JUAN LEDEZMA AND SHERRI ANN LEDEZMA v. RAFORD RAMAGE; LEONA V. RAMAGE; AND RAMAGE LIVING TRUST
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RENDERED: JUNE 14, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000054-MR
JUAN LEDEZMA AND
SHERRI ANN LEDEZMA
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM LIVINGSTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BILL CUNNINGHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00005
RAFORD RAMAGE;
LEONA V. RAMAGE; AND
RAMAGE LIVING TRUST
AND:
APPELLEES
NO. 2001-CA-000055-MR
STEVEN R. BELT AND
CAROLINE A. BELT
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM LIVINGSTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BILL CUNNINGHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00003
RAFORD RAMAGE;
LEONA V. RAMAGE; AND
RAMAGE LIVING TRUST
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, MILLER AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Juan Ledezma and Sherri Ann Ledezma
(hereinafter “Ledezma”), the appellants in appeal No. 2001-CA000054-MR, and Steven R. Belt and Caroline A. Belt (hereinafter
“Belt”), the appellants in appeal No. 2001-CA-000055-MR, have
appealed from the Livingston Circuit Court’s October 4, 2000,
orders dismissing their respective actions and the December 11,
2000, orders denying their motions to vacate the orders of
dismissal.
Raford E. Ramage, Leona V. Ramage, and Ramage Living
Trust (hereinafter “Ramage”) were named as appellees in both
appeals.
Having considered the record, the parties’ briefs, and
the applicable case law, we affirm.
As the sequence of events occurring in these companion
cases is important, we will briefly summarize these events.
January 5, 2000 - Ledezma and Belt file their
respective complaints in Livingston Circuit
Court seeking damages for faulty
construction.
January 13, 2000 - Ramage files answers to
the complaints.
May 18, 2000 - the circuit court
Ledezma’s and Belt’s motions for
relief, schedules a trial second
docket for October 30, 2000, and
the cases for mediation.
denies
temporary
on the
designates
June 19, 2001 - mediation held. Mediator
C.A. Woodall, III, files his report on June
26, 2000, indicating that the parties were
able to agree on a format for repair and
payment for repairs and that “hopefully this
agreement will be reduced to writing and lead
to dismissal of the suit in the near future.”
July 26 and 28, 2000 - counsel for Ramage
serves notices of the depositions of Ledezma
and Belt, files motions for inspection of the
property, and serves interrogatories on trial
counsel.
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August 30, 2000 - counsel for Ramage cancels
depositions scheduled for August 31, 2000, as
the completed interrogatories were not filed
within thirty days and files motions to
compel discovery with the circuit court.
September 11, 2000 - hearing on motions to
compel. Trial counsel for Ledezma and Belt
does not file any response to the motions and
does not appear at the hearing.
September 11, 2000 - circuit court grants the
motions to compel and for inspection, and
orders Ledezma and Belt to comply with the
interrogatory requests by September 13, 2000.
September 26, 2000 - Ramage moves to dismiss
the suits with prejudice for failure to
comply with the discovery requests and for
disregarding the order compelling discovery.
October 4, 2000 - hearing on motions to
dismiss. Trial counsel for Ledezma and Belt
does not file responses nor does he appear at
the hearing.
October 4, 2000 - circuit court grants the
motions to dismiss, citing plaintiffs’
failure to appear in response to motions, to
comply with discovery orders or provide
discovery, or to prosecute the cases in a
timely fashion.
Trial counsel for Ledezma and Belt moved the circuit
court to vacate the orders of dismissal on October 13, 2000.
In
the written motions, counsel first noted that the parties had
reached a settlement at the mediation, but upon receipt of the
interrogatories and discovery requests on July 28, 2000, he
promptly forwarded them to his clients.
His clients were also
prepared to attend the subsequently canceled depositions.
After
receiving the motions to compel and in an effort to conserve
legal expenses, counsel drafted and mailed a letter to his
clients on September 13, 2000, regarding the completion of the
discovery responses.
They did not return the responses prior to
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the filing of the motion to dismiss, and counsel was unable to
respond or appear at the hearing because the motion was received
too late.
He did not provide any other explanation as to why he
was unable to respond or attend the hearing.
Lastly, counsel
stated that he relied upon Ramage’s counsel’s indication that he
would be seeking a continuance in support of his failure to file
the completed discovery responses.
At the hearing on the motions to vacate, trial counsel
primarily argued that because the cases were settled, the
discovery matters were irrelevant.
He argued that the contract
claim had superseded the tort claim when the cases were settled.
Upon questioning by Judge Cunningham, counsel admitted that he
had no excuse for failing to file any responses or to appear at
the motion docket hearings.
In response, counsel for Ramage argued that the cases
were not settled at the mediation, and that plaintiffs’ trial
counsel did not respond to telephone calls or motions nor did he
appear at hearings.
Significantly, trial counsel for Ledezma and
Belt had never moved to enforce the purported settlement
agreement and had not used the claim that the cases had been
settled as an answer to the previously filed motions.
The
circuit court denied the motions to vacate by written order
entered December 11, 2000.
He based this decision on the lack of
response to the motions to dismiss and the subsequent dismissals.
These consolidated appeals, filed and perfected by new counsel,
followed.
-4-
Although it is unclear whether the motions to dismiss
were filed and orders of dismissal were entered pursuant to CR
37.02, dealing with failure to comply with an order, or CR 41.02,
dealing with involuntary dismissals, it is well established in
this Commonwealth that the standard of review in those situations
is whether the trial court abused its discretion.
Midwest Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Wireman, Ky.App., 54 S.W.3d 177 (2001); Ward v.
Houseman, Ky.App., 809 S.W.2d 717 (1991).
Similarly, the
standard of review regarding rulings on motions to vacate is also
abuse of discretion.
Bethlehem Minerals Co. v. Church & Mullins
Corp., Ky., 887 S.W.2d 327 (1994); Schott v. Citizens Fidelity
Bank and Trust Co., Ky., 692 S.W.2d 810 (1985); Fortney v. Mahan,
Ky., 302 S.W.2d 842 (1957).
Therefore, the rulings will not be
reversed unless it is established that the circuit court abused
its discretion in granting the motions to dismiss and denying the
motions to vacate.
Ledezma and Belt rely upon the decision of the Court of
Appeals in Ward v. Houseman, Ky.App., 809 S.W.2d 717 (1991), to
support their argument that the circuit court abused its
discretion.
In Ward, which involved an allegation of medical
malpractice, counsel for the plaintiff furnished the name of the
expert witness months after it was due.
The defendant filed a
motion to limit the plaintiffs’ proof or for a continuance
because of the surprise expert.
The trial court’s ruling on the
motion essentially prevented the plaintiff from relying on any
expert testimony and would not allow her to maintain her claim
beyond the directed verdict stage.
-5-
The plaintiffs’ motion for
reconsideration was denied, and the action was later dismissed by
summary judgment.
This Court reversed, reasoning that the result
was more than the defendant asked for and that the dismissal was
improvident for a one-time dilatory act of counsel without
consideration of alternative sanctions.
Ledezma and Belt urge
this Court to apply the six factors set forth in the Ward case
and hold that the circuit court did not adequately address these
factors in their respective cases.
Ramage, on the other hand, directs our attention to the
case of Jenkins v. City of Lexington, Ky., 528 S.W.2d 729 (1975).
In that case, Jenkins petitioned the circuit court for injunctive
relief in 1972.
After the answer was filed, no further action
was taken until City of Lexington filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of prosecution in 1974.
Although counsel for both sides
signed an order scheduling a hearing on the matter, counsel for
Jenkins did not make an appearance at the hearing.
court later dismissed the action.
The circuit
The former Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision, reasoning that a two year delay in an
action and counsel’s failure to attend the hearing on the motion
to dismiss provided an adequate basis for the circuit court’s
decision.
A review of the record in the present cases clearly
establishes that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion
in dismissing the actions and denying the motions to vacate.
We
agree with Ramage that the Jenkins case more closely matches the
factual pattern in the present cases as trial counsel’s actions
did not constitute a one time dilatory act as did the action of
-6-
the attorney in the Ward case.
Trial counsel for Ledezma and
Belt did not comply with the discovery requests by timely filing
the interrogatory answers and did not comply with the orders
compelling discovery.
In fact, it appears that the discovery
responses have never been filed.
He did not respond in writing
to either the motions to compel or the motions to dismiss, nor
did he appear at the hearings on either of the motions.
It was
clearly within the circuit court’s discretion to grant the
motions to dismiss when no written responses were filed and trial
counsel did not make an appearance to orally respond and voice
any objection to the motions.
Only after the cases had been
dismissed did trial counsel make any action.
For the same reasons, the circuit court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the subsequent motions to vacate.
Both
in the motions and at the hearing, trial counsel did not offer
any type of explanation as to why he did not respond to the
earlier motions, communicate with the court or opposing counsel,
or attend the previous motion dockets, other than the late
receipt of the motions to dismiss.
Because trial counsel failed
to respond or appear at the prior hearings, the circuit court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to vacate.
For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the Livingston
Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS IN BOTH
APPEALS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
William F. McGee, Jr.
Smithland, KY
Brad Goheen
Paducah, KY
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