RANDY D. STOKES, JR. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
December 13, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000939-MR
RANDY D. STOKES, JR.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS McDONALD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-002532
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM; McANULTY, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from an order denying
appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion alleging that his guilty plea was
involuntary and that his counsel on the plea rendered ineffective
assistance.
Upon review of the record, we adjudge appellant’s
arguments to be without merit and, thus, affirm.
On September 15, 1998, at about 10:00 p.m., a police
officer noticed appellant, Randy Stokes, leaving a liquor store
and looking underage.
After Stokes entered his car, the officer
approached and asked for his identification.
When the officer
checked Stokes’ identification, he found that Stokes had prior
misdemeanor drug convictions and thereupon asked Stokes if he had
any drugs in the vehicle.
sack of marijuana.
Stokes then handed the officer a small
At that point, the three other occupants of
the car scrambled out of the car and fled.
Stokes quickly
followed suit, and in the process of fleeing the car, dropped
what was later identified as 13.26 grams of crack cocaine on the
floorboard.
In a subsequent search of the car, a handgun was
also found on the floor of the vehicle.
As a result of the incident, an information was
ultimately filed against Stokes on October 14, 1998, charging him
with possession of marijuana, trafficking in a controlled
substance in the first degree, trafficking in a controlled
substance within 1000 yards of a school, and carrying a concealed
deadly weapon.
On October 14, 1998, Stokes entered into a plea
agreement with the Commonwealth and filed a motion to enter a
guilty plea and waiver of rights.
On October 19, 1998, Stokes
pled guilty to trafficking in the first degree and was thereafter
sentenced to ten years of supervised probation pursuant to the
plea agreement.
Subsequently, on April 25, 2000, Stokes pled
guilty to a second charge of trafficking.
Pursuant to that plea
agreement, Stokes stipulated to violating the conditions of his
1998 probation.
Accordingly, Stokes’ probation was revoked and
he was ordered to serve the ten-year sentence from 1998
consecutive with the ten-year sentence on the 2000 trafficking
conviction.
On February 20, 2001, Stokes filed an RCr 11.42
motion to vacate the 1998 conviction, claiming that his plea was
not voluntary and that his counsel on the plea rendered
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ineffective assistance.
After a full evidentiary hearing on the
matter, the court denied the motion.
This appeal followed.
We shall first address Stokes’ argument that his plea
was not entered voluntarily and intelligently.
“The test for
determining the validity of a guilty plea is whether the plea
represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the
alternative courses of action open to the defendant.”
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 721 S.W.2d 726, 727 (1986).
Sparks v.
It must be
affirmatively shown in the record that the plea was voluntary.
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274
(1969).
Whether a plea is voluntary is determined from the
totality of the circumstances, including factors surrounding the
plea as well as from the plea itself.
Kotas v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 565 S.W.2d 445 (1978).
Stokes maintains that because of his lack of education
and knowledge of the legal system, his plea was not voluntary.
During the plea proceedings, Stokes informed the court that he
was one credit shy of completing high school.
Further, during
the hearing on the RCr 11.42 motion, Stokes confirmed that he
could read and write.
In viewing the plea proceedings, we see
that Stokes spoke intelligibly and gave appropriate and coherent
responses to the court’s questions.
There was no indication that
Stokes was confused or did not understand the nature of the
proceedings or anything the court explained to him.
The fact
that Stokes had only an 11th grade education does not
automatically render his plea involuntary.
See Parke v. Raley,
506 U.S. 20, 113 S. Ct. 517, 121 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1992).
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As to his
claim of a lack of knowledge of the legal system, there was
evidence in the record that Stokes had nine prior misdemeanor
charges to which he had pled guilty to at least two at the time
of the plea in the instant case.
Hence, Stokes cannot claim he
did not have prior experience with the legal system.
See Lynch
v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 610 S.W.2d 902 (1980).
Stokes next contends that his plea was not voluntary
because he did not read any of the documents he signed.
During
the plea colloquy, Stokes answered in the affirmative when asked
if he had read and understood the motion to enter a guilty plea
and the waiver of rights.
this contention.
Hence, the record directly refutes
“Absent clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary, [the defendant] is bound by the representations he made
during the plea colloquy.”
Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 191
(4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1283, 120 S. Ct. 2761,
147 L. Ed. 2d 1022 (2000).
Stokes additionally argues that his plea was
involuntary because he was not informed that his conviction, as a
felony, could be used to enhance subsequent felony convictions
under the persistent felony offender (PFO) statute.
It has been
held that a plea is not rendered involuntary by the pleader’s
ignorance of its collateral consequences, in particular, future
PFO ramifications.
McGuire v. Commonwealth, Ky., 885 S.W.2d 931
(1994); see also Turner v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 647 S.W.2d 500
(1982).
Finally, Stokes maintains that the fact that he entered
his plea of guilty only five days after the information was filed
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against him demonstrates that the plea could not have been
voluntary.
We disagree.
First, it must be noted that Stokes had
already appeared on the charges at least two times in district
court before the information was filed against him.
had more than five days notice of the charges.
Hence, he
Secondly, the
mere fact that Stokes pled guilty a short time after the
information was filed does not automatically render the plea
involuntary.
Everything in the record indicates that the plea
was entered voluntarily and intelligently.
As stated earlier,
Stokes signed the motion to enter a guilty plea which
specifically set forth the rights Stokes was waiving and further
stated that, other than the Commonwealth’s sentence
recommendation, no promises or threats were made to induce the
guilty plea.
The motion also contained an explicit declaration
that the guilty plea was “freely, knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily made.”
During the guilty plea, Stokes confirmed that
he had read the motion to enter guilty plea and the
Commonwealth’s offer on a plea of guilty and that he had signed
both documents voluntarily.
During the plea colloquy, the court
specifically informed Stokes of all of his trial-related
constitutional rights.
Stokes stated that he understood these
rights and that by pleading guilty, he was waiving them.
Stokes
specifically stated that his plea was being entered willingly and
voluntarily.
The trial court is in the best position to assess
whether the defendant’s plea is voluntary and whether there was
some reluctance or misunderstanding.
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Centers v. Commonwealth,
Ky. App., 799 S.W.2d 51 (1990).
Upon consideration of the
totality of the circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court
erred in finding that Stokes’ guilty plea was entered voluntarily
and intelligently.
Stokes’ next argument is that his counsel on the guilty
plea rendered ineffective assistance.
Stokes contends that his
counsel did not adequately investigate his case and his possible
defenses and did not fully inform him of his options other than
pleading guilty.
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel on a guilty plea, the defendant must show
that his counsel’s performance was deficient relative to current
professional standards and that but for that deficient
performance, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant
would not have pled guilty but would have insisted on going to
trial.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed.
2d 203 (1985).
There is strong presumption that counsel’s
performance constituted sound trial strategy and the defendant
has the burden of proving otherwise.
Moore v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
983 S.W.2d 479 (1998), (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)).
Stokes argues that the fact that he was advised to
plead guilty so soon after the information was filed proves that
his counsel could not have adequately investigated his case.
The
amount of the time that defense counsel spends with the defendant
before a plea of guilty is but one of the factors to be
considered in assessing whether counsel was effective.
v. Russell, 423 F.2d 450 (6th Cir. 1970).
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Callahan
In Doughty v. Beto,
396 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1968), where defense counsel spent only
fifteen minutes with the defendant before negotiating a plea
deal, the Court found that under the circumstances, counsel spent
an adequate amount of time with the defendant such that he
rendered effective assistance.
“[W]hatever the showing may be as
to the time and facilities made available for rendering legal
service, the basic inquiry remains — was the representation
inadequate?”
Cofield v. United States, 263 F.2d 686, 688-689
(9th Cir. 1959), reversed on other grounds, 360 U.S. 472, 79 S.
Ct. 1430, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1531 (1959).
Stokes contends that his counsel conducted no
investigation of the merits of his case before advising him to
plead guilty.
In particular, he claims that his counsel should
have contacted and interviewed the other passengers in Stokes’
car on the night in question to see if they could provide some
mitigating evidence.
speculative.
However, this allegation is purely
Stokes does not state what mitigating evidence the
passengers could have provided that would have been beneficial to
his case.
A defendant must set forth in specific detail why RCr
11.42 relief is warranted.
Centers v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
799 S.W.2d 51 (1990).
Stokes also avers that had he understood that he could
have presented evidence at trial that the cocaine was not his, he
would not have pled guilty.
He maintains that his counsel should
have at least requested a probable cause hearing or filed a
suppression motion “which might have divulged additional facts
helpful to him in pursuing a defense.”
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(emphasis added).
Aside
from his self-serving claim that the cocaine was not his, Stokes
again does not state with particularity what favorable evidence
such a hearing would have elicited.
Further, regardless of what
evidence Stokes could have adduced relative to ownership of the
cocaine, the fact remained that the police officer saw Stokes
drop the cocaine when he fled the car.
Hence, we cannot say that
Stokes’ counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a
probable cause or suppression hearing to determine if there was
evidence that Stokes was not in possession of the cocaine.
Stokes also claims that his counsel was deficient for
failing to file a suppression motion based on the lack of
probable cause for the initial stop.
As stated earlier, the
police officer who stopped Stokes first saw him leaving a liquor
store and thought he was underage.
Additionally, on the arrest
warrant, the officer states that when he approached the car, he
smelled the odor of marijuana.
Thus, the officer clearly had
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to make an
investigative stop.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct.
1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
Accordingly, Stokes’ counsel was
likewise not ineffective for failing to file a suppression motion
based on the validity of the stop.
Stokes’ final claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is that his counsel should have challenged the
trafficking charge because there was insufficient evidence
thereof.
Stokes argues that he could not have been convicted of
the first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance charge
because other than the cocaine, there was no other evidence of
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trafficking.
Thus, he asserts he could only have been convicted
of possession of cocaine or, at most, second-degree trafficking.
The cocaine which was found was determined to be 13.26 grams.
It
has been held that the amount of a controlled substance alone can
be sufficient evidence to convict a defendant of trafficking.
Dawson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 756 S.W.2d 935 (1988).
Further,
second-degree trafficking in a controlled substance was not an
option relative to the cocaine because cocaine is expressly
designated as a “narcotic drug” in KRS 218A.010(15)(e), which
excludes it from the definition of second-degree trafficking in
KRS 218A.1413(1)(a).
“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations
or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary.”
McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 721
S.W.2d 694, 700 (1986), (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104
S. Ct. at 2066-2067.)
In the instant case, Stokes’ counsel made
a reasonable decision recommending that Stokes plead guilty to
the first-degree trafficking charge in exchange for 10 years’
probation.
Considering that he could have been sentenced to
seventeen years’ imprisonment had he been convicted of all four
charges, that was a very favorable deal for Stokes.
We cannot
say that Stokes’ counsel was ineffective for recommending that he
plead guilty pursuant to that plea agreement instead of going to
trial.
Nor can we say there was a reasonable probability that
Stokes would have ever insisted on going to trial.
During the
plea, Stokes indicated that he was fully satisfied with his
representation, that he had no complaints about this counsel, and
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that he had all the time he needed to discuss his case with
counsel.
Stokes took advantage of a very favorable plea offer
and then consequently blew it by his own recidivous conduct.
For the reasons stated above, the order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Dennis Stutsman
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Carlton S. Shier, IV
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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