BRUCE A. GRANT v. BARBARA ANN CHILTON HONEYCUTT
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 30, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002868-MR
BRUCE A. GRANT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CLINTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDIE C. LOVELACE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00131
v.
BARBARA ANN CHILTON HONEYCUTT
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND COMBS, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE: Bruce A. Grant appeals from an order of the
Clinton Circuit Court denying his motion to vacate or set aside a
separation agreement entered into by him and Barbara Ann Chilton
Honeycutt in their divorce case.
We affirm.
Grant and Honeycutt met while serving in the U.S. Army
and were married on May 8, 1981.
After becoming pregnant with
their first child, Honeycutt quit the Army.
She apparently never
pursued a long-term career or profession and, instead, maintained
the home and family while Grant was fulfilling his military duty.
During their sixteen-year marriage, Grant and Honeycutt had two
children.
Marital problems arose due to Grant’s infidelity, and
the parties separated on September 3, 1997.
Honeycutt hired an
attorney to effect a divorce, and a divorce petition was filed in
the Clinton Circuit Court on September 16, 1997.
On September
30, 1997, a Waiver of Process and Separation Agreement was filed
in which Grant waived future service of process and he and
Honeycutt settled issues concerning the distribution of assets,
allocation of debts, child custody, and payment of child support
and maintenance to Honeycutt.
On November 19, 1997, an amendment
to the agreement was filed altering the disposition of the
marital residence.
Also on that date, the circuit court entered
a decree of dissolution which incorporated the separation
agreement.
On January 6, 2000, Grant filed a motion to set aside
the separation agreement claiming that it was unconscionable and
the result of undue influence and overreaching.
The parties were
deposed and submitted their depositions as evidence, and the
deposition of Honeycutt’s attorney was also taken and submitted
as proof in the case.
Subsequently, the circuit court entered an
order finding that Grant had failed to show that the separation
agreement was unconscionable or the result of undue influence or
overreaching.
This appeal followed.
Divorce law in Kentucky promotes the settlement of
disputes by agreement and favors stability in such settlement.
Peterson v. Peterson, Ky. App., 583 S.W.2d 707, 711 (1979).
A
party attempting to modify an agreement or have one set aside is
required to meet a “definite and substantial burden.”
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Id.
An
agreement entered “on the basis of fraud, undue influence, or
overreaching” may be set aside as unconscionable.
Id. at 712.
However, an agreement may not be set aside merely because it was
a bad bargain.
Id.
Nevertheless, a severely one-sided or
“lopsided” bargain may be found to be unconscionable.
Sexton, Ky. App., 814 S.W.2d 290, 292 (1991).
Burke v.
“Unconscionable”
has been defined to mean “manifestly unfair or inequitable.”
Shraberg v. Shraberg, Ky., 939 S.W.2d 330, 333 (1997),
quoting Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, Ky., 506 S.W.2d 511 (1974).
Grant’s first argument is that the circuit court erred
in finding that the separation agreement was not manifestly
unfair and inequitable.
In support of his argument, Grant
asserts that the court erroneously determined that Grant had
entered into the agreement because he desired to quickly end the
marriage so that he could marry again.
Grant argues that it was
Honeycutt who immediately sought the divorce upon discovering
Grant’s extramarital affair.
Furthermore, Grant maintains that he misunderstood the
concept of maintenance when he entered into the separation
agreement.
He states that he believed the term “maintenance” to
mean funds used for maintaining the parties’ residence.
He also
complains that the agreement is unconscionable because after the
divorce Honeycutt remarried and began renting out the former
-3-
marital residence.1
He also asserts that Honeycutt was not
entitled to a maintenance award.2
While Grant did not seek separate counsel to represent
him in the divorce action, he was not ignorant of the terms
contained within the agreement.
He read the agreement, and
Honeycutt’s attorney discussed the agreement’s key provisions
with him.
In addition, Grant holds a bachelor’s degree and is
retired from a twenty-two-year military career.
The circuit court determined that Grant was a “highly
intelligent individual” who decided to enter into the agreement
to enable him to quickly end the marriage.
Further, the court
concluded that Grant failed to establish that the agreement was
attained by fraud, undue influence, or overreaching.
Under the
circumstances noted above, we hold that the trial court was not
clearly erroneous in its determinations in this regard.3
Grant’s second argument is that the separation
agreement was so patently inequitable as to be unconscionable.
In other words, he asserts that the terms of the agreement were
so one-sided as to be manifestly unfair and inequitable.
Grant
makes reference to the property he was awarded and the allocation
1
The agreement provided that the marital residence would be
deeded to the parties’ minor children subject to a life estate in
Honeycutt. Grant agreed to assume the mortgage indebtedness of
$121,618. Honeycutt remarried, moved to Indiana, and rented out
the marital residence.
2
Honeycutt, who has since remarried, was awarded $350 per
month for life as maintenance.
3
“[T]he trial court is in the best position to evaluate the
circumstances surrounding the agreement.” Shraberg, 939 S.W.2d
at 333. Its conclusion will not be overturned unless clearly
erroneous. Peterson, 583 S.W.2d at 712.
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of debt as compared to the property Honeycutt was awarded.
The
circuit court found that Grant did not prove that the agreement
was one-sided or so clearly detrimental to Grant’s interest as to
be manifestly unfair or inequitable.
Further, the court
determined that Grant merely accepted a “bad bargain” in order to
quickly exit the marriage and that he “must face the
consequences.”
Again, we cannot say that the findings of the
circuit court were clearly erroneous in this regard.
Finally, Grant argues that insufficient information was
submitted to the circuit court for it to approve the separation
agreement.
As we have noted, the parties submitted their
depositions and the deposition of Honeycutt’s attorney as proof
for the circuit court’s consideration.
When Grant agreed to
submit the case to the circuit court for consideration, he raised
no objection that he had not been given the opportunity to
present proof to support his position.
Further, the court had
adequate evidence upon which to base its decision.
The order of the Clinton Circuit Court is affirmed.
COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURS.
BARBER, JUDGE, DISSENTS BY SEPARATE OPINION.
BARBER, JUDGE, DISSENTING BY SEPARATE OPINION.
I
believe the circumstances of this case fall within the definition
of unconscionable.
Therefore, I would reverse the trial court’s
judgment.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gordon T. Germain
Monticello, Kentucky
Charlie C. Pharis
Monticello, Kentucky
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