MICHAEL KARRINGTON v. PINE MEADOWS HEALTH CARE, INC. AND MARSHA CABLE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: MAY 3, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000522-MR
MICHAEL KARRINGTON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN R. ADAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-02302
v.
PINE MEADOWS HEALTH CARE, INC.
AND MARSHA CABLE
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, GUIDUGLI AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Michael Karrington (Karrington) appeals a
judgment entered by the Fayette Circuit Court following a jury
verdict in favor of Pine Meadows Health Care, Inc. (Pine
Meadows), and Marsha Cable (Cable) (collectively Pine Meadows).
We affirm.
Karrington filed a complaint on June 30, 1999, alleging
discrimination in his place of employment based on race in
violation of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) Chapter 344,
intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent
infliction of emotional distress.
These claims were based upon
his allegations concerning his treatment while employed at Pine
Meadows and under the administration of Cable.
Karrington
alleged that he was subjected to unequal terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment because of his race, and that Pine
Meadows maintained a pattern and practice of race discrimination
against black employees by subjecting them to a work environment
which was hostile towards blacks.
He also alleged that Pine
Meadows either negligently, deliberately, intentionally,
recklessly, or grossly negligently encouraged, permitted, or
allowed to exist a workplace environment which was hostile,
intimidating, and discriminatory to him and other black
employees.
As a result of said actions, Karrington claimed he
suffered loss of income, extreme mental anguish, distress,
anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation.
Karrington further
claimed that Cable breached her duties to him and that her
conduct reached the level of outrageous conduct towards him.
He
sought general, special and punitive damages to be determined by
a jury of his peers.
Karrington specifically alleged various conduct by
Cable and Pine Meadows which he claimed supported his complaint.
The most serious claim is what he alleged lead to his
termination.
He stated in his complaint that “Cable ordered
[him] to get down on his hands and knees to clean a floor when
other white employees were not ordered to do so in such a
degrading manner.”
Pine Meadows denied all Karrington’s
allegations and claimed he was terminated because he refused to
assist in cleaning the floor in violation of company policy by
refusing to perform assigned work duties.
-2-
On October 30, 2000, the trial court entered an order
granting in part and denying in part Pine Meadows’s summary
judgment motion.
The court granted the motion as to the element
of a disparate wage between Karrington and other similarly
situated employees finding there to be insufficient evidence to
support this theory.
The court also granted summary judgment as
to Karrington’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress finding that his KRS Chapter 344 claims were
insufficient factually to establish the tort of outrage.
The
court further held that the claim of outrageous conduct was
subsumed by Karrington’s claim under KRS Chapter 344, relying on
Grzyb v. Evans, Ky., 700 S.W.2d 399 (1985) and Rigazio v.
Archdiocese of Louisville, Ky. App., 853 S.W.2d 295 (1993).
Finally, in this order, the trial court found that there is no
recognized claim in Kentucky for negligent infliction of
emotional distress nor had Karrington presented any facts or law
to support such a cause of action.
This finding was based upon
Kraft v. Rice, Ky., 671 S.W.2d 247 (1984) and Deutsch v. Shein,
Ky., 597 S.W.2d 141 (1980).
As usual, there was a flurry of legal activity in the
month proceeding the date set for trial.
In response, the trial
court entered several orders dealing with legal and evidentiary
issues.
On November 21, 2000, the court entered an order finding
that Karrington was not entitled to proceed on his punitive
damages claim and thus, granted Pine Meadows’s motion to strike
Karrington’s claim for punitive damages.
Thereafter, in an order
signed November 22, 2000, the court ruled on various issues
-3-
raised by each party in motions in limine.
A three (3) day jury
trial followed on November 28, 29 and 30, 2000.
After hearing
the evidence, reviewing the exhibits and being properly
instructed by the court, the jury returned a verdict finding that
race was not a substantial and motivating factor in Pine
Meadows’s decision to terminate Karrington’s employment, that
Pine Meadows did not discriminate against him by subjecting him
to unequal terms, conditions and privileges of employment because
of his race, and that Karrington was not subjected to a racially
hostile work environment.
The trial court denied Karrington’s
motion for a new trial and this appeal followed.
On appeal, Karrington raises two issues.
First, he
contends the trial court erred by allowing Pine Meadows to
introduce evidence at trial that was irrelevant and prejudicial.
Under this issue, Karrington sets forth six (6) specific
incidences where he believes that trial court permitted
prejudicial and irrelevant evidence to be introduced.
Karrington’s claim of error is that the trial court denied him
the opportunity to present all his evidence of disparate
treatment as evidence of race discrimination.
Karrington sets
forth two (2) alleged incidences of this type of trial error.
There is some question as to whether Karrington is
appealing the summary judgment in favor of Pine Meadows on the
issue of wage disparity or merely the evidentiary rulings made by
the trial court.
In that neither Karrington’s pre-hearing
statement nor the arguments made in his brief address the summary
judgment itself or the standard of review to be applied, we
-4-
believe this appeal most appropriately addresses only the
evidentiary rulings and we proceed accordingly.
See CR 76.03(8);
Karem in Greentree Corp., Ky. App., 783 S.W.2d 78 (1990).
This
distinction is important as to the standard of review to be
applied to this appeal and the issues presented.
In Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, Ky., 11 S.W.3d 575, 577 (2000),
our Supreme Court reaffirmed the proper standard of review of a
trial court’s evidentiary rulings to be abuse of discretion.
Rulings as to relevancy and prejudice are tasks properly reserved
to the sound discretion of the trial court, and an appellate
court will not disturb such rulings unless there has been an
abuse of discretion.
Transit Authority of River City v. Vinson,
Ky. App., 703 S.W.2d 482, 484 (1985).
The test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.
Goodyear, 11 S.W.3d at 581 citing Commonwealth v. English, Ky.,
993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (1999).
We review the trial court’s ruling
in the case before us applying these standards.
Karrington’s first issue on appeal deals with the
court’s permitting Pine Meadows to introduce his employee file.
Karrington claims the evidence was irrelevant, prejudicial and
hearsay.
Karrington alleges the negative information in his
personnel file was inadmissible in that the proffered evidence
was not relevant and did not rebut his evidence of pretext.
also argues that allegations of sexual harassment were
He
prejudicial and inflammatory, and were improperly utilized to
attack his credibility and to convince the jury of his bad
-5-
character.
Pine Meadows counters that the evidence contained in
Karrington’s employee file was properly admitted because it was
used to rebut Karrington’s evidence that the reason for his
termination was merely pretext, was relevant to rebut
Karrington’s claim that he maintained a good work record,
rebutted Karrington’s claim that Cable was a racist who made
false statements, that other allegedly comparable individuals
were not similarly-situated employees, was not hearsay and, if
all else failed, admissible under the business record exception.
Without going into great detail as to each of the
numerous items contained in Karrington’s personnel file, we
believe the trial court did not err in permitting Pine Meadows to
pursue, before the jury, negative information contained in his
employee file.
Despite Karrington’s argument that Pine Meadows
claimed it terminated him for one isolated incident and
specifically for not following a supervisor’s work order, it was
Karrington who first made his work record relevant.
Karrington
painted the picture that he had a stellar work record during his
five year employment at Pine Meadows and that Cable was a racist
out to get him.
In response, Pine Meadows merely placed his
employment record, the good and the bad, before the jury and gave
Karrington a full and complete opportunity to discuss and explain
all the problems he had encountered during his employment.
We
believe the trial court properly considered each of Karrington’s
objections then judicially ruled on the admissibility of the
evidence.
We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court.
We
believe the jury was properly presented with necessary, relevant
-6-
and admissible testimony concerning Karrington’s employment and
his interactions with other employees, supervisors and employment
policies of Pine Meadows.
Karrington’s second argument is that he was denied a
fair trial when the court ruled that evidence of disparate
treatment was not admissible.
disparate treatment.
disparate wages.
He sets forth two arguments as to
First, he contends he was the victim of
However, the trial court had entered summary
judgment on October 30, 2000, prior to the trial date on
Karrington’s claim of disparate wages.
That order stated, in
part, “The Court shall sustain the [Summary Judgment] Motion as
to the element of a disparate wage between [Karrington] and other
similarly situated employees, and finds that based upon the
representations of counsel and the record before the Court that
there is insufficient evidence for [Karrington] to proceed on
that theory.”
As previously stated, we do not believe Karrington
has appealed the summary judgment.
Instead, his argument centers
on the failure of the trial court to permit him to introduce
evidence which he believes would show Pine Meadows discriminated
against him with respect to compensation.
We disagree.
First,
the summary judgment entered as to this issue precludes such
testimony.
Second, a review of the evidence proffered by way of
avowal clearly shows that the attempted to be compared employees
were not similarly situated and that Karrington earned more than
the compared to employees.
Thus, he failed to present a prima
facie case of wage discrimination.
Evidence of such alleged
disparate wages would thus be irrelevant and highly prejudicial.
-7-
See McDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817
(1973); Turner v. Pendennis Club, Ky. App., 19 S.W.3d 117 (2000).
Karrington’s second argument as to disparate treatment
is that the trial court denied him the opportunity to introduce
evidence of different treatment of white employees.
Again, we
note these evidentiary issues were carefully considered by the
trial court and rejected as not being relevant or admissible.
Contrary to Karrington’s position that all conduct of a racial
nature is admissible as evidence of discrimination [citing
Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 1999)], we
believe it to be more accurate to state that admissible evidence
must comply with the Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE).
As such,
the trial judge must review each statement and proffered exhibit
to see if it complies with the KRE and is relevant, admissible
evidence.
The court did so in this case, and after having
thoroughly reviewed the record and arguments of the parties, we
find no abuse of discretion in its evidentiary rulings in this
matter.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment entered by the
Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Linda B. Sullivan
Lexington, KY
Richard C. Stephenson
Robert F. Houlihan,Jr.
Amy L. Johnson
Lexington, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Robert F. Houlihan, Jr.
Lexington, KY
-8-
-9-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.