RANDALL WAYNE HARPER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: May 24, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000608-MR
RANDALL WAYNE HARPER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TYLER L. GILL, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 91-CR-00007
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, DYCHE, AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE:
On December 19, 1990, Randall Wayne Harper
strangled his estranged wife, Marlana Lynn Harper, with her
brassiere.
He put her body in the trunk of his car, and the
following day took it to Tennessee and left it in a field, after
covering it with a large piece of insulation.
Randall then
denied any knowledge of Marlana’s disappearance and even assisted
in neighborhood searches for her.
But one month later, while
watching an episode of “America’s Most Wanted” with his mother,
Randall confessed to her that he had killed Marlana.
The next
day he gave a statement to the police and led them to the
victim’s body.
Randall was charged with murder.
On May 8, 1991, upon the advice of counsel, Randall
entered a plea of guilty to murder and received a life sentence.
He was formally sentenced on June 14, 1991.
In 1993 Randall
Harper filed a motion for collateral relief pursuant to Kentucky
Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42; he alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel.
A supplemental memorandum was filed and
an evidentiary hearing was held in October 2000.
The Logan
Circuit Court denied the requested relief, and Harper appeals.
Harper first alleges that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to insist that a competency hearing
pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 504.100(3) be held
prior to entering the guilty plea.
Harper was granted leave to
file supplemental citation of authority (viz., Thompson v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 56 S.W.3d 406 (2001)), to support the argument
that a competency hearing is mandatory when the trial court is
sufficiently aware that a defendant’s competence to stand trial
is questionable.
Here the facts do not arise to that level.
Harper
emphasizes that the trial court noted that Harper was in need of
psychological help.
However, he fails to demonstrate now or then
that he was incompetent to stand trial.
ordered by the court held otherwise.
The pretrial evaluation
Moreover, Thompson, supra,
requires only that a hearing be held on a later motion for RCr
11.42 relief to determine “whether a retrospective competency
hearing is warranted.”
Id. at 410; see also Norton v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d 175 (2001), and Fraser v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 59 S.W.3d 448 (2001).
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The Logan Circuit Court
found that “there would have been no logical reason for
[Harper’s] attorney to request a mental health evaluation or a
hearing before the court on this issue.”
The evidence before the
circuit court (from the hearing and the record) supports this
finding, and we will not disturb it.
Harper secondly contends that trial counsel was
ineffective for advising appellant to plead guilty to a
recommended sentence of life imprisonment.
Harper insists that
this was the maximum sentence for murder and that there was no
indication that the Commonwealth intended to seek the death
penalty.
At the evidentiary hearing trial counsel testified that
she had knowledge of evidence of possible statutory aggravators
(rape, robbery, or kidnaping) that, had there not been a timely
plea, could have been used by the Commonwealth to seek a death
sentence versus Harper.
Moreover, as the trial court found, life
was not the maximum sentence at the time of Harper’s plea.
There
was no upper limit on a term of years imposed1, and any sentence
greater than twenty-four years would have resulted in a lengthier
sentence than life in terms of parole eligibility.2
against Harper was overwhelming.
The evidence
Counsel was not ineffective for
recommending the guilty plea.
Harper’s third allegation is that trial counsel failed
to investigate, consider, and advise appellant that he had a
1
It is now fifty years under KRS 532.020(2)(a).
2
KRS 439.3401, at the time of Harper’s plea, allowed persons
sentenced to life in prison to meet the parole board after
serving twelve years. Other violent offenders had to serve fifty
percent of their time before being eligible for parole.
-3-
viable defense of extreme emotional disturbance.
claim is unsupported.
Again Harper’s
The autopsy report on Marlana Harper
revealed no evidence of alcohol, drugs, nor sexual intercourse.
Thus Harper’s version of the triggering event causing him to
murder Marlana (that they had gotten inebriated, had sex, and
that afterward she had threatened to kill their son) would not
have been tenable given the forensic evidence to the contrary.
Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue this
defense.
Harper next argues that the cumulative effect of
counsel’s errors constituted an outright denial of counsel.
disagree.
We
“In view of the fact that the individual allegations
of ineffective assistance of counsel are unconvincing, they can
have no cumulative effect.”
Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975
S.W.2d 905, 913 (1998)(citations omitted).
The fifth issue is whether the trial court erred in
labeling counsel’s deficiencies as “trial strategy.”
Again,
having found no deficiencies, we cannot accept appellant’s
argument here.
The trial court properly addressed the RCr 11.42
motion in light of federal and state legal precedent.
We lastly consider Harper’s argument that the trial
court erred in denying a motion for funds to procure a
postconviction psychology expert.
This issue is moot, as Dr.
Eric Drogin assisted and testified pro bono on Harper’s behalf.
Harper fails to allege how expert funding would have resulted in
testimony different from Drogin’s.
The judgment of the Logan Circuit Court is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brian Thomas Ruff
Assistant Public Advocate
LaGrange, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Brian T. Judy
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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