DONALD MARK BRISBY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
APRIL 12, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000426-MR
DONALD MARK BRISBY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM UNION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TOMMY W. CHANDLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00011
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, DYCHE, AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE:
Donald Mark Brisby appeals from an order of
the Union Circuit Court that denied without a hearing his RCr1
11.42 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence and
conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine.
We affirm.
On February 6, 1999, the Kentucky State Police executed
a search warrant at a mobile home based on information received
from medical personnel and an anonymous tip that a fire severely
injuring two persons, including Brisby, was related to the
manufacture of methamphetamine.
1
In the search, the police
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
recovered some items consistent with the manufacture of
methamphetamine including a book on the subject.
In March 1999,
the Union County grand jury indicted Brisby and two other
individuals for processing chemicals or equipment for the
manufacture of methamphetamine with the intent to manufacture
methamphetamine.2
One of the co-defendants provided information
to the police implicating Brisby and agreed to testify for the
prosecution.
On January 7, 2000, Brisby entered a guilty plea
pursuant to a plea agreement to one felony count of manufacturing
methamphetamine.
Under the plea agreement, the Commonwealth
recommended a sentence of twelve years to run concurrently with
the sentence under another indictment3 and opposed probation.
In
February 2000, the circuit court sentenced Brisby to twelve
years’ imprisonment consistent with the Commonwealth’s
recommendation.
On January 9, 2001, Brisby filed a motion to vacate his
sentence and conviction, a motion for appointment of counsel, and
a motion for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to RCr 11.42.
He
alleged that his guilty plea was invalid based on several
instances of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Following a
response by the Commonwealth, the circuit court entered an order
denying the RCr 11.42 motion without a hearing, stating the
2
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 218A.1432(1)(b), a Class B
felony. See KRS 532.060.
3
On the same day, Brisby pled guilty to one felony count of
complicity to commit criminal attempt to manufacture
methamphetamine in Indictment No. 99-CR-00003 with the
Commonwealth recommending a sentence of five years. Brisby has
not challenged that conviction.
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records showed that Brisby’s guilty plea was entered knowingly,
understandably, and voluntarily and that he was well represented
at all stages of the proceeding by competent counsel.
This
appeal followed.
Brisby’s primary complaints on appeal are that the
circuit court erred by failing to appoint counsel to assist him
with his RCr 11.42 motion and by failing to conduct an
evidentiary hearing on the motion.4
The Kentucky Supreme Court
recently clarified the standards and analysis applicable to
appointment of counsel in relation to an RCr 11.42 motion.
In
Fraser v. Commonwealth, Ky., 59 S.W.3d 448, 452-53 (2001), the
court held that a trial judge must appoint counsel to represent
an indigent defendant where he specifically requests such
appointment in writing and if an evidentiary hearing is required.
An evidentiary hearing is required if there is a material issue
of fact that cannot be conclusively resolved by examination of
the record.
Id.; RCr 11.42(5).
Stated another way, as prior
cases have said, an evidentiary hearing is not required on an RCr
11.42 motion where the issues raised in the motion are refuted on
the record, or where the allegations, even if true, would not be
sufficient to invalidate the conviction.
See Sanborn v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 905, 912 (1998), cert. denied, 526
U.S. 1025, 199 S. Ct. 1266, 143 L. Ed. 2d 361 (1999); Haight v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 41 S.W.3d 436, 442 (2001); Lewis v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (1967), cited in Fraser,
supra.
4
We note that Brisby has received legal assistance and
appointment of counsel to represent him in this court.
-3-
Brisby claims that his guilty plea was invalid because
defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance at a “critical
phase” of the proceedings. First, he asserts that counsel was
ineffective for failing to properly consult with him prior to his
entering the guilty plea.
He maintains that counsel discussed
the case with him for only approximately thirty minutes and did
not fully explain the charges against him or any available
defenses.
He states that in his discussions with counsel, she
focused on the Commonwealth’s guilty plea offer and advised him
that he would be convicted and receive the maximum sentence if he
went to trial.
Brisby alleges that defense counsel had not
investigated the case and that he pled guilty only because of
fear of the consequences of going to trial with an unprepared
attorney.
In order to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a movant must satisfy a two-part test showing that
counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency
caused actual prejudice affecting the outcome of the proceeding.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.
Ed. 2d 674 (1984); accord Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d
37 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S. Ct. 3311, 92 L.
Ed. 2d 724 (1986).
Where an appellant challenges a guilty plea
based on ineffective counsel, he must show both that the counsel
made serious errors outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance and that the deficient performance so
seriously affected the outcome of the plea process that, but for
the errors of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the
appellant would not have pled guilty, but would have insisted on
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going to trial.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S. Ct.
366, 370, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985); Phon v. Commonwealth, Ky., 51
S.W.3d 456, 459-60 (2001); Casey v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 994
S.W.2d 18, 22 (1999).
The burden is on the movant to overcome a
strong presumption that counsel’s assistance was constitutionally
sufficient.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065;
Commonwealth v. Pelphrey, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 460, 463 (1999).
A review of the record reveals that Brisby’s current
assertions conflict with his statements and actions at the guilty
plea hearing.
In both his written motion to enter a guilty plea
and in response to oral questions from the circuit court, Brisby
indicated that he had fully discussed the charges and any
possible defenses with his attorney and that he believed she was
fully informed about his case.
Brisby told the court that he was
satisfied with his attorney’s assistance and that he did not need
additional time to discuss the case with her prior to entering a
plea.
Brisby is critical of the trial court’s method of
conducting his guilty plea hearing simultaneously with seven
other defendants.
While this method is not optimal and the
preferable procedure would be restricted to a single defendant,
the court did obtain responses to each question from each
individual defendant, including Brisby.
Solemn declarations under oath in open court carry a
strong presumption of verity.
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S.
63, 73, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1629, 52 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1977); Centers v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 799 S.W.2d 51, 54 (1990).
Any claim that
conflicts with the statements made during a guilty plea hearing
faces a formidable barrier in a collateral proceeding challenging
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the plea.
Id.; Lasiter v. Thomas, 89 F.3d 699, 702-03 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 998, 117 S. Ct. 493, 136 L. Ed. 2d
386 (1996).
A defendant may surmount that barrier if there is
proof that the representations were a product of
misunderstanding, duress, or misrepresentation by others.
Fraser, 59 S.W.3d at 457 (quoting Blackledge, supra).
Brisby’s
assertions that he believed counsel was unprepared and he would
receive a lesser sentence if convicted at trial are insufficient
grounds to absolve him of responsibility for his statements at
the hearing.
Cf. Fraser (oral agreement with prosecution to
provide misleading statements at guilty plea hearing was
sufficient to overcome binding effect of statements made during
hearing).
Brisby devotes a substantial portion of his brief on
his claim that counsel did not fully consult with him and spent
only approximately thirty minutes discussing the case with him.
He argues that the pretrial period is a critical stage and
perfunctory consultation violates both the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel, see United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S. Ct.
2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984), and ineffective assistance of
counsel under Strickland.
Relying on Mitchell v. Mason, 257 F.3d
554 (6th Cir. 2001), Brisby argues that his situation constituted
constructive denial of counsel.
His reliance on Mitchell is
misplaced.
In Mitchell, the defendant’s only contact with his
attorney was during court proceedings for a total of six minutes
prior to trial.
Prior to trial, Mitchell wrote several letters
to the trial judge and orally complained about his attorney’s
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failure to consult with him.
In addition, his attorney was
unavailable due to being suspended for a month.
The court held
that these circumstances constituted prejudice per se as a denial
of counsel under Cronic.
It stated, “the pre-trial period
constitutes a ‘critical period’ because it encompasses counsel’s
constitutionally imposed duty to investigate the case.”
Id. at
567.
Unlike Mitchell, Brisby admits having met with his
attorney on four separate occasions where they discussed the
Commonwealth’s plea offers and the risks of going to trial.
In
Mitchell, the court stated, “the undisputed record evidence
demonstrates that Mitchell’s counsel never consulted with him and
that he was completely unrepresented during the entire month
prior to his trial.”
257 F.3d at 574.
In addition, Brisby never
complained about a lack of consultation with his attorney until a
year after pleading guilty and stated at the guilty plea hearing
that he was satisfied with his attorney and had sufficient time
to discuss the case with her.
In other words, the record clearly
refutes his claim of denial of counsel or deficient performance
with respect to this issue.
Additionally, Brisby has failed to show that counsel’s
conduct resulted in actual prejudice.
He alleges that he is
completely innocent of the offense and that counsel failed to
investigate the case.
He provides no valid information
supporting these claims such as exculpatory evidence or useful
information counsel would have discovered through further
investigation.
-7-
Brisby asserts that counsel failed to interview a codefendant, Donald Dunn, who was willing to testify that the third
co-defendant, Gary Caldwell, had falsely implicated him.
However, he also states that Dunn was innocent, when in fact,
Dunn had pled guilty to the charges several months prior to
Brisby’s guilty plea.
Brisby also says that counsel did not
interview Jennifer Sturgill, who would have testified that he was
innocent, but he provides no further information on this witness.
Brisby was severely burned when a methamphetamine lab
exploded.
Gary Caldwell, the other co-defendant also burned in
the explosion, pled guilty and agreed to testify for the
prosecution.
Brisby received a twelve-year sentence on a Class B
felony and a Class C felony under the two indictments, but he was
subject to a possible maximum sentence of thirty years.
The
record clearly refutes a claim that defense counsel rendered
deficient performance that would have reasonably affected his
decision to plead guilty, rather than go to trial.
See, e.g.,
Centers, 799 S.W.2d at 56 (appellant’s ineffective assistance
claim based on lack of investigation and failure to pursue
possible defenses fails for lack of specificity).
In his original RCr 11.42 motion, Brisby argued that
defense counsel was ineffective for not challenging KRS
218A.1432(1)(b) as being unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
A statute is void-for-vagueness under the due process clause if
it does not provide fair notice of prohibited conduct and is
susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Commonwealth v. Kash, Ky. App., 967 S.W.2d 37, 43 (1997)(citing
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 75 L. Ed. 2d
-8-
903 (1983)); Commonwealth v. Foley, Ky., 798 S.W.2d 947, 951
(1990).
The overbreath doctrine prohibits statutes that unduly
penalize constitutionally protected First Amendment rights in an
effort to control impermissible conduct.
See Kash, 967 S.W.2d at
42; Commonwealth v. Ashcraft, Ky. App., 691 S.W.2d 229 (1985).
KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) prohibits the knowing possession of
chemicals or equipment for the manufacture of a methamphetamine
with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine.
The overbreath
doctrine does not apply because this statute does not implicate
constitutionally protected free speech rights.
Furthermore, it
does not violate the void-for-vagueness doctrine because it
provides sufficient notice to ordinary persons of prohibited
conduct and does not encourage arbitrary enforcement because it
is directed at intentional conduct involving the manufacture of
an illegal substance.
Although some ordinary, otherwise legal
compounds, are generally used to manufacture methamphetamine,
prosecution under the statute is limited to situations involving
amounts or combinations of chemicals indicative of use for
production of methamphetamine.
Cf. Commonwealth v. Hayward, Ky.,
49 S.W.3d 674 (2001)(holding combination of common chemicals
evidence of intent to manufacture methamphetamine).
Consequently, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague or
overbroad, and Brisby was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to
challenge it.
In conclusion, Brisby’s complaints of ineffective
assistance of counsel are refuted on the record; therefore, the
trial court did not err in denying his RCr 11.42 motion without a
hearing and without appointing counsel.
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Union Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Christopher F. Polk
Louisville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Kent T. Young
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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