INTREPID INVESTMENTS, INC. v. PNC BANK OF KENTUCKY; EQUINE MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS, INC.; AND TIMOTHY SNODDY
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RENDERED: JUNE 14, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000662-MR (DIRECT)
INTREPID INVESTMENTS, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LAURANCE B. VANMETER, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 97-CI-04103 & 98-CI-01019
PNC BANK OF KENTUCKY; EQUINE MANAGEMENT
CONSULTANTS, INC.; AND TIMOTHY
SNODDY
AND
NO.
2001-CA-000732-MR (CROSS)
PNC BANK, N.A.,
f/k/a PNC BANK, KENTUCKY, INC.
v.
APPELLEES
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LAURANCE B. VANMETER, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 97-CI-04103 & 98-CI-01019
INTREPID INVESTMENTS, INC.; EQUINE
MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS, INC.; AND
TIMOTHY SNODDY
CROSS-APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING ON APPEAL
AND REVERSING AND REMANDING ON CROSS-APPEAL
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, McANULTY, SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal and cross-appeal from an
order of the Fayette Circuit Court.
Intrepid Investments, Inc.
(Intrepid) appeals the granting of summary judgment to PNC Bank,
N.A. (PNC) in a dispute concerning the assignment by PNC of a
loan agreement, note, and mortgage to Central Bank & Trust
Company, as Trustee f/b/o the P. Keith Nally KEOGH (Central
Bank), and the subsequent foreclosure of the mortgaged property,
which was owned by Intrepid.
The issue in the direct appeal is
whether the previous foreclosure lawsuit between Central Bank and
Intrepid concerning the loan agreement, note, and mortgage acts
as res judicata in Intrepid’s present lawsuit against PNC.
PNC
cross-appeals the circuit court’s denial of attorney fees
associated with its efforts to collect defaulted notes from
Equine Management Consultants, Inc. (Equine Management) and
Timothy Snoddy.
We affirm in the direct appeal and reverse and
remand in the cross-appeal.
In March 1994, FY Investments, Inc. (FYI), as Trustee
for its Profit Sharing Plan, became the owner of 35% of the stock
in Intrepid Investments, Inc.
Owens.
Snoddy.
FYI was wholly owned by Norman D.
The other 65% of Intrepid’s stock was owned by Timothy K.
At or about the same time, Norman Owens and his wife
conveyed to Intrepid approximately 26 acres of land located on
Newtown Pike in Fayette County, Kentucky, known as Providence
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Place.
At the time of these transactions, Norman Owens owed, and
was in default, on a promissory note held by PNC Bank, which, as
of April 1, 1994, had an unpaid balance of approximately
$266,000.00.
On April 8, 1994, Intrepid entered into a loan
agreement with PNC Bank under which Intrepid granted a mortgage
on Providence Place to PNC Bank.
Under the agreement, among
other things, PNC agreed to a forbearance in attempting to
collect on the $266,000.00 Owens note.
The loan agreement also
designated certain horses owned by Norman Owens as collateral on
the note, and provided that PNC would apply the proceeds from the
scheduled sale of the horses owned by Owens against the note.
It
is stipulated by the parties that the application of the proceeds
from the sale of the collateral to the note did not occur.
In December 1996, PNC Bank transferred the note,
mortgage, and loan agreement to Central Bank for $75,000.00.
According to Intrepid, as a result of the loan agreement and the
surrounding circumstances, PNC became a joint venturer with
Intrepid in the Providence Place property, and thereby became a
fiduciary with respect to Intrepid.
Intrepid alleges that in
conjunction with the transfer of the note and mortgage, PNC
breached various fiduciary duties PNC owed to Intrepid.
In February 1997, Central Bank filed a lawsuit in
Fayette Circuit Court (Seventh Division), Case 97-CI-0638,
seeking to foreclose against the Providence Place property.
the foreclosure lawsuit, Central Bank was the plaintiff, and
Intrepid Investments was one of several defendants; other
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In
mortgage holders on the Providence Place property were also named
as defendants.
On March 24, 1997, Intrepid filed an answer
contesting the enforcability of the mortgage and asserting
various counterclaims against Central Bank.
On June 2, 1997, Central Bank filed a motion for
summary judgment in the foreclosure case.
On June 25, 1997, the
circuit court entered an order granting the motion.
The order
also granted Central Bank summary judgment on Intrepid’s
counterclaims and dismissed the counterclaims with prejudice.
Intrepid filed a motion to alter, amend or vacate, which was
denied by order entered July 15, 1997.
Intrepid did not appeal
the foreclosure ruling or the dismissal of its counterclaims.
On November 24, 1997, Intrepid filed the present
lawsuit against PNC in Fayette Circuit Court (Division One), Case
No. 97-CI-4103.
Intrepid’s complaint alleged that PNC breached
the April 1, 1994, loan agreement; that PNC misrepresented that
it would collect the proceeds from the sale of collateral and
apply the proceeds to the $266,000.00 Owens note; that PNC made
misrepresentations in breach of its fiduciary duty owed to
Intrepid; that PNC breached its fiduciary duty to Intrepid by
selling the note to Central Bank without notice to Intrepid; and
that PNC breached its fiduciary duty to Intrepid by selling the
note with knowledge that Central Bank would foreclose even though
PNC was aware that the mortgage was invalid.
On March 20, 1998, PNC filed a separate lawsuit, Case
98-CI-1019, against Equine Management Consultants, Inc. and
Timothy Snoddy to collect two promissory notes.
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Case 97-CI-4103
and 98-CI-1019 were subsequently ordered consolidated.
Case 98-
CI-1019 and PNC’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees is the subject
of the cross-appeal and is irrelevant to the direct appeal.
In October 1999, PNC filed a motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that the decision in the foreclosure case
was res judicata as to the claims against PNC made by Intrepid in
the present case.1
On November 15, 2000, the circuit court entered an
Opinion and Order granting PNC summary judgment on the basis that
Intrepid’s claims against PNC were res judicata based upon the
decision in the foreclosure case.
A Final Judgment incorporating
the November 15 Opinion and Order was entered on December 18,
2000.
Intrepid subsequently filed a motion to alter, amend or
vacate, and PNC filed a motion to collect attorneys’ fees related
to its collection of the Snoddy and Equine Management notes.
On
February 21, 2001, the circuit court entered an order denying the
motions.
This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
In the direct appeal, Intrepid contends that the trial
court erred in its determination that its claims against PNC in
1
Prior to any ruling being made, the two Division One cases,
Case 97-CI-4103 and 98-CI-1019, were transferred to Division
Seven and consolidated with Case 97-CI-0638. On February 29,
2000, Division Seven granted PNC’s motion for summary judgment.
Intrepid appealed to this Court; in addition to the February 29,
2000, order, Intrepid attempted to appeal various other orders
which had been entered in Case 97-CI-0638. On August 16, 2000,
we entered an order dismissing Intrepid’s appeal on the basis
that appeal of the orders in Case 97-CI-0638 were time-barred,
and on the basis that the February 29, 2000, summary judgment
order was interlocutory because it did not include finality
language pursuant to CR 54.02 (see Case No. 2000-CA-000748-MR).
Upon remand, Cases 97-CI-4103 and 98-CI-1019 were returned to the
First Division. On remand, PNC again moved for summary judgment.
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the present case are res judicata by operation of the final
adjudication in the Central Bank case.
Intrepid contends that
the elements for res judicata are not met under either of the two
subgroups of res judicata, claim preclusion or issue preclusion
(collateral estoppel).
We are persuaded that Intrepid’s present
lawsuit is barred by claim preclusion.
The rule of res judicata is an affirmative defense
which operates to bar repetitious lawsuits involving the same
cause of action.
Godbey v. University Hosp., Ky. App., 975
S.W.2d 104, 105 (1998);
Yeoman v. Commonwealth Health Policy
Bd., Ky., 983 S.W.2d 459, 464 (1998).
Res judicata encompasses
two separate but related aspects: (1) claim preclusion, and (2)
issue preclusion (sometimes referred to as collateral estoppel).
Yeoman at 465. Because we decided the case under claim
preclusion, we need not discuss the merits of the case under
issue preclusion; however, we note that the same result is
reached under issue preclusion.
Claim preclusion bars a party from relitigating a
previously adjudicated cause of action and entirely bars a new
lawsuit on the same cause of action.
The requirements for claim
preclusion are as follows: (1) identity or privity of the
parties; (2) identity of the claims or causes of action; and (3)
resolution of the action on the merits.
Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at
465; Napier v. Jones By and Through Reynolds, Ky. App., 925
S.W.2d 193, 195 (1996); Newman v. Newman, Ky., 451 S.W.2d 417,
419 (1970).
Claim preclusion bars entire claims or causes of
action that were or should have been brought in a prior action.
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City of Covington v. Board of Trustees of the Policemen's and
Firefighters' Retirement Fund, Ky., 903 S.W.2d 517, 521 (1995);
Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 465.
The first element which must be met under claim
preclusion is identity of parties.
In this respect, Intrepid was
a party to both the Central Bank case and the case at bar, so the
only concern is whether there is an identity of parties between
Central Bank and PNC.
The identity of parties requirement may be
satisfied through a finding of privity between the two parties.
BTC Leasing, Inc. v. Martin, Ky. App., 685 S.W.2d 191, 197-198
(1984).
While the concept of privity defies a precise,
inflexible definition, a key consideration for its existence is
the sharing of the same legal right by the parties allegedly in
privity.
Id. at 198.
This is to ensure that the interests of
the party against whom res judicata has been asserted have been
adequately represented by his purported privity at the initial
trial of the cause of action.
Judgments § 532 (1969)).
Id. (citing, 46 Am. Jur. 2d
The absolute identity of legal interest
is fundamental to a finding of privity, and the mere fact that
two parties are interested in proving or disproving the same
facts will not create privity.
Id. (citing, Newark Insurance
Company v. Bennett, Ky., 355 S.W.2d 303, 304 (1962)).
The December 1996 transfer of the note, mortgage, and
loan agreement from PNC to Central Bank transferred and assigned
PNC’s rights in the note, mortgage, and loan agreement to Central
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Bank and, as a result, Central Bank succeeded to the same rights
and interests in the note, mortgage, and loan agreement as PNC.
One is in privity with a party to litigation when he has
succeeded to some estate or interest involved in the controversy.
Pineville Steam Laundry v. Phillips, 254 Ky. 391, 71 S.W.2d 980,
982 (1934).
The derivative right of succession of interest
creates a privity of estate and binds as well as inures to the
benefit of one who acquires it.
Id.
Between an assignor and
assignee, there is a privity in estate and in contract as well.
Id.
Further, since Intrepid was a participant in the Central
Bank case, its interests were adequately represented in the
initial case.
Pursuant to Pineville Steam Laundry and BTC
Leasing, we are persuaded that the identity of interest element
of claim preclusion is met.
Next, for claim preclusion to apply, the subject matter
of the subsequent suit must be identical.
465.
Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at
The key inquiry in deciding whether the two lawsuits
concern the same controversy is whether they both arise from the
same transactional nucleus of facts.
If the two suits concern
the same controversy, then the previous suit is deemed to have
adjudicated every matter which was or could have been brought in
support of the cause of action.
Id.
A comparison of the Central Bank case litigation and
the present litigation discloses that both cases arise from the
same transactional nucleus of facts.
Underlying Intrepid’s
defenses and counterclaims in the Central Bank case and its
claims in the present case are the fundamental allegations (1)
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that PNC breached its contractual agreement with Intrepid by
failing to comply with the terms and provisions of the loan
agreement by failing to apply the sales proceeds from the sale of
collateral against the $266,000.00 Owens note; (2) that PNC
breached its fiduciary duty and obligation of good faith and fair
dealing owed to Intrepid by its failure to comply with the terms
and provisions of the loan agreement by misrepresenting that it
would collect the horse sales proceeds and apply the proceeds
against the note, and by making other false representations to
Intrepid to induce it into entering into the loan agreement; (3)
that PNC breached the fiduciary duties to act in good faith and
fair dealing by selling the PNC note to Central Bank without
notice to Intrepid, with knowledge that Central Bank would file a
foreclosure action, and with the knowledge that the mortgage was
invalid because PNC had breached the loan agreement; (4) that PNC
was a fiduciary with respect to Intrepid and violated the trust
and confidence of Intrepid by dealing in its own interests and
otherwise failing to act in good faith and with due regard to the
interest of Intrepid; (5) that PNC violated its fiduciary duties
owed to Intrepid by acting and/or failing to act consistent with
the fiduciary duties owed to Intrepid; (6) that PNC fraudulently,
illegally or improperly colluded with Central Bank and others for
the purpose of attempting to secure payment of the mortgage by
Intrepid or for the purpose of obtaining the mortgaged property
at a premium in foreclosure; and (7) that PNC aided Central Bank
in purchasing the Robert and Peggy Owens note at substantially
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less than fair market value, thereby depriving Intrepid of a
lucrative sale of the property.
Intrepid’s counterclaims and defenses in the Central
Bank case, together, coincide with the claims in the case sub
judice.
The same transactional nucleus of facts apply to both
cases and, accordingly we are persuaded that this element of
claim preclusion is met.
Finally, claim preclusion requires that the prior
action must have been resolved on the merits.
A judgment on the
merits precluding the relitigation of the same cause of action is
one based on the legal rights and liabilities of the parties, as
distinguished from one based on technical or dilatory objections
or contentions, or on mere matters of form or of practice or
procedure.
46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments § 606 (1994).
It is a
judgment determining which party is right as to the cause of
action in dispute.
Id.
We are persuaded that the Central Bank
case was decided on the merits.
Our conclusion that the Central Bank case was decided
on the merits is determined, in large part, from our conclusion
that the failure of PNC’s defenses in the Central Bank case was
not decided on the basis that Central Bank was, with respect to
the note and mortgage, a holder in due course.
In turn, this
conclusion is compelled, first, by the circuit court’s
identification of Central Bank as merely a “holder” of the note,
even though the holder in due course issue had been placed
squarely before it, and was a rational and legitimate grounds
upon which to reject Intrepid’s defenses if Central Bank were, in
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fact, a holder in due course.
We conclude that Intrepid
prevailed in its argument that Central Bank was not a holder in
due course, which is understandable considering, along with the
note and mortgage, Central Bank also accepted assignment of a
contractual loan agreement, which imposed various obligations on
PNC2 and, further, Central Bank knew, or should have known, that
payment on the note was overdue.
See Hartford Insurance Group v.
Citizens Fidelity Bank and Trust Company, Ky. App., 579 S.W.2d
628, 631 (1979) (Holder in due course must take note without
notice that it was overdue); KRS 355.3-302.
Further, the breach of fiduciary allegations concerning
PNC in the Central Bank case were premised upon the theory that
the loan agreement established PNC and Intrepid as joint
venturers in the Providence Place property.
However, in
paragraph seven of the summary judgment order, the trial court
stated that Intrepid’s obligation to PNC was “in the nature of
debts” and that PNC was not an equity participant or joint
venturer in the Providence Place property.
It appears that the
circuit court felt that it was necessary to reach the
determination that the relationship between PNC and Intrepid was
a debtor-creditor relationship, and not a relationship which
would give rise to the fiduciary duties Intrepid alleges were
breached by PNC, though this issue would have been irrelevant to
the Central Bank litigation if Central Bank were a holder in due
course.
2
Such as the obligation to apply the loan proceeds from the
sale of collateral against the note, which Central Bank knew or
should have known had not been complied with.
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Lacking holder in due course status, Central Bank was
subject to all of the defenses Intrepid would be entitled to
assert against PNC.
See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Gamaliel
Farm Supply, Inc., Ky. App., 726 S.W.2d 709, 711 (1987); KRS
355.3-306.
These defenses include all of the theories Intrepid
asserts as claims in the present case - breach of contract,
misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty.
Indeed, all of
the various theories underlying the present claims appear to have
been raised by Intrepid in its pleadings and arguments in the
Central Bank claim, both as defenses and as counterclaims against
Central Bank.3
To the extent there is not absolute identical
overlap, claim preclusion also bars issues which could have been
brought in the prior action.
City of Covington, 903 S.W.2d at
521; Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 465.
In granting Central Bank summary judgment, the circuit
court necessarily determined that Intrepid did not have valid
defenses against Central Bank; it follows that, since Central
Bank was not a holder in due course and was subject to Intrepid’s
defenses against PNC, the trial court also determined that
Intrepid did not have valid defenses against PNC, as any defenses
Intrepid had against PNC were valid against Central Bank.
By
concluding that the defenses raised by Intrepid concerning PNC
were not good against Central Bank, the trial court necessarily
3
As noted by Intrepid in its July 7, 1997, motion to alter,
amend or vacate, “Intrepid has properly asserted many of the
theories on which it has based its counterclaims (e.g., breach of
fiduciary duty, bad faith, fraud, etc.) as defenses to
Plaintiff’s claims. The same facts establish those defenses as
establish the counterclaims.”
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determined that the defenses were not good as against PNC.
Since
the claims in the present case are the reciprocals of the
defenses in the Central Bank case, it follows that the failure of
the defenses in the Central Bank case is ascribable to the claims
in the present case.
Further, though the Central Bank case was decided by
summary judgment; nevertheless, the case was decided “on the
merits.”
In granting summary judgment, the circuit court
necessarily determined that there were no genuine issues of
material fact, and that Central Bank was entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center,
Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991); CR 56.
Hence all defenses and
counterclaims raised by Intrepid in the Central Bank case were
decided on the merits, not on technical grounds or on matters
concerning form or procedure.
We note that the standard for
summary judgment in Kentucky is rigorous, see Steelvest, 807
S.W.2d 476, and were we to be reviewing the Central Bank judgment
in this appeal, we may have concluded that Central Bank was not
entitled to summary judgment in the Central Bank case.
However,
that issue is not before us and, in any event, the res judicata
doctrine is applicable even though the former judgment was
erroneous.
Wallace v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., Ky., 305 S.W.2d
541, 544 (1957).
In conclusion, all the necessary elements of claim
preclusion are met in this case, and the litigation in the
Central Bank case acts as res judicata to the claims raised by
Intrepid in the present lawsuit.
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There are no genuine issues of
material fact, and PNC is entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law.
Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d 476.
In the cross-appeal, PNC contends that the trial court
erred in denying its motion to collect attorneys’ fees associated
with the cost of collecting on the Equine Management and Timothy
Snoddy notes.
KRS 411.195 is entitled, "Enforceability of
written agreement to pay attorney fees in event of default."
The
statute provides:
Any provisions in a writing which create a
debt, or create a lien on real property,
requiring the debtor, obligor, lienor or
mortgagor to pay reasonable attorney fees
incurred by the creditor, obligee or
lienholder in the event of default, shall be
enforceable, provided, however, such fees
shall only be allowed to the extent actually
paid or agreed to be paid, and shall not be
allowed to a salaried employee of such
creditor, obligor or lienholder.
The Snoddy note dated November 1, 1995, contained a
provision which provided that “In the event of any default under
this Note . . . the Borrower promises to pay the Bank’s
reasonable attorneys’ fees and court costs incurred in collecting
or attempting to secure this Note or enforcing the Bank’s rights
under any security instruments.”
Similarly, the Equine Management note dated March 31,
1996, contained a provision which provided that “If there is any
default under this Note . . . the undersigned Maker promises to
pay to the holder hereof its reasonable attorneys’ fees, court
costs and other expenses incurred in collecting . . . this
Note[.]”
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As both notes expressly provide for the payment of
attorney fees in the event of default, pursuant to 411.195, PNC
is entitled to collect attorney fees to the extent actually paid
or agreed to be paid.
We accordingly reverse and remand for an
award of attorney fees consistent with the provisions of the note
and KRS 411.195.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed as to the direct appeal, and reversed
and remanded as to the cross-appeal.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE, INTREPID
INVESTMENTS, INC.:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT, PNC BANK, N.A.:
Douglas Gene Sharp
Lexington, Kentucky
D. Eric Lycan
Lexington, Kentucky
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