ANTONIO D. JACKSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 5, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000937-MR
ANTONIO D. JACKSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN ADAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 00-CR-00765-02 & 00-CR-00894
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: BARBER, McANULTY, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Antonio D. Jackson appeals from a judgment of
the Fayette Circuit Court, wherein he was convicted by a jury of
trafficking in cocaine and being a persistent felony offender in
the second degree.
We affirm.
On May 16, 2000, the narcotics unit of the LexingtonFayette Urban County Police Department organized a “buy-bust”
operation where an informant would purchase illegal drugs from
suspected dealers in a targeted area of the city.
On this
particular evening, the police department targeted the area of
Roosevelt and Georgetown Streets for this type of operation after
receiving complaints from citizens about drug trafficking in that
particular area.
The informant, Rob Wilson, was obtained to go
into this particular neighborhood and make the controlled
purchase.
Wilson, who has served the Lexington police as an
informant for ten years, was given a twenty dollar ($20.00) bill
to purchase crack cocaine.
Police detectives set up a listening
device in Wilson’s vehicle so that the transaction could be
captured on audiotape.
After searching Wilson and his car for
contraband and photocopying the twenty dollar bill used in this
purchase, Wilson proceeded to enter the targeted neighborhood.
After pulling onto Roosevelt Street, Wilson began to
speak with a possible subject about purchasing some cocaine.
Wilson described this person, later identified as the appellant
Antonio Jackson, as a man with a stocky build, wearing a “brown
flannel shirt.”
After speaking with Wilson, Jackson walked over
to another man wearing a red shirt.
gave Jackson a rock of cocaine.
This man, Mandrill Cotton,
Jackson then proceeded to return
to Wilson’s car and exchanged the cocaine for the twenty dollar
bill.
Jackson returned to Cotton’s location and gave him the
twenty dollar bill.
After this sale concluded, Wilson informed
the narcotics officers who were listening in on the transaction
that the controlled sale “looks good.”
With this cue, the police
moved into the neighborhood and arrested both Jackson and Cotton.
Wilson identified Jackson as the man who sold him the cocaine
during a subsequent show-up identification.
bill was recovered from Cotton’s pocket.
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The twenty dollar
On July 24, 2000, the Fayette County Grand Jury
indicted Jackson and Cotton for trafficking in a controlled
substance in the first degree.
Cotton later pled guilty to this
charge and testified for the Commonwealth at Jackson’s trial.
During his testimony, Cotton acknowledged that he gave Jackson,
an acquaintance for approximately three months, twenty dollars
worth of crack cocaine which he had on his person.
Jackson then
sold this piece of cocaine to informant Wilson and brought the
twenty dollar bill back to Cotton.
Cotton testified that he
accepted the money from Jackson and put it with his other money.
After a one day trial, the jury, which consisted of no
African Americans, convicted Jackson of trafficking in cocaine.
After finding that Jackson was a persistent felony offender in
the second degree, the jury enhanced his original eight-year
prison sentence to twenty years.
The trial court, at Jackson’s
urging, reduced the total prison sentence to fifteen years.
This
appeal followed.
Jackson brings forward three arguments for our review.
First, Jackson alleges that the trial court erred by denying his
motion for a mistrial made at the beginning of the trial because
no potential jurors of African American descent were on the jury
panel.
Jackson further argues that the lack of African Americans
in the jury panel violated the requirement that the jurors be
drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.
We find these
assertions to be without merit.
The decision to grant a mistrial is within the
discretion of the trial judge, whose ruling will not be disturbed
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absent the showing of an abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth, Ky., 662 S.W.2d 483 (1983).
Jones v.
In order for a
mistrial, the record must reflect a manifest necessity for such
action or real necessity.
Miller v. Commonwealth, Ky., 925
S.W.2d 449 (1996), overruled in part on other grounds, Garrett v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 48 S.W.3d 6 (2001).
The occurrence complained
of must be of such character and magnitude that the litigant will
be denied a fair and impartial trial and the resulting
prejudicial effect can be removed in no other way.
Gould v.
Charlton Company, Inc., Ky., 929 S.W.2d 734 (1996).
In this
matter presently before us, Jackson failed to demonstrate that
the lack of African Americans in the jury pool denied him a fair
and impartial trial.
In order to establish a prima facie violation of the
fair cross-section requirement, a defendant must show:
1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a
distinctive group in the community; 2) that
the representation of this group in venires
from which the juries are selected is not
fair and reasonable in relation to the
numbers of other persons in the community;
and 3) that the underrepresentation is due to
the systematic exclusion of the group in the
jury selection process.
Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 734 S.W.2d 437, 442 (1987).
Here, Jackson has not demonstrated that some type of
systematic exclusion of African Americans in this jury panel
occurred because of the jury selection process.
Section Three of
the Administrative Procedures of the Court of Justice provides
that a jury pool shall be randomly selected by a computer from a
list of all registered voters of a county and adults holding
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drivers licenses issued in that county.
Section Four of the
Administrative Procedures of the Court of Justice mandates that
names shall be taken from the randomized list in sequential
order.
While it is unusual for no African American citizens to
be on a jury panel in Fayette County, there is no allegation by
Jackson that the selection procedure used herein was defective or
caused this result.
In fact, Jackson admits that there was no
systematic elimination of African American citizens from the
panel in this case.
Therefore, since Jackson cannot make out a
prima facie case that his right to a jury composed of a fair
cross section of the community was violated, we deem Jackson’s
first argument to have no merit.
Jackson’s second assertion of error is that the trial
court should not have permitted the Commonwealth to play a
portion of the videotape from Cotton’s previous statement because
questions from the trial court on that videotape implied that
Cotton had pled guilty to the trafficking charge.
Again, we see
no merit in this argument.
On the day prior to trial, co-defendant Cotton pled
guilty and responded to questions from both the trial court and
the Commonwealth to determine a factual basis for this plea and
to learn Cotton’s exact role in this crime.
At trial, Jackson
sought to play certain portions of the video from Cotton’s plea
hearing in order to impeach the credibility of Cotton and Wilson.
Specifically, Jackson wanted to show that Cotton’s video
statements imply that Jackson made only one trip to Cotton to
exchange the cocaine for the twenty dollar bill instead of two
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trips as Wilson described.
The Commonwealth then requested to
play a section of the tape where Cotton told the court that he
did observe Jackson give the cocaine to Wilson, for which Cotton
got twenty dollars.
The defense also wanted to prove that Cotton
was contradictory in the exact language he used to describe the
rock of cocaine.
At no time was Cotton’s actual guilty plea ever
shown to the jury.
A decision by the trial court concerning the admission
of evidence will not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse of
discretion.
Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219 (1996).
It is well-settled law that the Commonwealth cannot introduce
evidence that its witness, a co-defendant, has pleaded guilty to
the same charges being tried against the present defendant.
Parido v. Commonwealth, Ky., 547 S.W.2d 125 (1977).
Jackson
acknowledges that the actual guilty plea was never shown to the
jury.
Rather, Jackson argues that the jury could easily imply
that Cotton did plea guilty to the charge.
based upon a review of the record.
This assertion fails
The portions of the tape
played by the Commonwealth do not imply that a guilty plea
occurred.
Rather, the court’s questions to Cotton mirrored the
Commonwealth’s inquiry of Cotton in determining his role in this
drug transaction.
Therefore, we see no evidence that this jury
could have implied that Cotton had pled guilty to this charge.
We also believe that allowing the Commonwealth to play
the disputed parts of the videotape to the jury was proper under
the Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
KRE 106 clearly provides:
When a writing or recorded statement or part
thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse
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party may require the introduction at that
time of any other part or any other writing
or recorded statement which ought in fairness
to be considered contemporaneously with it.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has further clarified this
rule by stating, “Once a portion of a statement is introduced by
one party, the rule of completeness allows that adverse party to
require the introduction of the remainder of the statement.”
Slaven v. Commonwealth, Ky. 962 S.W.2d 845, 858 (1997).
The
fairness aspect of the rule is intended to prevent a misleading
impression as a result of an incomplete reproduction of a
statement.
Garrett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 48 S.W.3d 6 (2001).
Here, the Commonwealth was properly allowed to introduce its
requested portions of the videotape so that the jury could obtain
a clear and complete picture of the events that transpired on
May 16, 2000.
To deny the Commonwealth the ability to introduce
these portions of the video would have provided the jury with
statements that were taken out of context.
The jury is entitled
to a complete and fair record of Cotton’s June 7, 2001 statements
so long as no implication of his guilty plea is evident.
With
the record showing that the jury was not tainted with evidence of
a guilty plea by a co-defendant, no abuse of discretion occurred.
Therefore, the trial court properly placed Cotton’s videotaped
statements within the province of the jury so that it could
determine the credibility of each witness.
Jackson’s final contention of error is that, during
closing argument, the trial court should have permitted him to
argue that Cotton may have been lying to protect somebody else
whom he knew to be the actual seller.
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From a review of the
record, Jackson’s trial counsel thoroughly laid out
inconsistencies in Cotton’s testimony.
The Commonwealth
specifically objected to Jackson’s trial counsel making
statements that Cotton was lying to protect somebody else.
The
trial court ruled that trial counsel was entitled to argue that
Cotton was lying to protect another person, but counsel could not
specifically identify the suspect.
Also, the trial court held
that trial counsel, in making this argument, had to stay within
the bounds of reasonable inferences from the evidence.
Generally, counsel are granted wide latitude in their
closing argument.
A litigant is allowed to draw reasonable
inferences from the facts proven at trial.
Elswick v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 574 S.W.2d 916 (1978).
Inferring
possibilities that are not reasonable based on the evidence,
however, is beyond the scope of closing argument.
Id.
During
closing argument, Jackson’s counsel was allowed to argue that codefendant Cotton was lying to protect somebody else.
The
evidence presented at trial, particularly the possible
inconsistent testimony from Wilson and Cotton, plus testimony
from a neighborhood resident that several people usually
congregate in this particular area, could lead a juror to
reasonably conclude that Cotton was lying.
The only prohibition
issued by the trial court was that Jackson could not disclose the
identity of this mystery suspect.
The trial court was correct in
its ruling because the identity of Jackson’s mystery suspect was
not in the record, thus making the suggestion to the jury highly
improper and contrary to law.
Therefore, we adjudge that no
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error occurred because the trial court’s ruling on this issue was
appropriate.
Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Lexington, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Anitria M. Franklin
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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