FIRST FINANCIAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. AGENCY SPECIALTY OF KENTUCKY, INC. AND WESSEL INSURANCE AGENCY
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RENDERED: MAY 10, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000852-MR
FIRST FINANCIAL INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS J. KNOPF, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-002932
v.
AGENCY SPECIALTY OF KENTUCKY, INC.
AND WESSEL INSURANCE AGENCY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, McANULTY, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE:
First Financial Insurance Company (First
Financial) appeals from a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit
Court, which dismissed its complaint against Agency Specialty of
Kentucky, Inc. (Agency Specialty) and the Wessel Insurance Agency
(Wessel), for breach of contract and negligence following a jury
trial in favor of the appellees.
After reviewing the record and
the arguments of counsel, we affirm.
First Financial is an insurance company located in
North Carolina that underwrites insurance coverage for commercial
businesses.
In July 1986, Agency Specialty, through its
predecessor company, entered into a general agency contract to
act as the general insurance agent for First Financial in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky.
The General Agency Agreement
authorized Agency Specialty to solicit, receive and accept
applications; issue and countersign binders; and effect
cancellation of binders and policies.
3.1.
General Agency Agreement §
Agency Specialty could not appoint any local agents except
with the prior written approval of First Financial.
1.5.
Id. at §
The Agreement also included an indemnification provision
whereby Agency Specialty agreed to indemnify First Financial
against liabilities or losses resulting from or arising out of
acts or omissions by Agency Specialty or any other person for
whom it may be responsible.
Id. at § 19.1.
In late January 1989, James Rhodes, on behalf of Bob
Lowery, the owner of the Arcade Bar, contacted Lori Harlow, an
agent with the Wessel Insurance Agency, an independent insurance
agency, about obtaining premises liability insurance coverage.
Harlow in turn solicited quotes from several insurance companies
including Agency Specialty.
Lowery decided to accept coverage
through First Financial as quoted by Agency Specialty.
On
February 9, 1989, Harlow issued an insurance binder as a
temporary insurance contract for the Arcade Bar for commercial
general liability that stated there were “No Special Conditions.”
The binder also stated, however, on the back side, that it was
subject to the terms, conditions and limitations of the policy in
current use by the Company (First Financial).
At that time,
First Financial’s policies for taverns excluded coverage for
assault and battery.
Harlow did not tell Rhodes about the
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exclusion prior to issuing the binder.
Harlow gave the binder to
Rhodes and mailed it to Agency Specialty, who received it on
February 10, 1989.
On February 13, 1989, Agency Specialty issued
and mailed to Harlow a full policy containing the assault and
battery exclusion.
On February 16, 1989, Harlow mailed the
policy to Rhodes.
Meanwhile, on February 12, 1989, Donald Hargrove was
shot in an altercation while patronizing the Arcade Bar and died
two days later.
Hargrove’s estate filed a wrongful death action
against the person who shot Donald Hargrove and the Arcade Bar,
which filed a claim under its liability insurance policy.
First
Financial provided legal representation in the suit under a
reservation of rights and filed a declaration of rights action
against the Arcade Bar and the Hargrove estate concerning its
obligations under the policy.1
First Financial denied coverage
based on the assault and battery exclusion contained in the
policy.
In July 1992, the circuit court held that First
Financial was obligated to provide a defense and to indemnify the
Arcade Bar up to the limits of the policy based on the insurance
binder issued by Wessel.
In January 1993, a jury found in favor
of the Hargrove estate and apportioned causation to the Arcade
Bar of 33 1/3%.
Pursuant to the jury verdict, the circuit court
entered a judgment on January 28, 1993, against the Arcade Bar
for $143,373.19.
On August 6, 1993, this Court affirmed the
circuit court’s judgment in the declaration of rights action.
On
September 14, 1994, First Financial satisfied its portion of the
1
First Financial Ins. Co. v. Hargrove, 90-CI-4339.
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monetary judgment in the wrongful death action by payment to the
Hargrove estate.
On May 25, 1995, First Financial filed its complaint in
the current action against Agency Specialty and Wessel seeking
indemnification for $210,515.79 for costs, expenses and attorney
fees paid in relation to the Hargrove litigation.
It raised
claims of breach of contract under the General Agency Agreement
against Agency Specialty for authorizing an insurance binder
without the assault and battery exclusion and appointing Wessel
as a local agent without prior approval, and negligence for
allowing Wessel to issue the insurance binder without the policy
exclusions.
First Financial also raised a claim of negligence
against Wessel for issuing the insurance binder without the
proper exclusions.
On June 12, 1995, Wessel filed an answer
denying liability based on alleged authorization from Agency
Specialty to issue the insurance binder.
On June 30, 1995,
Agency Specialty filed an answer denying any breach of contract
or negligence, a counterclaim asserting First Financial failed to
raise all meritorious defenses in the declaration of rights
action, and a cross-claim seeking indemnity for negligence by
Wessel in issuing the insurance binder.
On January 26, 1996, First Financial filed a motion for
summary judgment against both defendants pursuant to CR 56.
It
stated that Agency Specialty had breached its duty under the
general agency agreement to ensure the insurance binder contained
the proper exclusions.
Agency Specialty responded that there was
no breach of contract because Wessel was not an agent, employee,
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or party for which it was responsible.
It also stated material
factual issues existed concerning the issuance of the insurance
binder.
Wessel filed a response to First Financial’s motion and
also requested summary judgment in its favor.
On August 6,
1996, the circuit court entered an opinion and order denying
First Financial’s motion stating whether Wessel was an agent of
Agency Specialty and whether Agency Specialty breached any duty
under the general agency agreement were factual issues not
susceptible to summary judgment.
It also denied Wessel’s motion
for summary judgment stating that Wessel assumed a duty to First
Financial in issuing the insurance binder, but whether it acted
negligently and whether Agency Specialty authorized the binder
were disputed factual issues for a jury to determine.
On January 21, 1997, Agency Specialty filed a motion
for summary judgment arguing the insurance binder was adequate
because it had incorporated the policy exclusions.
First
Financial responded by asserting the decision by this Court in
the declaration of rights action that the insurance binder was
inadequate could not be readjudicated under the doctrines of law
of the case and stare decisis.
It also renewed its motion for
summary judgment based on language in the general agency
agreement providing for indemnification for losses resulting from
or arising out of any transaction on the part of Agency
Specialty.
On April 25, 1997, the circuit court denied both
motions stating neither law of the case nor stare decisis applied
to this Court’s unpublished opinion in another lawsuit and
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whether Agency Specialty’s action or inaction resulted in or
caused the loss to First Financial was a disputed factual issue.
On August 5, 1996, First Financial filed its third
request for summary judgment against Agency Specialty.
It
contended that Agency Specialty was liable under the General
Agency Agreement for its failure to correct the inadequacies in
the insurance binder after it had notice of the binder.
On
October 22, 1998, the circuit court denied the renewed motion for
summary judgment stating that Agency Specialty could not be held
liable based on ratification of Wessel’s conduct for failing to
revoke or change the inadequate binder because a party may not
ratify an act which it could not have originally authorized.
On August 24, 2000, the circuit court held a jury trial
involving whether Agency Specialty and Wessel were negligent and,
if so, whether the negligence of either or both caused damages to
First Financial.
During the trial, Wessel called Harold W.
Birchfield, over the objection of First Financial, as an expert
witness on the standard of care for issuing insurance binders.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Agency Specialty and
Wessel.
On August 31, 2000, the circuit court entered a judgment
dismissing the action.
On September 8, 2000, First Financial
filed a CR 50.02 motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
and a CR 59.01 motion for a new trial, which were denied.
This
appeal followed.
First Financial raises several issues dealing with the
denial of its summary judgment motions and its motion for
directed verdict; the testimony of Harold Birchfield, Wessel’s
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expert; portions of Wessel’s closing argument; and the role of
this Court’s opinion in the prior declaration of rights action.
First Financial’s first complaint concerns the trial
court’s denial of its summary judgment motions and its motion for
directed verdict.
The party moving for summary judgment must
establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and
that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
CR 56.03;
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807
S.W.2d 476, 482 (1991).
Summary judgment should be cautiously
applied and should not be used as a substitute for trial unless
it appears impossible for the nonmoving party to produce evidence
at trial warranting a judgment in his favor.
Id. at 482, 483.
Generally, an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not
appealable because it is interlocutory and not a final judgment.
See CR 54.01;
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Hall, Ky. App., 879
S.W.2d 487, 489 (1994).
Moreover, an appellate court will not
review a trial court’s decision to deny summary judgment based on
a perceived dispute of material fact.
S.W.2d 812 (1955).
Bell v. Harmon, Ky., 284
Denial of summary judgment does not prejudice
a party because he still has the opportunity to establish the
merits of his motion at trial.
Id. at 814.
There is an
exception to this rule of nonreviewability where the facts are
not in dispute, the basis for the ruling involved only a matter
of law, the court denied the motion for summary judgment, and the
court entered a final judgment that the moving party appealed.
See Transportation Cabinet, Bureau of Highways v. Leneave, Ky.
App., 751 S.W.2d 36, 37 (1988)(citing Gumm v. Combs, Ky., 302
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S.W.2d 616 (1957)); Midwest Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wireman, Ky. App.,
54 S.W.3d 177, 179 (2001).
In this case, the trial court denied the motions for
summary judgment based on its belief there were disputed issues
of material fact and not solely on the basis of matters of law.
Consequently, the trial court’s decisions to deny First
Financial’s summary judgment motions are not subject to appellate
review.
First Financial also argues the trial court erred in
denying its motion for directed verdict.
We believe First
Financial failed to properly preserve the arguments raised in
this appeal challenging the trial court’s action on this issue.
In its appellate brief, First Financial asserts there were no
disputed issues of material fact and the matters of agency and
ratification were matters of law.
It basically restates the
arguments it provided in its summary judgment motions that Agency
Specialty’s failure to seek modification of the insurance binder
after receiving it constituted ratification of an inadequate
binder.
At trial, however, in response to the oral motions for
directed verdict by Agency Specialty and Wessel at the close of
First Financial’s case, which were based on the same arguments
presented in their summary judgment motions, First Financial
stated the issues raised by the appellees were factual issues for
the jury.
The trial court basically agreed with First Financial
and denied the appellees’ motions because the issues involved
factual questions.
At the close of all the evidence, First
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Financial merely stated that it “would move for a directed
verdict.”
Counsel gave no arguments or basis for its motion.
The trial court stated that it was denying First Financial’s
motion, as well as the renewed directed verdict motions of the
appellees, for the same reasons it denied the initial directed
verdict motions.
It is well-established that a party moving for
a directed verdict must “state the specific grounds therefor.”
CR 50.01.
See also Hercules Powder Co. v. Hicks, Ky., 453 S.W.2d
583 (1970).
Failure to specify each ground supporting a directed
verdict forecloses appellate review of the trial court’s denial
of the motion.
Id.
S.W.2d 788 (1977).
Barnett v. Stewart Lumber Co., Ky. App., 547
First Financial’s position in this appeal on
the denial of its directed verdict motion that only legal and no
factual issues are involved is directly contrary to its stated
position during the trial.
Even if the ratification argument had been properly
preserved, First Financial would not have been entitled to a
directed verdict on this ground.
The standard of review of a
denial of a directed verdict requires reversal only if the jury
verdict is palpably or flagrantly against the evidence so as to
indicate that it was reached as a result of passion and prejudice
after viewing all the evidence and any reasonable inferences
drawn from the evidence favoring the prevailing party as true.
See USAA Casualty Ins. Co. v. Kramer, Ky., 987 S.W.2d 779, 781-82
(1999)(quoting Lewis v. Bledsoe Surface Mining Co., Ky., 798
S.W.2d 459, 461 (1990)).
We agree with the trial court that
whether Agency Specialty’s conduct constituted a breach of duty
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by ratification of the insurance binder was a factual issue for
the jury.
The cases cited by First Financial in support of its
position are distinguishable.
First Financial also contends the trial court erred by
failing to grant its motion for mistrial for comments made by
Wessel’s attorney in closing argument that his client did not
“have the money to pay this type of claim.
that claim on him now.”
It’s not fair to put
It maintains that counsel’s comments
were improper and false representations that Wessel was
financially unable to pay any monetary judgment against it.
e.g., Triplett v. Napier, Ky., 286 S.W.2d 87 (1955).
See,
First
Financial believes these statements were intended to induce
sympathy with the jury and were outside the scope of the
evidence.
The trial court denied the motion for mistrial but
admonished the jury not to consider the relative size or wealth
of the parties and base their decision solely on the facts of the
case.
A trial court may declare a mistrial based on manifest
urgent or real necessity.
897, 906 (2000).
Gosser v. Commonwealth, Ky., 31 S.W.3d
In Gould v. Charlton Co., Ky., 929 S.W.2d 734
(1996), the Court stated:
It is universally agreed that a mistrial
is an extreme remedy and should be resorted
to only when there is a fundamental defect in
the proceedings which will result in a
manifest injustice. The occurrence
complained of must be of such character and
magnitude that a litigant will be denied a
fair and impartial trial and the prejudicial
effect can be removed in no other way.
“Mistrials in civil cases are generally
regarded as the most drastic remedy and
should be reserved for the most grievous
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error where prejudice cannot otherwise be
removed.”
Id. at 738 (internal citations omitted).
See also Burgess v.
Taylor, Ky. App., 44 S.W.3d 806, 814 (2001).
A trial court has
discretion in deciding whether a particular situation constitutes
sufficient manifest necessity to justify declaring a mistrial.
Id.
It is ordinarily presumed that a jury will follow an
admonition or curative instruction and it will remove any
prejudice caused by an offensive argument unless it appears the
argument was so prejudicial under the circumstances that an
admonition will not cure it.
See Price v. Commonwealth, Ky., 59
S.W.3d 878, 881 (2001); Hayes v. Commonwealth, Ky., 58 S.W.3d
879, 882 (2001).
The trial court held that while Wessel’s counsel’s
comments may have been improper, they did not result in manifest
injustice.
It noted that the comments were brief and were part
of the description of the risks assumed by the various parties in
providing liability insurance.
Counsel described Wessel as a
small independent broker acting as a middleman while First
Financial was the actual underwriting insurer who received
premiums in return for the risks of unexpected loss such as a
court decision determining the scope of liability for a
policy.
We agree with the trial court that these comments did
not create such grievous prejudice that it denied First Financial
a fair and impartial trial.
The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to declare a mistrial.
First Financial raises two issues with respect to
evidence associated with the arguments raised and the appellate
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opinion rendered in the declaration of rights action.
First
Financial contends the trial court improperly allowed Wessel and
Agency Specialty, over its objection, to elicit testimony and
documentary evidence about the position taken by First Financial
in the declaration of rights action.
Frank Dent, First
Financial’s claims vice-president, admitted during crossexamination that the company argued in the declaration of rights
action that the actual insurance policy containing the
unambiguous assault and battery exclusion controlled over the
insurance binder.
First Financial asserts that its position in
the earlier action was not relevant in the negligence action
because the declaration of rights case merely concerned coverage
under the insurance policy, not the conduct or responsibility of
Wessel and Agency Specialty with respect to the insurance binder.
It states the appellees could have moved to intervene in the
declaration of rights action if they so desired.
First Financial also criticizes the trial court’s
decision to prohibit it from introducing this Court’s entire
opinion from the declaration of rights action as an exhibit.
It
maintains that allowing the appellees to present evidence that
First Financial did not challenge the propriety of the insurance
binder in the declaration of rights action without allowing it to
show that in the negligence action it was adopting the appellate
court’s rationale in finding it liable on its policy created
confusion and was unfair.
First Financial maintains that the
trial court should have taken judicial notice of the entire
appellate court opinion.
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Agency Specialty argues that First Financial’s failure
to challenge the propriety of the insurance binder and raise the
responsibility of the appellees in the declaration of rights case
was relevant to whether First Financial raised all possible
defenses and could have avoided suffering an “actual loss”
because of the appellate court decision.
Wessel and Agency
Specialty argue that First Financial’s belief that the insurance
binder was adequate prior to the appellate decision was
consistent with their defense that they were not negligent
because they reasonably also believed the binder was adequate.
Agency Specialty also asserts this evidence was relevant to its
defense that it did not ratify Wessel’s issuance of an improper
binder by failing to insist the binder be modified or revoked.
We find no error by the trial court.
First Financial’s
position in the declaration of rights action was relevant and
admissible with respect to the appellees’ negligence, i.e.,
breach of the standard of care, and whether First Financial
sufficiently challenged the propriety of the insurance binder in
the earlier action.
First Financial admitted at trial that it
intentionally chose not to add Wessel or Agency Specialty as
parties in the declaration of rights action.
Because the
declaration of rights action did not include the appellees as
parties, the appellate decision was not binding on them under res
judicata or collateral estoppel.
See Yeoman v. Commonwealth,
Health Policy Board, Ky., 983 S.W.2d 459 (1998); Moore v.
Commonwealth, Cabinet for Human Resources, Ky., 954 S.W.2d 317
(1997).
Also, it was not the law of the case because it was not
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an opinion in the same case.
913 S.W.2d 310 (1994).
See Roberson v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
The trial court stated it would take
judicial notice of the appellate decision and allowed First
Financial to elicit testimony from its witnesses on the basis for
the decision.
In fact, Frank Dent read verbatim that portion of
the opinion that stated Wessel had failed to notify the Arcade
Bar of the exclusions in the binder.
First Financial was allowed
to argue to the jury that it changed its position based on the
appellate court decision.
The trial court’s decision not to
include the entire appellate court opinion as an exhibit was
reasonable and First Financial was not unduly prejudiced by the
trial court’s handling of this matter.
First Financial’s
assertion that KRE 201 mandated that the entire appellate court
opinion be submitted to the jury is erroneous and unsupported.
First Financial also complains about a jury instruction
concerning the effect of the prior appellate court decision.
The
trial court used the first sentence of First Financial’s proposed
instruction stating that the appellate court had ordered First
Financial to pay any judgment to the Arcade Bar, but the trial
judge added a section stating that the jury was to determine the
appellees’ negligence based on the evidence in that case and was
not bound by the appellate court decision on the issue of
negligence.
First Financial argues the latter provision
erroneously gave the jury the impression they could disregard the
appellate decision.
We disagree.
The instruction accurately states the legal effect of
the appellate court decision.
A review of the entire instruction
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shows that it clearly required the jury to accept the appellate
court’s decision imposing responsibility on First Financial under
the insurance policy and it narrows the non-binding nature of the
decision to the issue of negligence by Wessel and Agency
Specialty.
As stated earlier, the appellate decision was not
binding on the appellees under res judicata or the law of the
case.
The question of negligence by the appellees was not
decided in or at issue in the declaration of rights action.
The
trial court understandably was concerned that the jury would give
undue weight to the appellate court decision.
Thus, the
instruction was not erroneous.
Finally, First Financial contends the trial court erred
in allowing Harold Birchfield to testify as an expert witness for
Wessel.
Under KRE 702, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify
as to his opinions of scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge if the testimony will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
“Application of KRE 702 is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court.”
Farmland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, Ky., 36
S.W.3d 368, 378 (2001).
See also Owensboro Mercy Health System
v. Payne, Ky. App., 24 S.W.3d 675, 678 (1999).
Likewise, the
trial court’s decision on qualifying a witness as an expert
should not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.
Farmland, supra; Fugate v. Commonwealth, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 931, 935
(1999).
In order to constitute an abuse of discretion, a trial
court’s decision must be arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
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unsupported by sound legal principles.
Farmland, 36 S.W.3d at
378; Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, Ky., 11 S.W.3d
575, 581 (2000).
In addition to being qualified to testify, an
expert’s testimony must be both relevant and reliable.
Goodyear,
11 S.W.3d at 578.
First Financial argues that Birchfield was not
qualified to testify as an expert and that his testimony did not
assist the jury to determine a fact in issue.
Birchfield’s
qualifications included over twenty years as a practicing
insurance agent, certification as a chartered property and
casualty underwriter, various honorary awards, and fifteen years
service as an instructor of insurance agents in the certified
insurance counselor program.
Birchfield testified about the
process for issuing insurance binders.
He stated that the binder
issued by Wessel was a standard binder produced with an insurance
document computer program commonly used in the industry.
He said
the use of the term “no special conditions” in the restrictions
section of the binder was common practice and binders did not and
were not intended to include policy coverage exclusions.
Birchfield opined that Wessel had acted reasonably and in a
prudent manner under the standard of care in the insurance
industry.
First Financial asserts that Birchfield was not
qualified because he authored no publications and that he was
nothing more than an insurance agent as were several other trial
witnesses.
Birchfield’s background, however, includes extensive
experience as an instructor conducting seminars throughout the
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United States and as a member of industry governing boards.
He
also was independent and not connected with any of the parties.
We believe Birchfield was sufficiently qualified to give an
expert opinion on the practices of issuing binders in the
insurance industry.
First Financial also challenges the relevance and
reliability of Birchfield’s testimony.
It states he offered no
methodology which could be analyzed, no theories or techniques
that could be evaluated, and had no literature to support his
opinions.
It maintains that his testimony did not assist the
jury because it did not involve complex issues that the jury
could not determine from the evidence offered by the other
witnesses.
While we agree with First Financial that Kentucky has
adopted the analysis enunciated in Daubert v. Merrill Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d
469 (1993), the factors set out in Daubert relied upon by First
Financial are “neither exhaustive nor exclusive.”
S.W.3d at 478.
Goodyear, 11
a flexible one.”
“[T]he inquiry into reliability and relevance is
Id.
The factors emphasized by First Financial
are clearly more applicable to scientific and technical areas.
The area of insurance industry practices falls more appropriately
within the rubric of “specialized knowledge.”
It is an area of
specialized terminology, procedures, and unique relationships.
It is a field that few lay persons know well and is not an area
of general knowledge.
Birchfield offered testimony dealing
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specifically with the customary practices and understanding of
the agents in the issuing of insurance binders.
The standard of care with respect to the judgment of
Wessel’s and Agency Specialty’s agents on the sufficiency of the
insurance binder issued to the Arcade Bar was a central issue of
the case that was a proper subject for expert testimony.
See,
e.g., Golembiewski v. Hallberg Ins. Agency, 262 Ill.App.3d 1082,
635 N.E.2d 452 (1994)(insurance agent allowed to testify on
insurance industry practices with respect to oral binder for
automobile insurance).
Cf. Frank W. Schafer, Inc. v. C. Garfield
Mitchell Agency, 82 Ohio App.3d 322, 612 N.E.2d 442 (1992)
(insurance agents allowed to testify as experts on standard of
care in insurance industry for recommending stopgap insurance to
client); Kabban v. Mackin, 104 Ore.App. 422, 801 P.2d 883
(1990)(expert testimony admitted on standard industry practice in
obtaining liability coverage for client); Atwater Creamery Co. v.
Western Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1985)(standard
of care related to notifying client of gap in insurance coverage
should be established by expert testimony).
Under the
circumstances of this case, Birchfield’s testimony was relevant
and did assist the jury.
Consequently, we find the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in allowing Harold Birchfield to
testify as an expert.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the Jefferson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEEAGENCY SPECIALTY OF KENTUCKY:
Elizabeth Ullmer Mendel
Tera M. Rehmel
WOODWARD, HOBSON & FULTON
Louisville, Kentucky
Perry Adanich
BUSH LAW OFFICE
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEEWESSEL INSURANCE AGENCY:
Benjamin D. Crocker
TRAVELSTED & CROCKER
Bowling Green, Kentucky
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