CENTRAL CONCRETE, INC. v. JENKINS-ESSEX CONSTRUCTION, INC.; MANN CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; AND GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY AND JENKINS-ESSEX CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. CENTRAL CONCRETE, INC.
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RENDERED: AUGUST 9, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000129-MR
CENTRAL CONCRETE, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLY MARK EASTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-01183
JENKINS-ESSEX CONSTRUCTION, INC.;
MANN CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION, INC.;
AND GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLEES
AND
NO.
2001-CA-000168-MR
JENKINS-ESSEX CONSTRUCTION, INC.
v.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLY MARK EASTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-01183
CENTRAL CONCRETE, INC.
CROSS-APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE:
Central Concrete, Inc. (Central) appeals from a
judgment of the Hardin Circuit Court that awarded Jenkins-Essex
Construction, Inc. (Jenkins-Essex) $140,000 after a jury found
Central had been negligent in supplying concrete for a
construction project.
Jenkins-Essex cross-appeals from the trial
court’s denial of its motion for pre-judgment interest.
After
reviewing the record and the arguments of counsel, we affirm.
In early 1997, Jenkins-Essex contracted to serve as
general contractor on a commercial building expansion project for
Ambrake Corporation (Ambrake) that included construction of a
30,000 foot building with a concrete slab floor.
After its bid
was accepted by Ambrake, Jenkins-Essex contracted with Mann
Concrete Construction, Inc. (Mann Concrete), to serve as a
subcontractor for laying and finishing the concrete flooring.
As
part of the project, Jenkins-Essex ordered the necessary readymix concrete from Central, whom they had used as their exclusive
concrete supplier for over 30 years.
The order called for a
concrete mix with a strength of 4,000 pounds per square inch
(psi).
On July 24, 1997, Central supplied 302 cubic yards of
ready-mix concrete in 38 trucks.
Pursuant to instructions from
employees of Mann Concrete, 454 gallons of water was added to 31
of the truckloads at the site in amounts varying from 5 to 35
gallons.1
Sometime in December 1997, personnel at Ambrake noticed
the concrete floor was experiencing delamination, or spalling,
1
Four trucks had 5-7 gallons added, twenty trucks had 10-15
gallons added, and seven trucks had 20-35 gallons of water added
on site. Each truckload contained 8 cubic yards of concrete.
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with chips separating from the surface.
Ambrake notified
Jenkins-Essex of the problem, who also notified Mann Concrete and
Central, both of whom denied responsibility and blamed the other
for the problem.
Ambrake had four core samples taken from
various locations by Law Engineering which indicated corrected
compressive strength levels between 2,200 psi and 2,950 psi and
an average of 2,480 psi.
Ambrake also had two core samples taken
and tested by CTL Engineering, which included both a visual and
petrographic examination.
The samples were found to be air-
entrained concrete with total air void content of 13.8% and 8.1%
and compressive strength of 2,460 psi and 3,800 psi,
respectively.
Jenkins-Essex contacted Greenbaum Associates, a
geotechnical and civil engineering firm, to assist with its
analysis of the problem.
Greenbaum took six additional core
samples, tested them for compressive strength, and performed 49
Schmidt Hammer tests on the concrete near these core samples and
those taken by Law Engineering.
The tests on the floor slab
revealed that 45% of the samples had compressive strength between
1,500 psi and 2,000 psi and 55% had been 2,000 psi and 2,900 psi.
Greenbaum also found a reasonable correlation between the Schmidt
Hammer test results and the compressive strengths of the core
samples.
After negotiating various options, Jenkins-Essex
eventually decided to remove the concrete floor and installed a
new floor in order to satisfy Ambrake’s demand for a floor with a
strength of approximately 4,000 psi.
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Jenkins-Essex’s direct cost
was approximately $162,600.2
In August 1999, Jenkins-Essex filed
a complaint for damages related to the faulty concrete floor
against Mann Concrete and Central3 based on breach of contract,
negligence, and breach of implied warranties.
During trial,
Sandor Greenbaum testified as an expert for Jenkins-Essex and Dr.
J. P. Mohsen testified as an expert for Central.
The jury
rendered a verdict finding Central 100% at fault and awarding
Jenkins-Essex $140,000 in damages.
Central filed motions for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (J.N.O.V.) and
alternatively, a new trial pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure (CR) 50.02 and CR 59.01, which were denied.
Jenkins-
Essex filed a motion for pre-judgment interest, which likewise
was denied by the trial court.
This appeal and cross-appeal
followed.
Central presents three complaints on appeal.
First, it
argues the jury instructions were erroneous with respect to the
level of strength of the concrete Central had a duty to provide
for the floor slab for the Ambrake project.
The court instructed
the jury that while Central was contractually obligated to
provide concrete with a strength of 4,000 psi, delivery of
concrete between 3,500-4,000 psi was within acceptable tolerances
in the construction industry and in order for the jury to find
Central had failed to comply with its duty, the jury had to find
2
At trial, Jenkins-Essex sought recovery of $180,577.54,
which included direct costs, overhead, and profit.
3
The complaint also named Radcliff Concrete, which owned
Central and operated out of the same facilities, and General
Accident Insurance Co. with whom Jenkins-Essex had general
commercial insurance coverage.
-4-
the strength level of the concrete it delivered was less than
3,500 psi.
Central contends that by including this element in
the instructions, the court was erroneously assuming a fact about
which there was disputed evidence,
see, e.g., Kellyguard
Security Services, Inc. v. Church, Ky. App., 576 S.W.2d 228
(1978); Conley v. Foster, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 904 (1960), and that it
gave undue prominence to certain facts, see e.g., Geyer v.
Mankin, Ky. App., 984 S.W.2d 104 (1998); Fields v. Rutledge, Ky.,
284 S.W.2d 659 (1955).
This language was based on testimony from JenkinsEssex’s expert, Sandor Greenbaum, who stated several times that
the construction industry recognizes a 500 psi tolerance in the
strength level for test cylinders and core samples.
He intimated
that this acceptable tolerance account was a margin of error
level for interpreting test results based on statistical variance
methodology.
Central’s expert did not challenge this testimony,
but it points to testimony from Bert Jenkins that the JenkinsEssex/Ambrake contract required a 4,000 psi level for the floor
slab as creating a disputed factual issue.
Even assuming this aspect of the instructions was
erroneous, it is clear that Central was not harmed by any error.
Central mistakenly states this language prejudiced it because the
instructions tended to suggest to the jury that weakening of the
concrete by Mann Concrete’s introduction of water was
“acceptable.”
In fact, the instruction benefitted Central by
requiring the jury to accept a lesser level of strength (3,500
psi) in order to satisfy its legal duty.
-5-
The inclusion of the
tolerance language did not favor Mann Concrete at the expense of
Central because it specifically refers to the strength level of
delivered concrete before any water was added by Mann.
Central’s
position that it was somehow prejudiced because it was not held
to the higher strength level of 4,000 psi as suggested by Bert
Jenkins is counter-intuitive.
Although erroneous jury
instructions are presumed to be prejudicial, the presumption can
be overcome by an affirmative showing that no prejudice resulted
from the error.
S.W.2d 32 (1997).
See generally McKinney v. Heisel, Ky., 947
The inclusion of language in the instructions
allowing a 500 psi tolerance range was favorable to Central,
rather than prejudicial, and was supported by evidence in the
record.
Central contends the trial court should have granted
its motion for mistrial based on alleged inadmissible testimony
by Bert Jenkins in violation of the court’s order excluding
certain evidence concerning other construction projects.
Prior
to trial, the court granted Central’s motion in limine by
“prohibiting [either party] from offering any testimony by or
through any witness of any references to concrete that Central
Concrete, Inc. supplied to any projects or jobs other than the
Ambrake project.”
Bert Jenkins testified on direct examination
in response to a question about why Central was Jenkins-Essex’s
exclusive concrete supplier that he trusted Central and “[w]hen
we had had problems before, they had taken care of their
problems.”
Central objected and moved for a mistrial arguing
Jenkins’ testimony violated the court’s earlier order and that it
-6-
suggested there had been prior problems with the strength of the
concrete supplied by Central.
The trial court denied the motion
but did admonish the jury to decide the case “based only in
evidence pertaining to the Ambrake project.”
A trial court may declare a mistrial based on manifest
urgent or real necessity.
897, 906 (2000).
Gosser v. Commonwealth, Ky., 31 S.W.3d
In Gould v. Charlton Co., Ky., 929 S.W.2d 734
(1996), the court stated:
It is universally agreed that a mistrial
is an extreme remedy and should be resorted
to only when there is a fundamental defect in
the proceedings which will result in a
manifest injustice. The occurrence
complained of must be of such character and
magnitude that a litigant will be denied a
fair and impartial trial and the prejudicial
effect can be removed in no other way. . . .
Mistrials in civil cases are
generally regarded as the most
drastic remedy and should be
reserved for the most grievous
error where prejudice cannot
otherwise be removed.
Id. at 738 (internal citations omitted).
See also Burgess v.
Taylor, Ky. App., 44 S.W.3d 806, 814 (2001).
A trial court has
discretion in deciding whether a particular situation constitutes
sufficient manifest necessity to justify declaring a mistrial.
Id.
It is ordinarily presumed that a jury will follow an
admonition or curative instruction and it will remove any
prejudice caused by an offensive argument unless it appears the
argument was so prejudicial under the circumstances that an
admonition will not cure it.
See Price v. Commonwealth, Ky., 59
S.W.3d 878, 881 (2001); Hayes v. Commonwealth, Ky., 58 S.W.3d
879, 882 (2001).
-7-
The trial court denied the mistrial motion stating the
testimony did not violate the order because it did not clearly
involve the quality of the concrete supplied on other projects
but could have involved other types of problems.
It also felt
any objectionable inference that could have been drawn from
Jenkins’ general reference to “problems” was resolved by the
admonition.
Viewing the entire record, we agree with the trial
court that the testimony was not unduly prejudicial.
It occurred
during questioning on the background description of the parties’
general relationship.
It was generic and did not specifically
address strength deficiencies in the concrete supplied by Central
or that Central had committed similar negligent acts in the past.
Central has not shown the testimony resulted in manifest
injustice.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
deciding the drastic remedy of declaring a mistrial was not
necessary and that any potential prejudice was cured by the
admonition.
Central also maintains that the trial court erred by
failing to grant its motion for a directed verdict based on the
grounds that Mann Concrete’s actions constituted a superceding
cause for Jenkins-Essex’s damages.
It asserts that there was
undisputed evidence that Mann Concrete added at least 454 gallons
to 302 cubic yards of concrete, which would have altered or
weakened the strength of the concrete.
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Central states the only
evidence of the strength of the concrete prior to the addition of
water by Mann Concrete indicates a strength exceeding 4,000 psi.4
“A superceding cause is an act of a third person or
force which by its intervention prevents the actor from being
liable for harm which his antecedent negligence is a substantial
factor in bringing about.”
(1965).
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 440
See also Briscoe v. Amazing Products, Inc., Ky. App. 23
S.W.3d 228, 229 (2000).
In Kentucky, the question of whether an
undisputed act or circumstance is a superceding cause is a legal
issue for the court and not a factual matter for the jury.
Fryman v. Harrison, Ky., 896 S.W.2d 908, 910 (1995)(citing
Montgomery Elevator Co. v. McCulloch, Ky., 676 S.W.2d 776
(1984)).
In NKC Hospitals Inc. v. Anthony, Ky. App., 849 S.W.2d
564, 568 (1993), the court set-out the attributes of a
superceding cause:
1) an act or event that intervenes between
the original act and the injury;
2) the intervening act or event must be of
independent origin, unassociated with the
original act;
3) the intervening act or event must, itself,
be capable of bringing about the injury;
4) the intervening act or event must not have
been reasonably foreseeable by the original
actor;
5) the intervening act or event involves the
unforseen negligence of a third party [one
other than the first party original actor or
4
During trial, Central introduced compressive strength
results conducted by Damon Board, Central’s vice-president, for
Jenkins-Essex on three test samples created at the time the
concrete was delivered that indicated 28 day strength levels of
4,085-4,405 psi.
-9-
the second party plaintiff] or the
intervention of a natural force;
6) the original act must, in itself, be a
substantial factor in causing the injury not
a remote cause. The original act must not
merely create negligent condition or
occasion; the distinction between a legal
cause and a mere condition being
foreseeability of injury.
In House v. Kellerman, Ky., 519 S.W.2d 380, 383 (1974), the court
stated:
If there is no issue as to whether the
act or event actually occurred, whether it
constituted an independent cause superseding
and eliminating the alleged negligence of the
defendant as a legal cause should be
determined by the court. If it was not, or
if reasonable minds could differ on the
question the case should be submitted to the
jury under the usual instructions, leaving it
to the lawyers to argue in their summations
to the jury whether the event in question
played such a major role as to exclude the
defendant’s negligence from being a
“substantial factor” in causing the accident.
(Emphasis added)
An analysis of the evidence indicates that Mann Concrete’s
conduct did not satisfy several of the characteristics of a
superceding cause.
For example, Mann Concrete’s action was not,
itself, capable of bringing about the injury that occurred.
While it is undisputed that the addition of water will weaken
concrete, Greenbaum testified that the total amount of water
added by Mann Concrete was not sufficient to reduce the strength
of the 302 cubic yards of concrete more than 500 psi.
Although
Central’s expert, Dr. Mohsen, criticized some of Greenbaum’s
analysis, he testified that excess water tends to bleed to the
top rather than merely alter the hydration process uniformly,
which suggests that the added water would cause additional
-10-
delimitation more than affect the overall strength of the
concrete.
He declined to give an opinion on the extent the added
water weakened the concrete.
The actions of Mann Concrete also were foreseeable.
In
fact, Central’s delivery truck drivers actually added the water
to the concrete mixture on the trucks at the direction of Mann
Concrete’s employees.
Cf. NKC Hospitals, Inc., supra (negligence
by doctor foreseeable by hospital whose employees knew of
doctor’s actions and defense that nurses merely following orders
of doctor did not excuse hospital).
Additionally, Central’s
drivers knew the exact amount of water being added, so Central
was aware of any alleged negligence by Mann Concrete in adding
excessive amounts of water.
Finally, Central’s position was that
the strength of concrete as delivered exceeded 4,000 psi and that
it was not negligent at all, rather that its negligent was
superceded by Mann Concrete’s negligence in breaking the chain of
causation.
Central has not shown that Mann Concrete’s conduct
constituted a superceding cause as a matter of law.
As a result,
the trial court did not err in failing to grant Central a
directed verdict based on this issue.
On cross-appeal, Jenkins-Essex challenges the trial court’s
denial of its request for approximately $13,918 in prejudgment
interest.
In the leading case on prejudgment interest, Nucor
Corp. v. General Electric Co., 812 S.W.2d 136 (1990), the court
said that prejudgment interest should be awarded as a matter of
course for liquidated damages, while such an award is
discretionary with the trial court for unliquidated damages.
The
court noted that determining whether an amount is “liquidated” is
-11-
not always clear, but it stated in general “‘liquidated means’
[m]ade certain or fixed by agreement of parties or operation of
law.”
Id. at 141 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 930 (6th ed.
1990)).
The trial court held that Jenkins-Essex’s damages were
not liquidated and based on all the circumstances, felt an award
of prejudgment interest would be inappropriate.
Jenkins-Essex contends the damages were liquidated because
the cost to remedy the problem was ascertainable.
It asserts
that the cost to replace the floor was “certainly ascertainable
by referring to the going market rate to perform this type of
work.”
However, Bert Jenkins testified that he had received an
estimated cost to replace the floor from another contractor that
was substantially over $200,000.
Central disputed the damages
claim related to overhead and profit claimed by Jenkins-Essex.
It also alleged contributory fault by Mann Concrete and JenkinsEssex, and the case was submitted to the jury for apportionment
under a comparative fault approach.
Jenkins-Essex’s reliance on
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts §354 and various out-ofstate breach of construction contract cases is misplaced because
this case was submitted to the jury under negligence principles.5
Those cases are also distinguishable given the uncertainty of the
responsibility of the various parties in this case.
We hold that
the trial court did not err in finding that the damages were not
liquidated or abuse its discretion in deciding not to award
prejudgment interest.
5
For instance, performance by Mann, Central, and JenkinsEssex were expressed in terms of “duty” and “ordinary care” and
causation was expressed in terms of “substantial factor.”
Jenkins-Essex did not object to the jury instructions.
-12-
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
Hardin Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Emily A. Faith
O’Bryan, Brown & Toner
Louisville, Kentucky
G. Bruce Stigger
John R. Shelton
Parker & O’Connell PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
David Van Zant
Huddleston & Van Zant
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
-13-
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