CHRIS ORR; JOHN POHLMAN; DONNA ALLEN; DAVID ALLEN; DEBBY HALL; BILL CAYWOOD; PISGAH HISTORIC NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION; AND HUNTERTOWN ROAD ALLIANCE, AN UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION v. VERSAILLES-MIDWAY-WOODFORD COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT; VERSAILLES-MIDWAY- WOODFORD COUNTY PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION; JACK KAIN; AND STEVE CALLER
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 20, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000341-MR
CHRIS ORR; JOHN POHLMAN;
DONNA ALLEN; DAVID ALLEN;
DEBBY HALL; BILL CAYWOOD;
PISGAH HISTORIC NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION;
AND HUNTERTOWN ROAD ALLIANCE,
AN UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM WOODFORD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL F. ISAACS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00288
v.
VERSAILLES-MIDWAY-WOODFORD COUNTY
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT; VERSAILLES-MIDWAYWOODFORD COUNTY PLANNING AND ZONING
COMMISSION; JACK KAIN; AND STEVE CALLER
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, HUDDLESTON AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Chris Orr, John Pohlman, Donna Allen, David
Allen, Debby Hall, Bill Caywood, the Pisgah Historic Neighborhood
Association, and the Huntertown Road Alliance, an unincorporated
association, (hereinafter collectively referred to as HRA) have
appealed from an order of the Woodford Circuit Court entered on
January 18, 2001.
The trial court rejected all of HRA's claims
and denied its CR1 59.05 motion to alter, amend, or vacate
judgment.
Having concluded that HRA received all the process it
was due under the law and that no prejudicial error occurred, we
affirm.
The facts and procedural history of this case are both
lengthy and complex.
At some time prior to October of 1999, Jack
Kain Ford, Inc., one of the appellees herein, submitted a
development plan to Pattie Wilson, the Woodford County Zoning
Administrator, seeking permission to build an automobile
dealership on the parcel of land which is the subject of this
dispute.
The tract of land had been zoned "B-3 Planned Shopping
Center" since approximately 1971.
Wilson determined that an
automobile dealership would be a permissible use for property
with a B-3 designation and recommended that Kain's development
plan be approved.
HRA appealed that recommendation to the
Versailles-Midway-Woodford County Board of Adjustments, another
one of the appellees herein.
On October 4, 1999, the Board held
a public hearing to consider HRA's appeal.
Several HRA members,
as well as other interested residents from the area, presented
testimony opposing Wilson's recommendation.
At the close of the
hearing, the Board voted unanimously (5-0) to uphold Wilson's
interpretation of the zoning ordinance and her recommendation to
approve the development plan.
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-2-
On October 14, 1999, at a regularly scheduled meeting
of the Versailles-Midway-Woodford County Planning and Zoning
Commission, also one of the appellees herein, the Planning
Commission considered Kain's request to approve its development
plan.
The chairman of the Planning Commission stated at the
outset that it was an open meeting, meaning the public was
welcome to stay and observe, but that it would not be a public
hearing, i.e., there would not be an opportunity for residents to
voice their opposition to the development plan as they had
previously done before the Board.
However, the Planning
Commission did acknowledge that the record contained letters from
those opposed to the development plan, including one from HRA.
A
representative from Kain was present to answer questions from the
Planning Commission regarding the septic system and possible
traffic problems.
Diane Zimmerman, a traffic engineer, also
provided testimony concerning the probable impact on traffic
flow.
At the conclusion of this hearing, the Planning Commission
voted 6-3 to approve Kain's submitted development plan.
On November 3, 1999, HRA filed an "Appeal and
Complaint" in Woodford Circuit Court pursuant to KRS2 100.347 and
KRS 418.040.
HRA's "Appeal and Complaint" named as defendants,
the Board and its members; Jack Kain Ford, Inc.; Jack Kain, as
president of Jack Kain Ford, Inc., and as the applicant seeking
approval of the development plan; and Steve Caller, as the owner
of the parcel of land at issue.
2
HRA filed an amended "Appeal and
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-3-
Complaint" nine days later, adding the Planning Commission and
its members as defendants.
In an order entered on January 5,
2000, the trial court dismissed the "Appeal and Complaint" on the
grounds that HRA had failed to comply with KRS 100.347(4).3
The
trial court ruled that KRS 100.347(4) requires that the owner or
owners of the property in question be named as a party to an
appeal to circuit court.
Since HRA in its appeal had named
Caller as the owner, but had failed to name two other co-owners
of the property, the trial court ruled that HRA had failed to
comply with the statute.
HRA then filed a CR 59.05 motion to alter, amend, or
vacate the January 5, 2000, order, which had dismissed its
action.
On March 7, 2000, the trial court granted this motion
and modified the previous order.
Specifically, the trial court
ruled that while the appeal portion of the action, which had been
brought pursuant to KRS 100.347, had been properly dismissed due
to HRA's failure to name all three owners of the property as
parties, the complaint portion of the action, which had been
brought pursuant to KRS 418.040, should not have been dismissed.
The trial court ruled that HRA's procedural due process claims
under both the United States Constitution and the Kentucky
Constitution could go forward.
3
Judge James C. Cantrill was presiding in this case when the
dismissal order was signed on December 31, 1999. Judge Paul F.
Isaacs succeeded Judge Cantrill in January 2000, and presided
over this case from that point forward.
-4-
The appellees then filed a series of motions, asking
that the trial court grant summary judgment4 on certain issues,
and requesting that HRA’s remaining claims be dismissed for
failure to state an actionable claim.5
Subsequently, in an order
entered on August 2, 2000, the trial court ruled as follows:
1. That factual disputes remained as to
whether Board members had preconceived
opinions concerning the development plan
before the October 4, 1999, hearing began.
Since there was a genuine issue as to a
material fact as to whether HRA had been
denied procedural due process on this issue,
summary judgment was improper.
2. That the record of the October 4, 1999,
hearing clearly refuted HRA's claims that it
had not been afforded the opportunity to make
its position known to the Board. Therefore,
since there had been no procedural due
process deprivation, the trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the appellees on
this issue.
3. That the record clearly refuted HRA's
claims that the Board had denied HRA an
opportunity to present evidence in support of
its position on the proposed development
plan. Since there was no evidence of a
denial of procedural due process, summary
judgment in favor of the appellees was proper
on this issue.
4. That contrary to HRA's claims, the record
showed the Planning Commission did consider
the impact on traffic in the area if the
development plan was approved, and that there
was insufficient evidence before the Planning
Commission that would have warranted a
rejection of the plan on those grounds.
Summary judgment in favor of the appellees on
this issue was therefore proper.
4
CR 56.02.
5
CR 12.03.
-5-
5. That contrary to HRA's claims, the
Planning Commission was not required to
conduct an evidentiary-type hearing before
approving Kain's development plan.
Therefore, summary judgment in favor of the
appellees on this issue was proper.
A bench trial was set for August 4, 2000, for the
parties to present evidence on the sole issue of whether the
Board members had preconceived opinions concerning the
development plan prior to the October 4, 1999, hearing.
The
trial court entered an opinion and order on November 14, 2000,
which included extensive findings of fact and concluded that
while one member of the Board may have had a preconceived
opinion, the other members of the Board did not, and that they
had instead based their decisions only upon the evidence
presented.
The trial court then concluded that HRA had not been
denied procedural due process.
HRA then filed a CR 59.05 motion to alter, amend or
vacate the trial court's order entered on November 14, 2000.
On
January 18, 2001, the trial court denied HRA's CR 59.05 motion
and reaffirmed its prior interlocutory rulings in its March 7,
2000, August 2, 2000, and November 14, 2000, orders.
This appeal
followed.
Before we address HRA's claims of error, we first turn
to the appellees' argument that Judge Cantrill's order entered on
January 5, 2000, was correct in dismissing HRA's entire "Appeal
and Complaint," and that Judge Isaacs subsequently erred by
modifying that order to allow HRA's procedural due process claims
to go forward.
As will be evident from our subsequent
-6-
discussion, we believe Judge Isaacs correctly ruled that HRA's
due process claims could survive the dismissal of the other
claims.
In Board of Adjustments v. Flood,6 our Supreme Court
discussed what is required when appealing from a decision of an
administrative agency:
There is no appeal to the courts from an
action of an administrative agency as a
matter of right. When grace to appeal is
granted by statute, a strict compliance with
its terms is required. Where the conditions
for the exercise of power by a court are not
met, the judicial power is not lawfully
invoked. That is to say, that the court lacks
jurisdiction or has no right to decide the
controversy.
Under KRS 100.347(4), when a party wishes to appeal a decision of
either a board of adjustments or a planning commission, the
statute mandates that:
(4) The owner of the subject property and
applicants who initiated the proceeding shall
be made parties to the appeal. Other persons
speaking at the public hearing are not
required to be made parties to such appeal.
It is not disputed that in its "Appeal and Complaint,"
HRA failed to name all of the owners of the parcel of land which
is the subject of this dispute.
Hence, absent strict compliance
with KRS 100.347(4), the jurisdiction of the circuit court was
not invoked.
HRA was therefore precluded from appealing the
decisions of the Board or the Planning Commission regarding
whether the proposed automobile dealership was a permissible use.
6
Ky., 581 S.W.2d 1, 2 (1978).
-7-
Accordingly, we conclude that the portion of HRA's "Appeal and
Complaint" which sought review of these determinations was
properly dismissed.
However, HRA also claimed it its “Appeal and Complaint”
that it had been deprived of procedural due process under both
the United States Constitution and the Kentucky Constitution,
based on allegations related to how the proceedings before the
Board and the Planning Commission were conducted.
In Greater
Cincinnati Marine Service, Inc. v. Ludlow,7 our Supreme Court
stated:
It is clear that the complaint, judged
by its content, is far more than an appeal
under the aegis of KRS 100.347(2). It
includes a petition for a declaration of
rights, setting out numerous grounds for
relief. Therefore, the requirement that the
planning commission be joined as a party is
applicable only to the part of the complaint
which sought review of the decision of the
Board of Adjustments.
Similarly, HRA's "Appeal and Complaint" not only sought
review of the decisions of the Board and the Planning Commission
pursuant to KRS 100.347, it also set out other grounds for
relief, including a petition for a declaration of rights pursuant
to KRS 418.040.
The appellees argue that HRA's procedural due
process claims "only thinly veil its real objection" which,
according to the appellees, is HRA's disagreement with the
decisions made by the Board and the Planning Commission regarding
7
Ky., 602 S.W.2d 427, 429 (1980).
-8-
Kain's development plan.
We do not agree with the appellees'
characterization.
Our review of HRA's "Appeal and Complaint" reveals that
HRA not only objected to what the Board and the Planning
Commission ultimately decided in approving Kain's development
plan, it also strongly objected to how these administrative
bodies went about reaching those decisions.
Throughout its
"Appeal and Complaint," HRA points to instances in which it
claims that it was denied a fair opportunity to be heard.8
These
constitutional issues are not concerned with the substance of the
results, but rather how the results were reached.
Accordingly,
we agree with Judge Isaacs’s determination that HRA's
constitutional procedural due process claims could survive, even
though the appeals brought pursuant to KRS 100.347 were properly
dismissed.
We now turn to HRA's claims of error.
HRA first
argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in
favor of the appellees on the issue of whether the Planning
Commission was required to conduct a public, evidentiary-type
hearing before approving Kain's development plan.
According to
HRA, the failure of the Planning Commission to conduct such a
hearing deprived HRA of procedural due process.
Before we
address HRA's argument in detail, we will provide a brief
8
See City of Louisville v. McDonald, Ky., 470 S.W.2d 173,
176 (1971) (holding that "procedural due process is required in
the proceedings of an administrative body performing zoning
functions").
-9-
discussion of the proper procedure for reviewing a trial court's
granting of summary judgment.
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."9
In Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose,10
the Supreme Court of
Kentucky held that for summary judgment to be proper the movant
must show that the adverse party cannot prevail under any
circumstances. The Court has also stated that "the proper
function of summary judgment is to terminate litigation when, as
a matter of law, it appears that it would be impossible for the
respondent to produce evidence at the trial warranting a judgment
in his favor."11
The standard of review on appeal of a summary
judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that there
was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.12
There is no
requirement that the appellate court defer to the trial court
9
CR 56.03.
10
Ky., 683 S.W.2d 255 (1985).
11
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky.,
807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991).
12
Scrifres v. Kraft, Ky.App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996).
-10-
since factual findings are not at issue.13
"The record must be
viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion
for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his
favor."14
Applying these principles to the case at bar, we
conclude that summary judgment in favor of the appellees was
proper on the issue of whether a public, evidentiary-type hearing
was required.
HRA makes the following argument in support of its
position that the Planning Commission erred by not conducting an
evidentiary-type hearing:
In the case before the court, the zoning for
the subject property occurred thirty years
ago when Woodford County adopted county-wide
planning and zoning. At that time, there was
no requirement that a conceptual development
plan must be part of a rezoning application.
The requirement for a conceptual development
plan was added to the Woodford County Zoning
Ordinance after the subject property received
the B-3 designation. . . [footnote omitted]
[citation to record omitted].
[W]here a zoning ordinance is amended to add
the requirement of a conceptual development
plan to the rezoning procedure, [ ]
consideration of the legal sufficiency of the
conceptual development plan must follow the
same procedure as with any other aspect of a
rezoning decision, including the requirement
that the conceptual development plan must be
subject to a public hearing.
We are not persuaded by this argument.
13
Goldsmith v. Allied Building Components, Inc., Ky., 833
S.W.2d 378, 381 (1992).
14
Steelvest, supra at 480.
-11-
Although none of the following cases appear to be
directly on point, collectively, the cases lead us to the
conclusion that an evidentiary-type hearing was not required.
In
Danville-Boyle County Planning and Zoning Commission v. Prall,15
our Supreme Court stated:
The application to diminish the green
space buffer zone and to erect a 3,600 square
foot office building thereon is, in effect,
not a request for rezoning or map amendment.
It is to be considered only as an expansion
of activities within the geographical area
which had heretofore been rezoned. Thus,
entitlement to due process is questionable.
We agree with the cogent dissent in the
Court of Appeals opinion which opined that
the Pralls had the only hearing to which they
were entitled when the original zone was
changed from A-1 (agriculture) to C-2
(neighborhood commercial), with the Planned
Unit Development.
The case sub judice presents an analogous situation.
not asking for a rezoning of the land in question.
Kain was
Instead, Kain
was merely presenting a development plan for what was ultimately
found to be a permissible use under the existing zoning
classification.
Therefore, a public, evidentiary-type hearing
was not required.
HRA's reliance on this Court's decision in Davis v.
Board of Commissioners,16 is misplaced.
In Davis, this Court
found error when a planning commission granted a request for
rezoning, without requiring the party to present a proper
15
Ky., 840 S.W.2d 205, 207 (1992).
16
Ky.App., 995 S.W.2d 404 (1999).
-12-
development plan as the local ordinance required.
sub judice, no request for rezoning was made.
In the case
The property had
been zoned B-3 for approximately 28 years; and Kain was merely
attempting to use the land in accordance with that designation.17
Further, in Snyder v. City of Owensboro,18 this Court
stated:
The proposition is generally accepted in
other jurisdictions that a mere
generalization of matters to be considered in
approval of subdivision plats is not
sufficient; there must be rules and
regulations constituting specific standards
to be applied in determining whether approval
is to be granted. And the power of a planning
board to approve or disapprove plats is
limited by those rules and regulations
[citations omitted].
It follows, therefore, that the approval
of subdivision plats is a ministerial act.
That our statute so intends is made obvious
by the provision of KRS 100.281 that the
planning commission may delegate to its
secretary or any other officer or employe[e]
the power to approve plats [emphases
original] [citations omitted].
The appellees herein, OMPC and others,
cite some of our Kentucky cases dealing with
the granting of variances from zoning
regulations. Of necessity, the granting of
variances, based on factors such as hardship,
requires the exercise of some discretion.
That is not so, however, in the determination
of the fact of whether there is a compliance
with regulations, as in the case of approval
of subdivision plats [emphases original].
17
Of course, HRA strongly protests the determination that an
automobile dealership is an appropriate use for property zoned B3; but as discussed previously, this issue was not property
appealed to the circuit court.
18
Ky., 528 S.W.2d 663, 664 (1975).
-13-
Similarly, the approval of a development plan is a ministerial
act, involving only the application of already enacted zoning
laws to a proposed development plan.
Hence, in approving Kain's
development plan, the Planning Commission was not exercising its
discretion, it was merely applying the existing zoning laws to
Kain's submitted development plan.
The Planning Commission’s
action could therefore be characterized as ministerial.
We find
support for this position from at least one prior decision.
In City of Georgetown v. Deevco, Inc.,19 the former
Court of Appeals suggested that in approving a development plan,
a planning commission is generally limited to considering only
whether the proposed development plan is appropriate under the
already existing zoning classifications:
Apparently it is appellants' position that
the Commission has some sort of floating
power to disapprove a land-use plan if in its
opinion traffic problems will be created.
These problems are properly taken into
consideration when the zoning plan is
adopted, but we find no authority granted the
Commission to reconsider them every time a
property owner seeks to use his land in
conformity with the zoning regulations
[emphasis original].
The foregoing cases compel the conclusion that the
Planning Commission was not required to conduct a public,
evidentiary-type hearing before approving Kain's development
plan.
Therefore, we hold that the Planning Commission correctly
reached its decision by examining Kain’s proposed development
plan in light of the zoning laws already in existence.
19
Ky., 451 S.W.2d 422, 424 (1970).
-14-
Accordingly, since there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact concerning the occurrence of a procedural due process
violation, we conclude that the trial court was correct as a
matter of law in awarding summary judgment to the appellees.
HRA next argues that it was deprived of procedural due
process, because some of the Board members had preconceived
opinions on how they were going to vote before the October 4,
1999, hearing was held.
Specifically, HRA argues:
One requirement of due process is an
impartial decision-maker. [HRA] allege[s]
that [it was] denied a fair hearing before
the Board of Adjustments because that Board
was improperly influenced by the person whose
decision was being appealed - and the lawyer
who advised the Zoning [A]dministrator was
also advising the body hearing the appeal and where [HRA] supported that claim with
affidavits that evidence that certain members
of the Board admitted that they voted as they
were told to by the attorney whose advice was
being appealed, [HRA's] allegation of an
unconstitutionally biased decision-maker
should have prevented the circuit court from
granting summary judgment against [HRA]
concerning the conduct of the hearing. . . .
These claims of alleged procedural due process
violations are without merit.
In determining whether the Board
members had preconceived opinions concerning Kain's development
plan before voting, and whether there had been improper influence
on the Board members, the trial court did not grant the appellees
summary judgment.
Instead, the trial court specifically found
that genuine issues of material fact precluded an award of
summary judgment on these issues, and that a bench trial was
therefore necessary to resolve these factual disputes.
-15-
Following
this bench trial, the trial court made numerous findings of fact
and concluded that HRA's procedural due process claims were
without merit.
We hold that the trial court’s findings of fact
were supported by substantial evidence and thus not clearly
erroneous, and that it correctly applied the law to those factual
findings.
In its order entered on November 14, 2000, the trial
court stated that "[a]s a neutral outside observer, this Court is
convinced of the goodwill and dedication of both parties, and
finds no evidence of tampering with or outside influence on the
Board."
The trial court also found that "the members of the
Board, with the possible exception of Mr. Jones, decided this
case based solely on the evidence presented to them at the
hearing and did not decide the case prior to the hearing."
The
trial court reasoned that even if Jones did have a preconceived
opinion on the matter, the result of the vote would have been the
same.20
These findings of fact by the trial court are supported
by substantial evidence in the record and thus not clearly
erroneous, and cannot be set aside.21
Among the evidence presented to the trial court during
the bench trial held on August 4, 2000, was the following:
1. Samuel Dozier, a member of the Board,
testified that his decision to affirm
Wilson's interpretation of the zoning
ordinance was based upon evidence presented
20
As mentioned above, the board's decision to approve Kain's
development plan was unanimous (5-0).
21
See CR 52.01.
-16-
at the hearing, and upon an information
packet provided by Wilson before the
meeting.22 He stated that he would not
hesitate to reject Wilson's interpretation if
the evidence presented at the hearing
warranted it.
2. David Prewitt, a member of the Board,
testified that his decision to affirm
Wilson's interpretation was based on the
evidence at the hearing and the information
packet given to him before the hearing. He
stated that there had been no prior
discussions between the Board members
concerning the matter and that he would
likewise have no problem in rejecting
Wilson's interpretation if the evidence
warranted such a decision.
3. Robert Jackson, chairman of the Board,
testified that his decision was based upon
the evidence at the hearing, materials that
he had reviewed, and the text of the zoning
ordinance. He stated that there had been no
discussions between Board members concerning
this matter before the night of the hearing
and that there was no indication that any
Board member had pre-judged the issue prior
to the hearing.
4. Eugene Borland, a Board member, testified
that his decision was based upon evidence at
the hearing and that he did not believe that
any of the evidence presented warranted a
rejection of Wilson's interpretation. He
stated that there had been no discussions
prior to the hearing between Board members
concerning this matter.
5. Pattie Wilson testified that, in order to
maintain credibility, she "[strove] very
hard" not to influence members of the Board,
and that she did not have discussions with
any Board members concerning this matter
before the night of the hearing.
22
Wilson testified that information packets are given to the
Board members as background factual information so they can come
to the meeting with a clearer understanding of the issues. She
stated that these packets are not intended to influence the
decision of the Board members.
-17-
In light of this evidence, we cannot say that the trial court
clearly erred in finding that the Board members had not been
improperly influenced and that the Board members had not prejudged the appropriateness of Kain's development plan.
There was
substantial evidence presented to the trial court which refuted
HRA's claims that it had been denied an impartial decision-maker.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
ruling that HRA had not been denied procedural due process in
this regard.
HRA next argues that it was denied procedural due
process, because certain evidence at the hearing before the Board
was deemed to be "irrelevant" by the Board's advising counsel.
Specifically, HRA argues:
HRA sought a fair opportunity to prove that
"new and used automobile sales" was precisely
the kind of retail activity permitted in the
B-4 district but not appropriate in other
zones such as a B-3 neighborhood shopping
center... As a result of Mr. Butler's23
advice to the Zoning [A]dministrator, Ms.
Wilson, and as a result of his advice to the
Board of Adjustments before [HRA] was given a
chance to speak, and his repeated advice that
the Zoning Ordinance section on Intent was
not relevant, [HRA] was denied a fair hearing
before the Board of Adjustments.
In its order entered on August 2, 2000, the trial court found
that the record refuted HRA's claims that it had been denied an
opportunity to present relevant evidence, and it granted summary
judgment in favor of the appellees.
We agree that summary
judgment was proper.
23
Timothy Butler was the advising attorney to the Board.
-18-
Our review of the record of the hearing conducted
before the Board on October 4, 1999, shows that contrary to HRA's
claims, it was in fact able to present evidence to the Board
regarding why it believed that an automobile dealership was an
impermissible use in a B-3 zone.
Chris Orr and Jenny Given, both
members of HRA, each spoke at the hearing and presented arguments
to the Board.
Both Orr and Given suggested to the Board that, in
their opinion, the "Intent" section of the zoning ordinance was
relevant and that under their interpretation of the ordinances,
an automobile dealership was an improper use.
We agree with the
following summation made by the trial court in describing the
presentation of evidence at the hearing:
In reviewing [the minutes of the hearing]
quite thoroughly and looking for examples of
[HRA] being denied an opportunity to make
their arguments and to present their position
on this matter, the Court can find no example
where [HRA was] prevented from presenting any
information they desired to introduce or
argue to the Board. There was considerable
give-and-take between the members of the
Board and the representatives of [HRA] about
the nature of the decision to be made, and
what was appropriate for the Board to
consider. It appears to this Court that the
Board was very liberal in allowing as much
information as proper to be presented. The
fact that the information offered by [HRA]
was not considered persuasive by the Board
does not mean that there wasn't an
opportunity to present their side of the
case.
HRA has failed to point to any evidence in the record
which raises a genuine issue as to any material fact in support
of its claim that it was in fact denied an opportunity to present
relevant evidence.
Nor did HRA allege that it needed additional
-19-
time to produce any such evidence.
Once the appellees presented
evidence showing that despite the allegations in HRA's pleadings,
there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, it was
incumbent upon HRA to refute this evidence with evidence of its
own to avoid summary judgment.24
Since HRA failed to do so, we
conclude that summary judgment was proper.
HRA's objections on this issue are more properly
characterized as a disagreement on how the zoning ordinances
should have been interpreted, rather than on how the hearing
itself should have been conducted.
Indeed, HRA devotes a good
portion of its brief to an explanation of why it believes the
"Intent" section of the zoning ordinance was relevant, as well as
to how HRA believes the ordinance should have been interpreted.
However, disagreements with board decisions are properly brought
under an appeal pursuant to KRS 100.347.
As stated earlier, HRA
failed to follow the appeal procedures set forth in KRS 100.347.
The mandates of this statute cannot be circumvented by merely
couching arguments in terms of alleged procedural due process
violations.
Accordingly, we hold that summary judgment was
proper on this issue as there was no genuine issue as to a
material fact and the appellees were entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
Finally, HRA argues that the trial court improperly
granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees on the issue
of whether the Planning Commission wrongfully approved Kain's
24
See Neal v. Welker, Ky., 426 S.W.2d 476, 479 (1968).
-20-
development plan, without considering HRA's argument that traffic
conditions would be made unsafe if the plan were approved.
Specifically, HRA argues:
The circuit court recognized that in
Deevco, the Planning Commission had heard
evidence on the traffic impacts, and that the
Court of Appeals recognized that if there was
evidence that traffic congestion constitutes
a nuisance or a safety factor, that could be
a justifiable reason for denial of the plan.
However, after recognizing that this issue
depended on the weight of the evidence, and
that [HRA] was before the court seeking the
opportunity to present such evidence, the
circuit court proceeded to decide the factual
question, without allowing [HRA] a chance to
present [its] case.
According to HRA, this action by the trial court resulted in a
denial of procedural due process.
We disagree.
In Deevco, supra, discussed above, the former Court of
Appeals discussed what a party would need to show before a
planning commission could deny a property owner lawful use of his
property:
Assuming, however, that the Commission
has some regulatory control over land use in
a zoned area, it cannot deny the right of a
property owner to conduct a lawful business
on his premises which is permissible under
the zoning plan, even if traffic congestion
is increased. Parkrite Auto Park v. Shea, 314
Ky. 520, 235 S.W.2d 986 [(1950)]. In 75
A.L.R.2d 168, 286, many cases are cited for
the proposition that:
"Under most circumstances, the
denial of an application for the
erection or operation of a gasoline
filling station in a zone in which
such use is not forbidden by the
zoning ordinance is regarded as
arbitrary and unreasonable."
-21-
The foregoing cases stand for the
proposition that a property owner has a legal
right to conduct a lawful business which is
permissible under a prevailing zoning
ordinance and he cannot be deprived of that
right except for most impelling reasons
[citations omitted].25
We have already held in this case that a planning commission is
not required to hold a public, evidentiary-type hearing when
approving or rejecting a proposed development plan.
While Deevco
states that there may be some situations which arise where a
planning commission may consider whether an “impelling reason”
exists that would warrant a rejection of an otherwise lawful use,
the record herein does not contain such an impelling reason.
While the Planning Commission at its meeting on October
14, 1999, did consider testimony from a traffic engineer, wherein
she stated that a traffic report showed that any increase in
traffic would be negligible, this information was submitted as a
part of the development plan.
It was proper for the Planning
Commission to consider this additional information in voting on
whether the proposed development plan was permissible under the
zoning laws.
The procedures followed by the Planning Commission
did not fall short of the requirements of constitutional
procedural due process.
The Planning Commission was not required
to conduct an evidentiary-type hearing, and the additional
information provided concerning an increase in traffic was
appropriate as a part of the development plan’s expected impact
on traffic.
25
Deevco, supra at 424.
-22-
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Woodford
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE, VERSAILLES-MIDWAYWOODFORD COUNTY BOARD OF
ADJUSTMENTS AND PLANNING AND
ZONING COMMISSION:
W. Henry Graddy, IV
Midway, Kentucky
Timothy C. Butler
Bardstown, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, JACK KAIN
FORD, INC.:
Shelby C. Kinkead, Jr.
Robert C. Stiltz, Jr.
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE,
JACK KAIN FORD, INC.:
Shelby C. Kinkead, Jr.
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, STEVEN H.
CALLER:
Robert S. Miller
Susan Y. W. Chun
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE,
STEVEN H. CALLER:
Carroll M. Redford III
Lexington, Kentucky
-23-
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