DANIEL K. DOYLE v. BEVERLY M. MILLER
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 6, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002964-MR
DANIEL K. DOYLE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANIEL A. SCHNEIDER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-FD-001247
BEVERLY M. MILLER
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE, BUCKINGHAM AND GUDGEL, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE:
Daniel K. Doyle appeals from an order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court denying his motion to alter, amend, or
vacate the trial court’s July 5, 2000 order requiring him to pay
one-half of all school-related expenses incurred by his children
that are not attributable to extracurricular activities.
Upon
reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm.
Doyle and Beverly M. Miller were divorced by a decree
of dissolution of marriage entered on July 12, 1994. This
marriage produced two daughters.
At issue in this appeal is the
payment of the children’s school-related expenses.
The parties herein entered into an agreement which was
incorporated into the dissolution decree.
Numerical paragraph
ten of this agreement provides as follows:
10. Commencing in April of 1994, the parties
shall divide equally the tuition or tithing
requirements for the children to attend Our
Lady of Lourdes Parochial School until each
child graduates from said institution. All
other elementary school expenses incurred on
behalf of the children shall be divided
equally, which shall include extracurricular
academic, athletic and summer activities.
In the event the children attend
parochial high schools or attend the college
of their choice, all school-related expenses
shall be divided on a gross income percentage
basis according to the parties’ previous
year’s income tax returns. . . .
In 1998, the parties entered into an Agreed Order
modifying the provision of the above cited paragraph.
Numerical
paragraph five of the 1998 Agreed Order states:
The parties shall pay on a gross income basis
(according to the parties’ previous year
income tax returns) the tuition and
registration costs for each of their
daughters to attend parochial high school and
the college of their choice. . . .
The Respondent no longer has any obligation
to contribute to any extracurricular
academic, athletic, summer activity, or any
other like or similar expense on behalf of
his children. . . .
On May 26, 2002, Miller filed a motion to compel Doyle
to pay for school-related expenses in addition to tuition and
registration costs incurred by their daughters.
Doyle argued
that, pursuant to the 1998 Agreed Order, he has no obligation to
pay for any expenses related to the education of his daughters
other than tuition and registration costs.
-2-
On July 5, 2000, the trial court granted Miller’s
motion and ordered Doyle to pay his share of the children’s
school-related expenses.
In that order, the trial court held:
The Respondent no longer has any obligation
to contribute to any extracurricular,
academic, athletic, summer activity, or any
other like or similar expense on behalf of
his children.
This does not mean “tuition only.” The
Respondent is still obligated to pay one half
of all school related expenses that are not
attributable to “extracurricular, academic,
athletic, or summer activity or any other
like or similar expense.” Those expenses
could be but are not limited to those items
such as books, uniforms, mandatory school
trips, lab fees, etc....
Doyle immediately filed a motion with the trial court
asking that its July 5, 2000 order be altered, amended, or
vacated.
The trial court denied Doyle’s motion, and this appeal
followed.
Doyle argues that the trial court erred by ordering him
to pay a portion of his daughters’ educational expenses that are
incidental to parochial school tuition and registration fees.
He
asserts that the court clearly exceeded its authority when it
rewrote “the unambiguous language of the parties’ August 1998
Agreed Order.”
We disagree.
In its November 14, 2000 order denying Doyle’s motion
to alter, amend, or vacate its July 2000 ruling, the trial court
reasserted that Doyle was not responsible for expenses incurred
by his daughters in the pursuit of extracurricular activities.
However, the court held that the language of the July 2000 Agreed
Order required Doyle to pay for any expenses incurred by his
-3-
children that are directly related to school.
We agree and
construe the second paragraph in numerical paragraph five of the
Agreed Order as amending the original order only to the extent it
relieved Doyle from sharing in the expenses of extracurricular
activities.
The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
B. Mark Mulloy
Louisville, Kentucky
Thomas E. Clay
Louisville, Kentucky
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.