ANTHONY VINCENT BARKER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: September 13, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001041-MR
ANTHONY VINCENT BARKER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ANN O'MALLEY SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-000323
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, JOHNSON AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Anthony Vincent Barker has appealed from an
order entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court on March 9, 2001,
which denied him relief on his motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas due to ineffective assistance of counsel.1
1
Having
Barker’s appellate counsel asserts that the motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas, filed six months after the guilty
pleas were entered but prior to his final sentencing, was filed
pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42.
Accordingly, for purposes of this appeal, we will treat the
motion as a collateral attack on the judgment. (“As a general
rule, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will not be
(continued...)
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Barker’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, we affirm.
On February 9, 2000, a Jefferson County grand jury
indicted Barker on one count of criminal abuse in the first
degree,2 and one count of assault in the fourth degree.3
In a
separate indictment, returned on April 13, 2000, Barker was
charged with being a persistent felony offender in the first
degree (PFO I).4
The criminal complaint giving rise to the
indictments alleged that on October 30, 1999, Barker repeatedly
assaulted his eight-year-old stepson.
Specifically, Barker was
accused of grabbing the child, striking him with his fist,
stripping him naked, whipping him with a belt, throwing him into
a bathtub, dragging him down a hallway, and repeatedly striking
him with his boot.
When the child’s mother arrived, she observed
the child crying and cowering in the corner.
Barker’s four-year-
old daughter allegedly told the mother that “my daddy was kicking
him.”
When the mother confronted Barker with the allegations, he
punched her in the jaw.
Thereupon, the police and emergency
1
(...continued)
reviewed on direct appeal from the trial court’s judgment,
because there is usually no record or trial court ruling on which
such a claim can be properly considered. Appellate courts review
only claims of error which have been presented to trial courts.”
Humphrey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 962 S.W.2d 870, 872 (1998)(citing
Caslin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 491 S.W.2d 832 (1973))).
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 508.100.
3
KRS 508.030.
4
KRS 532.080(3).
-2-
authorities were contacted, and the child was transported to
Kosair Children’s Hospital for treatment.
In its plea offer, the Commonwealth agreed to dismiss
the indictment for PFO I and offered Barker the minimum five-year
sentence on the felony charge of criminal abuse in the first
degree and the maximum 12-month sentence on the misdemeanor
charge of assault in the fourth degree, with the sentences to be
served concurrently.
The Commonwealth also agreed to remain
silent on the issue of probation and to recommend that Barker be
released to the Home Incarceration Program, pending his final
sentencing so he could be at home with his ailing mother.
Barker
agreed to these terms, and on April 21, 2000, the trial court
accepted Barker’s guilty pleas, adjudicating him guilty of
criminal abuse in the first degree and assault in the fourth
degree.
Sentencing was postponed and Barker was released to the
Home Incarceration Program so he could return home to his mother.
Before a final sentence could be pronounced, Barker
left his mother’s home, apparently through a bathroom window, and
violated the terms of his release.
After Barker failed to appear
at a scheduled meeting with his probation and parole officer, and
after Barker failed to appear in court for his sentencing
hearing, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest.
Eventually,
Barker was apprehended and returned to custody.
Having obtained new counsel in the intervening time
period, Barker, on November 13, 2000, filed a motion to withdraw
his guilty pleas.
In his motion, Barker alleged that he had
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received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel since his
counsel had failed to interview two witnesses that Barker claimed
could have provided exculpatory evidence at his trial.
Barker
contended that if these two witnesses had been available, and if
his trial counsel had subpoenaed their attendance at his trial,
he would not have agreed to the Commonwealth’s plea offer.
On January 4, 2001, an evidentiary hearing was held on
the motion.
One of the two witnesses, the defendant’s brother,
Ricky Barker, testified during the hearing that, although he was
not actually present during the time of the alleged child abuse,
he was present both before and after the alleged incident.
Ricky
stated that he could have given testimony about the circumstances
giving rise to the child abuse — that Barker suspected his
stepson of sexually abusing Barker’s four-year-old daughter —
and that in response Barker took his stepson to the back of the
house to administer punishment.
Ricky also stated that he would
have given testimony that when he returned to Barker’s residence
the victim did not appear badly hurt, and that the victim “put on
a show” in front of the mother when she returned.
The second of Barker’s two witnesses, Keith Outlaw,
failed to appear at the hearing.
admitted by affidavit.
However, his testimony was
Outlaw’s affidavit claimed that he was
also present around the time of the alleged incident, although
not actually present during the alleged beating.
Outlaw’s
affidavit also stated that he was aware of the circumstances
giving rise to the alleged abuse and that he observed Barker
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calmly go into the house to retrieve his stepson.
Outlaw also
stated that Barker appeared calm when he returned from
administering the punishment to his stepson and that he could
observe Barker’s stepson through a window, noting that the
stepson did not appear to be injured.
Both Ricky Barker and
Keith Outlaw stated that they had never been contacted by
Barker’s trial counsel.
On March 9, 2001, the Jefferson Circuit Court entered
an opinion and order denying Barker’s motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas.
The opinion and order concluded that Barker
received adequate assistance of counsel and that the witnesses’
testimony would have had little impact at trial.
On May 3, 2001,
the trial court sentenced Barker, in accordance with the plea
agreement, to five years in prison for the conviction for
criminal abuse in the first degree and 12 months in jail for the
conviction for assault in the fourth degree.
ordered to run concurrently.
The sentences were
This appeal followed.
The standard for determining whether a defendant
received ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to a
guilty plea was discussed by this Court in Sparks v.
Commonwealth:5
A showing that counsel’s assistance was
ineffective in enabling a defendant to
intelligently weigh his legal alternatives in
deciding to plead guilty has two components:
5
Ky.App., 721 S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (1986)(citing Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203
(1985)).
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(1) that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel’s performance fell outside the wide
range of professionally competent assistance;
and (2) that the deficient performance so
seriously affected the outcome of the plea
process that, but for the errors of counsel,
there is a reasonable probability that the
defendant would not have pleaded guilty, but
would have insisted on going to trial.
Upon examination of the record, it is apparent that the
testimony from the two witnesses would not have been highly
beneficial to Barker.
Most compelling is the fact that neither
witness was actually present during the alleged beating of
Barker’s stepson.
In fact, if anything the testimony from the
witnesses confirms the fact that Barker did beat his stepson.
Both witnesses have stated, for instance, that Barker took his
stepson to the back of the house in order to punish him.
Additionally, Barker’s brother testified that when the victim
returned, he was crying and upset.
Barker is correct that his
brother’s testimony, concerning the circumstances giving rise to
the beating, might have been helpful in proving that Barker only
had a reckless mental state at the time of the beating.
However,
Outlaw’s testimony seems to suggest just the opposite — that
Barker did possess the requisite, intentional mental state; i.e.,
Barker was thinking clearly and calmly when he took his stepson
to the rear of his house to beat him.
In sum, we fail to see how
Barker’s attorney rendered ineffective assistance in failing to
investigate these two witnesses.
After hearing about the
information the two witnesses possessed, Barker’s attorney
advised him that their testimony would not be helpful.
-6-
Given the
record of the evidentiary hearing, we are not disposed to
disagree with Barker’s trial counsel.
Certainly, counsel acted
well within the range of providing professionally, competent
assistance when he suggested that calling these two witnesses may
not have been sound trial strategy, and instead recommended that
Barker accept the Commonwealth’s plea offer.
The evidence against Barker was substantial, and trial
counsel’s advice to him to accept the plea agreement was sound.
In Sparks, this Court stated:
[A]ppellant’s counsel advised him to plead
guilty on the basis of a reasoned evaluation
of the strength of the evidence..., the
likelihood of conviction and the probability
that Sparks could easily receive a sentence
in excess of the Commonwealth’s offer of 35
years should Sparks be convicted of both
murder and first-degree robbery. Counsel’s
advice was not unreasonable under the
circumstances, and was therefore not
constitutionally defective.6
In the instant case, we agree with the trial court that
it was not unreasonable for Barker’s trial counsel to advise
Barker to plead guilty in light of both the evidence pointing
towards his guilt, and the punishment he faced if convicted.
In
addition to the testimony from both the victims, the Commonwealth
was in possession of medical records reflecting the child’s
injuries, the police testimony, and recordings of the 911 phone
call.
If Barker had gone to trial and been convicted as charged,
the PFO enhancement would have subjected him to a minimum
6
Sparks, supra at 728.
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sentence of ten years’ imprisonment, and he could have been
sentenced to as many as 20 years in prison.
In exchange for his
guilty pleas, Barker’s counsel negotiated a five-year term of
imprisonment, with the benefit of Barker remaining under house
arrest until his final sentence was imposed.
Having concluded
that Barker has failed to show that his trial counsel’s
representation fell below that of a competent attorney and that
the first prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test has
not been met, it is not necessary to discuss the second prong,
i.e., whether Barker would not have pled guilty, but for the
alleged error.
This Court in Centers v. Commonwealth,7 discussed the
factors to consider in determining whether a guilty plea was
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered:
In determining the validity of guilty pleas
in criminal cases, the plea must represent a
voluntary and intelligent choice among the
alternative course of action open to the
defendant. The United States Supreme Court
has held that both federal and state courts
must satisfy themselves that guilty pleas are
voluntarily and intelligently made by
competent defendants. Since pleading guilty
involves the waiver of several constitutional
rights, including the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to
trial by jury, and the right to confront
one’s accusers, a waiver of these rights
cannot be presumed from a silent record. The
court must question the accused to determine
that he has a full understanding of what the
plea connotes and of its consequences, and
this determination should become part of the
record [citations omitted].
7
Ky.App., 799 S.W.2d 51, 54 (1990).
-8-
We have reviewed the videotape of Barker’s guilty pleas
in its entirety and the record clearly shows that Barker’s guilty
pleas were knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered.
During the colloquy between Barker and the trial court, the judge
thoroughly and patiently explained to Barker all of his
constitutional rights and carefully ensured that all of the
requirements set out by the United States Supreme Court in Boykin
v. Alabama,8 were met.
When Barker was asked if he understood
that he was waiving his right to a jury trial, the right to be
represented by counsel at a jury trial, the right not to testify
against himself, and the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses against him, he clearly responded in the affirmative
each time.
When Barker was asked if he and his counsel had been
afforded enough time to go over all of the relevant evidence and
to discuss the elements of the offenses with which he had been
charged, and whether he was satisfied with the advice that his
counsel had given him, he again clearly responded in the
affirmative each time.
Furthermore, in establishing a factual basis for the
guilty pleas, the trial court carefully asked Barker if each of
the elements of the offenses had been met.
In response, Barker
freely admitted in open court that he did in fact repeatedly and
intentionally beat his stepson and that he did strike his wife on
her jaw.
8
Barker’s “solemn declarations in open court carry a
395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
-9-
strong presumption of verity.”9
Accordingly, the record refutes
Barker’s claim that he did not enter his pleas knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kim Brooks
Covington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
J. Hamilton Thompson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
9
Centers, supra at 54 (1990).
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