ROSANNE COLEMAN v. LORENZO D. NICHOLS
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 27, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 2001-CA-000150-MR
ROSANNE COLEMAN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE FAMILY COURT
(NOW FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT)
HONORABLE LARRY E. THOMPSON, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-CI-00576
v.
LORENZO D. NICHOLS
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, HUDDLESTON and JOHNSON, Judges.
HUDDLESTON, Judge:
Rosanne Coleman appeals an order of the Pike
Family Court which increased the child support obligation of her
ex-spouse,
Lorenzo
$1,809.00 per month.1
D.
Nichols,
from
$1,500.00
per
month
to
She argues that the circuit court abused its
discretion in failing to consider the statutorily mandated factors
for modification of a child support order, and specifically that
1
Sometime after the instant appeal was taken, the case was
transferred from Pike Family Court to Floyd Circuit Court. The
record does not reveal the reason for this transfer, but it is not
being contested.
the
circuit
court’s
failure
to
find
Nichols
voluntarily
underemployed was an abuse of discretion.
The parties’ marriage was dissolved by Pike Family Court
on September 21, 2000.
Incorporated in the court’s decree was an
award of $1,500.00 per month in child support to be paid by Nichols
to Coleman.
The only factual findings in the decree2 were that the
parties were married on June 16, 1990, their marriage was dissolved
by order entered on February 10, 2000, the parties had amicably
settled “all matters relating to their marriage including the
division of all property, both real and personal,” that such
agreement was not unconscionable, and that Nichols had a gross
monthly income of $15,000.00 while Coleman had a gross monthly
income
of
$10,000.00.
The
court
did
not
make
any
findings
regarding the reasonable needs of the children.
Pursuant to a motion filed by Coleman and following a
hearing, the court, on December 20, 2000, modified Nichols’s
support obligation.
The court’s discussion of its reasons for
modification are contained in the following paragraph:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the
RESPONDENT [Nichols] owes a duty of support to his minor
children [] as outlined in prior orders of this Court.
That
effective
September
1,
2000,
child
support
is
increased to $1,809.00 per month.
2
That is, the only factual findings relevant for present
purposes, although the court made some findings with respect to
division of debts.
-2-
Coleman’s primary argument on appeal is that the family
court abused its discretion in setting Nichols’s increased child
support obligation at $1,809.00 per month.
In cases such as this,
where the combined incomes of the parents exceed the child support
guideline
403.212,
tables
our
codified
function
on
at
Kentucky
review,
as
Revised
explained
Statutes
in
(KRS)
Downing
v.
Downing,3 is as follows:
The child support guidelines set out in KRS
403.212
serve
as
a
rebuttable
presumption
for
the
establishment or modification of the amount of child
support.
Courts may deviate from the guidelines only
upon making a specific finding that application of the
guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate.[4] However,
KRS 403.211(3)(e) specifically designates that “combined
monthly adjusted parental gross income in excess of the
Kentucky child support guidelines” is a valid basis for
deviating from the child support table. Furthermore, the
trial court may use its judicial discretion to determine
child support in circumstances where combined adjusted
parental gross income exceeds the uppermost level of the
guidelines table.[5] The child support table ends at the
$15,000.00
per
month
level,
so
deviation
from
guidelines is clearly appropriate in this case.
3
Ky. App., 45 S.W.3d 449, 454 (2001).
4
KRS 403.211(2).
5
KRS 403.212(5).
-3-
the
Kentucky trial courts have been given broad
discretion in considering a parent’s assets and setting
correspondingly
appropriate
reviewing
should
court
child
defer
to
support.[6]
the
lower
A
court’s
discretion in child support matters whenever possible.[7]
As long as the trial court’s discretion comports with the
guidelines, or any deviation is adequately justified in
writing, this Court will not disturb the trial court’s
ruling in this regard.[8]
However, a trial court’s
discretion is not unlimited.
The test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unsupported by sound legal
principles.[9]
Review of a circuit (or family) court’s order modifying
a child support obligation must begin with the court’s factual
findings to determine whether they are clearly erroneous.
We must
then look to the factors the court considered in reaching its
decision to establish whether the court properly exercised its
discretion.
In this case, the inadequate nature of the family court’s
order precludes us from undertaking a meaningful review.
We are
6
Redmon v. Redmon, Ky. App., 823 S.W.2d 463 (1992).
7
See Pegler v. Pegler, Ky. App., 895 S.W.2d 580 (1995).
8
Commonwealth v. Marshall, Ky. App., 15 S.W.3d 396, 40001
(2000).
9
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, Ky. 11 S.W.3d
575, 581 (2000); Commonwealth v. English, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 941, 945
(1999).
-4-
presented with no factual findings and no discussion of the factors
the court considered in reaching its decision.
Accordingly, we
vacate the order of December 20, 2000, and remand this case to
Floyd Circuit Court for further proceedings.
On remand, the court
must make sufficient factual findings on which to base its decision
and provide a discussion of the factors considered in reaching its
award should it deem a departure from the statutory guidelines
appropriate,
so
that
its
subsequent
order
comports
with
the
requirements of Downing.
With respect to Nichols’s second argument, we note that
a party’s income is not by itself a dispositive factor in setting
child
support.
In
fixing
the
amount
of
child
support,
the
following language from Downing must be considered:
An increase in child support above the child’s reasonable
needs primarily accrues to the benefit of the custodial
parent rather than the children.
In addition, this
approach effectively transfers most of the discretionary
spending
on
children
to
the
custodial
parent.
Furthermore, a strict reliance on linear extrapolation
could
result
in
vast
increases
in
child
unwarranted by the children’s actual needs.
support
Beyond a
certain point, additional child support serves no purpose
but to provide extravagance and an unwarranted transfer
of wealth. While to some degree children have a right to
share in each parent’s standard of living, child support
must
be
set
rationally
in
an
related
amount
to
-5-
the
which
is
realistic
reasonably
needs
of
and
the
children.
This is sometimes referred to as the “Three
Pony Rule.” That is, no child, no matter how wealthy the
parents, needs to be provided with more than three
ponies.10
The order fixing child support is vacated and this case
is
remanded
to
Floyd
Circuit
Court
for
further
proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
JOHNSON, Judge, CONCURS.
GUIDUGLI, Judge, DISSENTS.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jo Ann Harvey
FLOYD COUNTY DIVISION
F CHILD SUPPORT
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
Michael de Bourbon
PRUITT & de BOURBON LAW FIRM
Pikeville, Kentucky
10
Downing, supra, n. 3, at 455.
-6-
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