CITY-COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION OF BOWLING GREEN, WARREN COUNTY v. JOHN W. RIDLEY AND ROIANN R. RIDLEY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
AUGUST 23, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001020-MR
CITY-COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION
OF BOWLING GREEN, WARREN COUNTY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS R. LEWIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-01456
v.
JOHN W. RIDLEY AND
ROIANN R. RIDLEY
APPELLEES
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, MILLER AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
The City-County Planning Commission of Bowling
Green, Warren County ("the Commission") appeals from an order of
the Warren Circuit Court denying the Commission's petition to
enjoin John W. Ridley and Roiann R. Ridley ("the Ridleys") from
operating a parcel of improved real property in violation of a
zoning district.
For the reasons stated herein, we must dismiss
the appeal as moot.
The facts are not in controversy.
The Ridleys were
owners of the subject parcel known as "Boxwood" situated in
Bowling Green, Kentucky.
The record indicates that the Ridleys
rented out the Boxwood property for private functions and/or
overnight lodging.
At the time of the filing of the instant petition,
Boxwood was located in an "R-3" zoning district1, which permitted
single family dwellings, two family dwellings, multi-family
dwellings of no more than eight units, and the taking of
boarders.
In mid-2000, the Bowling Green Code Enforcement Board
("the Board") cited the Ridleys with having violated the R-3
ordinance by using Boxwood as a retail business and place of
assembly (Citation No. 1015).
In July, 2000, the Board conducted a hearing on the
matter in which it upheld the validity of Citation No. 1015.
The
Ridleys appealed to the Warren District Court, which rendered
findings of fact, conclusions of law, order and judgment on
February 8, 2001.
The court found in relevant part that the
Ridleys’ use of the parcel did not run afoul of the R-3
ordinance, and it ruled that Citation No.1015 was not valid.
During the pendency of the District Court proceeding
the Commission filed a petition with the Warren Circuit Court
seeking to both temporarily and permanently enjoin the Ridleys
from operating Boxwood in a matter which violated the R-3
ordinance.
The petition for a temporary injunction was denied by
way of an order rendered on December 21, 2000.
On April 12, 2001, the circuit court rendered an order
denying the Commission's petition for permanent injunctive
relief.
1
The court found in relevant part that the zoning
The zoning districts have subsequently been amended.
-2-
ordinance at issue did not specifically prohibit the types of
activities being conducted by the Ridleys at Boxwood.
It opined
that since zoning ordinances constitute a deprivation of property
rights, they must be strictly construed.
In so doing, the court
concluded that the Ridleys had not violated the ordinance, and as
such it denied the Commission's petition for permanent injunctive
relief.
The Commission now appeals from the circuit court's
denial of its petition for permanent injunctive relief.
We need
not reach the corpus of the Commission's claim of error, however,
as the matter at bar has been rendered moot by events occurring
subsequent to the filing of the petition for injunctive relief.
On May 17, 2001, the Ridleys sold the Boxwood property.
This
fact, taken alone, renders the matter moot because the Commission
is now seeking to enjoin the Ridleys from an activity which they
are no longer able to pursue.
As the parties are well aware, the Unites States
Supreme Court has held that the voluntary cessation of wrongful
activity does not render moot an action against the alleged
wrongdoer to enjoin the activity.
See generally, United States
v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953).
The basis for this rule
is the Court's recognition that the wrongdoer may resume the
conduct after the dismissal of the action.
Lexington Herald-
Leader Co., Inc. v. Meigs, Ky., 660 S.W.2d 658 (1983).
In the matter at bar, though, this rationale does not
form a sound basis for continuing the appeal since the Ridleys,
who no longer have any legal interest in the Boxwood property,
-3-
cannot resume the alleged wrongful conduct.
The Commission's
best argument in support of its position, we believe, is that
future owners of the Boxwood property may seek to use the
property in violation of a then-existing ordinance.
This
contention is purely speculative, though, and in any event the
Commission would be availed of the opportunity of seeking
permanent injunctive relief against that future owner.
Furthermore, even if the Ridleys were permanently enjoined from a
particular activity at the Boxwood property, that injunction
would not bar future owners from the same or similar conduct
since they are not parties to the instant action.
It remains
uncontroverted that the Ridleys cannot resume the conduct of
which the Commission complains irrespective of the outcome of the
instant appeal.
The matter, therefore, is moot.
The Commission's interest in the instant appeal appears
to center on the effect the outcome the appeal will have on a
pending federal action filed by the Ridleys against the City of
Bowling Green and the Board.
It maintains that a judgment
against the City in the federal case would affect the
Commission's budget, the result being that the Commission has a
collateral interest in the federal litigation which keeps the
instant appeal alive.
We are not persuaded by this argument.
The dispositive inquiry with respect to mootness is whether the
Ridleys are in a position to resume the alleged wrongful conduct
at the conclusion of the instant appeal.
Clearly, they are not.
A desire of either party to use the outcome of the instant action
in the federal case, or to prevent its use, has no bearing on
-4-
whether the circuit court properly denied the petition for
permanent injunctive relief, or whether the matter has been
rendered moot by the Ridleys' sale of the property.
Lastly, it is worth noting that the zoning ordinance in
existence at the filing of the instant petition has been replaced
with new regulations which are substantially more comprehensive
in scope.
We need not enter into a protracted analysis of the
new zoning ordinance, because the instant appeal is moot
irrespective of this change.
Suffice it to say that the
ordinance's amendment supports the argument that the instant
appeal is moot, for not only is the Commission seeking to enjoin
a party who no longer owns the Boxwood property, it is seeking to
enforce a zoning ordinance which no longer exists.
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss as moot the
Commission's appeal from the order of the Warren Circuit Court
denying the Commission's petition for injunctive relief.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED: _August 23, 2002______
__/s/ Daniel Guidugli_____
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Frank Hampton Moore, Jr.
Matthew P. Cook
Bowling Green, KY
Charles E. English
Park L. Priest
Bowling Green, KY
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.