BEVINS BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.; JOHNNY PAUL BEVINS v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL CORPORATION
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RENDERED: JUNE 7, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000676-MR
BEVINS BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.; JOHNNY PAUL BEVINS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MASON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT I. GALLENSTEIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00230
v.
GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL
CORPORATION
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
In March 1998, Bevins Brothers Construction
Company, Inc. leased a crushing machine--a Powerscreen Turbo
Chieftain--from Classic Equipment Leasing.
Bevins paid
$10,000.00 down and agreed to pay $2,018.73 per month for sixty
months.
Classic Equipment assigned its lease to GE Capital
Corporation.
In August 2000, GE brought this action to enforce the
lease.
It alleged that as of January 2000 Bevins had ceased to
make its monthly payments.
the complaint.
A copy of the lease was attached to
In its answer, Bevins admitted the execution of
the lease and its own default.
It alleged, however, “that
certain fraudulent or false representations and statements were
made to th[is] Defendant[] by the Plaintiff, or its predecessor
in interest, . . . which alter or modify the terms of the subject
lease.”
Bevins also alleged that “there was no meeting of the
minds between the parties and therefore the contract is
unenforceable. . . . [And] the alleged agreement between the
parties constitutes a contract of adhesion, and is therefore
unenforceable.”
Soon thereafter, GE moved for judgment on the
pleadings pursuant to CR 12.03.
In response Bevins merely
repeated the allegations of its answer.
On February 28, 2001, the Mason Circuit Court granted
GE’s motion and awarded it almost $56,000.00 in damages plus
costs and attorney fees.
Bevins contends that its answer raised
colorable defenses and thus should not have been subject to a
judgment on the pleadings.
It also contends that the pleadings
do not provide a basis for determining the amount of damages or
other relief.
We disagree with the first but agree with the
second of these contentions and so must affirm in part, vacate in
part, and remand.
As Bevins correctly notes, to overcome a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, an adverse defendant need do no more
than allege a colorable defense.1
Even under our current notice-
pleading regime, however, the allegations must give notice that
1
Archer v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Company, Ky., 365 S.W.2d 727 (1962).
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there is a factual basis for the defense,2 and, where fraud is
alleged, the factual basis for the allegation must be pled in
some detail.3
Bevins’ allegations do not meet these standards.
Having admitted that it executed the lease (perhaps the most
common way a party manifests assent to a contract), Bevins cannot
call the existence of the agreement into question merely with the
unelaborated assertion that “there was no meeting of the minds.”
Likewise, because contracts of adhesion are not per se
unenforceable, Bevins’ mere assertion that this contract was
adhesive does not state a defense.4
And, while it is true, as
Bevins contends, that allegations of fraud are not subject to the
parol evidence rule,5
by failing to allege a particular
misrepresentation by a particular person with particular
consequences, Bevins did not meet its burden of pleading fraud in
sufficient detail.
We agree with the trial court, accordingly,
that Bevins’ admissions establish the lease and the default, that
its assertions do not state a colorable defense, and therefore
that GE was entitled to a judgment of liability on the pleadings.
We do not agree, however, that the pleadings alone
establish the relief to which GE is entitled.
Section 17 of the
lease agreement provides in pertinent part that, upon the
lessee’s default, the lessor may dispose of the equipment in any
2
Hoke v. Cullinan, Ky., 914 S.W.2d 335 (1995); Morgan v. O’Neil, Ky., 652 S.W.2d 83
3
CR 9.02. Scott v. Farmers State Bank, Ky., 410 S.W.2d 717 (1966).
4
Conseco Finance Servicing Corporation v. Wilder, Ky. App., 47 S.W.3d 335 (2001).
5
Bryant v. Troutman, Ky., 287 S.W.2d 918 (1956).
(1983).
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one of several ways and collect liquidated damages calculated as
follows: reduce the outstanding amount of the lease to its
present value, subtract the amount realized in the disposition of
the equipment, and add the costs of the disposition.
GE’s
complaint says nothing about its disposition of the equipment and
so the pleadings do not enable the court to carry out this
calculation.
Bevins contends, moreover, that GE disposed of the
equipment unreasonably.
If Bevins can demonstrate some factual
basis for this contention then a hearing will be necessary.
In
any event, the full basis of GE’s claim and the basis of any
award to it (including an award of attorney fees) should be made
to appear in the record.
GE argues that Bevins waived his right to complain
about the insufficient record by failing to move for “additional”
findings under CR 52.
Because there have been no findings as
yet, only Bevins’ admissions, CR 52 has no application.
The
record is not merely silent with respect to some of the necessary
evidence in support of GE’s claim, it is nonexistent.
It will
not support a presumption, in other words, that the trial court
had grounds for its award.
The award to GE was thus premature.
For these reasons we affirm the February 21, 2001,
judgment of the Mason Circuit Court to the extent that it finds
Bevins liable under its lease agreement with GE.
We vacate the
award to GE, however, and remand for further proceedings in which
GE will have the opportunity to establish the amount of its
claim.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John F. Estill
Fox, Wood, Wood & Estill
Maysville, Kentucky
Phillip D. Scott
Brian M. Johnson
Greenbaum Doll & McDonald PLLC
Lexington, Kentucky
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