RITA C. GELLHAUS, WINSTON L. SHELTON, AND LAURA S. HALL v. LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION, JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY METROPOLITAN SEWER DISTRICT, DOMINION HOMES, INC., DOMINION HOMES OF KENTUCKY, GP, LLC, DOMINION HOMES OF KENTUCKY, LTD., AND TRIAD DEVELOPMENT/ALTA GLYNE, INC.
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 2, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000325-MR
RITA C. GELLHAUS,
WINSTON L. SHELTON, AND
LAURA S. HALL
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS B. WINE, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 00-CI-003933, 94-CI-002642,
and 96-CI-000926
v.
LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY
PLANNING COMMISSION, JEFFERSON
COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS,
LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY
METROPOLITAN SEWER DISTRICT,
DOMINION HOMES, INC.,
DOMINION HOMES OF KENTUCKY, GP, LLC,
DOMINION HOMES OF KENTUCKY, LTD.,
AND TRIAD DEVELOPMENT/ALTA GLYNE, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART,
AND
REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE: Appellants Rita C. Gellhaus, Winston L.
Shelton, and Laura S. Hall appeal from an opinion and order of
the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing their appeal and civil
complaint.
The appellees are the Louisville and Jefferson County
Planning Commission (Planning Commission); the Jefferson County
Department of Public Works (County Works); the Louisville and
Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD); Dominion
Homes, Inc.; Dominion Homes of Kentucky, GP, LLC; Dominion Homes
of Kentucky, Ltd.; and Triad Development/Alta Glyne, Inc.
We
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Litigation in one form or another between some of the
parties concerning the subject property began in 1994 and has
continued until this date.
We believe it would serve no purpose
to recite the specifics in this regard, and we will state only
the facts relevant in this appeal.
The case involves a proposed subdivision of
approximately 117 acres in southeastern Jefferson County near the
intersection of Billtown Road and Gene Synder Freeway.
The
appellants are adjacent property owners who claim that their
properties will be adversely affected by the subdivision
development.
Specifically, the appellants claim that the
subdivision will have an adverse environmental impact on their
properties because runoff from the development will flow onto
their properties and into their lakes and streams.
In 1992, Triad submitted an “innovative” subdivision
plan to the Planning Commission.
The Planning Commission
approved the plan on April 21, 1994, and litigation between the
parties began.
In 1999, Triad1 proposed a substitute development
1
In July 1999, Triad conditionally sold the property to
Dominion Homes.
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plan.
The substitute plan was a standard development plan rather
than an innovative plan.
The Planning Commission approved the plan on August 19,
1999, by a vote.
The appellants did not appeal the approval
within thirty days after the vote.
See KRS2 100.347(2).
However, the development of the land could not begin
until MSD approved a soil and sedimentation control plan and
until the County Works director approved the construction plan.
The director approved the construction plan on May 18, 2000, and
the appellants filed their appeal and civil complaint in the
Jefferson Circuit Court on June 17, 2000.
The appeal and civil
complaint alleged that the final approval of the construction
plan was arbitrary and that the appellants were denied due
process.3
On August 3, 2000, the developers filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal and civil complaint for lack of jurisdiction
pursuant to CR4 12.02(a).
Citing KRS 100.347(2) and (5), the
developers alleged in their motion that the court did not have
jurisdiction to hear the appeal because it was not filed within
thirty days of the August 19, 1999, subdivision approval.
In
addition, the developers asserted that the civil complaint was
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
3
The appellants’ main complaint with the entire process was
that the Planning Commission’s earlier approval of the innovative
plan required Triad to retain on-site at least the first halfinch of surface water runoff, but the approval of the standard
plan did not include surface water retention basins but only dry
basins.
4
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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indistinguishable from the appeal since it claimed arbitrary
approval of the construction plan and a denial of due process,
issues raised by the appeal of the administrative decision.
The circuit court conducted a hearing and granted the
developers’ motion to dismiss.
An opinion and order was entered
on November 16, 2000, and an order amending the opinion and order
was entered on January 17, 2001.
The basis of the court’s ruling
was that it was without jurisdiction to consider the appeal and
that the civil complaint stated the same grounds as the appeal.
This appeal followed.
The appellants’ first argument is that the circuit
court erred in holding that it was without jurisdiction to hear
the appeal.
KRS 100.347(2) states in relevant part as follows:
Any person or entity claiming to be
injured or aggrieved by any final action of
the planning commission shall appeal from the
final action to the Circuit Court of the
county in which the property, which is the
subject of the commission’s action, lies.
Such appeal shall be taken within thirty (30)
days after such action. Such action shall
not include the commission’s recommendations
made to other governmental bodies. All final
actions which have not been appealed within
thirty (30) days shall not be subject to
judicial review.
KRS 100.347(2).
Further, KRS 100.347(5) states that “[f]or
purposes of this chapter, final action shall be deemed to have
occurred on the calendar date when the vote is taken to approve
or disapprove the matter pending before the body.”
First, the appellants seem to argue that KRS 100.347(5)
applies only to “legislative bodies” as referenced in KRS
100.347(3).
In support of their argument, the appellants contend
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that KRS 100.347(5) uses the word “body” rather than
“commission.”
We disagree with the appellants and hold that KRS
100.347(5) applies to actions of planning commissions as well as
legislative bodies.
We believe the word “body” as used in the
statute refers to other entities, such as planning commissions,
as well as to legislative bodies.
Therefore, KRS 100.347(5)
relates to KRS 100.347(2) as well as KRS 100.347(3).
Next, the appellants argue that the August 19, 1999,
vote by the Planning Commission to approve the developers’
subdivision plan was not a “final action” as that term is used in
KRS 100.347(5).
Rather, the appellants assert that the Planning
Commission conditionally voted to approve the plan and then
referred it to MSD to develop a surface water management plan as
part of a construction plan.
According to the appellants, MSD
was required to return the construction plan to the Planning
Commission for final approval.
The appellants state that the
commission was then required to take “final action” of approval,
which it did through its regulatory designated agent, County
Works.5
KRS 100.347(5) states the definition of “final action”
as, “For purposes of this Chapter, final action shall be deemed
to have occurred on the calendar date when the vote is taken to
approve or disapprove the matter pending before the body.”
See
Leslie v. City of Henderson, Ky. App., 797 S.W.2d 718, 719
5
In explaining this procedure, the appellants have referred
to Commission Subdivision Regulations. No citation to the record
was given, and we have been unable to locate a copy of such
regulations anywhere in the record.
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(1990).
The subject of the Planning Commission’s action was the
approval of the subdivision plan.
Pursuant to KRS 100.347(5),
“final action” occurred on August 19, 1999, the date when the
vote was taken to approve the subdivision plan.
Thus, by not
appealing within thirty days of that date, the matter was not
subject to judicial review.
KRS 100.347(2).
In short, the
circuit court ruled correctly in this regard.
The appellants’ next argument is that the circuit court
erred in dismissing the appellants’ civil complaint seeking
constitutional review.
The circuit court held that its
constitutional review for arbitrariness was subject to KRS
100.347.
On the other hand, the appellants argue that they
sought constitutional review based on arbitrariness of the
administrative acts of MSD, County Works, and the Planning
Commission following the August 19, 1999, approval of the
subdivision plan.
The administrative actions for which the appellants
sought constitutional review for arbitrariness occurred after the
time for filing an appeal of the final action of the Planning
Commission had expired.
Although there appears to be no
statutory appeal of such alleged arbitrary acts, there is an
inherent right of appeal.
See American Beauty Homes Corp. v.
Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission,
Ky., 379 S.W.2d 450, 456 (1964).
Therefore, we conclude that the
trial court erred when it dismissed the appellants’
constitutional claim concerning the actions of MSD, County Works,
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and the Planning Commission following the August 19, 1999,
approval of the subdivision plan.
Citing City of Lyndon v. Proud, Ky. App., 898 S.W.2d
534 (1995), the appellees argue that the ministerial actions
taken by the administrative agencies following the final action
of the Planning Commission are not subject to appeal.
We agree
that the administrative actions subsequent to the approval by the
Planning Commission were ministerial acts.
See Snyder v.
Owensboro, Ky., 528 S.W.2d 663, 665 (1975).
However, “There is
an inherent right of appeal from orders of administrative
agencies where constitutional rights are involved, and section
(2) of the Constitution prohibits the exercise of arbitrary
power.”
American Beauty Homes, 379 S.W.2d at 456.
We know of no reason why ministerial administrative
acts may not be contested as being arbitrary.
For example, see
Wolf Pen v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning Commission,
Ky. App., 942 S.W.2d 310 (1997).
Such ministerial acts may be
challenged on such grounds as the regulations were not followed
or were misinterpreted.
City of Lyndon v. Proud does not convince us to side
with the appellees on this issue.
In that case the court held
that the passing of a resolution rejecting a recommendation of a
planning commission for a zoning change was final on the date it
passed and that the administrative task of approving the minutes
at the following meeting did not affect finality for purposes of
KRS 100.347(5).
Id. at 536.
In the case sub judice the
administrative acts following initial subdivision approval
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involved considerably more than the approval of minutes from the
previous meeting.
Further, appellees urge us to affirm the circuit
court’s dismissal of their complaint as it relates to the appeal
of the later administrative actions because the appellants did
not cite any violation of any regulation by any of the
administrative agencies.
However, the argument overlooks the
fact that the issue before us is whether the trial court erred in
determining that the appellants did not have the right to appeal
the later actions.
The merits of the appeal are not before us;
in fact, the appellants never had the opportunity to argue the
merits of the appeal to the circuit court.
In short, we must reverse and remand the dismissal of
the appeal of the later administrative actions.
We hold that the
developers did have the right to appeal such actions.
However,
it is not for this court but for the circuit court to determine
whether the appeal has any merit or whether it even states
sufficient allegations on its face so as to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
See CR 12.02(f).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, CONCURS WITH RESULT.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART.
This is a troublesome case.
On the one hand, our courts
have consistently held that there is an inherent right of review
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from orders of administrative agencies, regardless of whether
there is an explicit right of appeal, because an agency is
prohibited by Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution from acting
arbitrarily.6
On the other hand, our courts have also
consistently emphasized that one seeking review of administrative
decisions must strictly follow the applicable procedures.
Since
an appeal from an administrative decision is a matter of
legislative grace and not a right, the failure to follow the
statutory guidelines for an appeal is fatal.
The cases
interpreting KRS 100.347 are clear that parties aggrieved by the
actions of a planning commission must bring their grievances to
the appropriate appeals panel, administrative or judicial, in a
timely fashion.7
The legislature has given aggrieved parties 30
days from the planning commission’s “final action” in which to
perfect an appeal.
The first problem is when that final action is deemed
to have occurred in the context of approval of a subdivision
plat.
The peculiar nature of a planning commission’s
“conditional” approval of a “preliminary” subdivision plat
further complicates our analysis.
Indeed, it is not at all clear
the legislature contemplated that the planning commission would
reserve to itself the right to impose conditions subsequent on
its approval.
KRS 100.347(5) defines “final action” to occur on
the calendar date when the vote is taken to approve or disapprove
6
American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson
County Planning and Zoning Commission, Ky., 379 S.W.2d 450, 456
(1964).
7
Taylor v. Duke, Ky. App. 896 S.W.2d 618, 621 (1995).
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the matter pending before the body.
This definition does not
suggest that any further administrative action would take place.
Likewise, KRS 100.277 requires all subdivision plats to receive
planning commission approval. “[N]o plat of a subdivision of land
within the planning unit jurisdiction shall be recorded by the
county clerk until the plat has been approved by the commission
and the approval entered thereon in writing by the chairman,
secretary, or other duly authorized officer of the commission”
KRS 100.277(2).
The language of this statute does not suggest
that the planning commission’s “final” approval would be
conditional.
Nevertheless, I fully agree with the majority that the
planning commission’s final action must be deemed to occur when
it votes to approve the subdivision plat, conditional,
preliminary, or otherwise.
In practice, all plats when initially
submitted are referred to as preliminary.
If such plat is
preliminarily approved, the developer is empowered to implement
the development.
This necessarily includes the submission of
plans to the relevant agencies to show compliance with the
conditions placed upon the approval of the preliminary plat.
The
preliminary plat is the initial hurdle, while the final plat
follows the preliminary plat and complies with it. The
conditional approval of a subdivision plan is the most important
step in the subdivision regulation process.
Final approval of
the amended subdivision plan is a clearly foreseeable consequence
of the granting of tentative approval.
Simply put, there cannot
be two final actions for purposes of KRS 100.347, and therefore
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the right to review should be deemed to have accrued in relation
to the earlier date.
Any other interpretation would allow an
aggrieved party to sit back while the builder and the community
proceed in reliance of the original approval, and seek review of
the granting of final approval.
This conclusion leaves unresolved the even thornier
question of the appropriate remedy.
Furthermore, this is also
where I must depart from the rest of the majority opinion.
Although there is an inherent right to appeal the allegedly
arbitrary ministerial actions, I disagree with the majority that
the “civil complaint” filed by the appellants was sufficient to
bring the issue before the trial court.
The planning commission’s approval of the final plat in
this case was based upon satisfaction of the conditions in its
initial approval.
In turn, that decision was based upon MSD’s
approval of the developer’s soil and sedimentation plan, and the
public works’ director’s approval of the construction plan.
MSD
and the public works director found that the developer’s plans
for controlling surface water runoff were adequate to protect the
water quality on adjacent properties.
But the planning commission did not undertake an
independent review of these findings, nor did it consider whether
these findings were based upon substantial evidence.
Rather, the
planning commission deferred to the expertise of these agencies
to ensure compliance with its conditions.
Indeed, these findings
may well be outside of the scope of the planning commission’s
expertise to review.
Therefore, the property-owner’s appeal
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cannot be said to be taken from the planning commission’s
approval of the final plat.
That action is merely the triggering
event to establish that they have been aggrieved.
The property-
owner’s objections arise from MSD’s and the public works
director’s approval of the developer’s plans, although the
planning commission would be a necessary party to any action
challenging these decisions.
If there is an inherent right to appeal these
ministerial decisions, but they are not subject to review under
KRS 100.347, how then can they come before the court?
The
parties do not refer to any statutory authority for an appeal
from the decisions of MSD or the public works director, nor can I
find any applicable statutory basis for an appeal.8
If there is
an avenue for relief, it could be through a declaratory judgment
action.
KRS 418.040 allows a plaintiff to seek a declaration of
rights when an actual and justiciable controversy exists.9
Such
an action would seem to be the appropriate way of challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence underlying the actions taken by MSD
and the public works director.
We do not need to reach this issue, however, because
the appellants did not bring a declaratory judgment action.
The
property-owners’ appeal pursuant to KRS 100.347 was neither
8
KRS 76.180(2) authorizes MSD to develop procedures for the
hearing, review, and resolution of citizen’s complaints and
grievances. Decisions by the hearing officer may be accepted or
rejected by MSD’s board. However, the approval of a drainage
plan is not the type of action which the statute allows review.
9
Curry v. Coyne, Ky. App., 992 S.W.2d 858, 859 (1998); Bank
One Kentucky NA v. Woodfield Financial Consortium LP, Ky. App.
957 S.W.2d 276, 279 (1997).
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timely nor appropriate, and the appellants’ filing of a civil
complaint is not the equivalent of a declaratory judgment action.
Under the circumstances, therefore, I must conclude that the
trial court properly dismissed the appellant’s complaint, and
that this matter should not be remanded for further proceedings.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
JOINT BRIEF FOR APPELLEES,
APPELLANTS:
TRIAD DEVELOPMENT/ALTA GLYNE,
INC., DOMINION HOMES, INC.,
Richard M. Trautwein
DOMINION HOMES OF KENTUCKY,
Louisville, Kentucky
GP, LLC, AND DOMINION HOMES OF
KENTUCKY, LTD.:
Brian F. Haara
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE,
TRIAD DEVELOPMENT:
Dustin E. Meek
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE,
PLANNING COMMISSION:
Deborah Bilitski
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE,
DOMINION HOMES, INC.:
Ann Toni Kereiakes
Louisville, Kentucky
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