplaced.
As the Court in Gordon noted, such evidence is admissible under
limited circumstances when offered to prove why the police acted
in a certain manner and if there was an issue in the case about
the action of the police.21
In the case sub judice, Price
asserted an entrapment defense.
He admitted selling drugs to the
Babbs22 but maintained that he was unfairly singled out for
prosecution even though he had never used or sold drugs prior to
the March transactions.
He specifically placed into issue the
procedures and motivations of the police; thus, the information
on his prior drug activity was admissible to explain disputed
actions taken by the police and the Babbs, and not necessarily
for the truth of the matter asserted.
Price testified that other than the two March
incidents, he had never used or sold drugs.
His girlfriend also
testified that she had never known Price to use or sell drugs or
to have sold drugs out of their residence.
20
Defense counsel
Id. at 179.
21
Id. See also Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d
534, 541 (1988); United States v. Freeman, 816 F.2d 558 (10th
Cir. 1987)(holding police testimony of confidential informant’s
statements concerning defendant’s illegal counterfeiting were
admissible for nonhearsay purpose of explaining police
investigation).
22
By contrast, the defendant in Gordon denied having sold
any drugs to the confidential informant.
-9-
indicated in his opening statement and through his crossexaminations of the prosecution witnesses that Price was
asserting an entrapment defense.
Given the admissibility of the
evidence concerning out-of-court statements about Price’s
reputation and prior drug dealing, defense counsel’s failure to
object to this testimony was not deficient performance.
Price argues that defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to alleged inadmissible testimony by Sgt.
Jennings that Price asserts was offered to bolster the
credibility of the Babbs.
He contends that Sgt. Jennings’s
testimony about the Babbs’ reliability and usefulness in the drug
operation, which he said resulted in the prosecution of 22
individuals, was inadmissible under KRE 404(e) and KRE 608
because the Babbs’ credibility had not yet been attacked by the
defense and character evidence cannot include specific acts.
“Bolstering” involves building up a witness’s
credibility before impeachment has been attempted.23
This
practice is improper because it has the potential for extending
the length of trials, asks the jury to accept a witness’s
testimony on faith, and could reduce the care with which jurors
scrutinize a witness’s testimony for inaccuracies.24
Under KRE
23
United States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d 1232, 1242 (7th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 966, 117 S. Ct. 392, 136 L. Ed. 2d
307 (1996).
24
United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977, 983 (7th Cir.
1986).
-10-
608, a party may offer supportive evidence only after a witness’s
credibility has been attacked.25
Several federal circuits analyzing Fed. R. Evid.
608(b), the federal counterpart to KRE 608, have held that this
federal rule does not apply to extrinsic evidence offered for a
legitimate reason such as to justify a cooperation agreement or
rebut allegations of bias, as opposed to evidence offered solely
to bolster a witness’s credibility.26
They have recognized
testimony on the reliability and cooperation of confidential
informants in a drug operation is admissible to rebut bias.
Government informants present a uniquely
difficult case for courts determining whether
the prosecution has offered the so-called
“bolstering” evidence for a permissible or an
impermissible purpose. Routinely, defense
counsel cross-examines government witnesses
about an informant’s bias—whether it be a
plea agreement, a financial arrangement, or
both. On re-direct, the prosecution may want
to introduce specific instances of fruitful
cooperation under the plea agreement to show
that the informant has already cooperated
substantially with the police, thereby
reducing the marginal temptation to be in the
present circumstances. The line between this
permissible use and impermissible
“bolstering” is indeed a hazy one. In
[United States v.] Fusco,27 the Fifth Circuit
held extrinsic evidence of past cooperation
admissible to rebut implications that the
25
Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 983 S.W.2d 513, 515 (1999);
Pickard Chrysler, Inc. v. Sizemore, Ky. App., 918 S.W.2d 736, 740
(1995).
26
See, e.g., United States v. Lochmondy, 890 F.2d 817, 821
(6 Cir. 1989); United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d 1257, 1264 (7th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1121, 116 S. Ct. 931, 133 L.
Ed. 2d 858 (1996); Lindemann, 85 F.3d at 1243; United States v.
Smith, 232 F.3d 236, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v.
Green, 258 F.3d 683, 692-93 (7th Cir. 2001).
th
27
748 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1984).
-11-
informant had received $45,000 from the DEA
solely for his help in that case: “Because
the government was trying to convince the
jury that [the informant] was not biased, it
was not ‘bolstering’ [the informant] in a
prohibited way, and [the informant’s] prior
cooperation was not ‘extrinsic’ as those
terms are used in Federal Rule of Evidence
608. Bias, as opposed to general veracity,
is not a collateral issue.”28
Bias is the relationship between a party and a witness which
might lead the witness to slant his testimony in favor of, or
against, one party.
Bias may exist because of a witness’s like
or dislike, or fear of a party, or his own self-interest.29
In the current case, Price attacked the motives of the
Babbs through cross-examination and direct testimony.
As part of
the entrapment defense, defense counsel highlighted the
arrangement between the police and Tara Babb that allowed her to
avoid prosecution on drug charges in exchange for her
participation in eight to ten undercover drug transactions.
In
addition, both Bill and Tara Babb received monetary compensation
for their participation.
Price portrayed himself as an innocent
Samaritan merely attempting to help two persons he believed to be
drug addicts.
While introduction of the rehabilitation evidence
through the Commonwealth’s first witness, Sgt. Jennings, may have
been premature, defense counsel’s failure to object was not
unreasonable given the defense plan to attack the informants as
biased and the inevitable admissibility of this evidence.
28
Smith, 232 F.3d at 242-43 (internal citations omitted).
29
Lindemann, 85 F.3d at 1243 (quoting United States v. Abel,
469 U.S. 45, 53, 105 S. Ct. 465, 469-70, 83 L. Ed. 2d 450
(1984)).
-12-
Consequently, defense counsel’s failure to object to this
testimony was not deficient performance.
Price alternatively argues that if any error by
counsel, standing alone, would not entitle him to relief, their
cumulative effect would justify a new trial.
Finally, he
contends that he was at least entitled to an evidentiary hearing
on his motion.
Price’s cumulative error argument fails because he has
not shown that counsel was deficient or committed multiple
errors.
Our above analysis indicates that Price’s conclusion
that his trial was riddled with inadmissible evidence is
unconvincing.
Because his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is clearly refuted on the record, the trial court did not
err in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the RCr 11.42
motion.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Fayette Circuit Court.
COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURS.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART, DISSENTS IN PART, AND
FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART:
I concur with portions of the Majority Opinion, but I
respectfully dissent concerning the denial of an evidentiary
hearing.
I would vacate the order of the Fayette Circuit Court
and remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing.
As noted by the Majority Opinion, Price asserts that
counsel’s action regarding the cross-examination of Sgt. Jennings
-13-
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel by “opening the
door” to evidence of his prior criminal history that was
prejudicial to his defense.
KRE 404(b) states that evidence of
other crimes or wrongs used to prove the character of a person in
order to show conformity with that behavior generally is
inadmissible.
KRE 404 (b)(1) sanctions admissibility of such
evidence if offered for other specific purposes.
In addition,
the evidence must be relevant, probative and the potential for
prejudice must not outweigh the probative value30.
This limited
approach to evidence of other crimes is based on the highly
inflammatory nature of this evidence.31
As our Supreme Court
noted in O’Bryan v. Commonwealth,32 evidence of other crimes
tends to
influence the jury, and the resulting
prejudice often outweighs its probative
value. Ultimate fairness mandates that an
accused be tried only for the particular
crime for which he is charged. An accused is
entitled to be tried for one offense at a
time and evidence must be confined to that
offense. The rule is based on the
fundamental demands of justice and fair play
[citations omitted].33
Although Sgt. Jennings’s reference to Price’s
“extensive record” was not necessarily inadmissable under KRE 404
(b) because it was not offered to prove his criminal disposition,
it was highly prejudicial.
30
This testimony became relevant and
Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 983 S.W.2d 513, 546 (1999).
31
See, e.g., Robert Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law
Handbook § 2.25 (D) at 93-94 (3rd ed. 1993); KRE 402 and KRE 403.
32
Ky., 634 S.W.2d 153 (1982).
33
Id. at 156.
-14-
admissible only because defense counsel raised the issue through
a question.34
The Commonwealth argues that defense counsel was
attempting to assert Price’s entrapment defense by showing that
he was treated differently than Tara Babb because the police
“knew he did not do drugs.”
The Commonwealth’s argument assumes
facts not evident from the record.
While defense counsel’s
question attempted to expose differential treatment toward Price
by the police, it is unclear whether defense counsel had
information that led him to believe the differential treatment
was unfair or improper.
Absent further information from defense
counsel on how he arrived at his decision to ask this question, a
determination of whether his action constituted a legitimate
strategy in weighing the risks of soliciting potentially harmful
testimony against the benefits of showing unfair differential
treatment by the police cannot be made.
Since Price’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be refuted on the
record, an evidentiary hearing is required.
I concur with the discussion by the Majority Opinion
concerning the admissibility of the testimony by the Babbs.
However, unlike the Babbs’ testimony, the testimony of Sgt.
Jennings that he had received anonymous tips and information from
the Babbs that Price was selling drugs out of his home was
inadmissible.
Price did not directly
challenge the actions of
Sgt. Jennings, and therefore, this specific testimony was not
necessary to explain an issue in the case involving the actions
34
Evidence of collateral criminal conduct is admissible for
purposes of rebutting a material contention of the defendant.
Brown, 983 S.W.2d at 513.
-15-
of Sgt. Jennings and was highly prejudicial.
It is unclear from
the record why defense counsel did not object to this testimony,
and Price should receive an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
As to Price’s complaint that defense counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to Sgt. Jennings’s testimony
which bolstered the credibility of the Babbs, the Commonwealth
argues that defense counsel’s failure to object to this testimony
constituted legitimate trial strategy because it tended to show
the Babbs’ bias in favor of the Commonwealth.
This argument
appears to postulate that the defense’s possible success in
challenging the credibility of the informants increases in direct
relationship to the strength of their credibility as supported by
the Commonwealth’s evidence.
To the contrary, the defense would
benefit more by excluding supportive evidence than merely relying
on the vague claim of bias by close association.
Moreover, the
defense theory that the Babbs were motivated to implicate and
entrap innocent persons because of Tara Babb’s immunity agreement
would conflict with a conscious decision by defense counsel not
to attempt to exclude evidence that their actions led to valid
prosecutions.
Again, since it is unclear from the record whether
defense counsel considered objecting to this testimony by Sgt.
Jennings, or if so, why he did not raise an objection, an
evidentiary hearing is required.
The Commonwealth argues that in addition to the
existence of legitimate trial strategy, Price was not prejudiced
by defense counsel’s conduct.
Price argues that each of the
instances of deficient performance, or the combination of errors
-16-
cumulatively, created actual prejudice.
The Commonwealth
contends that the Supreme Court’s decision in the direct appeal
that the hearsay issues did not constitute palpable error
pursuant to RCr 10.26 precludes finding actual prejudice.
It
asserts that the standard for determining manifest injustice is
not nearly as strict as the standard for assessing actual
prejudice on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
argument is without merit.
This
Manifest injustice under RCr 10.26
requires a finding that the error created a “substantial
possibility that the result of the trial would have been
different,”35 and the error seriously affects the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceeding.36
As
stated earlier, actual prejudice under RCr 11.42 involves a
“reasonable probability” that counsel’s error affected the
outcome of the proceeding.
However, a defendant need not show by
a preponderance of the evidence that the outcome would have been
different.
Clearly, the palpable error standard is more
restrictive than the actual prejudice standard.
An ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is not precluded by an unsuccessful
challenge based on palpable error.37
35
Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219, 224 (1996).
36
See Brock v. Commonwealth, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 24, 28
(1997)(construing KRE 103(e)); Castle v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
44 S.W.3d 790, 793 (2000).
37
Humphrey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 962 S.W.2d 870, 873
(1998)(stating defendant may seek review of conviction based on
ineffective assistance of counsel in a collateral appeal if RCr
10.26 claim is rejected on direct appeal).
-17-
While I agree with the Commonwealth that the evidence
of Price’s guilt was strong and the evidence of the entrapment
weak, at this stage of the proceedings without holding an
evidentiary hearing, the record does not support a conclusion
that Price has not presented at least a colorable claim of actual
prejudice.
Although none of the instances of alleged deficient
performance alone would appear to support a finding of actual
prejudice under the ineffective assistance standard, a proper
analysis of prejudice cannot be made until it has been determined
which issues raised by Price qualify as deficient performance.
As explained above, further inquiry and an evidentiary hearing is
necessary to determine whether defense counsel had legitimate
reasons for his actions.
I believe the trial court should
conduct a hearing and then make specific factual findings and
conclusions of law on each issue of potential deficient
performance identified in this Dissent with respect to both
deficient performance and actual prejudice.
Because Price’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is not clearly refuted on the record, I would vacate the
denial of the motion for an evidentiary hearing and RCr 11.42
relief, and remand for further proceedings.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Richard Edwin Neal
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-18-
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